The Uncomfortable Reality of Russia and Iran’s New Defense Relationship
On April 2, 2024, Ukraine’s military struck several buildings in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia’s Tatarstan region. The strike demonstrated Ukraine’s steadily improving ability to hold targets deep inside Russia at risk. But it was also a stark reminder of just how far Iranian-Russian defense cooperation has come since 2022: As of last year, Russia has indigenized the production of Iranian-designed Shahed drones at Alabuga — practicing a degree of cooperation with Tehran that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. The Shaheds and other Iranian-origin drones deployed by Russia have created a severe headache for Ukraine, leading its military planners to resort to the April strike.
From the 1990s to 2022, Russia provided, off and on, important military assistance to Iran across the ground, aerospace, and naval domains, largely focused on hardware instead of technology transfers. In addition to Russian support to Iran’s nuclear program, this assistance included the provision of tanks, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, combat aircraft, helicopters, and surface-to-air missiles, among others. Assistance — at least in the 1990s — also entailed unofficial transfers by low-level Russian entities to Iran’s ballistic missile and suspected chemical and biological weapons programs.
Since 2022, Russia’s defense relationship with Iran has taken a big leap forward. Cooperation has moved past the previous patron-client dynamic, with Iran emerging as a key enabler of Russia’s air and ground campaign in Ukraine. Military-technical collaboration has intensified in existing areas, while also advancing to new frontiers such as the joint development of novel uncrewed aerial vehicles. Amid a general weakening of past constraints on cooperation, Iran and Russia have also taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship.
Western capitals should accept an uncomfortable reality: Even if Russia’s war against Ukraine were to end, there is little hope that the Iran-Russia defense relationship will revert to its pre-2022 status quo. Both countries have identified needs for future military contingencies that they can help each other meet — even if Iran will continue to be more reliant on advanced technology from Russia than vice versa. Traditional instruments such as diplomatic pressure or sanctions are unlikely to be effective in checking this cooperation so long as both Iran and Russia view Washington and its allies as their main adversaries.
As a result, the best the United States and its partners can do is to disrupt this cooperation on the margins and focus on undermining it in the most sensitive areas. Specifically, Washington should focus on complicating Iran’s and Russia’s procurement of electronics for high-end defense goods and seek to derail or deter impending deals or deliveries through strategic disclosures.
Brothers in Arms
Since February 2022, the Iranian-Russian defense relationship has expanded both in degree and in kind. Pre-existing areas of cooperation — such as electronic warfare, space, or cyber — have seen increased activity. In August 2022 and February 2024, Russia launched imaging satellites for Iran and has committed to aid Iran’s space program in additional ways, including through a December 2022 agreement. Russia has helped Iran with GPS denial and jamming capabilities, sharing lessons from its own electronic warfare efforts in Syria. Russia has also continued to deliver conventional weapons to Iran, providing it with Yak-130 training aircraft last September. To be sure, cooperation in these areas has been underway for years, having received a boost with the expiration of the conventional arms embargo against Iran in October 2020. At the time, Moscow reacted negatively to U.S. efforts to extend the embargo and Russian experts signaled that Russia could step up its defense cooperation with Iran.
Since February 2022, however, cooperation has taken an even more significant leap forward, with Iran and Russia collaborating in entirely new areas. Iran’s provision of drones, drone production technology, and drone training to Russia has received considerable international attention, given its impact on the Ukrainian battlefield. As of May 2024, the Russian armed forces had launched at least 4,000 Iranian-designed Shahed drones against Ukraine. Less noted, though, is Iran’s multifaceted support for Russia’s ground war, including through artillery shells, small-arms ammunition, anti-tank rockets, mortar bombs, and glide bombs. This shows how Russia can benefit from Iranian aid in terms of quantity, if not quality.
Iran has also assisted Russia’s war effort in more indirect ways, sharing expertise on how to circumvent or overcome the effects of sanctions. Tehran and Moscow signed a joint declaration to that effect in December 2023. Emerging as a critical supporter of Russia’s Ukraine campaign, Iran ended the client-patron dynamic that had characterized the relationship for the better part of three decades. During this period, Iran had relied on Russian support, but had little to offer its partner. Russia’s own assistance to Iran has extended into new domains, too. Russian technicians have been detected working on Iran’s space launch vehicle program and other aspects of its missile programs. Russia has also provided Iran with Western-origin military technology captured on the battlefield in Ukraine, which Tehran can study in order to reverse engineer it or to develop countermeasures.
