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In December 2022, North Korea dispatched five drones across the demilitarized zone into South Korean territory. One reached as far south as the capital city of Seoul and might have even recorded images of the presidential office. South Korea scrambled fighter jets and attack helicopters but failed to destroy the drones. Although the South Korean military has invested in anti-drone defense capabilities since the incident, counter-drone operations are more difficult and expensive than offensive operations.

In the three short years since the incursion, North Korea’s drone capabilities have rapidly advanced. Thanks to material, technological, and training support from Russia (and indirectly from Iran), as well as modern battlefield experience in Russia’s Kursk oblast, North Korea’s offensive and defensive drone warfare hardware and tactics have become substantially more lethal.

Using media reports, statements from national security officials, testimonies of front-line soldiers, and footage from social media (Telegram), we investigate how North Korean tactics and hardware have evolved, how troops have received training assistance and hardware from Russia, how this technology compensates for North Korean tactical and technological shortcomings, and how these upgrades can help Pyongyang pursue its strategic goals.

North Korean troops fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine have gained tactical experience in modern drone warfare, despite heavy initial losses due to their lack of experience and capabilities. This combat exposure, coupled with substantial Russian technology transfers, is rapidly enhancing North Korea’s drone development and operational tactics. The result will significantly boost North Korea’s military power, amplifying its coercive potential on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. This is a story of ruthless adaptation, technological brinkmanship, and an evolving alliance that could reshape the future of warfare.

Early Struggles

North Korea deployed about 15,000 soldiers to fight against Ukraine inside Russia’s Kursk oblast. Aside from receiving weapons, technology, oil, currency, and other forms of compensation, one of the major advantages of deploying the troops into a modern battlefield was to gain tactical experience and develop technologies and strategies for future contingencies.

Drones play a central role in the Russo-Ukrainian war, accounting for 70–80 percent of casualties on both sides. Inexpensive, adaptable, and quick off the production line, drone warfare is characterized by a cat-and-mouse technological race to see which side can out-maneuver, out-jam, and outsmart their opponent. First, electronic warfare was used to target the drones and then jam-resistant drones began to emerge. Russia then deployed jam-resistant fiber optic cable drones that don’t rely on radio waves. These are now being tracked by Ukrainian mobile radar and destroyed by drone interceptors. For the North Koreans watching, the specific technology is less important than the overall dynamic. They’ve learned that it’s essential to be on the cutting edge when it comes to tech-enabled infantry tactics.

Alongside its troops, North Korea also provided Russia with self-propelled guns, multiple rocket launchers, and ballistic missiles. However, it appears that the Kim regime did not send an accompanying drone component, despite the fact that developing this capability is a top priority for its military modernization efforts. North Korean forces received basic training about drone warfare upon their arrival and had some support from Russian drone operators, yet they were highly vulnerable to Ukrainian drones. For example, in late 2024, a Ukrainian Army drone unit wiped out about 50 North Korean troops who sought in vain to hide behind trees, on the ground, and in the dark of night.

Although casualty rates were high, North Korean soldiers learned fast. They set up forward observation posts to spot drones and broke down platoons into smaller, more agile squads. Specific instructions for counter-drone tactics were found in the diary of a killed North Korean soldier. A hand-drawn diagram revealed how they use a “bait and kill” system to counter Ukrainian drones: One soldier approaches the drone while two wait from hidden positions to shoot it down. Ordered not to be taken alive, the soldier serving as bait clenches a grenade in their neck as a last resort.

Nonetheless, the troops still lacked drone detection and jamming equipment, and therefore struggled to fend the drones off, as demonstrated by this video. Ukrainian artillery and bomber drones took out large groups of North Korean troops (platoons of about 20–30 soldiers) moving together as a pack in a way that Russian troops did not.

Poor communication with Russian forces also played a role. Russia tried to teach North Korean soldiers 100 key military phrases in Russian, but this was too little, too late. In one particular episode, the language barrier contributed to a friendly fire incident in which North Koreans accidentally killed eight Russian allies. Communication improved gradually. According to a captured North Korean soldier, seven Russian officials liaised directly with his company to provide artillery, logistics, wayfinding, and drone reconnaissance support.

Adapting and Counteracting

As demonstrated, jammers and detectors were not standard issue for North Korean troops. However, evidence trickled out revealing that a minority of North Korean units had received some type of electronic warfare capabilities. For instance, after engaging and neutralizing a squad of 13 North Korean troops in February of this year, Ukrainian special operations forces in Kursk discovered one drone detector and one Azart handheld radio in the possession of what appeared to be an officer.

In March, the first evidence of North Koreans using drone jamming guns emerged. In an interview with South Korean lawmaker Yoo Yong-won, a captured North Korean soldier said that his company (100–200 soldiers) had received six drone jamming guns from Russia. Attesting to the cat-and-mouse nature of drone warfare, he said, “At first, the drones fell easily, but it seems the Ukrainians changed the frequency. After that, it didn’t work as well.”

