Taiwan’s Biggest Limitation in Defense Isn’t Spending, It’s Late Deliveries from U.S. Defense Companies

When it comes to Taiwan, comments from the Trump administration about the island nation increasing its defense budget to up to 10 percent of its annual gross domestic product have been making headlines, but this isn’t the real problem.

Taiwan relies almost exclusively on the United States for arms sales due to its diplomatic constraints. Such sales from the United States are mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979. This reliance renders Taiwan particularly vulnerable to chronic delays and systemic problems in U.S. arms deliveries. Persistent backlogs continue to hamper Taiwan’s defense planning and budgetary momentum — casting a long shadow over even the strongest political and institutional support for arms investment.

If the U.S. government and the defense industry it oversees can’t fix the systemic problems with late deliveries, Taiwan will be left to defend its shores with outdated equipment, including World War II-era artillery.

Escalating Costs of U.S. Arms Delays

Washington is concerned about Taiwan’s inadequate defense spending level, underprepared military, and any possible signs that would show the island’s lack of willingness to fight. However, the repeated delays in weapon delivery are precisely why Taiwan’s defense budget is unable to grow significantly. The weapon no-shows are hurting Taiwanese taxpayers’ confidence in such spending, and it is increasingly difficult for lawmakers to justify them in front of their electorate. Therefore, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has been more cautious with budget review, freezing — but not cutting — the parts that concern U.S. foreign military sales and direct commercial sales that have experienced delays — to track project execution.

Taipei frequently experiences delivery delays of critical military assets purchased from Washington. The $750 million M109A6 Paladin howitzer deal is one example. In 2020, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense prioritized the construction of long-range precision fire, including the procurement of the M109A6 self-propelled howitzer, as detailed in its official statement. The project, proposed via a classified budget, quickly gained the Legislative Yuan’s approval. Yet, In 2022, the Defense Ministry was informed that due to “production line diversion,” the delivery schedule for new artillery would be significantly delayed.

Under the original schedule, the first batch of eight M109A6 self-propelled howitzers was expected to arrive in Taiwan in 2023, followed by 16 units in both 2024 and 2025, completing the full delivery of 40 units by the end of 2025. However, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, delivery has now been delayed to 2026 — and even then, only six units are expected to arrive that year. This marks a delay of more than three years for the overall procurement timeline.

Taiwan’s mechanized infantry still relies on M114 155-millimeter howitzers, first produced in 1942, making them outdated. Limited range and lack of automation have become a significant weakness in the Army’s firepower. Delays further hinder Taiwan’s artillery modernization efforts.

Likewise, the FIM-92 Stinger missiles, initiated by the Ministry of National Defense to address the need for infantry anti-air capabilities, were designated as an “urgent operational requirement” to expedite the project.

The project later underwent price increases and renegotiations, with the quantity purchased increasing from an initial 250 to nearly 2,500. However, Taipei confirmed in 2022 that the deliveries were delayed due to “changes in the international situation.”

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, in its budget review resolution, clearly noted that the timeline for the entire Stinger missile program has been extended through FY2031, with the total budget increased to approximately $2.17 billion. However, it also pointed out that the missiles, launch systems, and identification devices have yet to be delivered — a situation deemed unreasonable. Recent news indicates there may be further delays, forcing the Ministry of National Defense to send delegations to the United States to keep track of progress. It should be noted that some Stinger missiles reported to have arrived in 2023 were sourced through U.S. military aid under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, not as part of Taiwan’s original arms purchase program. (In fact, the Ministry of National Defense has remained deliberately low-key about the specific contents of transfers, so details remain unclear). Therefore, the Stinger missiles purchased through Taiwan’s military budget are still undelivered.

Taiwan’s ability to maintain effective air defense capabilities over the Taiwan Strait is increasingly challenged, and the continued delays in acquiring next-generation fighter aircraft have worsened this imbalance. The first batch of new F-16Vs was originally scheduled for delivery in the fourth quarter of 2023. However, due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions, Taiwan was informed that delivery would be postponed to the third quarter of 2024. As of 2025, no further updates have been provided.

