The Submarine Workforce Crisis: Admitting Realities and Restructuring Long-Term Strategy
“We have to build and sustain submarines in the next 15 to 17-plus years the same way we did in the ’80s with an industrial base that’s one-third the size.” On a recent trip to Lake Charles, Louisiana, the executive director of program executive office strategic submarines laid out the stark challenge facing the U.S. industrial base.
These concerns are not new. When testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in 2012, then-Chief of Naval Research Adm. Matthew Klunder noted over 50 percent of the submarine industrial workforce would be retirement-eligible by 2020. A decade on from the U.S. Navy raising concerns, the outlook is no better. The Government Accountability Office found that by September 2022, the submarine industrial base was 25 percent below adequate staffing levels to meet their delivery schedules for Virginia-class fast-attack submarines. This workforce crisis has impacted procurement timelines to the point that the U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain an adequately sized underwater fleet for force projection priorities is at risk. As the United States continues to lag behind near-peer competitors in the development of hypersonic missiles, the role of submarines — both conventionally and nuclear-armed — is a priority for maintaining American national security. As such, the most recent 30-year ship building plan from the chief of naval operations intends to dramatically increase the scale of submarine procurement over the next several decades. This scale-up will only complicate and deepen the workforce crisis as the industrial base struggles to deliver even more submarines.
To tackle the workforce crisis and expand industrial capacity, Washington should adopt a two-pronged institutional shift. First, force projection policy should evolve to efficiently utilize resources. This means shifting from the “silent service” model to a more conspicuous submarine presence to strengthen deterrence in key regions, especially the Indo-Pacific. Second, the submarine industrial base must innovate its recruitment strategies, moving from a broad, generalized approach to a more focused targeting of regional talent around the industrial bases, capturing as much local science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent as possible to secure the necessary manpower for timely platform construction.
Scaling Demand, Stagnant Output
The challenge begins with the submarine industrial base and its workforce woes. There are two prime contractors: General Dynamics–Electric Boat in Groton, Conn., and Quonset Point, R.I., and Huntington Ingalls Industries in Newport News, Va. Both shipyards were devastated in the 1990s by the slashing of defense budgets, which led to the cancellation of most of the Seawolf-class. Emma Salisbury’s excellent piece for War on the Rocks gives a more detailed history of the submarine industrial base during this period. Importantly for our discussion, in the 1990s, Huntington Ingalls transitioned away from submarines, becoming the sole producer of aircraft carriers and only a minor producer of Virginia submarines. Electric Boat slowly reduced its workforce over two decades and is today half the size it was at its height in 1989. It is the sole producer of ballistic-missile submarines, splitting production of Virginia submarines with Huntington Ingalls. The prime contractors are supported by thousands of subcontractors spread across 47 states.
The U.S. Navy expects to dramatically increase submarine production over the next several decades, buying 72 boats over 30 years. The 30-year shipbuilding plan (which was approved in the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act) will scale procurement from the current two submarines per year to five per year by 2028. This means the industrial base will be producing five different platforms simultaneously: the Columbia, an unnamed large-payload cruise missile platform, the Virginia, the Virginia Block V, and the SSN(X). Under any circumstances, this level of production would be ambitious. The last time the industrial base produced five or more boats per year was in the 1980s. Yet under current production capabilities, these goals seem almost impossible. Over the last several years, the industrial base on average has delivered 1.2 submarines annually, with 20 percent of critical jobs unfilled. The industry is struggling to scale to meet its current two per year procurement calendar, let alone five.
Even as workforce issues have persisted for half a decade, this is not for lack of attention. The U.S. Navy is keenly aware of the workforce crunch and the looming demand. Team Submarine, the section of Naval Sea Systems Command that procures and maintains the underwater fleet, estimates the submarine industrial base needs to hire 100,000 new employees between 2022 and 2032 to meet the five-per-year procurement goal. Electric Boat is expecting to hire between 4,000 and 5,000 workers per year for the foreseeable future, accounting for about half of Team Submarine’s yearly industrial base growth. The prime contract got off to a rocky start in this recruitment surge but seems to have improved. In 2022, they hired 3,896, about 20 percent below their yearly goal. In 2023, they hired some 5,300 employees, a substantial increase, but one that must be maintained for the rest of the decade to meet the Navy’s procurement needs. Beyond the prime contractor, a recent Ernst & Young report suggests about a 4 percent yearly growth rate for the rest of the submarine industry. Again, this is promising but remains well below the rapid growth needed to meet the five-per-year demand.
