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For centuries, infantry attacks have begun with a cacophony of eardrum-splitting gunfire. However, today, many engagements are initiated by the unflinching eyes of drones.

Now the ability of infantry to effectively engage targets is no longer limited to human soldiers’ line of sight. While weapon systems such as mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, man-portable rockets, and grenade launchers fired at high angles significantly extended engagement ranges, they still required a human soldier to be present with the weapon system to operate it or needed a forward observer to see, acquire, and coordinate effective fires. What distinguishes drone-enabled infantry is the fusion of sensor and shooter into a single, remotely operated platform. Crucially, the infantry soldier or forward observer no longer needs to be physically near the weapon or the target area, shifting not just engagement geometry but also the risk calculus and tactical flexibility of infantry formations. Drone-enabled infantry has extended the range of contact well beyond visual range. This new sight capability, which can easily extend to 20-kilometer ranges, has decentralized the kill chain and altered the relationship between tactical maneuver forces and fires.

Squads and platoons can now scout and initiate attacks across vast distances. Once reserved for higher headquarters, the ability to see and strike is now organic at the lowest tactical levels.

Much like how indirect fire changed the infantry’s ability to strike targets beyond the range of machine guns, the adoption of drones alters how infantrymen can use force. Platoons that once placed fire within a few hundred meters can now influence areas spanning more than a dozen miles that were previously held by a battalion. Mechanized combined arms warfare dominated engagements in the last century. It seems likely that the ability to integrate tactics with drones in the airspace above friendly formations will be just as important, if not more so, in the next era.

The Air Littoral: The New Key Terrain

Once considered irrelevant to small-unit tactics, the airspace up to 1,000 feet above the battlefield embodies this new concept of an “air littoral.” In Ukraine and elsewhere, gaining access to and control over the low-altitude battlespace is becoming increasingly important for even the most basic battlefield activities.

One reason is that control of the air littoral influences who has the initiative in close combat. Drones used for surveillance and/or as loitering munitions can be quickly repurposed for targeting. When combined with fires, these systems’ persistent visibility allows lower tactical echelons to exert control that far exceeds the ranges of any current direct-fire weapon systems.

The consequences of this shift are important for modern security experts to understand. The integration of drones into infantry formations, down to the squad level, flattens traditional command-and-control kill chains — enabling platoons to contest and control the air littoral. Troop movements, staging areas, command-and-control nodes, and sustainment capabilities have long been vulnerable to artillery strikes when identified by ISR assets under the command of higher headquarters. What is changing today is not the vulnerability but rather who can observe, target, and exploit it. Now, platoons — once dependent on battalion or brigade coordination — can identify, track, and strike targets directly. This new platoon- and even squad-level capability vastly compresses the time, coordination, and geography required to deliver violent force. Once blind beyond its traditional range card, the platoon can now shape the battlefield miles away.

This is a battlefield where visibility equals control and control equals survivability.

Units that lose control over the air littoral will be vulnerable to enemy fire and will be combat ineffective long before they can close with the enemy. Old kill zones existed within the maximum effective range of rifles and machine guns. But today, the new engagement envelope appears to encompass every area that the drone can observe.

From Drone Squad to Bayonet Drone

One way to attack this challenge is to restructure regular infantry platoons into two rifle squads, a weapons squad, and a drone squad. The drone squad, equipped with four larger drones, can be divided into reconnaissance, hunter-killer, counter-drone, and fire coordination roles. This concept still has merit, but it may not be enough for future infantry engagements.

Today, a platoon’s ability to strike targets appears to be increasingly influenced by the number of airborne sensors it can deploy in the air littoral, providing the capability to put eyes in the sky and launch strikes before the enemy can react. Just as the Spanish tercios evolved from pike-dense formations into leaner, firepower-focused units, today’s infantry might want to consider fielding a distributed swarm of sensor shooters. Modern infantry forces may want to ensure that drone capabilities are fielded at the lowest level. Perhaps every soldier should carry a drone, and every rifleman should become a drone operator.

One option, now that at least one American company is producing hundreds of $2,000 first-person view drones per week, could be that every infantry soldier, from the platoon leader to the rifleman, carries a lightweight, deployable “bayonet drone” — a lightweight scout that can be launched in seconds, significantly extending a soldier’s senses beyond his or her immediate line of sight. Using their “bayonet drones,” riflemen can scan rooftops, peek behind walls, clear a trench, or detect an ambush across a valley. Moreover, with a grenade, C-4, or even a shaped charge strapped beneath its belly, it does not just scout: It kills. And the potential of this new lethality has senior leaders from the commandant of the Marine Corps to the secretary and chief of staff of the Army to House Armed Services Committee members increasingly excited to get the capabilities into marines’ and soldiers’ hands.

