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In 2022, Luis Simón wrote “America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Runs Through Ukraine” where he argued that a decisive defeat of Russia in Europe would ultimately strengthen America’s ability to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific. With the balance of power still in flux in both regions, we asked him to revisit his assessment.Image: President of UkraineIn your 2022 article, “America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Runs Through Ukraine,” you argued that decisively defeating Russia remains the best way for the United States to compete successfully against China. Given the conflict’s ongoing nature and the Trump administration’s divergent view, how do you assess this thesis? This assumption builds on the concept of strategic sequencing, which is premised on the idea that a great power can avoid a multi-front war by first neutralizing the threat in the secondary theater. That’s what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin may have had in mind when he alluded to the importance of degrading Russian power. However, strategic sequencing only works if the United States can control the timing and outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War, whether or when China decides to attack Asia, and prevent Sino-Russian coordination. For several reasons, including fear of escalation, the Biden administration provided Ukraine with enough support to hold but not to decisively defeat or significantly degrade Russian power, which raises the question of whether Biden was ever fully committed to strategic sequencing. Denying limited operational objectives is not comprehensively defeating Russia. The remarks made by President Biden to his national security advisor, as documented in Bob Woodward’s recent book, War, are symbolic in this sense: “We are stuck. Too much success is nukes, too little success is a kind of uncertain indefinite outcome.” For its part, Russia has demonstrated a high degree of resilience, not least thanks to the support it has received from