Deep Strikes into Russia: A Partner’s Decision for Ukraine’s Strategic Success

Two years ago, on May 31, 2022, President Joe Biden announced in his New York Times op-ed that the United States would provide Ukraine with high-mobility artillery rocket systems. The op-ed noted that the White House neither encourages nor allows Ukraine to launch strikes outside its borders. “We don’t want to prolong the war just to hurt Russia,” Biden wrote at the time. Today, the restrictions are being eased, but U.S. officials assure that the overall policy on attacking targets in Russia has not changed — long-range strikes deep into Russian territory are still prohibited.

However, the war has been going on for two-and-a-half years now, and Russia is still waging it relentlessly. Russia is using guided aerial bombs to strike cities with populations of over one million, including Kharkiv. Russia also has recently destroyed 80 percent of Ukraine’s thermal generation and one-third of its hydroelectric generation, and Ukrainians are now facing an extremely difficult winter. In addition, with his recent statement on the eve of the June peace summit in Switzerland, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that he can only be stopped by force. The idea of allowing Western weapons to strike Russian territory is increasingly gaining support among Western leaders, a point Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tried to drive home in Washington on the sidelines of the NATO Summit. Along these lines, it looks like, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer changed U.K. policy when he said, on July 9, that Ukraine could use British long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike Russia, Bloomberg reported.

Changes in the Policy of Ukraine’s Partners

The discussion about the possibility of responding to Russian aggression within the framework of international law began on May 3, 2024, with a statement by British Foreign Secretary David Cameron. He said that Ukraine has the right to strike targets in Russia with British weapons because Moscow is shelling Ukrainian territory. So far, more than a dozen countries have supported Ukraine’s right to respond symmetrically to Russia using weapons produced by them.

Nevertheless, the United States remains the most important country in this matter. Only Washington can quantitatively and qualitatively cover the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for long-range weapons. The United States is currently the only country that has the appropriate stockpiles of a wide range of long-range weapons. If Washington were to grant permission to Ukraine to use these to strike military targets in Russia, the impact could encourage other allies of Ukraine to help with their own long-range weapons, such as Germany’s Taurus cruise missiles. Currently Germany is refusing to supply its long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine, still believing that providing them to Kyiv could draw Berlin into a war with Russia. The German missile has a higher “hit probability” and a longer range than, for example, the Storm Shadow, so if it were used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes on legitimate targets in Russia would be more effective.

On May 31, Zelensky announced that Washington had authorized the limited use of U.S. weapons in the Russian region bordering Kharkiv. And the United States has now authorized Ukraine to use American weapons to defeat any Russian forces attacking across the border, not just those in the Kharkiv region. However, this permission is only a half-measure. For successful defense, the United States should completely remove restrictions on Ukraine repelling the Kremlin’s aggression, especially giving authorization to use long-range Army tactical missile systems against legitimate military targets throughout the entire reach of the Russian Federation.

Currently, Kyiv remains unable to respond to the attacks symmetrically, being limited to its own territory occupied by Russia and a strip of the Russian border 100 kilometers from Ukraine. At the same time, Russia strikes both military and civilian targets in Ukraine from its territory almost daily, using a wide range of weapons — from strategic aircraft and bombers to multiple-launch rocket systems and surface-to-air missile systems that kill civilians and destroy entire cities.

Ukraine has a successful track record of using Western weapons, particularly American ones, to gain advantages on the battlefield and liberate territories — for example, the liberation of Kherson in late 2022, when Ukrainian M142 high-mobility artillery rocket systems destroyed Russian logistics on the right bank of the Dnipro River, or the strikes by British-French Storm Shadow cruise missiles against the headquarters and ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Together with the liberation of Zmiinyi Island and other actions, these strikes have become an important component in restoring Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea to pre-war levels. According to Bloomberg, world wheat prices began to drop after the first grain ship left Ukraine in August 2023.

