Bullets pelt the armored plating of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle as insurgents surround the small convoy. A rocket-propelled grenade ravages the lead vehicle, forcing the occupants to dive for cover from the flames and shrapnel. The convoy is outgunned and outnumbered by the well-coordinated insurgent attack. The Joint Terminal Attack Controller is unavailable and no one can precisely locate the enemy. Fast moving fighters soar past but cannot identify enemy targets. So the pilots come low into the valley to provide a show of force until a lucky burst from an insurgent machinegun hits a wing and causes the fighter pilot to crash. A more proficient pilot might have coaxed the damaged plane home but reduced flight hours have reduced pilot proficiency overall and especially on Close Air Support (CAS) — a second priority. The bombers fly circles overhead with 40,000 pounds of bombs hoping someone will provide the enemy’s location before they get danger close to the MRAP. Unfortunately, coordinates never arrive and the enemy kills half the convoy and spirits equipment and prisoners into caves, securing a great propaganda victory.
The above vignette is more true to a likely combat scenario than the one that opened a recent War on the Rocks article by Derek O’Malley and Andrew Hill on the future of close air support (CAS). Air Force fighters and bombers provided great support to ground forces in their vignette. Unfortunately, there are many situations where only purpose-built CAS aircraft have the capabilities necessary to meet the needs of ground forces that they accurately describe. More importantly, O’Malley and Hill make erroneous and dangerous assumptions about future warfare, miss the key future procurement issue, and fail to address the substantive arguments for a dedicated CAS plane that can save billions.
Two Dangerous Assumptions about Future War
Most importantly, O’Malley and Hill overestimate the ability of technology to make U.S. forces “nearly impossible to ambush” due to an exceedingly high “degree of situational awareness” from “dozens of land and sea-based unmanned air and ground surveillance assets” with “automated processing and exploitation algorithms.” This idea defies historical precedent and the interactive nature of war. As LTG H.R. McMaster said, in the past we have assumed “advances in … technology, … automated decision-making tools, and so on were going to make war … efficient, and relatively risk free — that technology would lift the fog of war … But that’s not true, of course.”
During my time playing a small role supporting numerous combat missions, I routinely saw the enemy adapt to and evade high-tech intelligence efforts with low-tech solutions — we improved, they improved in a continuous cycle. When we find an adversary who wants to lose, he might allow us the situational awareness described in O’Malley and Hill’s fictional story. However, at that point there will be no need for human soldiers or the staff supporting them. Without the fantastic automation described in the fictional story, a lone F-35 pilot cannot simultaneously fly and direct unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) with any precision. The fog of war will continue no matter how many unmanned surveillance assets flood an area because war is an interactive enterprise and the enemy adapts.
The authors’ second crucial mistake is failing to appreciate future requirements to frequently operate in low air threat environments, preferring to focus solely on a future “that features widespread surface and air threats.” The United States must prepare for the proliferation of air threats and high-end threats. However, the threat from most enemies and near-peer competitors is dramatically different; most U.S. military operations will likely continue occuring on the “low-end” against adversaries with limited, or at least inexpensive, anti-air capabilities for many years to come at a minimum. Surface-to-air missile proliferation is a problem and generally poses a greater threat to slow aircraft lacking stealth. However, more advanced aircraft lack immunity, especially when there are flight ristrictions, as demonstrated by a Serbian anti-aircraft missile battery’s ability to shoot down a stealth F-117 fighter in 1999. Furthermore countries like China are working hard to defeat U.S. stealth technology.
Admittedly, low-end threats should be the Air Force’s second priority despite their greater frequency today, which will likely continue in the future. However, using expensive aircraft for low-end missions will quickly consume Air Force spending, and forces changes to ground operations. I have watched commanders change plans based on aircraft availability and know of others who have canceled dangerous missions because the only available aircraft were not CAS-specific. With the right tactics, fighters and bombers can provide CAS, but they do not do it as well. Similarly, “legacy” attack aircraft, like the A-10, can fight in a high air threat environment but at a higher risk that good tactics (e.g. pairing with fighter cover) can reduce but not eliminate. While legacy Air Force aircraft may sustain casualties, their casualty rates will likely remain lower than the more vulnerable Army and Marine Corps attack helicopters operating in the same environment. While unfortunate, the sacrifices of brave CAS pilots (helicopter and plane) will save lives on the ground and increase the potential for battlefield success.
Procurement
“Single-role” plane procurement offers a potential way to increase funding for Air Force priorities. Sadly, like the Air Force, Hill and O’Mally prioritize generalization over specialization and advocate for “joint development and resourcing of systems.” Unfortunately, joint procurement often fails. RAND’s 2014 study demonstrates that historical joint aircraft acquisitions generally increase program complexity, technical risk, and overall cost. These programs have caused “unwelcome design compromises, contributed to the shrinking of the industrial base, and increased strategic and operational risk.” For example, the Marine Corps requirement to land and take off vertically forced all F-35 Joint Strike Fighter variants to accept a less aerodynamic shape, which potentially gives the Chinese F-35 clone an advantage.