Another ongoing case is the F-16A/B upgrade program, which includes airframe upgrades that have already been completed in 2023. However, certain components — such as the digital radio frequency memory electronic warfare pods and AGM-154C missiles — have been delayed from an original delivery timeline of 2023 to 2026. This program is also one of the cases that saw part of its funding frozen in FY2025.

The same pattern has plagued Taiwan’s Abrams tanks and TOW 2B anti-tank missiles, highlighting a systemic issue in U.S. arms sales execution. These weapons systems were meant to become an immediate deterrent and were continually highlighted by experts as a core element of the porcupine strategy and asymmetric warfare, yet most face delivery delays (the major exception being HIMARS, which were delivered early).

Key Conditions for Legislative Backing

Despite disruptions from the pandemic, the world has long moved out of the shadow of COVID-19, and the Russo-Ukrainian War has become the new normal. These factors no longer justify routine delays in weapons projects, not to mention the fact that most of the purchase of the delayed systems preceded the Russo-Ukrainian War and the COVID-19 pandemic. Even if Ukraine was not directly competing with Taiwan for the same weapon systems, as Jennifer Kavanagh and Jordan Cohen argued, the effects of delays are not evenly felt.

While insufficient investment in the U.S. defense industrial base is a substantial driver of some delays, in the case of the M109A6 Paladin howitzer deal, however, the manufacturer — BAE Systems Inc. — in their response to Taipei’s accusation of its lack of capacity, stated that it had sufficient production capacity to meet Taiwan’s needs and deliver on schedule. Contradicting information and opaque messaging from Washington have confused leaders and stakeholders in Taipei.

Because military expenditure had not translated into improved defense capabilities, repeated reminders and alerts from the Taiwanese equivalent of the Congressional Budget Office have raised public concerns about the central government’s ability to manage military investments and America’s efficiency in arms sales, leading to more stringent budget oversight. The reviews have aimed to ensure the efficiency and accountability of defense spending and procurements.

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan involve complex relationships among governments and arms manufacturers from Taiwan and the United States. Taipei’s policy circle may not have fully grasped the secretive negotiations between power brokers and stakeholders in Washington when arms procurement efforts fall short of expectations. At times, even when the U.S. military recommends a procurement plan to Taipei and Taiwan has allocated the necessary budget, the proposal still fails to secure approval from the State Department or Congress.

For example, Taiwan allocated over $900 million in 2021 to purchase ten MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters, a platform long recommended by the U.S. Navy. The State Department decided not to respond to the request, arguing that the helicopters would not significantly strengthen Taiwan’s defense. Similarly, Taiwan’s planned acquisition of the M109A6 self-propelled howitzers was put on hold after years of negotiation and a formal announcement of approval of the sales by the United States, with U.S. officials later urging a switch to the newer M109A7 variant. More recently, reports indicate that Taiwan may be preparing a new arms request — potentially between $7 billion and US$10 billion — that could include funding for that newer variant. It is now almost certain that Taiwan’s original M109A6 program is set aside due to a shift in U.S. assessments regarding Taiwan’s operational needs, and is now being replaced by a potential M109A7 acquisition.

These cases highlight deeper structural issues: senior officials face limited accountability, there is often a lack of urgency or strategic clarity in prioritizing key sales, and the process itself remains fragmented—without a coherent framework or platform among the Pentagon, State Department, Congress, industry, and partner governments.

Whatever the stated reasons for delivery delays are, including U.S. industrial bottlenecks as Kavanagh and Cohen rightly highlight, less attention is paid to the cascading effects these failed arms procurements have on Taiwan’s internal defense budgeting process. Taiwan must maintain bipartisan political support for defense budgets, and timely delivery is crucial for sustaining public confidence and political consensus. Chronic delays result in public skepticism of a good return on investment and thereby erode legislative trust in procurement, creating a vicious cycle that further slows Taiwan’s defense modernization and the budgets necessary to achieve it.

Despite such concerns among the public, the Legislative Yuan — regardless of party affiliation — has consistently maintained a highly open and supportive stance toward investment in weapons procurement. Newly proposed arms purchases from the United States are rarely, if ever, subject to budget cuts, even when the legislature is notified in only the broadest or most urgent terms.

