When the world's at stake,
go beyond the headlines.

Some enthusiasts today talk about the probability of the horse becoming extinct and prophesy that the aeroplane, the tank, and the motor-car will supersede the horse in future wars … I am sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse — the well bred horse — as you have done in the past.

-Attributed to British General Douglas Haig

The U.S. military is undergoing the most significant technology-driven transformation in 30 years. As the Army integrates advanced digital technologies across the force today, observers can watch in real-time as units explore, adapt, and — in some cases — resist.

This conflict between legacy systems and modern technology isn’t new. One hundred years ago, armies faced similar debates about the utility of mechanized warfare. Even after tanks proved decisive in World War I, some officers clung to cavalry tactics well into World War II. The U.S. military is now at a similar inflection point — not between steel and horseflesh, but between analog comforts and step change modernization.

Recent efforts to improve “data literacy” can be misunderstood as training computer nerds. In reality, the specific application is unimportant for most leaders. Yes, units need to train on the new systems, but the harder challenge is to develop a culture of critical thinking and analysis. Modern tools simply make it easier to do analysis that could be done in a spreadsheet (or even by hand in some cases). If leaders don’t think critically, their staff won’t either. To become a data-driven force, the Army needs to design training that exercises data systems while challenging leaders in realistic ways to do more than superficial analysis. Together, this will power the digital transformation.

In June, the Army Reserve deployed a small handpicked operational data team to Exercise Mojave Falcon at Fort Hunter Liggett to support the 79th Theater Sustainment Command and 311th Expeditionary Sustainment Command as a pilot effort. The mission was simple but groundbreaking: leverage Reserve talent to give commanders the tools they need to fight and win in high-end conflict .

This was the first time an operational data team had been deployed by the Army Reserve. Our citizen soldiers include many digital experts who are uniquely suited to “accelerate decision making,” a priority of the Army Transformation Initiative. This experiment also explored talent optimization across the total force — another priority.

Having spent years advocating for digital transformation in the military, I was both hopeful and apprehensive. What we discovered confirmed our highest hopes — and our deepest frustrations. The data team pilot created real value in driving operations, especially in logistics optimization. But it also exposed the distance the Army still has to go in building a digitally competent force.

The operational data team pilot was tasked with a focused mission: use data to track and optimize the distribution of food, fuel, and ammunition across a wide area of operations. This logistics use case was chosen because it’s messy, vital, and common across echelons. This is not technology for the sake of technology — an operational data team enables better decision-making. Over 10 days, the team wrangled data pipelines; worked with platforms like Palantir, Tableau, and PowerBI; and produced an array of custom visualizations to support the staff and commander.

Yet the reception from the unit we supported was mixed. Some staff sections eagerly welcomed the support. These leaders understand the new digital paradigm and the capability it provides. Others were less open-minded. One officer put it bluntly: “We can’t be dependent on computers and networks; we just need to get back to map boards and acetate [overlays].” It was a reminder of the work needed to build trust in these new tools. In short, many Army leaders are again riding horses while tanks are transforming warfare.

A Culture Problem, Not a Tech Problem

As noted recently in these virtual pages by Maj. Gen. Patrick Ellis, the Army has made massive investments in communications and data platforms, artificial intelligence, and cloud infrastructure over the last decade. Vantage, cARMY (the Army’s managed cloud computing environment), and the newly released Decision Optimization concepts all reflect a growing institutional commitment to data-driven operations while the Army Software Factory, Artificial Intelligence Integration Center, and other programs highlight human capital investments to most effectively leverage these new capabilities. But culture moves much slower than code (or even policy).

To be clear, none of the resistance we faced at Mojave Falcon was malicious. It was rooted in unfamiliarity and competing priorities. Most often, staff sections had become used to simply reporting status updates and lacked the curiosity to see modeling or dashboards as useful. Our team was shocked when a member of the intelligence section casually briefed: “Sir, we are just calling all routes red because we don’t really see a pattern” and the commander carried on with the brief. If leaders are not asking hard questions, staffs and lower leaders have no reason to dig deeper. Decision optimization only matters if the commander is actually making decisions. If data isn’t driving decisions, leaders should direct their staff to stop toiling for hours merely to “report the news.”

As frustrating as that moment was, the real pain points were much deeper. For example, the simulation data for a sustainment command did not even approach mimicking real-world data. Ammunition was at least broken down by major weapon systems, but hardly the variety and granularity available from Total Ammunition Management Information System. By contrast, the notional data for food and fuel was simplified and aggregated to the point of forcing the staff to spend hours converting it into something approximating real. Running the exercise with static data instead of using the systems of record might be akin to yelling “bang-bang” with a plastic rifle, but this was more like playing pretend with a stick or even drilling with muskets. The mantra has always been: “train as you fight” — the Army needs to look hard at updating training to exercise data science.

