Keeping the “Best and Brightest” Junior Officers in the U.S. Military
How would our world be different if Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, John Lejeune, and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin had resigned after five or 10 years in uniform? As junior officers, they all likely knew they were among their peer group’s “best and brightest.” Thankfully, even though talent has options, they all chose to remain in the military for a career. Subsequently, the Allies won World War II, and the United States walked on the moon.
A recent empirical analysis of West Point-commissioned officers, based on data collected in 2013, used separate performance indicators to identify officers who qualified as “best” and who qualified as “brightest.” It then compared the retention trends among those who qualified as both “best” and “brightest,” hereafter “best and brightest,” with the retention trends of their average-performing peers. It found that while the “best and brightest” officers retained to become company commanders at the same rate as their average-performing peers, they stayed at even higher rates to become field-grade officers. The “best and brightest” officers who were ethnic minorities, however, were much less likely to stay to become field-grade officers than both their average-performing peers and the subset of “best and brightest” officers who were white.
To better retain the “best and brightest,” Army battalion and brigade commanders should identify their “best and brightest,” let them know that they are, develop them individually, support them in striving for excellence, and give them meaningful missions with autonomy. Unit commanders should also strive to live lives worth emulating (both at work and home) while holding low-effort junior officers accountable. Similarly, the Department of the Army and Human Resources Command should enable the “best and brightest” officers to have alternative career paths, fiercely protect the integrity of the new Command Assessment Program, reestablish the primary path for promotion to colonel as being through battalion command, and increase two-year advanced civil schooling opportunities. Doing so can help the U.S. military retain more of its most talented members, making it more likely to win future wars and provide the astronauts who walk on Mars. Though this article uses an Army context to provide specific retention challenges and recommendations, most of them apply across the military services.
To Battalion and Brigade Commanders
Battalion commanders (for O-1/2s) and brigade commanders (for O-3/4s) are the first group to have a significant impact on junior officer retention. What can you do?
Seek and ye shall find. Leaders should actively and quietly look for various signals and indicators that can help identify their “best and brightest” junior officers. When officers arrive at your unit from the Basic Officers Leadership Course and Captains Career Course, take an interest in them and examine signs of conceptual ability, such as their basic and career course’s Academic Evaluation Reports, Graduate Record Examination result if military-funded, and signs of diligence such as previous Army Combat Fitness Test scores. Encourage and watch which of your lieutenants volunteer for challenging activities, including intellectual ones like submitting professional publications in branch-specific journals or entering innovation competitions. Hold best-platoon and best-lieutenant competitions, to include multi-day events. Have a staff captain host an optional professional reading group and quietly find out which junior officers are active in it. Require your rated officers to submit confidential 360-degree evaluations of peers, assessing competence, teamwork, concern for others, and character (all important components of “best”). Ask your senior and mid-grade non-commissioned officers for feedback on them. When you see officers who regularly offer ideas that are both novel and useful, especially those that do not align with previous guidance, do not assume they lack loyalty. Instead, consider approaching this behavior as a signal of their integrity, courage, and high potential.
Let your high-potential officers know, “I see you and I’ve got you.” Senior leaders should let the “best and brightest” junior officers know they recognize how good they are, or these officers may seek acknowledgement of their talents elsewhere. You can do this quietly, as most do not want or need public acknowledgment. Examples include verbal affirmation, finding and offering them special developmental opportunities, or connecting them with like-minded senior officers. It is not enough for a senior mentor (outside of their chain of command) to know. Someone with formal influence over them ought to know. Reach out to them deliberately. Tell them the truth, such as, “You are very talented, we are fortunate to have you leading in our Army, and we need you for higher levels of leadership.” Additionally, leaders should remember that the “best and brightest” captains who are ethnic minorities may be more likely to leave the Army after command, so investment in this population may be especially impactful.
Let your eagles soar. Many of your best officers will want to shoot for aspirational units, schools, and jobs — let them go. A high-performing maneuver branch platoon leader asked his chain of command for approval to try out for the 75th Ranger Regiment. His battalion commander called him “a disloyal f*&k” and disapproved his application packet. A top-performing Special Forces A-Team leader captain asked for a slot to free-fall parachute school so he could qualify to lead a specialty team in his battalion. When his battalion commander found out he wanted to teach at West Point after leading his second Special Forces team (who were currently excelling in difficult combat), the commander pulled the captain’s miliary free-fall school slot and took it himself. Reframe what may feel like short-term loss with the truth, that a junior officer trying out for an elite unit or competing for a broadening assignment is likely a win for the Army, and your unit now has a great ambassador making positive impacts across the force.