Russia’s needs for its Ukraine campaign have been the key factor driving the expansion of defense cooperation. But this isn’t the only factor. Previous constraints on the relationship have now subsided in importance against the backdrop of a shared Iranian-Russian animosity toward the United States. Those past constraints included a Russian susceptibility to U.S. or Western pressure to limit cooperation with Iran, Russian concerns with adhering to nonproliferation norms and export control regimes, Iran’s inability to pay for Russian technology, Russia’s ties with the Gulf Arab states and Israel, and historical mistrust between both countries.
To be clear, present Iranian-Russian defense cooperation is not limitless. Highly coveted items on Iran’s wish list from Russia — such as Su-35 advanced fighter aircraft — have not yet been delivered and no agreement on the delivery of S-400 advanced air defense systems has been reached. Potential obstacles to cooperation will also continue going forward. These include both countries’ supply chain vulnerabilities, Russia’s desire not to antagonize its Gulf Arab partners, and Russia’s enduring technological superiority vis-a-vis Iran in key areas. All these should preclude the formation of a full-fledged and equal military-strategic partnership.
And yet, the defense relationship is on a clear upward trajectory. It is also benefitting from a joint Iranian-Russian effort to institutionalize defense ties by bolstering formal mechanisms that facilitate and coordinate military-technical cooperation. Institutionalization started in Syria, where the Russian and Iranian campaigns in support of the government developed an “integrated grouping” of irregular armed formations under Russian command. Iran’s then-secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, and Gen. Qasem Soleimani served as Iran’s main points of contact with the Russian military.
Building on that valuable experience, the period after February 2022 has been marked by a further increase in high-level engagements among military and defense officials — including their bilateral Joint Military Cooperation Commission, which is especially important for cooperation between the two countries’ General Staffs. The two countries have also been negotiating a new 20-year strategic agreement and will resume talks towards its finalization once the newly elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet have settled into office. In addition they have made forays into the joint production of weapon systems, thereby creating new path dependencies.
With increasing institutionalization of the defense relationship, we should expect expanded cooperation not only at the official level — including transfers of weapon systems and production technology — but also from lower-level entities looking to procure technologies to support their weapons programs. Investment into the International North-South Transport Corridor and other infrastructure to facilitate trade will likely provide a further institutional “hook” for expanded Iranian-Russian defense cooperation over the medium term.
The recent surprise election of Pezeshkian is unlikely to impact these trend lines. He may pursue modest economic reforms and social liberalization, and may even seek to revive diplomacy on the nuclear dossier with the West. Still, Iran will not waver in its cultivation of close ties with Russia and, more importantly, the pursuit of a regional strategy that will benefit from Russian military-technical support. On these matters, Iran’s supreme leader, its Supreme National Security Council, and high-level military officials are the most important decision makers. Most bilateral cooperation occurs independent of the president’s oversight — through the General Staff, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and regular military (Artesh), and the Defense Ministry. Similarly, while the Kremlin determines the overall thrust of Russia’s ties with Iran, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and Russian defense conglomerate Rostec perform important functions in driving defense and military-technical cooperation, creating vested interests in its continuation beyond the top leadership.
Scenarios of Future Cooperation
The combination of weakened constraints and growing institutionalization make it unlikely that the Russian-Iranian defense relationship will lapse back into its previous patron-client dynamic even once the war in Ukraine ends. Both Iran and Russia have needs for future military contingencies, some of which the partner country may help meet. Assessing the future military needs of each country, and identifying the areas in which the partnership could be leveraged to meet those needs, allows analysts and policymakers to think through the most worrisome scenarios for future Russian-Iranian defense cooperation.
In terms of what Iran may seek from Russia, two areas of Iranian strategic interest are of highest concern: There are weapons and technologies that would enhance Iran’s asymmetric capabilities, especially those important for the most likely conflict scenarios with the United States and Israel in the aerospace and naval domains. Similarly alarming are those Russian weapons and technologies that Iran might transfer to its partners in the “axis of resistance” — especially Lebanese Hizballah, the Yemeni Houthis, and Iraqi militias — that could threaten U.S. and allied security interests.