Due to physics, the ideal characteristics making a plane, manned or unmanned, effective at CAS generally detract from its ability to excel in air-to-air combat. Key characteristics ideal for CAS include efficient fuel use (loiter time), low and slow flying (target discrimination and acquisition), and rough landing strip capability (close to the fight). These characteristics generally lead to greater wing area and weight. Response time is also important and more congruent with air superiority requirements but less important than the ability to distinguish friend from foe and precise targeting. The Air Force needs more specialized planes (manned or unmanned) to increase capabilities while reducing costs; mediocre “multi-role” fighters create excessive costs.
Air Force pilots realize the greater capabilities of the A-10 for CAS and F-22 for air superiority missions but incorrectly assume the F-35 saves the Air Force money. Operating a fleet of 881 A-10s and 881 F-22s instead of 1,762 F-35As could save the Air Force $1 to $9 billion annually in operating costs, which would quickly make up for the $4-5 billion saved by the A-10’s retirement. The great variation depends on actual flight hours and how far F-35 operating costs can drop. If the F-35’s operational cost trajectory mirrors the F-22’s the drop may be negative; Congress expected the F-22’s 2008 cost of $44,000 per flight hour to decline dramatically but the cost rose to $53,084 in 2014. Buying a mixed F-22 and A-10 fleet might also cost less than an F-35 fleet. At worst, the A-10/F-22 fleet would be slightly more expensive but possess greater capabilities and lower operating costs.
I am not arguing to end the F-35 to obtain these savings, which cannot be fully realized due to past decisions including but not limited to existing F-35 purchases and purchase committments — cancellations incur substantial penalties. However, the dramatic operating cost differences suggest a broad problem with advanced “multi-role” fighter procurement and show why the Air Force’s cost argument to retire the A-10 without a low-cost (compared to the F-35 and F-22) CAS platform defies logic. CAS aircraft that are relatively cheap to operate would allow the Air Force to spend less money on the more common day-to-day missions in low air threat environments, while spending more on expensive stealth fighters (e.g. F-22/F-35) and other technologies (e.g. drones or 6th generation planes) for the rare but must-win fight in a contested air environment.
The A-10 Retirement
CAS is a mission, not a plane, and the emotions that plague the A-10 retirement debate fail to address substantive arguments against the decision. However, O’Malley and Hill use my article as evidence of criticism that exists “despite fiscal incentives” without ever addressing the fiscal analysis I provided (oriented on comparing A-10 operating costs to other current Air Force platforms). The debate remains emotional because most ground troops, like myself, fail to understand how the Air Force can claim to provide the same level of support with more expensive aircraft lacking similar capabilities. Ground troops generally believe only a purpose-built CAS aircraft with full-time CAS pilots can correct erroneous requests from troops under fire, identify changes to ground maneuver without notification, or carry sufficient ammunition to provide repeated “gun runs” when the enemy “hugs” friendly units in an effort to evade bombing. If Hill and O’Malley want to “weigh the evidence” and elevate the debate, they should evaluate alternative ways to save taxpayers billions by either using A-10s instead of more expensive planes or retiring any of the other four legacy Air Force fighters and bombers with overlapping capabilities. These other legacy aircraft cost more than A-10s and would suffer similar problems against a significant anti-air threat. Admittedly, using A-10s more will reduce taxpayer expenditures, not Air Force budgets, because overseas contingency operations funds combat operations.
If the A-10 decision is about saving money, the Air Force should explain why it is retiring the least expensive and most capable CAS aircraft without a similarly low-cost manned or unmanned replacement. The rationale for zero CAS-specific platforms but two multi-role planes (F-16 and F-35), two air superiority planes (F-15 and F-22), and three to four bombers (B-1, B-2, B-52, B-X) seems specious at best. As a CAS customer, it appears the Air Force should focus on developing cost-effective ways to streamline its aircraft portfolio and procurement process to maximize Air Force capabilities across mission sets instead of duplicating the products it prefers to produce. The Air Force must eliminate a plane due to budget constraints, but eliminating the cheapest plane with the greatest capability for the most common aerial combat mission remains the worst way to choose a plane for retirement.
Elevating the debate requires using evidence, not mistaken assumptions about future warfare in a gripping story. The Air Force appears trapped defending past decisions instead of weighing the evidence and listening to the advice of the Air Force’s CAS experts — Joint Terminal Attack Controllers. All airmen, from the newest graduate from Air Force Basic Training to the Air Force chief of staff, want to win wars and protect ground troops; however, succeeding in this task requires understanding the interactive nature of war and efficiently managing a tight budget by making wise fiscal decisions for operations and procurement. Past procurement decisions represent sunk costs the Air Force should continue ignoring; however, the Air Force should learn from those mistakes and make future operational and procurement decisions with a more realistic view of future threats and costs.