These lagging recruitment numbers come in spite of investments of over $1 billion into submarine workforce development from 2018 to 2022. The Biden administration recently requested an additional $3.4 billion for submarine workforce development to bring the industry above the two-per-year delivery schedule for Virginia-class submarines and prepare for further growth under AUKUS, the trilateral submarine-sharing agreement with Great Britain and Australia. Yet as recruitment seems steady but below the assessed need, the U.S. Navy should prepare for the real possibility that the submarine industrial base might not have capacity to meet the five-per-year submarine goal.
Extended Period of Diminished Capacity
Assuming this possibility of falling short, there are two challenges that should be factored into the strategic posture of the underwater fleet going forward. First, the U.S. Navy needs to prepare for an extended period of diminished capacity and adapt its submarine fleet to meet short- to medium-term challenges. The Los Angeles platforms have had their lives extended several times, but they are rapidly approaching the end of their service capacity. More than half have been retired, and more are prepared for recycling each year. These extensions bought some time, but the lag of Virginia replacements means that the U.S. Navy is already factoring in a period of diminished capacity. The chief of naval operations is estimating that a minimum of 50 fast-attack submarines will be needed to maintain surveillance and force projection missions globally. Department of Defense risk assessments assume this period will be transitory, projecting “that the SSN force will reach a minimum of 46 boats in FY2030, return to 50 boats in FY2032,” and grow to a total size of 69 by the 2040s. The same report notes that China has already referenced in public-facing military documents its plans to increase underwater activity in the Pacific during this period of diminished capacity.
However, considering the ongoing struggles of manufacturers to adequately staff their shipyards and deliver on time, it seems unreasonable to assume this period of diminished capacity will only last two to four years as anticipated. If the industrial base is incapable of producing two boats per year, it seems even less likely they will be able to produce five per year by the end of the decade. A herculean effort by both government and industry may get close to that goal, but meeting it remains unrealistic. Moreover, the Columbia class, as the future stewards of 70 percent of the American nuclear arsenal, is the top procurement priority for the U.S. government. Any production delays will force planners to prioritize the Columbia over the fast-attacks, further hampering the industry’s ability to return the fleet to 50-plus boats with any haste.
As such, rather than hoping workforce goals will be met, it would be better for the U.S. Navy to proactively reorient its underwater posture for the short to medium term and become more creative with submarine usage. Longer deployments are a natural first step to keep a more active global presence. Moreover, on April 26, 2023, the White House announced an agreement with the Republic of Korea to station ballistic-missile submarines more regularly as a regional deterrence, in a move similar to the AUKUS basing agreement. Similar basing agreements with global, but especially Asian, allies to maintain a visible submarine presence close to near-peer adversaries would allow for a visible defensive posture, which could mitigate questions of an active U.S. underwater presence in regions of concern. In a period of diminished capacity with a still mostly covert underwater fleet, China may gamble there are fewer U.S. submarines in the Pacific and increase activities. If the Chinese can see American submarines permanently stationed in military ports across the Pacific, they know there is an active presence and will have to plan accordingly.
Rethinking Recruiting and Developing a Sustainable Pipeline
This period of diminished capacity will stem from the workforce shortage and likely difficulties of the industrial base in meeting procurement timelines. To mitigate this risk, immense resources have gone into recruitment strategies to bring in talent. The U.S. Navy has shown no shortage of creativity, trying to hit every demographic to get as many positions filled as possible. Some campaigns of particular note: sponsoring a NASCAR team, partnering with a Virginia craft brewery to produce a submarine-themed summer lager, and the launching of buildsubmarines.com, a specialized job board with radio, television, and social media ad buys. These have had mixed results. The website is undoubtedly a good recruitment tool, able to bring in a diverse audience and show them opportunities across the industrial base. The others, however, are dubious. Most submarine jobs are in the Northeast; most NASCAR viewers are in the South and Midwest. What is the likelihood of someone from Alabama uprooting and moving to Connecticut to build boats based on an ad on the side of a racecar or a can of beer? A better method would be to take a regional approach to marketing, finding areas with significant concentrations of submarine industrial contractors and attempting to capture every spare STEM and vocational student possible.
