Squeezing Water from a Stone: Five Missed Opportunities in Planning the Future of the U.S. Army
During the past 15 years, the U.S. Army has borne the brunt of the demands of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also called ISIL) — wars that are far from over. In this context, the fact that Congress felt compelled to establish a commission to consider the future mission and purpose of the Army tells us something dismaying about the quality of strategic thinking in Washington. As disorder spreads in the Middle East and regional powers such as Russia flex their muscles, we will undoubtedly rely time and again on the Army, whose reason for being is to deter and defeat adversaries. The real question is what resources Congress needs to provide to the Army to enable officers and soldiers to perform this mission.
Let’s start with the positive. The National Commission on the Future of the Army, which reported out last week, made some valuable points. First, it pushed back on some bad, politically driven ideas that questioned the need for a robust Army. The report affirmed that “land power will be required to fight and win wars now and in the future, despite the aspirations of some to fight wars at arm’s length.” It also stated that demands for Army forces are increasing. While these points might seem obvious, they implicitly challenge the worldview of the Obama administration, which has consistently undervalued the role of conventional ground forces in its way of war and for keeping the peace.
Second, the commission rightly focused attention to a key tension facing today’s Army: how to balance the need to prevail in a fight against conventional and irregular enemies and the requirement to reshape the Army for future challenges. The report insists the Army must do both. Unless the Army is able to win the wars that “we’ve got,” as Jim Dubik has pointed out, it will have a hard time positioning itself for future wins.
Third, the report highlights the problem of “risk to mission” and “risk to force.” The former means that Army forces do not have the capability and capacity to accomplish assigned missions — whether in the near term (e.g., “fight tonight”) or the longer term. It makes the excellent point that because the joint force is interdependent, Army risk to mission has a domino effect on the capability of the entire joint force. “Risk to force” addresses the problems that the Army will face as it seeks to maintain the health of its all-volunteer force. It noted that the force was at risk in several ways, including the fact that the Army cannot recruit and retain enough qualified men and women with the needed skill sets.
Fourth, the commission correctly praised the Army for some of its “creative options on organizational designs for major Army combat formations” and urged the continued modeling of “alternative Army design and operational concepts — including the Reconnaissance Strike Group, Hybrid Battalion Task Force, Stryker Global Response Force, and the Reconnaissance and Security Brigade Combat Team.”
Fifth, the report reaffirmed the value of armored forces for conducting major combat operations, particularly in Europe, noting that such forces take significant time to prepare and resources to sustain. The commission noted that underestimating armored force requirements increases risk to mission and recommended that the Army should increase armored brigade combat team (ABCT) capacity based on the current and projected threat environment.
If commissions exist to speak truth to power, however, this one might have spoken louder on other key debates affecting the future of the Army.
First, the commission pulled its punches on Army end strength. It endorses a minimum level of manpower, while admitting existing rotational policies actually leave the active duty force understrength in the event of simultaneous contingencies. On the one hand, it countered arguments for additional troop reductions, making clear that a total force of 980,000 (with an active Army of 450,000) was the “absolute minimum” that the United States would need in order not to incur greater risk. On the other hand, however, it discussed the problems that a force of this size would have in undertaking the missions assigned to it, given Army rotation policies, existing Army commitments, and the need to be prepared to handle “three significant near simultaneous events” — such as a large-scale homeland defense response, a large-scale conventional operation, and a limited-duration deterrence mission. Though the report refers in many places to the tensions caused by existing rotation policies, it does not clearly draw out the operational implications for a force of 450,000: An active Army of that size cannot fulfill its missions while maintaining the needed rotational base.
Since the report also offers an extensive discussion of modeling used by the Army it might have used some models to explore the limitations of 450,000 active duty troops given existing and future mission requirements. Sustaining deployments calls to mind what Kevin Benson has described as the mathematics of war, which takes into account what is required to go to the war, fight and win the war, and establish the conditions for security so that a transition can take place.
Second, as discussed at length at War on the Rocks by Andrew Hill of the U.S. Army War College, the report was oddly silent about one of the key problems that the Army — and the nation — has struggled with for the past 15 years: the problem of how to consolidate the gains of combat, often through extended stability operations. The commission seems to accept the commitment expressed by the Pentagon in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” The trouble is, reality keeps intervening in the form of continued challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.
While the political will to sustain a meaningful footprint in Afghanistan and use conventional military force to bring Middle Eastern civil wars to an end may not be in the cards in this administration, refusing to plan for something does not mean it will go away. As such, the omission of stabilization-related missions is surprising and I would be curious to know if the commission considered the issue behind closed doors.
Third, the commission hedges about how to modernize the Army. While the commissioners seemed to support the Army’s approach of prioritizing readiness and capacity, it noted that its “consequences for modernization are regrettable.” It warned that the Army’s current efforts to protect science and technology investments, incrementally improve existing fleets of vehicles, and delay the procurement of the next generation of platforms will strain its ability to build the foundation for the future force and put major acquisition programs at risk. Thus, while it stated that “investing in near-term readiness is a must,” it warned that if more resources could not be identified for modernization through changes in Army structure, processes, and programs, the long-term risk to force and mission would be significant. As David Johnson of RAND has pointed out, even if we do not end up in a conflict with Russia and China today, future conflicts “will almost surely find us confronting their weapon systems. We are vulnerable to these capabilities now, and these vulnerabilities need to be dealt with now to avoid operational and political surprise” in the future.
Fourth, the commission hedged regarding the need for more U.S. forces in Europe. It did imply that the United States had made a serious mistake in removing so many troops from Europe given the shifting strategic picture there. It also did “suggest” that, in light of the relatively lengthy timelines associated with deploying armored brigade combat teams, there was a need to return to permanent stationing of an ABCT in the region. But its language was not as strong as that in a new report by U.S. European Command. This report states clearly that the United States
cannot fully mitigate the impact felt from a reduction in assigned military forces through the augmentation of rotational forces from the United States. The temporary presence of rotational forces complements, but does not substitute for an enduring forward deployed presence that is tangible and real.
Fifth, the report fell in line with the Obama administration’s stubborn and dangerous refusal to identify threats by name, which, of course, has specific implications for what the United States, and its Army, must do to defeat its adversaries. The commission chose to echo White House obfuscation with its observation that “terrorism has emerged as the most visible threat to Americans and the nation’s allies.” It might have used its platform to identify these groups not as terrorists (terrorism is a tactic) but instead to describe what is in fact threatening the United States: a mass movement led by extremist and violent Islamists with clear ideological, political, and military objectives that require a tailored political-military strategy to defeat it. With its almost stilted reference to ISIL as “the organization currently receiving the most attention on the threat spectrum,” the commission perpetuates the White House’s insistence on parsing each “organization” that embodies this threat, as if there were no connections between the “organization” that is ISIL and the virulent political and religious ideologies roiling the states and the many disintegrating states of the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world.
It is hard not to think that the commission’s recommendations are a bit like trying to squeeze water from stone. If we want the Army to be able to perform its assigned missions, which include handling three simultaneous operations, deterring adversaries such as Russia and China, and engaging in the long war against violent Islamists, we need an active force larger than 450,000 troops and we need sound policies and laws that permit appropriate access to the 530,000 troops in the Guard and reserve. Innovation, new designs for combat units, and wishing away threats won’t do the job. The commission missed an opportunity to explain to policy-makers that, in light of current and likely future challenges, the bottom line is that underinvestment in our Army is creating unacceptable risk in our military’s ability to deter and defeat adversaries.
Nadia Schadlow is a senior program officer at the Smith Richardson Foundation who occasionally writes on defense and foreign policy-related issues.
Photo credit: Staff Sgt. Grady Jones, U.S. Army
captcouv 
Good assessment and spot on! It is stupid to think that U.S. won’t engage in future stability or peacekeeping operations. These type of operations are essential to shaping a political solution to conflicts. A 450,000 force of active duty soldiers is not enough unless dwell times between deployments of 12-months or less becomes the norm, particularly for high-demand specialties. How soon we forget the lessons learned of past conflicts!
“…has struggled with for the past 15 years: the problem of how to consolidate the gains of combat, often through extended stability operations. ”
Yet we continue to ignore the successful examples in history for doing just such: The US Marine Corps in the Carribbean; the US Army in the Phillipines; the East India Company/Great Britain in India, Nepal, Burma (yes I remember the Sepoy Rebellion -but that was after 100 years) – all examples of locally recruited troops officered and NCO’d (initially) by Regulars. In the case of US involvement, this provides for local employment (and Retirement!) with US Dollars (now the families are beholden) and local influence with respect to local customs. This method also provides opportunity to educate the hired army in all manner of things, but particularly leadership in western, democratic style. In many cases, these, trained, hired army leaders would migrate to the local government army bringing those professional lessons and lessening the US military requirement over time. Yes, this is a financial cost to the US for salaries, equipment and support but much more economical in terms of US military manpower needed for stability operations.
The commission flubbed it. First, it’s a simple call for MORE! MORE money, MORE people. No regard for the fact the US is already in the hole $18 trillion. Second, regardless of the size of the Army or how much money we spend on them, the results are the same. We keep losing wars. The Army spend BILLIONS of war money reorganizing (because it couldn’t afford to do that in its base budget) into the BCTs and now want to reorganize again. One of two things I learned in college was…when all else fails reorganize because it has the appearance of progress. The Army’s structure is STILL seriously flawed to fight insurgencies. Third, sure, we need to beef up the forces in Europe to real combat units, but within the current total forces. If Europe feels threatened by Russia, let THEM double the sizes (and pay for) of their militaries! We should NOT be subsidizing them with dollars we borrow from China under the “European Initiative.” Last, I understand and appreciate the dwell time math, but when at war, STAY at war until the fightings done. That’s the way it was done in WW2. This rotational application of military forces says we’re not dedicated and weak.
There have been many commissions about US Army topics that were so contentious that the usual processes were stalled. The conflicts arose because someone did not want to be the bill payer for change, and the commissions were intended to overcome those objections. The primary conflict that this commission was to resolve was the distribution of aviation among the active, Guard and Reserve components. If the Guard pushes back successfully, it will keep its Apache helicopters. The other points made by the commission are much less important and will probably be ignored.
With regards two your first two issues with the report (End Strength and Capitalization) you are forgetting that the Army isn’t just a means of carrying on political discourse by force but also a representation of American political ideals. As the folks from the Lawfare podcast pointed out a few days ago populist American ideas of our international involvement are changing. Joe Voter on the street doesn’t see the value in pursuing policy as we have over the last 70+ years. If there is anyone to fault, it is ourselves in failing to make a compelling case for preservation of the American Liberal International system.
With regards to the last point it also seems you forget that the military instrument is not the sole instrument of power and it that is subordinate to National Grand Strategy. Just because something isn’t named publicly doesn’t mean it is neglected. Furthermore, it seems a stretch to say that a commission formed by the Congress was skewed in favor of Presidential Policy.