North Koreans underwent training by the Russian military in coordinating combat groups and countering drones, according to a video produced by Russian state media. No jammers or detectors are visible. Instead, the troops wield Vepr-12 shotguns, which have emerged as a popular means of countering drones for both Ukrainians and Russians. A pro-Kremlin media outlet also reported on the training, explaining that the Russian instructors trained North Korean troops to counter drones in squads of 2–3 soldiers without going into further details on drone detection equipment or jammers. The division of labor between Russian and North Korean forces partially explains why the latter’s troops were so lightly equipped for drone defense. For instance, other Russian military sources demonstrate that the main role of the North Korean tactical assault groups is to spearhead territorial acquisition while their Russian counterparts handle drone reconnaissance, support, and logistics.

North Korean troops are proficient at marksmanship but not necessarily astute at differentiating Ukrainian from Russian drones, according to Russian military correspondent Boris Rozhin. The Korean comrades “began to shoot down almost all the drones in the area — both the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ drones, and, let’s face it, ours too. At one point, our guys even tried to change flight routes so as not to fall under the watchful eye of a Korean soldier, because the number of drones shot down had already begun to go off the scale” (translation by the author).

North Korean soldiers played an essential role in helping Russia to recapture Kursk, albeit at a very high human cost of 4,000 casualties. Rozhin said that North Korean forces “took an active part in the assault actions in a number of areas of the Kursk.” He praised the high level of training of North Korean special operations forces. In Kursk, Ukrainian defenders were overrun by Russian bombardments, artillery barrages, and drones coupled with assaults by numerically superior North Korean tactical assault groups. One Ukrainian defender said, “They just sweep us away. We have six men in a position, and the North Koreans come at us in groups of 50.”

Another important component of this advance was Russia’s employment of new drones that use fiber-optic cables instead of radio waves. Operating with 200–300 meters of slack, these drones are resistant to radio jamming. North Korean forces thus witnessed and benefited from a tactical adaptation. Rozhin added that the experience presented “an opportunity to gain unique experience in modern warfare, which will certainly be used in the modernization of the [North Korean] armed forces.”

Another drone-countering tactic the North Korean soldiers learned in Kursk is to use snow and fog for cover. In the early stages of the war, whole North Korean platoons advanced across uncovered terrain, becoming veritable fish in a barrel for Ukrainian drones. But they gradually wised up. In late April, North Korean tactical assault groups supported by Russian marines and infantry allegedly retook the village of Plekhovo in three hours by “taking advantage of bad weather conditions that prevented the enemy from fully using drones,” according to a Russian military correspondent.

Time will tell how effectively the North Korean military operationalizes these lessons. North Korean soldiers could return in large numbers to the fight, possibly in Kursk, or even in the Donbas region of Ukraine, according to Ukrainian officials. If so, it will be noteworthy to observe whether North Korean units are provided with jamming equipment, whether they adapt their infantry doctrine to accommodate drones, and whether they continue to benefit from Russian drone support or if they embed native capabilities and personnel for a trial by combat.

Lethal Technology Transfers

As payment for the deployment of soldiers and arms transfers, Moscow has bestowed Pyongyang with a plethora of benefits, including economic, military, diplomatic, and technological aid. This cooperation has spurred a “common market of autocracies” leading to the joint development and proliferation of lethal technologies among American adversaries. Assistance from Russia has been key to help North Korea pursue its drone development objectives.

North Korean drone designs have a history of imitation. When Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu visited the country in July 2023, North Korea showed off two new drones that appeared to imitate U.S. systems. One model closely resembles the U.S. Reaper attack drone while the other resembles the Global Hawk surveillance drone. However, analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests that these systems “merely mimic the airframes” and likely do not possess “advanced equipment similar to that found in the U.S.” In footage released by North Korean state media, the multi-role drone test fires a missile that appears similar to America’s Hellfire missile and may have been created “with some knowledge of American hardware.” However, the exact capabilities of the platform are unknown and testing, even when advertised on propaganda, does not equal operational deployment.

When Kim Jong Un visited Russia in September 2023, he was presented with a variety of gifts. Among these were five suicide attack drones and one reconnaissance drone provided by Oleg Kozhemyako, governor of the Primorsky region. While the number of these drones is insubstantial, their value lies in their technology. North Korea’s military industrial system is adept at reverse engineering.

In 2024, Kim ordered the “full-scale mass production” of suicide attack drones and also called for the utilization of AI in the drones. He said that “drones are achieving clear successes in big and small conflicts” and that the proliferation of drones “urgently calls for updating many parts of military theory.”

