When the world's at stake,
go beyond the headlines.

In his 2023 article, “Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa” Raphael Parens discussed what Russia’s mercenary forces in Africa would look like after the war in Ukraine comes to an end. Two years later, we asked him to revisit his analysis in light of the changing face of the Wagner Group and the institutionalization of the mercenary system in Africa.Image: Clément Di Roma via Wikimedia CommonsIn your 2023 article, “Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa,” the Wagner Group was a critical component of your overall argument. Since the Wagner Group (as we knew it) has been disbanded in Africa and largely morphed into the Africa Corps, how does your argument change? There are more players at the table, which fortifies the core argument that the Russo-Ukrainian War would yield significant mercenary operations in Africa because of the surplus of skilled fighters from the conflict. Russia is supporting Africa Corps in conducting the same types of mercenary operations — counter-insurgency, regime protection, resource protection — that the Wagner Group was doing in the past, relying on a mix of Russian mercenaries and local hires, despite the high attrition rates that Russia has suffered during its war in Ukraine. However, the bigger development might be Russia’s competitors, including Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, who are all now involved in private military work in Africa. This involvement spans from Turkey’s SADAT International Defense Consultancy corporation, a private military company modeled after Wagner Group, to the geopolitical rivalry in Sudan between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which has contributed to an elongated and deadlier civil war. Further, Russia is even competing with Ukraine, with reported Ukrainian involvement in Sudan and Mali against Russian private military formations, and