The only Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales project Taipei cut this year was the “attack drone” project, which involves the purchase of Switchblade 300 and ALTIUS 600M-V, due to alleged U.S. manufacturer price gouging to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. Other defense spending cuts primarily targeted administrative expenses, travel, and publicity costs with low execution rates. In fact, Taiwan’s opposition-led legislature has just approved the largest-ever national defense budget ($14.3 billion — an increase of 8.5 percent from last year). While passing the defense budget has broad political consensus, the public still expects that such spending be both efficient and accountable.

Delays in arms deliveries can hinder increases in Taiwan’s defense budget not merely due to legislative and representative politics. Even if the Legislative Yuan approves funding for weapons procurement, Taiwan’s independent audit body — the National Audit Office of the Control Yuan — also monitors how government spending is carried out. Past audits in 2023 revealed that, out of a total of 419 U.S. arms sales cases, nearly $26.7 billion worth of arms remained undelivered due to delays. These figures show up in the government’s final accounts, which directly affect Taiwan’s ability to secure higher defense budgets in the following year.

Reducing the backlog of undelivered arms is therefore critical for unlocking greater budget support — not only in dealings with legislators, but also when the defense ministry faces auditors or negotiates for more funding within the Taiwanese government during the budget request phase of each cycle.

Overcoming the Backlog Challenge

Change has to start from within. Taipei should strengthen its negotiation skills and demonstrate to its people that it can be a savvy buyer rather than relying solely on the other side’s compliance. Instead of merely reacting to U.S. demands, it needs to adopt a firmer stance in negotiations, actively challenging unfavorable pricing structures, delivery delays, and substandard conditions — while maintaining clear negotiation boundaries.

Specifically, military sales contracts between Taiwan and the United States should be more rigorous, explicitly stipulating delivery conditions and incorporating legal alternatives for obstacles and new conditions. Taiwan’s defense ministry currently lacks an effective mechanism to oversee key aspects of its U.S. arms sales, such as contract execution, project progress, and payments to contractors, but it can be improved. According to the U.S. Department of Defense Security Assistance Management Manual, C6.3.6.1 grants purchasing countries (such as Taiwan) the right to request additional information concerning contract prices. C6.3.6.2 specifies that the release can be considered if the contract is unclassified and only includes requirements for the requesting country. This legal foundation supports a structured framework for regular information exchange, enhancing transparency and efficiency. It is also essential that both legislatures stay informed.

Furthermore, in cases of delayed new equipment deliveries, the U.S. military should at least provide certain stockpiles to Taiwan’s forces for training and doctrine development first. The Biden administration’s use of the Presidential Drawdown Authority in 2023 helped mitigate arms sale delays, but this stopgap approach is unsustainable and not a long-term solution to our defense acquisition strategy.

Most importantly, the United States should revise export limits, streamline arms sales approvals, and improve the underlying evaluation and decision-making processes to ensure consistency, enhance efficiency, and prevent its international partners from receiving contradictory responses. Although all these efforts will require extra effort from the United States, they will effectively allow Taiwan, with sufficient information, to make more self-defense commitments, also easing U.S. defense commitment pressures.

Deliver for Taiwan’s Willingness

Taiwan is more than willing to increase its military spending and allocate more of its budget to arms sales. However, due to its democratic system and societal expectations, Taipei requires U.S. or Pentagon-supervised manufacturers to fulfill their contractual promises. Timely and consistent delivery of military assets will ensure continuous, efficient, and effective purchase of weapons, thus enhancing the island’s defense readiness. Without them, allies’ concerns will turn into frustrations. Amid an increasingly turbulent geopolitical landscape, Taipei will inevitably look to Washington for more arms purchases, but Washington should deliver.

Kevin Ting-Chen Sun is a senior legislative policy advisor to a Kuomintang legislator at the Taiwan Legislative Yuan and a licensed attorney.

Howard Shen was a foreign policy fellow at Taiwan Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee on the Kuomintang staff.

Image: U.S. Army via Wikimedia Commons