Kim emphasized that drone production and the integration of AI should be a top priority when he oversaw tests of the AI-enabled suicide drones in March of this year. While the operational status and functionality of the AI systems remain unclear, Pyongyang’s quick progress raises questions about possible technological assistance from Russia. Reports have emerged about Russia employing a variant of the Shahed-136 drone outfitted with a jamming resistant antenna and an AI processor capable of “precision terminal guidance onto targets even without GPS.” It uses a Nvidia Jetson Orin high-speed AI mini-computer to “process visual data mid-flight, compare it with preloaded models, and autonomously refine targeting.”

In late 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that North Korea was planning to send workers to Russian military factories, potentially including those that produce suicide drones. This summer, Japanese media outlet NHK reported that North Korea is preparing to send 25,000 workers to a drone manufacturer in Russia to accelerate production “in exchange for training in how to operate the unmanned aircraft.” It’s possible that this could also serve as a means for technology transfers and engineering advisory.

In February of this year, NHK reported that Moscow had agreed to provide Pyongyang with technical assistance for the mass production of multiple types of drones. Around the same time, North Korea dispatched a delegation of aviation officials to Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation’s “Technopark for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” which includes a training center for drone operators. There, they received a briefing about training drone pilots. The North Korean officials also attended an aviation expo containing exhibits on drone technology where they may have been able to make industry connections with suppliers.

Further details about the production agreement emerged this summer. According to a June 2025 interview with Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, commander of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate, Russia is helping North Korea to domestically produce the Garpiya and the Geran, long-range Russian kamikaze drones that are modeled after Iran’s Shahed-126 drone. These drones are an important long range standoff munition for Moscow, which produces thousands per month and employs them regularly to deadly effect in the war against Ukraine. This is also a notable development because it is the first known instance of Iranian-origin weaponry flowing to North Korea — throughout the decades-long illicit arms trade between the two countries, “Iran has been the buyer and North Korea has been the seller,” according to Bruce Becthol.

Russia also provided North Korea with a Pantsir mobile air defense system. The Pantsir is a “more modernized air defense system compared to its current inventory of legacy Russian systems.” In addition to drones, the Pantsir can be used against aircraft, cruise missiles, and precision munitions. Although the report said that “at least one” Pantsir vehicle was supplied, that could open the door to further shipments or Russian technology transfers to enable domestic manufacturing of similar platforms.

A Boost for Pyongyang’s Strategy of Coercion

Pyongyang’s focus on drones reflects the leadership’s confidence that mass producing a variety of drones and outfitting them with the latest technology will significantly amplify its power projection in service of its strategic and political objectives.

Like Russia, North Korea suffers from an outdated air force, weak navy, and difficulty conducting combined arms operations. Both militaries feature massive ground forces, relying on artillery barrages and infantry assaults to grind down adversaries and seize territory. Drones offer a cheap, decentralized solution to some of these problems, providing a long range standoff munition, a powerful reconnaissance tool, export revenue, and compensation for a lack of jointness and a weak air force. Because of this, drones could help support the Kim regime’s strategy of coercion to intimidate its neighbors, extract concessions, and bolster the regime’s military credentials. As Kim’s nuclear weapons program evolves and support from Russia deepens, he may feel emboldened to engage in threats, grey-zone aggressions, and conventional attacks.

North Korea’s leadership has explicitly and frequently singled out drones as an important modernizing force multiplier, emphasizing the development of diverse drone and counter-drone capabilities and combined operations training. Observing one such training session by an electronic warfare unit of the Korean People’s Army, Kim said, “Global military competition increasingly centers on innovative drone technology. The Workers’ Party of Korea has prioritized integrating unmanned systems into our operational plans and military doctrine, continuously refining these capabilities.” Speaking to drone warfare’s asymmetric characteristics, Kim said that the use of drones is expanding in conflicts because of “their low production costs and simple manufacturing processes.” Acknowledging their potential to contribute to a wide set of different contingencies, a commentary in the party-run newspaper Rodong Sinmun said that drones, “have achieved clear results in both large and small-scale conflicts … demonstrating their essential role in modern military demands.”

What are some specific ways that North Korean drones could affect the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula?

First, if North Korea is able to produce effective homegrown versions of the Iranian-Russian suicide drones, the North Korean air force could potentially “hit targets anywhere in South Korea and potentially in huge volumes.” Russia is known to launch hundreds of these drones simultaneously. Massive volleys of the drones, especially if they successfully operationalize AI for dynamic targeting, may be able to “overwhelm the South’s air defenses, paving the way for attacks by other munitions.”

Second, drones fit nicely into North Korea’s strategic prerogatives because they are a powerful asymmetric capability. Just like ballistic missiles and cyber warfare, drones are cheaper to deploy than to defend against. A war of attrition therefore favors the attacker.