Major Benjamin Fernandes, U.S. Army, is a Council on Foreign Relations Term Member and PhD student at George Mason University. His studies focus on security assistance, principal-agent theory, and grand strategy. He is currently assigned to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government, U.S. Army, or TRADOC.
Tom 
mmcgannon 
Ted Danson 
James B. 
M.McGannon 
Jon 
CBCalif 
Tom 
L 
Ben 
Paladin 
CharleyA 
Neal Rauhauser 
StormTrooper 
Geodkyt 
Tjp 
Tyrone Bomba 
NeilW 
Joshua Jordan, KSC 
NavymanBill 
ckfinite 
JoshIII, Maj, USAFR (Ret) 
TomG 
What does the Air Force know about close air support. More importantly, what does the Air Force even care about CAS?
What missions do you think the USAF has been doing the last 14 years?
All those A-10s, F-15s, F-16s even the B-1s weren’t being used to provide CAS to the conventional Army and Marine units as well as special operations deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
How about the AC-130, what do you think that was used for…Airshows?
So we don’t have TACPs deployed with conventional units for the sole purpose to direct CAS or Combat Controllers deployed with Special Operations to direct CAS?
Really?
Amateurs talk platforms.
Professionals talk doctrine.
As long as the AF insists on WW2 era doctrine for CAS, whatever they buy will be inefficient and unresponsive.
In the 1940s and 50s, the Air Force was run by the bomber mafia. Today it is run by the fighter mafia. Until the ground-attack mafia gets a turn, the Air Force will always prioritize fighters and bombers over ground support.
The current USAF Chief of Staff is a former A-10/F-16 pilot
The previous was a C-130 pilot, before him also a transport pilot
The current Vice Chief is a career staff officer, not even a pilot
Chief of the Rsserves was a Figter and Tanker Pilot
Chief of the ANG was also and A-10 Pilot
Seriously, you’re counting the transport pilot who was chief for 31 days as proof fighter pilots don’t hold sway? A) James B is correct the fighter mafia holds tremendous sway – look at overall promotions. B) you’re probably right the AF is trying to be less less fighter centric-but that is nascent. Current chief appears to be far more fighter than attack pilot as his last A-10 assignment was OVER 30 years ago in 1984… I’d also humbly suggest Gen Schwartz was not really a C-130 pilot but a special operations forces pilot – big difference and probably why he was selected considering our SOF emphasis in 2008, transporter though he was.
One can write a straw man argument that proves some claimed position, just as one can make the claim that some weapons system or methodology will not prevail because your opponent is attempting to develop methods that defeat it or prevent its successful application. Neither of those arguing strategies prove a point, else (e.g.) the U.S. Army would have all anti-tank weapons and no tanks.
It would be an act of self-destruction for this country to organize a military and equip it based on the presumption that : “most U.S. military operations will likely continue occurring on the “low-end” against adversaries with limited, or at least inexpensive, anti-air capabilities for many years to come at a minimum.”
The writer’s argument (in this aspect) fails for two reason. First, as Sun Tzu noted, the most successful of military operations are those which succeed without the need to engage in hostile actions; and this country’s military has in the past excelled in proving the validity of that approach and aim of military operations. Operations by the Army in NATO defended areas of Europe (versus the Soviets), the Air Force in the air over various parts of the globe, and the Navy on the Seas has demonstrated our ability to strategically dominate those geographic arenas and prevent challenges to our military dominance in those critical areas. It is the technological advance in weapons systems and the accompanying operational methods that have enabled us to keep pace with the technologies and weapons systems our “potential’ opponents are developing to challenge our operational dominance in these strategically important operating arenas. Generally speaking, many military officers are simply not adequately educated in the technologies or experienced in the referenced strategic domains of the air or sea to pose a logical or accurate argument concerning the objectives or necessities of retaining military dominance therein. And, in those domains, removing the fog of operations is a key and necessary component of those activities such as in the ASW or anti-missile word. Perhaps, that would also be true when conducting convention military operations on the ground, such as those capabilities that will be needed to restrain the Russians in Europe.
Most military operations occur in these above domains, not in the over publicized low intensity operations that are conducted – which have their requirements that should be satisfied, given the available budget. Further, basing the needs of the military on our Nation’s wasteful and strategically disastrous and failed efforts to invade, occupy, and dominate the hostile and resisting population of a foreign occupied land would be the height of folly on the part of the U.S. How many times need we fail at that effort before determining they constitute Mission Impossible?