Grant autonomy with high expectations. Expect your “best and brightest” to excel at making their and your organization better, not just performing standard quality work. Having high expectations is one of the seven transformational leader behaviors and doing so will help meet high performers’ need for growth at work while improving your organization. Build meaningful and challenging missions for your “best and brightest” platoons or companies to accomplish alone and give them to your “best and brightest” officers. During the planned liberation of Haiti in October 1994, an 82nd Airborne platoon leader received the mission to ruck 12 miles with his platoon alone to raid a key enemy communications outpost. Two years earlier he had been one of the top cadets at the Citadel. He and his troopers were pumped.
Show poor performers the road or your boot. Minimize your high potentials’ dissatisfaction by holding low-performing officers accountable. A lazy junior officer typically receives the same Army benefits, promotions, awards, and roles as the hardest-working junior officers, who certainly notice when peers are allowed to shirk. Being an Army officer is an incredible honor and responsibility. It feels less so when you see some of your peers’ perennially mediocre or lazy behavior tolerated and implicitly rewarded.
To the Department of the Army and Human Resources Command
The second set of key influencers of the “best and brightest” junior officers’ retention decisions are the Army’s enterprise-wide personnel policy makers: the Headquarters, Department of the Army, and the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. There are a number of key steps that you should take.
Expect the “best and brightest” to have atypical career paths. Correspondingly, have the Army assume their timeline risks, so they do not have to. High-potential officers may be drafted into or request roles in emerging or developmental jobs that may not be coded as key and developmental. Assignments in emerging roles such as the Army’s Software Factory, robotics platoons, and Army Intelligence Integration Center should be considered strengths, not risks in files. If atypical assignment leads to timeline “risk,” the Army should promote these officers with strong officer evaluation reports conditionally, asking them to complete any pending key and developmental or similar timeline requirements within the following four years. Human Resources Command deserves much credit for trending in this direction over the past five years, though more flexibility is needed.
Fiercely protect the integrity of the Army’s new Command Assessment Program. The “best and brightest” need to know that if they decide to stay in past company command to remain competitive for battalion command, the process that will decide their selection will be as objective as possible. Protect the Command Assessment Program from undue influence from well-meaning senior leaders and advocacy groups, including relentlessly minimizing the subjective parts of the process. And continue to do everything possible to encourage the “best and brightest” officers to opt-in to command, including deliberately calling them one-on-one, especially during periods where they are considering whether or not to opt-in to the next level of command, asking them how the Army can keep them in and letting them know that they are needed and valued.
Reestablish that the primary path to colonel is through battalion command. To choose to stay in the Army, the “best and brightest” will need to know that their desire to command a battalion will be met with a reasonable likelihood of continuing upward mobility after that command. Yet the well-intended changes resulting from the 1996 Army Officer Personnel Management System XXI Task Force moved many O-6 billets from the Army’s operational branches into its functional areas, significantly dropping the likelihood of promotion to O-6 after battalion command. For example, the O-6 promotion board that just released results in April 2024 reported an in-the-zone (i.e., primary zone) selection rate for the operations branches as 38.2 percent, the lowest of all four branch categories. Though officers in all branches and functional areas deserve a reasonable path to O-6, since the Army’s total number of O-6 billets are limited by Congress, the Army should reallocate a disproportionate number of O-6 billets towards operational branches, which will restore the strong likelihood of upward mobility after battalion command.
Increase opportunities for advanced civil schooling, specifically two-year master’s programs at top-10 graduate schools. Bright officers often are attracted to higher education. In the 1980s, the Army sent 5,500–7,000 officers for civilian degrees annually, but dropped that number to below 400 in 1995, resulting in less than one in ten officers receiving a fully-funded graduate degree from 1990-2005. Bring back civilian education programs such as graduate school incentive program, allowing the “best and brightest” cadets (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps and U.S. Military Academy) and junior officers to sign up for guaranteed graduate schooling in exchange for continued service — a transaction where everyone wins, especially with two-year degrees. The officer meets his or her intellectual/educational goals while in uniform, and the Army gets a smarter officer locked in for six years post-graduation, getting them close to the start of battalion command.
Fix capacity issues at on-post Army childcare centers and issue interim vouchers for high-quality civilian childcare to waitlisted families. Highly educated servicemembers are more likely to have highly educated spouses, which makes them more likely to have jobs, in turn making them more likely to require dependable child-care. If a family cannot find a dependable childcare option, the servicemember is incentivized to leave active duty. Thankfully, the Army, Department of Defense, and White House have worked hard to enable more interstate government job availability and professional licensing reciprocity for working spouses.