Compounding this challenge, many staff simply had not trained on the tools and didn’t want to learn during the exercise. One officer said, “This is great, but I don’t have time to figure out a new tool while we’re trying to execute” and he was half right. The burden is on leaders across the Army — not just the technologists— to meet soldiers where they are and commanders should not accept low-fidelity data when the tools are available. Army leaders would be surprised if the fire direction center was hand-calculating artillery in 2025 and this is no different.

One of our key insights was that data teams should be paired with units that already have some data literacy baseline. Deploying a specialized analytics team to a unit with no digital muscle memory is like assigning a professional strength coach to someone who’s never been to a gym — not a great use of resources.

The second insight was confirmation that pairing technologists with users in the field makes agile development better, but it should not be permanent. Physical co-location with the users increases collaboration and understanding but quickly decreases productivity for the engineers. We recommend a mixed approach of everyone on-site for a kick-off, followed by a small forward team with most engineers working where bandwidth and power are strong and stable. Converge to understand the users’ pain and then iterate delivering product updates as quickly as possible.

Our third conclusion was equally unsurprising: Early in the exercise, we encountered confusion about data governance and security policies. While most personnel knew the basics of classification and access, few even knew who was responsible for managing digital artifacts under joint and Army policy. We realize that this might be less clear because it’s an exercise, but that’s sort of the point: a digital force should be able to request data just as easily as they request ammunition or fuel.

The exercise was run on a classified network with all notional data, but our attempts to export any of that data to unclassified systems — a standard process in many commands — was a proverbial wild goose chase. At each step, the response was: “I can’t approve that, try asking this person” until it finally pointed us back to U.S. Army Reserve Command, which is silly. Rather than work though this, we simply worked around it and took note. As the Army Data Plan and Data Strategy guidance becomes more integrated with Army and joint publications, the Army must exercise the processes and policies and build understanding.

Looking for Allies, Not Converts

Despite these frustrations, there were bright spots. A few staff sections embraced the operational data team wholeheartedly. They sliced their data, wanted to be predictive, and leaned into the new capabilities. These early adopters are future battalion and brigade commanders, chief warrant officers, and sergeants major — they get it. We already expect to be invited to exercises next summer.

Under the Army Transformation Initiative, the imperative of continuously building leaders who are comfortable navigating ambiguity, weighing data against intuition, and seeing technology as an enabler — not a threat — has not changed. Just as yesterday’s leaders learned to trust the engine over the horse, today’s leaders must learn to depend on their algorithms, data, and networks and to build resiliency. Data analytics is just a new tool for the modern observe-orient-decide-act loop.

The Mojave Falcon pilot made one thing clear: Operational data teams work, but only if the institution is ready to use them. The Army doesn’t want every commander to become a data scientist, but leaders must become critical thinkers — to know what questions to ask about data and how to integrate operational data teams into their formations. As part of the initiative’s effort to reduce administrative toil, leaders at all levels should ask (and encourage their staffs to ask) what value a task provides, whether it needs to be provided synchronously, and what format is best for the audience.

More importantly, the Army Transformation Initiative and Transformation in Contact reflect the Army’s top-to-bottom embrace of experimentation and integration of emerging technologies. This is our offset strategy. Leaders —  even those in the Guard and Reserve —  must see every training event as an opportunity for learning and experimentation. Reserve and Guard leaders should ensure this is understood across their teams.

Drive the Tank

We are living in a moment akin to the early 20th century when the U.S. Army was debating whether to stick with horses or embrace mechanization. We should learn from, not repeat, this experience. The transition was not just about platforms, it was about doctrine, training, and mindset.

The horse cavalry didn’t die overnight, and early tanks had many setbacks. The same is true for digital systems. Early tanks ran out of fuel or broke down. Modern communications are troublesome. In both cases, the stakes are high: lives hang in the balance of these systems. But military units that continue to treat data as an afterthought and cling to their analog systems will find themselves outpaced by adversaries who are willing to innovate. The Army is investing in its people and equipping them with the right tools — the only question is whether Army leaders have the institutional will to change. Are you still clinging to the comfort of riding a horse while tanks pass you by?

Jim Perkins is an officer in the Army Reserve and an expert in digital technology in national security. He is assigned to the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve’s Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office and previously served in the Army’s 75th Innovation Command after 11 years of various tactical assignments.

The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Reserve, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government. The appearance of or any reference to any commercial products or services does not constitute an Army or Defense Department endorsement of those products or services.

Image: Candy C Knight via Wikimedia Commons