Iran’s military-technical needs in pursuit of these strategic interests fall into three main categories. First, Iran is keen on improving its long-range strike capabilities. To do so, it may seek assistance from Russia on key technical and operational elements of its targeting cycle, relying on ballistic and cruise missiles, uncrewed aerial and naval systems, and even glide bombs. Iranian needs in this area may have been rendered even more acute by the lackluster performance of its missiles and drones during its large-scale attack against Israel this past April. Russian assistance might help Iran with over-the-horizon targeting, advanced propulsion, guidance, and seeker technologies. Second, Iran may turn to Russia for help on improving its “air defense cycle” (charkheh-ye padafand-e havai) and passive defense (padafand-e gheyr-e amel) capabilities designed to protect its nuclear, military, and other sensitive facilities from a U.S. or Israeli air attack. Such help may entail the transfer of more advanced air defense systems or of technologies to support Iran’s domestic air defense programs. Finally, Iran may request Russian support to improve the surface and subsurface attack and defense capabilities that underpin its asymmetric naval strategy. Especially important in this regard may be Russian technical help to improve Iran’s anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles and anti-ship drones.
Russia could conceivably help Iran in all three areas, given its superior long-range strike, air defense, and naval capabilities. It could do so not just by transferring complete systems, but also through technology transfers or by sharing operational expertise. Considering that Moscow and individual Russian entities have previously transferred missile and other sensitive technologies to Iran, it is not a stretch to think that this may happen again in the future.
Russia may also step up its direct assistance to Iran’s partners in the “axis of resistance.” Prior to February 2022, any Russian security assistance to such groups was sporadic, with the exception of Iran-backed groups in Syria, with which Russia collaborated more intensively from 2015. After February 2022, Moscow ramped up intelligence sharing with Iran-backed militias and supplied Hizballah with anti-ship missiles via Syria. Hizballah struck Israel’s Meron air control base with Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles in January 2024, suggesting that Moscow may have provided additional arms to the militant group. U.S. officials warned late last year that the Wagner Group may provide air defense systems to Hizballah. In the event of further escalation between Israel and Hizballah, Russia should be expected to funnel additional weapons not needed for the Ukraine campaign to Hizballah and the Yemeni Houthis.
Western states should also worry about less likely — but no less consequential — forms of Russian assistance that would enhance the hedging strategies underpinning Iran’s asymmetric deterrence and compellence. Moscow may, for instance, support Iran’s nuclear hedging capabilities without helping it cross the threshold to building a nuclear bomb. Iran is also suspected of hedging in other areas where it could benefit from Russian know-how: intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic missile-applicable technologies, including solid-propellant space launch vehicles, technologies applicable to direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons, and dual-use technologies in the chemical and biological weapons domains to enhance its “on demand” capacity to produce such weapons. Since Moscow’s capabilities in these realms are superior to those of Iran, it could support its partner in honing these hedging strategies.
Russia would benefit from Iranian assistance in return. For as long as Russia pursues its military campaign in Ukraine, Iranian backing will come in handy to help Russia meet some of its most acute needs for ammunition, relatively inexpensive drones, and possibly ballistic missiles. Beyond the war in Ukraine, Russian needs from Iran are likely going to be far more limited than Iranian needs for advanced technology from Russia. Still, Moscow may turn to Tehran for support in niche areas. For example, considering Iran’s sophistication in long-range precision strike, Russia may hope to glean technical or operational insights from its partner. It may also rely on Iranian help to replenish its weapons and munitions inventories once the war in Ukraine is over. Finally, Russia might benefit from the supply of spare parts via Iranian Defense Ministry and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps procurement networks.
As the bilateral defense relationship continues to deepen, the two sides might also pursue joint programs. In the area of combat drones, production has already evolved into a joint venture of sorts, with Moscow and Tehran working cooperatively to develop new kinds of drones. In the future, the partners could pursue joint programs to enhance each other’s anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities, as Iran and Russia are among a small number of countries in the world that develop them. They could also deepen their counter-sanctions cooperation, given that both rely heavily on Western electronic components for missiles and drones.
