Turkey, Greece, and Trump

Deliberation and debate across the world continue apace on the question of what Donald Trump’s victory means for global security. In Europe, discussions appear to have already attained a frenetic pitch. Leaders in Brussels and other capitals visibly fret over the possibility that the United States may withdraw its support for Ukraine or perhaps leave NATO altogether. Adding to these worries is the likelihood that the Trump administration may initiate a trade war with the European Union, an act that could lead to further instability. Adding his voice to these concerns is Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. In an interview with Bloomberg, Mitsotakis emphasized the need for Europe to come together to strengthen its “strategic autonomy” and “make sure the European economy becomes more competitive” in the wake of the American election. Nevertheless, Greece’s prime minister was among the first European leaders to congratulate Trump on his success, declaring his desire to deepen “the strategic partnership between our two countries.”

Across the Aegean from Athens, there were far fewer visible signs of apprehension or worry on the night of Trump’s victory. Peruse the X accounts of many of Turkey’s more prominent media personalities and you will find little sorrow or remorse when it comes to Vice President Kamala Harris’ electoral defeat. As the hour approached eleven on election night, CNN Türk’s Washington correspondent tweeted his own sourly curt summation of the day’s results. “Rest in peace, Biden. Trump took his revenge.” Leading the way in embracing the news of Trump’s election was Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In congratulating his “friend” on his triumph, Erdogan expressed his belief that Turkish-American relations would improve and that “regional and global crises and wars, especially the Palestinian issue and the Russia-Ukraine war, will come to an end.”

Look more closely at the coverage and commentary in Greece and Turkey in the days since the election and you will find a far more complex set of reactions. For all the difficulties Europe may encounter with a new Trump administration, editors in Athens see a distinct possibility that Greek-American relations may in fact improve in the coming months and years ahead. Precedents set under the first Trump administration, as well as newer developments, endow many commentators in Greece with this confidence. The view from Turkey is strikingly more mixed. Even though some American commentators have voiced cautious optimism at the possibility of a more cooperative era in Turkish-American relations, editors and pundits have tended to emphasize greater trepidation at what they see as the beginning of a potentially more volatile period ahead. Trump’s second coming, by and large, is not seen as a welcome relief when it comes to issues that matter most to the country’s commentariat. Offsetting this anxiety, however, is a genuine satisfaction with the prospects facing the United States as a global power. Trump’s return to power, as many see it, will weaken Washington and help speed the demise of the West as a global force.

Greece in a New Landscape

There is little doubt among Greece’s commentariat that serious challenges lie ahead for the country as it faces a “new landscape.” Few deny that the core problem before Athens is Europe’s unity and effectiveness in the face of a more combative American president. Increased pressure from Washington on Europe’s largest and wealthier countries, as one observer noted, likely may lead smaller nations, like Greece, to seek stronger bilateral relations with the United States. A weakening European consensus not only would undermine Greek calls for greater “strategic autonomy” among E.U. states, but place the region’s pursuit of economic growth and energy independence at risk. Closer to home, Greek commentators have lamented the potential growth of populists in Europe, a phenomenon that potentially could jeopardize Mitsotakis’ hold on power.

Optimists, however, tend to agree that Athens possesses unique tools and opportunities to weather these strains. Should Washington reduce its involvement in European affairs, one Greek expert proposed policymakers pursue “outside the box” solutions for the benefit of Greece and its partners in Brussels. The country’s large merchant fleet, for example, could serve as a conduit for American natural gas producers seeking to ship to transatlantic customers. Perhaps Greece’s Defense Ministry, together with government development agencies, could find greater avenues of cooperation with the United States.

Regardless of the means, the mood among Greek analysts is generally positive when it comes to the foundations of the country’s relationship with Washington. One insider who spoke with Greek diplomats pointed to a number of important factors aiding Athens, such as the good relationship supposedly shared by Mitsotakis, Trump, and their spouses. Finally, there are the strongly pro-Greek sentiments found in Congress and the surprise appointment of Marco Rubio, who was dubbed the “Republican Menendez” for the comparably pro-Greek attitudes he shares with the former New Jersey senator, Robert Menendez.

Trump and Ankara’s Tempered Hopes

A similar set of positive expectations framed early Turkish reports of the Trump administration’s return. News that several potential American appointees were speaking optimistically about the future of Turkish-American relations received glowing coverage among some Turkish outlets. As in Greece, insiders in Ankara point to the historically good relationship between Trump and Erdogan. Despite the American president’s “personality traits,” one columnist asked readers to not lose heart. “It is good,” he declared, “to have a president in the White House with whom we have direct relations.”

In terms of actual policy agreement, however, it is hard to see how Ankara and Washington will see eye to eye when it comes to the situation in the Levant. As in much of the world, news reporting of Israel’s dual campaign in Gaza and Lebanon has enflamed Turkish public opinion and united the country’s leadership in anger. Both Erdogan’s supporters and antagonists see the establishment of a new Republican administration as a critical turn for the worse for Palestinians. Even though dissenting American Muslims appeared to have helped place Trump in the White House (a fact one columnist posed as the key reason why Harris lost), there is a general agreement that the new American president is more likely to aid, than hinder, ongoing military Israeli operations.