Recruiting must become more targeted and pivot to students of interest as early as possible. Electric Boat president Kevin Graney is aware of this, noting, “The people that we hire in 2033, think about this, are currently in the second grade.” Moreover, education research suggests opinions on STEM as a career are decided by, at the latest, eighth grade. Simultaneously, STEM education is becoming vital to all aspects of submarine production; design engineers are not the only group who need a significant STEM background in building modern submarines. Additive manufacturing and 3D printing are the future, and computer numerical control machining is a core trade in the submarine industrial base. If the entire workforce needs a quality STEM education, and opinions on STEM are formed well before one enters the workforce, the U.S. Navy should invest in ensuring long-term production viability. That will require a strong elementary and secondary school pipeline. If short- and medium-term viability remains in doubt, the long term can still be salvaged through this pivot.
There are already programs prioritizing early intervention and pipeline development. Of particular note are the Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing program in Danville, Va., which trains about 1,000 machinists annually, and Electric Boat’s Westerly Education Center, which partners with local high schools to train students in the core trades for submarine production. Yet if the need is 10,000 workers per year, these programs are insufficient. It should be noted that the procurement risk is centered on the workforce. At the height of submarine production in the 1980s, the industrial base could reliably produce as many as eight boats per year, and the physical infrastructure — docks, cranes, and warehouses — still exists on site. They have been used for repair instead of for building contracts in the interim. Shipbuilders have the space to put five boats in the water each year, but they are struggling to find enough talent. Thus, the U.S. Navy should identify regions with a significant concentration of submarine industrial firms, with infrastructure already in place, and begin strategic partnerships with local schools and universities to build sustainable STEM pipelines. These programs should aim to get students excited about STEM early, teach them about submarines, and then make them aware of local opportunities for careers in building these enormous platforms. This is the only way to ensure the long-term survival of the submarine industrial base.
Conclusion
The submarine industrial base’s workforce crisis is not new. War on the Rocks put out multiple pieces in 2023 alone covering the procurement issues facing the industry. Breaking Defense similarly writes frequently about the sector. However, despite the regular stream of warnings over the past decade, the U.S. Navy appears to have not appreciated the scale of the workforce woes facing submarine procurement until recently. The rapid investment in rebuilding the fleet with the launch of Columbia appears to have coincided with a realization of the scale of the workforce development challenge.
Now, the U.S. Navy is trying to make up for lost time. But it is still not moving quickly enough. Significant investment and endless creativity have brought improvements. But recent numbers suggest that the sector will not meet its recruitment goals to deliver on the short-term needs of the U.S. Navy. As such, it is time to accept that there will be a period of diminished capacity for a significant part of the 2030s as delivery schedules continue to lag. This means it is also time to start thinking creatively about how to use the remaining underwater fleet more aggressively to maintain deterrence and surveillance.
More importantly, the United States is at a critical juncture and should abandon the spaghetti-on-the-wall approach to finding bodies to fill vacancies. Instead, for the long-term sustainability of the underwater fleet, workforce development dollars should be spent on encouraging the children who will one day be building the next generation of submarines. Getting them invested early, and in large numbers, is the only way to do this. The U.S. Navy, and its industry partners, should get into classrooms and get children excited to build submarines.
Alexander Grey is a Ph.D. student at the University of Connecticut and program manager for the University of Connecticut–University of Rhode Island Navy STEM Coalition within the National Institute for Undersea Vehicle Technology. He oversees a naval workforce development grant addressing the submarine industrial base. He has formed partnerships with Electric Boat, Naval Sea Systems Command, and the New London Naval Base to bring more engineering and building talent into the submarine sector by developing a K-16 pipeline.
Image: U.S. Navy
