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Rewind and Reconnoiter: How Likely Is an Invasion of Taiwan?

February 12, 2025
Rewind and Reconnoiter: How Likely Is an Invasion of Taiwan?
Rewind and Reconnoiter: How Likely Is an Invasion of Taiwan?

Rewind and Reconnoiter: How Likely Is an Invasion of Taiwan?

Amanda Hsiao
February 12, 2025
In 2024, Amanda Hsiao wrote “A Post-Election Risk Assessment for the Taiwan Strait,” which assessed relations and policies between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington ahead of the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. In the wake of leadership change in both Taipei and Washington and continued cross-strait tensions, we invited Amanda back to reflect on her article.Image: Studio Incendo via FlickrIn your 2024 article, “A Post-Election Risk Assessment for the Taiwan Strait,” you wrote about Washington and Beijing’s “shared desire to lower the temperature,” noting that Chinese leader Xi Jinping reportedly denied on multiple occasions that China was planning to invade Taiwan anytime soon. In the year since your article was published, what events have shaped China’s escalatory behavior in the region? Is a projection of power to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te the sole cause of this unprecedented demonstration of maritime strength? Beijing’s escalatory behavior in the past year was — as ever — driven by at least two goals. First, Beijing seeks to deter Taipei and Washington from adopting cross-strait rhetoric and policies that strengthen Taiwan’s de facto autonomy. Beijing believes Lai is a troublemaker secessionist and was never going to make it easy for him, but its suspicions deepened after Lai explicitly described Taiwan as separate and distinct from China — in terms of sovereignty and identity —throughout the first months of his presidency. China’s Joint Sword-2024 military exercises following Lai’s inauguration and national day speeches in May and October were aimed at signaling its opposition to Lai’s rhetoric to both Washington and Taipei, hoping to compel the Lai administration to adopt more conciliatory language on the cross-strait relationship. Since the 2024 U.S. elections, Beijing’s calculus has slightly changed — it has more reasons to adopt a quieter approach toward Taiwan. While China wants to make clear to the Trump administration that Taiwan is one of its red lines, it

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In 2024, Amanda Hsiao wrote “A Post-Election Risk Assessment for the Taiwan Strait,” which assessed relations and policies between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington ahead of the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. In the wake of leadership change in both Taipei and Washington and continued cross-strait tensions, we invited Amanda back to reflect on her article.Image: Studio Incendo via FlickrIn your 2024 article, “A Post-Election Risk Assessment for the Taiwan Strait,” you wrote about Washington and Beijing’s “shared desire to lower the temperature,” noting that Chinese leader Xi Jinping reportedly denied on multiple occasions that China was planning to invade Taiwan anytime soon. In the

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