Even the limited use of the weapons is already producing results. Immediately after the United States granted a limited authorization, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a high-mobility artillery rocket system strike against the Russian air defense system in the Belgorod region, and video of the burning equipment was disseminated by Russian TV channels on June 3. The strike destroyed or damaged two radars and two S-400 launchers that were firing at the city of Kharkiv. The Russian army has been using these types of air defense missile systems to shell the city. According to the Washington Post, in May 2024 the Russians launched 76 strikes on Kharkiv, killing and injuring 278 people. In June, the number of strikes dropped to three. Russian air bombs remain the main threat to the city. On June 22–23 alone, Russians carried out several air strikes on the city center and residential areas, killing 4 people and injuring 60 others.

Changing the Direction of Strikes

If Ukraine is able to use long-range weapons to destroy legitimate military targets in response to Moscow’s attacks, Russia may face a potential “strike zone” of up to 300 kilometers, which presents the Kremlin with new challenges. It is worth noting that the 300-kilometer zone is a conditional definition of the potential range of Western weapons (for example, the U.S. Army M39 or M39A1 tactical missile systems, the French-British Storm Shadow cruise missiles, or the German Taurus missiles) that Ukraine has received or may receive. Of course, the range will depend on a combination of different factors, such as the place of use, the type of weapon, and the weapon carrier itself.

The security of the border regions is critically important for the Russian military-industrial complex and the army as a whole because a significant number of Russian military facilities are located in the European part of the country, with many in the defined zone of potential destruction. In particular, dozens of military factories that manufacture weapons used to destroy civilian infrastructure and attack Ukrainian residents fall in the strip — for instance, the Russian composite materials plant Avangard in Safonovo, Smolensk region. This enterprise, part of the Tactical Missile Arms corporation, produces transport-launch containers and engine housings for solid-fuel missiles used to strike Ukraine. Smolensk itself is a home to an aviation plant that was already hit by drones from the Defense Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine in November 2023. That strike disrupted the production process of Kh-59 missiles of various modifications.

The potential zone also includes the Aviaavtomatika plant in Kursk (which produces control systems for drones and armored vehicles) and Elektrosignal in Voronezh (a manufacturer of communications equipment for the Russian army). Voronezh has several enterprises that produce electronic components (microcircuits, transistors, diodes, and so forth) intended to replace Western components in Russian weapons. The products of the Voronezh Semiconductor Plant VZPP-S are intended for use in electronic warfare, electronic intelligence, and military communication systems. Electronic warfare and electronic intelligence systems could soon become a significant factor in this war, so the development of this branch of Russia’s military-industrial complex is a critical danger not only for Ukraine but also for NATO countries. In addition to electronic warfare devices, the company’s electronics can also be used in other military products. And there are dozens of similar enterprises in other cities, such as Taganrog, Bryansk, Rostov-on-Don, and Lipetsk.

However, it is no less important to strike at the rear military units, military depots, and, most importantly, airfields of the Russian Federation. In the approximately 300-kilometer border zone with Ukraine, Russia has about 184 military units of the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, and the Russian National Guard, and at least 18 military airfields that are regularly used for strikes against Ukraine, logistics and transportation of weapons, and radio reconnaissance.

Despite the limitations in means, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to achieve certain successes in hitting such targets behind enemy lines. To do this, they use all available resources — in particular, attack drones, whose payload is relatively small, as well as sabotage and reconnaissance groups. In this way, the Main Intelligence Directorate attacked the Seshcha, Shaykovka, and Voronezh airfields with Ukrainian drones, and a Tu-22M3 strategic bomber was destroyed for the first time at the Soltsy airfield by the Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group. However, if more powerful and long-range weapons from allies had been used, these strikes could have had a much greater effect.

A military intelligence source of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center reported on the consequences of Ukrainian security service attacks on Russian airfields and strikes on Kushchevskaya and Morozovsk facilities. Russian planes conduct 100 to 150 sorties against Ukraine from these airfields per day. Confirmed strikes on these airbases have destroyed or damaged at least 17 Russian aircraft, including Su-34 bombers — the aircraft that Russia uses to drop precision weapons on Ukrainian Armed Forces positions and frontline Ukrainian cities.