In this new battlespace, whoever flies more sees more. Whoever sees more can strike faster. Moreover, whoever strikes faster survives. Every platoon should also consider the necessity of organic air littoral defense capabilities and drones for counter-drone missions.

This is not just about acquiring new equipment. It will be important to also train our infantrymen to understand this new instrument of violence. Employing drones should become as instinctive as shooting back at the enemy during the first precious and chaotic moments of a firefight. If adequately equipped, led, and trained, these decentralized, combined small-unit infantry-aviation sensor-strike groups can now themselves deliver violence that before was only achievable by traditional airpower or artillery.

Establishing Air Littoral Dominance

For decades, infantry combat followed a familiar rhythm. Vietnam veterans watching Iraq or Afghanistan recognized the scenes instantly: squads in contact maneuvering through alleys and irrigation canals, taking cover behind walls and boulders, and forming firing lines while waiting for artillery or air support to create the conditions needed for an assault. Despite advances in weaponry and communications, the character of ground combat remained unchanged — constrained by terrain, human eyesight, and the tempo of human movement.

But perhaps that rhythm is changing.

Future infantry engagements for U.S. forces should unfold, much like they are now for squads and platoons across the Ukrainian and Russian militaries, in distinct yet interconnected phases, influencing the character of ground combat. The new firefight begins in the air, not on the ground.

Phase 1: Set Conditions to Get Friendly Drones in the Air and Secure the Air Littoral

The first step of drone-enabled combat begins not on the ground but rather by securing drone dominance in the contested airspace above the platoon. Drone squads should be paired with man-portable anti-drone weapons such as electronic warfare jammers, shotguns, nets, and decoys, and these systems should be used to secure several decentralized launch sites. Soldiers should master drone launch procedures in case they make contact with enemy drones. Platoons must also develop coordination measures that enable drone operators to deconflict flight paths and targets.

Once the launch sites are secure, the first wave of drones to launch will be reconnaissance platforms paired with hunter-killer drones, fanning out to identify enemy drones in the battlespace. Once detected, hunter-killer drones will identify and immediately engage these enemy drones. The forward drone element will then maintain overwatch, preparing to deal with any enemy drone counterattacks.

The platoon that successfully secures this layer of battlespace will have a significant advantage in seizing the initiative and setting the conditions needed to close with the enemy. Failure means leaving the enemy reconnaissance-strike complex with the ability to mass its fires on friendly forces and destroy them before they can even close with the enemy’s ground forces.

Phase 2: Target and Strike the Enemy Infantry Force

Once friendly forces control the littoral airspace, the drones may pivot to engage human targets. Reconnaissance platforms will begin tagging the coordinates of enemy infantry, weapon systems, command nodes, and resupply points. Loitering munitions and first-person view drones will crash into machine gun teams, detonate inside buildings, and strike exposed squads. Drones will also provide coordinates for mortar, artillery, or missile strikes. Simultaneously, friendly drone operators will continue searching for enemy drone operators and reserving platforms to destroy them before they can launch.

This is the attritional phase in which enemy cohesion breaks down well before the friendly human platoon makes visual contact.

Phase 3: Support Human Infantry Movement to Close

With the enemy disrupted and the terrain mapped, the infantry platoon begins its advance. Now, the traditional work of the rifleman starts: maneuver, suppress, and seize. However, drone-enabled infantry can maneuver with a clearer picture, even if it’s not a perfect picture, of the battlespace than ever before. Every alley, every tree line, and every rooftop has been observed from above. Drone overwatch covers the flanks, monitors the ridgelines, and identifies targets in real time. Bounding overwatch becomes a vertical dance, with human fire teams below and drones above.

Humans still finish the fight. However, they now do so under the cover of their own flying eyes — many of which have an assortment of weapons ready to deliver if and when requested.

Phase 4: Actions on the Objective, Consolidation, and Airborne Pursuit

Once the objective is secured, drones remain overhead, scanning for counterattacks, providing overwatch during consolidation, and pursuing withdrawing enemy elements. The pursuit no longer ends at a wall or tree line or because of human exhaustion. It stretches for many kilometers. The withdrawing enemy forces, while safe from direct gunfire, continue to remain at risk of being targeted by friendly drones. Drone pursuit eliminates the need for costly human follow-on attacks and facilitates rapid exploitation of the enemy’s collapse. They may mirror and create small-scale, tactical highways of death not seen since the Gulf War.