Third, drones could provide a badly needed boost to North Korean military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Right now, North Korea has only one moderate resolution imagery satellite in orbit. But the strategic reconnaissance drone could “significantly increase the scope and timeliness of the nation’s situational awareness in and around the Korean Peninsula,” according to analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Fourth, another major weakness of the North Korean military is its air force, which is hamstrung by “aging aircraft, limited operational range, and lack of precision-guided weapons.” To overcome these limitations, the North Korean military is turning to a hybrid doctrine combining manned aircraft with the new drones. In May, the North Korean air force conducted a series of combat exercises integrating manned aircraft with reconnaissance and suicide drones, conducting live fire strikes in multiple terrain conditions at multiple ranges. Two specialized drone units have been created expressly for the purpose of developing drone integration tactics.

Fifth, the deployment to Kursk has provided the North Korean military with precious combat experience in perhaps the world’s most technologically advanced battlefield, accelerating its military modernization efforts. With regard to drones, North Korean military commanders have learned that maintaining an edge in the drone domain requires constant technological adaptation, agile deployment of new capabilities, and integration of electronic warfare units. To complement efforts in drone capabilities development, the Kim regime has also poured resources into training. Last summer, the Korean People’s Army’s five specially designated electronic warfare units engaged in a month-long series of command exercises around the country that included drone-relevant capabilities such as jamming enemy communication networks and real-time reconnaissance using advanced drones. In the winter, electronic warfare units conducted exercises utilizing “combat manuals that analyze drone tactics from the Russia-Ukraine war,” including instances of Russian units using jamming to disable and capture Ukrainian drones. The exercises used real examples of drone and counter-drone operations from the Russo-Ukrainian war, applying them to conditions that North Korean electronic warfare units could expert to encounter on the peninsula.

Sixth, the introduction of drone-enabled forward line of sight has revolutionized infantry tactics and North Korea has had a front row seat to the action. Put simply, drones compress “the time, coordination, and geography required to deliver violent force,” necessitating a total rethink of infantry doctrine. The Korean People’s Army’s early struggle to adapt to a drone-centric battlefield, gradual development of counter-drone tactics, and firsthand view of technological cat-and-mouse competition are all hard-won lessons that will inform its future approach to warfighting.

Last, drones will present a lucrative revenue-earning opportunity for the Kim regime. According to Daily NK, North Korea initiated inspections for drone exports in March of this year. The Kim regime is hoping to earn foreign currency by exporting drones to existing arms clients in the Middle East, Africa, and Russia. To facilitate sanctions evasion, North Korea’s manufacturers have deliberately omitted “country of origin” markings.

The caveat is that North Korea is still developing its drone technology and tactics. It’s unlikely that the North Korean military will deploy next-generation drones and counter-drone capabilities to the battlefield overnight. But their experience in Kursk and technology transfers from Russia have given this mission a dramatic boost.

Conclusion

North Korea’s drone incursion in 2022 was a wake-up call for South Korea and the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Along with plans to beef up its defense spending and drone technology, South Korea has also been working with the United States to counter North Korea’s drone advancements. In March, drones were prominently featured in various wartime simulations during the annual U.S.-South Korean Freedom Shield military exercises. The integration of drone technology in the joint exercises underscores the allies’ commitment to coordinate on addressing the imminent threat posed by North Korea’s quickly advancing drone capabilities.

In addition, South Korea has established a drone command, plans to double the size of its drone fleet by next year, and is developing innovative concepts like a carrier-based combat drone. The United States is also leaning forward with a White House Executive Order and a new Defense Department plan to bolster the drone manufacturing base, “power a technological leapfrog” to arm combat units with advanced yet low-cost drones, and “train as we expect to fight.”

The key dynamic remains the fact that counter-drone systems are expensive to develop and drones themselves are comparatively cheap to produce. Instead of spending millions on missiles to target drones that cost thousands, Rear Adm. Fred Pyle, the director of surface warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff, recommended finding more cost effective ways to counter drones. As two leaders in a wide array of advanced technologies, the United States and South Korea should vigorously pursue methods to maintain a technological edge, adapt doctrine to embrace new technologies, devise innovative methods to quickly scale production, and train together to jointly operationalize emerging drone and counter-drone capabilities and tactics.

Jonathan Corrado is director of policy for The Korea Society. He is also a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an adjunct lecturer at Columbia University.

Chelsie Alexandre is the policy program officer at The Korea Society. She works with the Director of Policy to develop and implement events that address issues shaping the dynamics of U.S.-South Korean relations, the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast Asia.

Anton Ponomarenko is a policy intern at The Korea Society. He previously worked as a policy assistant at the U.N. Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. He holds a Master’s in Regional Studies (East Asia) from Columbia, a BSc in Economics from Fudan University, and is fluent in Russian, Ukrainian, and Chinese.

Image: KCNA Watch