Still, the available weapons are not always sufficient to effectively defeat enemy targets in the rear. Moscow understands the relative security of its border from the use of high-precision and long-range weapons, such as multiple-launch rocket system missiles or European-made cruise missiles. This allows it not only to use existing military facilities but also to build new ones. For example, Russia is building a new military airfield in the Belgorod region, 70 kilometers from the border. It is from this region that indiscriminate shelling of Kharkiv and settlements in the Kharkiv region regularly takes place, mainly with the use of artillery or S-300 air defense systems, which Ukrainian forces have long been unable to destroy due to lack of technical capabilities.

At the moment, there is still a window of opportunity to hit Russian airfields and aircraft. Russian military experts and bloggers have long been sounding the alarm about the lack of full-fledged protective shelters for military aircraft in the form of concrete hangars and have proposed making protection from cargo containers filled with earth. And their fears are not unfounded: Given that aircraft at airfields are protected only along the perimeter and are unprotected from above, the use of cluster munitions would have a significant impact on Russian aviation. Army tactical missile system cluster munitions do not leave large craters, but they cover a large area and turn unarmored aircraft into a sieve. In this case, provided none are intercepted, a few Army tactical missile system Block I cluster missiles would be enough to disable one squadron of the Russian Aerospace Forces at an airbase within 150 to 300 kilometers of Ukraine’s territory.

For example, the first successful use of Army tactical missile system cluster missiles took place on Oct. 17, 2023, during the Dragonfly operation of the Special Operations Forces. Then the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck airports near the temporarily occupied cities of Berdiansk (Zaporizhzhia region) and Luhansk. The operation destroyed at least nine helicopters, special equipment, an air defense launcher, and an aviation ammunition depot. After the strike, the Russian Air Force was forced to relocate its helicopters away from the front to the temporarily occupied Crimea and to the territory of Russia. However, due to the recent Army tactical missile system strikes, the air force’s base in Crimea is now also under threat. In particular, after the missile strike on May 16, Russia lost two airplanes and a helicopter, as confirmed by satellite images. As a result, in November 2023, Moscow began to build hangars at a military airfield in the Volgograd region, 450 kilometers from the territory controlled by Ukraine.

Another important and positive aspect of attacks on military and strategic targets in Russia is the need for Russians to withdraw air defense assets from other areas to cover them. This creates gaps in the Russian air defense system, which in turn allows Ukrainian drones to penetrate to a depth of more than 1,800 kilometers into Russian territory.

Improving Defense Capabilities

The boundaries of Ukraine’s defense are defined by international law yet are hindered by restrictions imposed by its partners. Given that Ukraine could strike Russian positions at considerable depth, in addition to hitting strategic targets, removing these restrictions would also complicate any build-up of Russian reserves on the border and their advance deeper into Ukraine’s northern regions.

The Kremlin has used blackmail and intimidation to form a position among Western countries that any strike on targets in Russia with Western weapons would be evidence of the West’s participation in the war. However, the announced “red lines” are not working and the Kremlin has already been claiming that it has been at war with NATO — for example, there was no response to the strikes by high-mobility artillery rocket system missiles on military targets in the Belgorod region of Russia or to the use of U.S. long-range Army tactical missile system missiles on the military airfield in Dzhankoy (in temporarily occupied Crimea).

Existing limitations imposed by the allies give the aggressor an invaluable advantage. For example, the defeat of Russian fighters stationed at airbases in the border regions would deprive the Russian army’s assault units of effective air support during offensive operations, as happened during the assaults on Avdiivka and Bakhmut. Accordingly, Russian operations such as the one the Kremlin launched on May 10 in the northeast of Kharkiv region would be far more difficult for Moscow. Both Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi and representatives of Ukrainian intelligence spoke about possible plans for Kharkiv in late March. In particular, the plans and the number of Russian troops that could be involved in this offensive were discussed in an interview with the Economist by the deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Vadym Skibitskyi. Therefore, Ukrainian intelligence officers saw the accumulation of enemy forces and assets and informed the command. As a result, additional units were sent to the potential breakthrough zone on the eve of the offensive.