Stop over-commissioning lieutenants to compensate for predicted future manning shortfalls. Lieutenants should be platoon leaders and company executive officers, not assistant staff officers. Among the key attractions of a junior officer’s job is the opportunity to lead others. If the “best and brightest” lieutenants only get 12 or fewer months as a platoon leader, they will interpret staff time as their long-term Army future, possibly incentivizing them to leave. Additionally, over-commissioning active-duty officers leads to a direct decrease in the average quality of officers, which is not good for the Army. Many (including me) would argue that as far as leaders (including officers) go, quality is much more important than quantity.
Consider expanding active-duty service obligations for elite assignments. Want to serve in the 75th Rangers, Special Forces, Joint Special Operations Command, or other nominative units that have a comprehensive selection process? These jobs likely attract a disproportionate amount of the “best and brightest” officers. Requiring a healthy active-duty service obligation upon completion of extended selection and training pipelines would ensure these officers take their incredible experiences to subsequent Army formations. This can be tricky, as adding active-duty service obligations can unintentionally discourage high-potential officers from opting-in to challenging assignments, which is the opposite of what the nation needs. So, this option, if implemented, should be approached with great care.
To the “Best and Brightest” Junior Officers
Finally, to the most important influencers, the “best and brightest” lieutenants, captains, and young majors themselves. Thank you for originally volunteering, and for leading well, often in difficult circumstances. You have met your obligations and then some. Please strongly consider staying on the best team in the world. The nation needs you. Also, please lean towards remaining in operational branches, where there is the most opportunity to directly lead and care for soldiers and their families.
Seek out the Army’s biggest challenges and assignments. Try out for the hardest things in the Army. It needs you there, and you will enjoy and develop during the application, assessment, and selection processes. Opt-in for and compete for every command opportunity you can. The Army needs you to compete to lead the most consequential formations at the nation’s future decisive points. If you are not chosen, bloom where you are planted, and try out for the next opportunity. Lift others along the way.
In the words of James Tuite, do not strive to be the best officer in the battalion, strive to be the best officer for the battalion. The “best and brightest” of today are often watched closely by peers and subordinates. Be humble, give more than you get, advocate for and support your peers and sister units, do the harder right over the easier wrong, always seek to learn from others (regardless of their rank), and invest in your subordinates and their families.
Remember, there is no rush to get out. If you choose to retire after battalion command, you will be in your early forties, which leaves many years to thrive in one or more subsequent careers out of uniform. And as a former mentor told me, company and battalion command become (a great) part of you.
Closing Thoughts
This essay is not about retention of all officers, which is an important but different topic, it is about retaining the “best and brightest” lieutenants, captains, and young majors. Through the years, a key strength of U.S. military culture has been its egalitarian ethos, the recognition that no one is better than anyone else, especially amongst peers. Though informal good-old-boy systems of treating some officers as “special” can be highly problematic, in an era of intense competition for talent, limited resources, and expanding national security challenges, deliberately managing high-potential personnel differently is a talent-management concept worth considering. In fact, it is already indirectly done by senior unit leaders and the Human Resources Command through the officer evaluation report system and its second-order effects. Perhaps Army leaders can do targeted talent management thoughtfully by always remembering that “potential” is only valuable if it converts to performance, to minimize biases while gathering numerous data points whenever evaluating junior officers, and to give junior officers repeated opportunities to confirm (or invalidate) their excellence, as there are many late bloomers and spotlight rangers yearning to be identified.
Our world is increasingly dangerous and complex. To achieve better outcomes, the Army should do things differently, even though new initiatives and perspectives on talent management are likely to be met with (well-intentioned) resistance. Being bold to keep the “best and brightest” junior officers in the Army is essential to helping maintain a well-led fighting force that can successfully protect the nation and its freedom for generations to come.
Everett S. P. Spain is a U.S. Army officer, professor of management, and the head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy. He has served with the 82nd Airborne Division, V Corps (U.S. Army Europe), and U.S. Army Special Operations Command; deployed to Kosovo and Iraq; and commanded the U.S. Army Garrison-Schweinfurt (Germany). He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and the Harvard Business School.
The author would like to thank many colleagues for sharing their thoughts on the topic and feedback on earlier versions of this essay. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not purport to represent the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
Image: Jeremy Todd
