Editor’s Note: This piece on the War on the Rocks Hasty Ambush blog is published in partnership with the Hoover Institution’s new Military History in the News, a weekly column from the Hoover Institution that reflects on how the study of the past alone allows us to make sense of the often baffling daily violence, not by offering exact parallels from history, but rather by providing contexts of similarity and difference that foster perspective and insight—and reassurance that nothing is ever quite new.
There is something about weapons “testing” that excites all of mankind’s most irrational emotions. The worst example has been the Pentagon’s official test agency, which is—most of the time—dedicated to the proposition that anything can be blown up. A missile designed to destroy heavy tanks can also cripple lighter-weight fighting vehicles. If a big mine is detonated underneath a small ship, the ship doesn’t work quite so well. And so on; you get the idea.
The latest weapons-test-buzz to enflame the passions of defense reporters and reformers was a recent “dogfighting” encounter between the very expensive F-35 strike fighter and a lowly, old F-16. As the headline writers at the War Is Boring blog put it, the test supposedly demonstrated that “the F-35 can’t dogfight” and “the new stealth fighter is dead meat in an air battle.” Others in the press jumped into the fray: the F-35 has always been a lousy airplane, a horse designed by a three-service committee, gold-plated and too complex to work.
But stories that are too good to be true usually aren’t, and this is no exception. The test in question was a test of maneuverability; pitting the F-35 against the F-16 is sort of like asking a minivan to go up against a Porsche in a cornering test. The minivan may be brand new and the Porsche a mid-1970s relic, but when it comes to coming ‘round the bend, it’s no contest. But what this has to do with air-to-air combat is quite another question.
Modern aerial combat is less like Top Gun than a video game. “Jinking” and “pulling Gs” are things that pilots do just before their planes explode, not the tricks of the ace. The contest is mostly an electronic one: who has the best sensors, the best command-and-control networks, and the most capable missiles. Oh, yes: “stealth” still matters. A lot. While stealth features don’t amount to a Star-Trek-style “cloaking device,” confusing adversaries’ radars and other sensors gives U.S. aircraft a big advantage. In the game of aerial quick-draw, they get to shoot first. In the real world, “Maverick” never sees the bullet that kills him.
And it won’t be a bullet, but a missile: since Vietnam, the only time a U.S. Air Force pilot has used his cannon against another aircraft was in 1991, when an A-10 pilot used his Gatling gun to shoot down an Iraqi helicopter. In the old days, about 60 percent of air-to-air kills were with guns. That’s declined to about 5 percent.
The guys with the silk scarves and the Raybans still look hot. But in the true air-combat danger zone, it’s the geeky guy with the heavy helmet and the squat looking airplane, flying straight and smooth and talking to his computer rather than his wingman who’s going to come home alive. Dogfighting is, well, for the dogs.
Thomas Donnelly, a defense and security policy analyst, is the codirector of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
Image: U.S. Air Force
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“And it won’t be a bullet, but a missile: since Vietnam, the only time a U.S. Air Force pilot has used his cannon against another aircraft was in 1991, when an A-10 pilot used his Gatling gun to shoot down an Iraqi helicopter. In the old days, about 60 percent of air-to-air kills were with guns. That’s declined to about 5 percent.”
That’s a pretty bad assumption, because since Vietnam we haven’t exactly gone head to head against any other capable Air Forces. We can never assume the next conflict is going to be like the last.
•Grenada- None
•Panama- None
•Libyan Raid- vs Air Defense, did they launch any aircraft
•First Gulf War- vs air defense, Iraqi Pilots fled, although wasn’t there one MIG engagement
•Bosnia- None
•Kosovo-?
•Afghanistan- None
•Iraq round 2- They buried their aircraft or removed them from the country
•Libya- None
•CT operations globally- None
So let’s not rule out the value of the cannon on fighter aircraft just yet. What do you think would happen if we engaged the Russians over Europe or the Chinese over Taiwan or even the North Koreas if they Invaded South Korea?
If future fights are all about missiles and radar, why have lots of fighters? Why not just build big stealthy bombers with better radars, lots of long-range missiles, and maybe drones for protection?
With this set-up you could have much, much more responsive drones by controlling them via line of site, eliminating the pesky satellite bounce and control delays. You could also augment with land or sea based missiles. While the missiles and advanced bombers for this solution may be far more expensive than the F-35 and AIM-120 or 9X, the need for fewer aircraft is probably less expensive than maintaining thousands of fighters. If fighters are necessary, then the ability to dog fight is also necessary.
In Kosovo we shot down five enemy aircraft, at least some of them MiG-29s, but we destroyed over 100 planes on the ground, so it wasn’t much of an air threat for long.
Let’s leave the maneuvering aside.
The F-35 carries 2 BVR and 2 WVR missiles internally.
You can’t seriously argue that’s adequate for a plane that’s going to make up 75%+ of our fighter force.
The math just doesn’t work.
I’d love to hear your response as to how this can be overcome.
It does have 6 hard points on the wings to carry another 15,000 lb + the 3000lb in the Bay
It’s replacing the Harrier, F-16 and F-15
AV-8B Harrier
Hardpoints: 6× under-wing pylon stations holding up to 9,200 lb (4,200 kg) of payload
F-16
Hardpoints: 2× wing-tip Air-to-air missile launch rails, 6× under-wing, and 3× under-fuselage pylon (2 of 3 for sensors) stations with a capacity of up to 17,000 lb (7,700 kg)
F-15
Hardpoints: Total 11 (not including CFTs): two under-wing (each with additional two missile launch rails), four under-fuselage (for semi-recessed carriage of AIM-7 Sparrows) and a single centerline pylon station, optional fuselage pylons with a capacity of 16,000 lb (7,300 kg)
The A-35 is a bad dogfighter.
The next problem is the A-35 is also not good at long range fights:
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/no-the-f-35-can-t-fight-at-long-range-either-5508913252dd
Future air combat is unlikely to involve gunfighting, but it will undoubtedly involve energy and geometry management, which the F-35 struggles with.
Air-to-air missiles fly further when they are launched at higher speeds and higher altitudes, and are generally gliding when they reach their targets. Even the best radar in the world won’t make the missile physically fly further.
In visual-range combat, there are distinctly advantageous shooting positions.
Better sensors are always better, but a more agile fighter is also always better. The F-35’s prayer is that nobody will figure out how to jam their sensors; in other words, the generally vain hope that our enemies will be stupid.
F35c replaces the A6 for carriers
F35a replaces the F117 and convert F117 to UAV “Kamakasi commando” Boomer bombers
F35b replace the Harrier for the happy marines
The 35 is designed to fight the war the generals want to fight.
Let us all pray that the next war fits their narrative, because, if it doesn’t,
♫So long, it’s been good to know Ya♫