However, Ukrainian troops were unable to use long-range Western weapons, such as artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, to defeat military formations on the territory of the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian weapons that the Ukrainian Armed Forces could use — such as their most modern Bogdan self-propelled artillery systems — are inferior to Western weapons, which are better than their Russian and Ukrainian (Soviet) counterparts. As a result, three Bogdan self-propelled artillery systems were destroyed in the Kharkiv region in May. In turn, Western artillery with greater range and mobility, such as Archer or Caesar, would be more effective and have a better chance of surviving counter-battery combat.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said after the June 13 Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting that Washington’s decision to allow the Ukrainian military to use American weapons to strike targets in Russia had a positive impact on the operational situation in the Kharkiv region — the Russian offensive had slowed down and any serious breakthroughs had been avoided.

In addition, lifting restrictions would help eliminate the threat posed by Russian aircraft to cities, such as Kharkiv, and to the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Currently, planning and correction module bombs, the Russian equivalent of joint direct attack munitions, are one of the main weapons of choice for Russian tactical aviation. Since the beginning of 2024, Russian combat aircraft have dropped more than 3,500 bombs on Ukrainian positions. This number is 16 times higher than the same period last year. Russia uses Su-34 bombers 30, 40, and sometimes 60 kilometers from the front line to strike Ukrainian fortifications or cities, so the short-range surface-to-air missiles Ukraine currently uses are not able to reach these aircraft. However, if the allies allow it, the situation may change.

The 100-kilometer strike zone on Russian territory that, according to Western media reports, currently exists does not allow for effective strikes on the main targets used by Russia for attacks. In particular, the strike zone does not include the Russian airbases of Voronezh Baltimor and Buturlinovka, where Su-34 bombers attacking Ukraine are based.

Strikes on Russian military airbases will force the Russian command to move these bases out of the 300-kilometer strike zone, which will increase the flight time of Russian aircraft to the area where bombs or missiles are launched and reduce their service life. For instance, according to British intelligence, the Ukrainian attack on Kushchevskaya airfield forced Russia to withdraw about 40 aircraft of various types from the area and disperse them to airfields farther from the front line. Another major factor is that the increased approach time of Russian aircraft will increase the time for detection and response in Ukraine, both on the ground and in the air. Accordingly, this will allow for advance warning of attacks and increase the time to respond to these strikes.

Political calculations should not outweigh sound military strategy if you expect to succeed in a war. It should not be forgotten that restrictions raise the cost of defense, as the weapons needed for defense are much more expensive than the expected means of destruction.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs James OBrien recently noted that if Russia tries to expand the current front, Ukraine will be allowed to fire at a greater distance. Now, according to O’Brien, Russia is losing its ability to attack because of Ukraine’s destruction of Russian facilities near the border. This statement confirms the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes on military targets in Russia. At the same time, it suggests that there is currently no political will in Washington to permit the use of American weapons more widely. Increasing the distance is possible only in the event of a new Russian offensive, so the United States has no concerns about possible risks and Russia’s reaction to this step, only its own self-restraint.

At the moment, the delay in making such a decision is negatively affecting the security of Ukrainian cities and the situation at the front. Such a change is a strategic issue, and Ukrainians cannot wait for Moscow to expand the front by going on the offensive in northern Ukraine or other regions.

Strikes on targets in Russia could help the Ukrainian Armed Forces seize the initiative on the battlefield and reduce the enemy’s military potential, which does not only threaten Ukraine. To do this, Ukraine’s allies should implement their own long-term strategy to counter Russian aggression.

Serhii Kuzan, a military and political expert, is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center. He was an advisor to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (2022 to 2023) and to the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (2014).

Image: Kyiv City State Administration via Wikimedia Commons