Phase 5: Sustainment, Security, and Control of the Littoral

Even after securing the objective, the drones remain airborne. Medics treat casualties while leaders reorganize. Company- and battalion-level drones assist with resupplying and evacuating casualties. However, drones continue to orbit in the air — ready to cue fires, detect reinforcements, or deny enemy drones the opportunity to reenter the airspace. This persistent presence secures the battlespace and establishes conditions for follow-on operations.

Maintaining control of low-altitude airspace will remain an active and continuous mission. Unlike ground combat, airspace cannot be entrenched and seized. Instead, it must be continually fought over and dominated.

The side that can best establish the conditions for persistent control will gain an advantage over forces with only sporadic capabilities to achieve air littoral control. To accomplish this, the United States must adapt and integrate these systems more rapidly, train its soldiers and drones to work together effectively, and foster a command culture that encourages soldiers to recognize and exploit opportunities to fulfill the mission’s purpose as they emerge on the battlefield.

Rewrite the Infantry Manual

It appears that infantry combat has entered an age where striking the enemy is no longer dependent on human eyesight and where a platoon’s reach is measured not in meters but in miles. What was once the exclusive domain of forward observers, attack helicopters, and higher headquarters is now in the hands of rifle squads and junior leaders. The geometry of battle for a platoon equipped with drones is now a three-dimensional landscape, unfolding at distances previously unattainable for ground forces. It is important to note that this change is not only technological but requires a doctrinal evolution as well.

What remains unchanged is the infantry’s core mission: to close with and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver, repel assaults with direct fire, and seize ground through close combat and counterattack. That mission has endured through jungles, cities, deserts, and mountains and will endure into the drone age. Ground forces must still practice fire commands, machine-gun suppression, and mortar integration. The muscle memory of traditional battle drills — refined in blood from Normandy to Mosul to Kunar — cannot be discarded, as they will be needed when drones are attrited. However, those drills and methods must now evolve to survive with the realities of drone integration.

First-person view drones are not merely tools: They are influencing an era of warfare in which every squad acts as a sensor-shooter node, every platoon operates as a precision strike network, and every ridge, rooftop, and tree line can be scouted, scanned, or attacked within seconds. In this new battlespace, line of sight no longer imposes limits or provides sanctuary. This new reality of infantry combat requires a major doctrinal revision.

Perhaps the infantry should begin with the fundamentals, such as Battle Drill 1A: React to Direct Fire Contact While Dismounted. Currently, it instructs squads to return fire, seek cover, and maneuver to eliminate the threat. However, there may be a need to establish a parallel set of actions for drone-integrated units, such as deploying a reconnaissance drone under fire, identifying enemy positions from above, and cuing loitering munitions and other indirect fires to strike. Mastering this new facet of close combat can only enhance the survivability and lethal potential of our formations.

The future infantry platoon might incorporate drone formations and fight alongside them, bleed beside them, and win because of them. Moreover, just as the United States has trained soldiers to fire, maneuver, and survive, there may be a need to prepare machines to do the same.

There might be a need for new drills, formations, and instincts — not just for soldiers but also for the metal warriors hovering on the battlefield.

Victory will belong to those who integrate unmanned systems into the very core of their tactical thinking, not just by issuing drones but by rewriting doctrine.

If the last century of infantry warfare was defined by trenches, machine guns, and mechanization, then the next will be shaped by what happens in the skies just above them. The future belongs to those who can fight — and win — in the air littoral.

Antonio Salinas is an active-duty U.S. Army officer and Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Georgetown University. Following his coursework, he will teach at the National Intelligence University. Salinas has 26 years of military service in the U.S. Marine Corps and Army, where he has served as an Infantry officer, assistant professor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and Strategic Intelligence officer, with operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is the author of Siren’s Song: The Allure of War and Boot Camp: The Making of a United States Marine.

Mark Askew is an active-duty Army officer and military historian. He has over 20 years of military service as an Armor officer, assistant professor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and Army strategist, with operational experience in Iraq. Askew has a Ph.D. in military history at Texas A&M University and currently serves at U.S. Army Futures Command.

Jason P. LeVay teaches joint doctrine at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and is a doctoral student in the Security Studies program at Kansas State University. He earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Washington and holds graduate degrees from Yale University and the National Intelligence University.

The views and opinions presented herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government. The appearance of or any reference to any commercial products or services does not constitute an Army or Defense Department endorsement of those products or services. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute an Army or Defense Department endorsement of the linked websites or the information, products, or services therein.

Image: Midjourney