The Long Shadow of Iranian-Russian Defense Cooperation
Iranian-Russian defense cooperation is not just a matter of acute concern as Washington seeks to bolster Kyiv’s defenses. In planning for the future security environment in both Europe and the Middle East, U.S. defense planners should proceed from worst-case assumptions around Iranian-Russian cooperation and think through the second- and third-order effects. Beyond the Ukrainian battlefield, there are implications for U.S. security interests in at least four areas. First, any Russian assistance that creates qualitative upticks in Iran’s asymmetric capabilities — especially its long-range conventional strike and air defense capabilities — will inevitably complicate the ability of the United States and its regional allies to deter and defeat Iran and its regional partners. Second, the sheer volume of assistance that Iran could theoretically provide to Russia in munitions and inexpensive missiles and drones would not just enhance Russia’s position in Ukraine, but could also pose a headache for NATO defense planners down the line. Third, any Russian aid to Iran’s hedging efforts in the areas of nuclear, long-range missile, anti-satellite technologies, or chemical and biological weapons would inevitably undermine international efforts to control and prevent the proliferation of these technologies, while also enhancing Iran’s regional deterrence and compellence.
Finally, growing collaboration between Iran and Russia in any of these areas may provide a “plank” to spur military-technical cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. While there is much talk of an emerging “axis” tying the four countries together, there is little evidence to date of trilateral or quadrilateral defense cooperation among them. That could change in the future, however, with Iranian-Russian ties forming a nucleus for the four countries to develop or improve anti-ship ballistic missiles and other long-range strike systems, jointly conduct illicit procurement of critical technologies, or share technical and operational insights gained from tests, exercises, and the use of missiles and drones. There is past precedent of military-technical cooperation in most of the dyads among the four countries. All of them see the United States as their most important adversary, and each country has its own mix of military needs and strengths that will create valuable synergies to take advantage of.
In tackling these challenges, Washington will have its work cut out. Given the mix of drivers of and weakened constraints on Iran-Russia cooperation, the U.S. playbook from the 1990s and 2000s — which included diplomatic pressure, the threat and use of sanctions, and the offer of incentives — will be far less effective today to confront the defense relationship. The further institutionalization of Iranian-Russian defense ties will additionally complicate efforts to undermine or unwind the relationship through traditional instruments. The best Washington and its partners can therefore do is to disrupt cooperation on the margins and prevent it from materializing in the most sensitive areas.
First, they should strengthen trade sanctions on both countries and export controls, especially those that target critical “chokepoint” technologies and their suppliers. Specifically, such measures should target both states’ procurement of electronic components, guidance and engine components, and test and production equipment, all needed for drones and missiles. In addition, financial sanctions might curtail Iran’s ability to pay for Russian assistance.
Second, they should improve intelligence collection and their use of “strategic disclosures” on Iranian-Russian cooperation, especially those that highlight negotiations of concern, transfers that are planned or underway, and the key organizations and officials involved. Over the past year, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has displayed Shahed drones for media representatives and foreign government delegations. U.S. disclosures about possible Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia were among the reasons prompting the E3 to extend ballistic missile related sanctions on Iran. Continuing and improving strategic disclosures might help warn of upcoming transfers, increase international scrutiny, and deter some cooperation. Disclosures of cooperation between Russian and Iranian military and other universities could also be used to highlight areas of concern for the transfer of intangible technology.
Third, the United States and its partners should prepare for enhanced Iranian and Russian capabilities by improving their own air and missile defenses. In the Middle East, Washington has already laid the basis for such efforts by convening a U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council working group on integrated air and missile defense that, among other measures, discusses the regional expansion of air and missile defense early warning systems and information sharing to ensure a common air picture.
Lastly, Washington should engage Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and possibly China, to exert quiet pressure on Moscow to refrain from giving certain technologies to Iran. These countries retain leverage with Russia that they can use to press the Kremlin to tone down its assistance to Tehran: China because of its overall significant economic relations with Russia; the United Arab Emirates as a conduit for Russia’s roundabout trade; and Saudi Arabia as Russia’s partner in OPEC+. Both the Gulf Arab states and Beijing rely on Middle Eastern stability to pursue their own economic agendas, which should give them a further incentive to lean on Moscow.
Hanna Notte, Ph.D., is director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a nonresident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her work focuses on Russia’s foreign and security policy, the Middle East, and nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.
Jim Lamson is a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Prior to that, he worked for 23 years as an analyst with the CIA.
This article is based on a research study recently conducted with the support of the Russia Strategic Initiative at U.S. European Command.
Image: khamenei.ir via Wikimedia Commons