None among Turkey’s most prominent commentators have proposed any policy meant to directly counteract further American support for Israel’s war plans. That does not mean, however, that observers believe Ankara will remain idle. For months, television and print media have promoted the belief that Israel threatens Turkey and its territory, a belief actively supported by Erdogan. Prominent opinion-makers, as well as opposition leaders, have forwarded the possibility that Israel would utilize Kurdish militants as proxies bent upon undermining Turkey from within. Trump’s election, as one columnist recently noted, has only elevated the likelihood that Israel would play its euphemistic “Kurdish card.”

The solution, some have proposed, is to go on the offensive in Syria. “Turkey is determined to clear the Syrian border of the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party],” one insider recently declared. “It has been decided to control our borders to a depth of 30-40 kilometers. Both military and diplomatic pillars of this are being formed. What the Mexican border is for Trump, so is the Syrian border for Erdogan.” Turkish faith in Trump’s willingness to go along with this plan, however, is generally modest. With the announced appointment of Mike Waltz as Trump’s national security advisor, analysts have underscored the congressman’s past support for American joint operations with Kurdish forces in Syria.

Far greater confidence has been expressed in the possibility that Trump’s election signals an end to American support for the Ukrainian war effort. Both Erdogan, and his closest supporters in the press, have expressed hope that the president-elect’s desire to find a settlement to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes Turkey’s participation essential. What Ankara hopes to gain from this participation, however, remains more nebulous. Both Erdogan and media commentators have stated that closer cooperation with the United States on Ukraine could deliver breakthroughs on issues such as Turkey’s eviction from the F-35 program. A United States more focused on competition with China, one columnist noted, could lead to greater American investment in Turkey and greater bilateral trade. Television moderators have even mused that Washington may be enticed into halting military assistance to Greece on the backs of improved Turkish-American relations.

Despite these hopes, however, there is a general air of skepticism within Turkish media. As far back as the day of Lyndon Johnson, one talk show panelist recently declared, every American administration had either disappointed or sought to harm Turkey. The true significance of Trump’s victory, many appear to agree, is that the United States appears visibly weaker.

In advance of election day, Turkey’s most popular news outlets forecasted the possibility that America was heading toward civil war. Talk of the United States descending into chaos continues despite Trump’s victory. Several prominent commentators have expressed more specific hopes that the new administration would lead Washington to conduct a campaign to destroy “the American deep state.” It was this deep state, which critics pose is alternatively made up of military officers, Democrats, and Jews, that was the force that prevented Trump from fulfilling his promise to Turkey to withdraw American troops from Syria. The benefits of a vanquished American deep state, however, appear to exceed the advantage it affords Ankara’s efforts in Syria. The civil unrest such a domestic campaign would invoke is upheld as symbolic of America’s diminishing power on the world stage. Trump’s ascendency, many agree, makes conflict with China more likely. In such an armed contest, commentators tend to agree that Beijing is the most likely to succeed. The sum result of such a scenario, as one columnist recently argued, would constitute the “death announcement of the American Empire.”

Peace in the Aegean? Not Quite Yet

It is unclear how far these opinions reflect the views of Erdogan and his advisors. So far, Erdogan and his surrogates have voiced no apprehensions as to what they expect from a second Trump administration. Nevertheless, the unity of opinion that has emerged since election day gives strong indications as to the prevailing climate in Ankara. And given what is known about the government’s efforts to manufacture consent among the country’s thought leaders, it is likely that the media’s prevailing views are within the bounds of what Erdogan deems acceptable. What this consensus appears to tell us is the degree to which many Turks see conditions getting worse in their region in the months ahead.

Yet amid these misgivings, Turkey and Greece continue to carry forward their mutual commitment to improving ties with one another. Recent foreign ministry meetings between the two countries resulted in warm expressions of mutual respect and understanding. Where talks lead to in the future remains up the air. Although high-level discussions are planned for December and the new year, disagreement over the full scope of these meetings still looms. Speaking among domestic audiences, both sides do not appear willing to compromise on much. Greece, one spokesperson in Athens maintained, is invested in “the continuation of the dialogue.” “Dialogue,” he cautioned, “does not mean retreat. Dialogue means assertion.” In both Ankara and Athens, critics have portrayed talks as pre-emptive steps towards forfeiture of territory or sovereign rights.

These internal misgivings do not yet appear to have caught the attention of Trump’s still nascent administration. Should talks break down, both Greece and Turkey may be left with a United States more distracted by affairs in Asia. Even more likely is the prospect that neither state fully trusts Washington with providing mediation on issues that separate the two capitals.

Ryan Gingeras is a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history. He is the author of seven books, including the forthcoming Mafia: A Global History (due out with Simon & Schuster in July 2025). His Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire received short-list distinctions for the Rothschild Book Prize in Nationalism and Ethnic Studies and the British-Kuwait Friendship Society Book Prize. The views expressed here are not those of the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government. 

Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons.