Last month’s release of the 2016 Marine Corps Aviation Plan highlighted the service’s struggles to keep its planes flying and its pilots trained. Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, the deputy commandant for aviation, stated in the report’s introduction that the Corps has seen “a decrease in flight hours per month per aircrew and an uptick in [its] mishap rates,” leading to concerns about the readiness of Marine squadrons. These challenges stem, in part, from two conditions impacting the force as a whole: The Corps is continuing to deploy thousands worldwide even as the size of the force has shrunk; and the budgetary turmoil of the past few years has prevented the service from carrying out important maintenance and equipment updates. Aviation readiness will continue to suffer despite the best efforts of the Marine Corps unless adequate funding levels are maintained and operational commitments are limited to what is sustainable.
Bryan Clark and I described the difficulties posed by the Corps’ high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in our recent report, Deploying Beyond Their Means: America’s Navy and Marine Corps at a Tipping Point. Although the U.S. troop commitment in Afghanistan has fallen precipitously, the resumption of a rotational deployment program in the Pacific and an increasing number of deployments in response to contingencies in Africa continue to place large demands on Marine manpower. The Corps is also in the midst of a drawdown that will ultimately reduce its overall strength to 182,000 by 2017. There are currently some 30,000 marines deployed overseas out of an active force of 186,000. That total is just 6,000 fewer than in January 2014, when there were more than 196,000 men and women on active duty. The Corps’ manning and resources are declining faster than its operational commitments.
The Marine Corps’ punishing OPTEMPO is taking a toll on Marine aviation’s people and hardware. Global security commitments have forced the service to sustain a deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio in the active force of 1:2, or two months at home for every month deployed. This figure is well below the ideal ratio of 1:3, which the Corps has determined would be optimal for the health of the force. Personnel assigned to units that are in particularly high-demand, such as MV-22 Osprey and KC-130 tanker squadrons, are enduring D2D ratios below 1:2. These excessive deployment requirements tax the force in a myriad of ways, from reducing marines’ time with their families to preventing them from receiving training that is critical to their individual readiness. In the long term, insufficient downtime between deployments can adversely affect the Corps by pushing its most experienced marines to leave the service.
Aircraft are also suffering from the operational demands being placed on them. Current global requirements have precluded any “reset” following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The unprecedented flight time these aircraft incurred during combat has prematurely aged many platforms. Some, like the F/A-18 Hornet, have served well beyond their intended lifespan and are kept flying only with the help of costly modifications and extensive maintenance. Both measures eat up precious funding and extend the time the platforms must spend in the hangar instead of in the air.
The Corps is still contending with the effects of the 2013 sequestration, when the service was forced to make dramatic spending cuts by furloughing key civilian specialists and stopping overtime work. These furloughs, in turn, slowed the pace at which aircraft can go through depot maintenance, leading to a backlog of airframes waiting to undergo overhaul. As a result, aviators in the fleet are struggling to maintain their skills with limited numbers of aircraft to fly. The Corps has concluded that it is 20 percent short of the aircraft necessary to meet its readiness standards, defined as having a squadron complete 70 percent or more of its essential training requirements. Squadrons that have low readiness ratings present more of a safety risk in peacetime and threaten to erode the qualitative edge that U.S. pilots have historically enjoyed in combat.
The 2016 Aviation Plan identifies material readiness as being “the key component to current readiness,” and outlines some initiatives to increase the number of Ready Basic Aircraft (RBA) that squadrons can field. The Corps is in the process of carrying out independent readiness reviews on a number of its legacy platforms in order to identify areas for improvement, such as improving sustainment management and ensuring squadrons have access to an adequate supply of spare parts. In addition, the new airframes many squadrons will be receiving as they transition to advanced platforms may help alleviate some maintenance woes.
In the long run, however, there is no escaping the reality that current global requirements are severely taxing a Marine Corps that is much smaller and more fiscally constrained than it was several years ago. Maintenance process improvements can only do so much if too few aircraft and aircrew are being asked to fly too often. Marine leaders have declared their intention to focus on readiness and are striving to achieve dramatic, across-the-board improvements by 2020. To be successful, the Corps will need to receive a steady, predictable stream of funding — a repeat of the 2013 sequester would be disastrous — and the service’s OPTEMPO must be contained to limit the stress placed on both equipment and personnel. It may be possible to “do the same with less,” as former Commandant Gen. James Amos declared in 2014, but if Marine aviators are asked to “do more with less,” the community will inevitably suffer an even further degradation of its readiness and combat capability.
Jesse Sloman is a research assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve. He served on active duty from 2009 to 2013.
Photo credit: Sgt. Christopher Q. Stone, U.S. Marine Corps
pts 
captcouv 
FedUpWithWelfareStates 
The solution is to vote for TRUMP ?
the solution is to not to vote for TRUMP
He is not a Christian or any experience in the military
Mr Soloman,
Good article, however a good number of these wounds are self inflicted because the Marines are asking to do more. Additionally the Aviation procurement is vastly better than the ground side where forces are still running around in AAVs and LAV25s from generations ago. Examples
1. Assist visits and partnership with African and South American nations. Just because the former SOUTHCOM CDR was a great Marine, the USMC expanded missions south of the border. Also why are we doing dedicated visits to Africa. Just as bad is the Army and NG setting up African visits.
2. The JSF. One of the reasons why the F18 and to a lesser extent the Harrier are falling apart is the money being sucked up by the JSF. The aircraft was supposed to be fielded almost 8 years ago. We have still not seen a deployment nor do we expect it to for a few more years. There is a huge litany of problems with the aircraft that include the problems operating out of austere locations and lets not discuss the problems that it had on the Wasp.
3. The V22. For the price of 1 V22 you could have had roughly 3 AH60 versions of the BlackHawk (the one with the chin gun and the ability to operate as an attack helo) or the SPECOPS versions. FMC/PMC rates are terrible and having spent time on the LHA/LHDs, I watched this complex machine eat up maintenance and deck space. Lets not even talk about cost per flight hour.
4. Using an expensive platform when cheaper items are worth it. Also a problem with the USAF. A handful of Super Turanos or AT6s would have dramatically reduce the wear and tear on top line aircraft. Why we had F18s doing route clearance missions with IT pods is just one example.
5. Special MAGTFs for regional response. While not a bad idea, what discussion was done with the JSOC and their requirement to provide COCOM QRT support? Have we just duplicated a SOCOM mission again? Also is this not a job to share especially in Europe/North Africa with the 173rd Airborne?
6. Marines in Eastern Europe. We sent a Heavy unit (tanks, LAVs, ect) to play around in eastern Europe. Why? Is this a better job for an Army unit. Why play around with a reinforced Mechanized Company when the Russians are using multiple Battalion Sized Battle Groups.
7. We are drunk off of the “War accounts” that are now in decline. We burned up equipment (including parts), service life and people during the massive Marine support to OIF and OEF. Instead of buying parts, we spent money on JSF and V22 (back to those two platforms) We had to us old CH53Ds in OEF because the V22 could not handle a hover in the mountains in Helmand.
8. The Money is not there, the Navy is decommissioning a whole Carrier Airwing. Maybe the USMC should gut a MAG or two. Maybe the one in Iwakuni?
9 Of the 6 functions of Marine Air… we are doing pretty poorly on our stated goals. EW will be dead when the EA-6B is going. Granted it was doing a lot of Joint work and allegedly the JSF will cover for it. Assault Support, we are doing ok again the problems and cost of the V22 hurts. Lets not talk about how we screwed the 46 community by promising them that they will be stood down for almost a decade as the V22 was still going though challenges. Anti air, outside of a few stingers and our fighters where is anything to replace the old Hawks? Offensive Air Support… again we are praying on the complex and expensive JSF to eventually deliver. Granted it is over 8 years late but who is counting. Aerial Reccon? Well we have not replaced the OV10s (which could fly off LHA/LHDs) or the RF4s, so I guess we have to rely upon the ever increasingly burdened JSF (someday). Finally control of Air/Missiles.. I guess we are doing ok there.
pts, your comments are spot on! Bravo Zulu.
So we continue to reduce forces in the Marines and Army to buy high price super weapons which can’t compete with the systems they replace. The “gots to have” attitude of pols who get kickbacks along with officers selling us out to get that special job after retirement is sick. Flying around in Hueys in Vietnam got us where we needed to be, doesn’t seem like we are doing it better now…..
I agree we got no where, doesn’t seem like we are doing it now. The “gots to have”, attitude of pols; who get kickbacks along with officers selling us out to get that special job. After retirement is sick. That’s right to continue the reducing the forces of Marines and Army. Buying the high price super weapons with the system replacement that can’t compete
Am I missing something?
30,000 deployed of 186,000 is 16%.
36,000 of 196,000 is 18%.
So hasn’t the proportion of deployed Marines fallen?
Yup. But that figure does not support the “Cry Poor Mouth” agenda the author is pushing. I mean, OMG — America is down to its last $590 Billion for Defense!!
pts: Knocking the X-ring out of the black!
One Fixed Wing Air Force (all fixed wing assets) — U.S. Air Force. STOP the madness, we DO NOT need “THREE (USAF, USN, & USMC)” separate Fixed Wing Air forces!
USMC should be restricted to rotary wing only!
I am sorry to say, I am not a fan of one Fixed Wing Air Force for the US. As a former naval aviator who has spent a lot of time with both Marine and AF air, I see tremendous problems for a single “Air Force”
1. The myopic view from the USAF that air power is the savior for all of warfare. That any problems with the use of airpower is that the wrong strategist or leader misused airpower or that the a failure is the result of not having the next greatest widget available that will change everything.
2. The Air Force’s inability to support the other service unless forced to. See A10, also Vietnam and the use of F105 and having to buy older Navy A1s. Or even the Army Sherpa replacement, or the sigint birds they fly in support of the Army.
3. See also the Royal Navy airpower starting in WW2 (the only carrier nation to fly biplanes into the war because the RAF did not see a need carriers or navy support)
4. The belief that centralized C2 and direction of air assets against deep strike or enemy leadership targets is the best way to employ airpower.
5. Stealth for every mission. Why send a 100+mil aircraft for a mission that a cheap prop plane can do for a fraction of the cost and thus you have the ability to provide more coverage by having 20 of for the price of one JSF or F22?
I could go on. Each of the services bring a unique take on aviation that I think is still viable and worth the cost.
pts I agree with your Airforce for each service doctrine.
The problem is still that the U.S.A.F. eats up most of the Defense Budget with their ”Stealth” Aircraft. No one seems to be able to stop this trend. America has a large reserve Airforce out in the desert that could be brought back into the mix, but instead these aircraft are being sold off to other [Sometimes Hostile] Governments. Aircraft types are being yearly retired only to be picked up for minimal dollars to be used again. While the U.S.Military sits with no replacements for these types. Time for the American public to wake up.