The Russians are not going to be impressed by military’s ability to conduct low intensity warfare. And, while I not suggesting we involve this country’s military again in the Middle East on a large scale basis, ISIS is not going to be impressed by our ability to conduct low intensity warfare or by an opposing air campaign averaging 15 bomb dropping sorties a day. Further the Chinese are not going to be deterred in the South China Sea (should that be an American objective) by any number of nickel-dime sized ships with machine guns as their primary weapons system accompanied by low tech helicopters carrying similarly capable weapons Neither are the Iranians in the Oil Tanker heavily transited Persian Gulf going to be impressed given their acquisition of modern submarines, A2AD capability, and little gun boats – all of which can best be destroyed by modern detection and weapons systems. It is those “potential struggles” against which the graater bulk of the military budgets should be applied.
As for those Flag and other Officers in the military, who in their capacity are concerned with securing positive results from low intensity operations, as they should be, they should determine and / or design (if necessary) the systems and equipment needed to succeed in that operating environment and argue for the dollar amount of budget they require to perform their mission, without assuming they have any understanding of the U.S. military’s operational needs outside of their domain. Simply put, they do not understand the requirements of others. In other words concentrate on your own needs without incorrectly attempting to address the needs of the military as a whole or by incorrectly stating the needs of the other areas of concern to the military, i.e. stop being political. And, if you have a need (in your opinion) not currently being provided for, by another branch, argue that it be included in your budget, determine the funding required and make your case. You cannot set the strategic priorities and operational methods for the other branches of the service, whose primary interest and concern is (and should be) the successful completion of their strategic mission – in the manner they deem it be completed.
This Nation can afford to fail to secure the results it aims at achieving in some low intensity conflict in some distant part of the world without damaging our strategic position – from a political and economic position. Our only strategic suffering will be the costs that were the costs in dollars drained from our treasury. On the other hand, we cannot afford to lose strategic dominance over those geographic areas of the word on which our political stature and economic condition depend. Budgeting scarce military funding, should that political situation arise – as it currently seems to so have, to secure / sustain the Nation’s primary strategic needs around the world is far more important than supporting the needs underlying the conduct of some low intensity conflict.
Nobody is suggesting we scrap the entire air-superiority branch of Air Combat Command, but using a over-$100-million F-35 to drop a $100,000 bomb on a pickup truck, while burning tens of thousands an hour in gas is probably not a sustainable model, particularly if the F-35 pilot spend all his time training for air to air and isn’t terribly proficient at CAS.
Also, the cutting edge air defense systems are both very expensive and of limited use to smaller militaries, so most of our third-world enemies will continue to be behind the power curve.
P.S
The author fails to realize the F-35 is designed to carry out “attack” missions. Attempting to so use the A-10 would turn it into a flying coffin — and it wouldn’t be flying for long. Our potential strategic enemies would find the 50 / 60 or so split between F-22s and A-10s laughable.
Military Officers need to understand their intellectual limitations, especially when it comes to deciding on how other branches should be configured. A former Navy Offiver, I make no pretense to understand the tactical needs of the Army. Again, if the Army has certain tactical needs their officers and supporters should develop their needs and specify the budget to provide that need — and stop trying to tell the other services what is best for them. In the latter instance they are acting far out of their spectrum of knowledge.
CBCalif: Your argument collapses under the terms of the Key West Agreement. In order to gain complete control over “strategic” air power – itself a phenomenon that history has largely falsified – the Air Force agreed to take on the role of providing CAS to the joint force. The primary “customers” of this support are the Army and Marine Corps, so it is absolutely within their purview to tell the Air Force which platform they believe to be best suited to meet their CAS needs, which the Air Force has committed to meeting. Of course, the Key West Agreement took place in 1948, and not unlike the concept of an independent Air Force, perhaps it deserves revisitation. (Robert Farley’s book is a good start.)
The year 1948 was a long time ago. As Paul Nitze noted his memoirs, the Army was then not interested in having CAS as part of their mission. Big mistake on the part of the Army.
For the Army only, it was picked up by the Air Force, however that never gives the recipient the power to command the provider in any way, shape, or form. That is not how the U.S. Military functions.
If the Army wishes a particular weapons systems platform, they should lobby to take over the mission.
Farley’s book and papers about the Air Force are nonsense and their content silly, but everybody has to make a living, and some even get to do it by dreaming nonsense.
As for Air Power, it is the key component of the U.S. military which assures this nation’s “actual” national interests can not be successfully attacked.
If this country wishes to waste trillions engaging in one failed (and completely unnecessary) so-called low intensity ground conflict after another, where the U.S. has absolutely nothing of strategic value to gain — so be it. Those campaigns which have usually resulted in one strategic failure after another, and drained our Treasury, can never be allowed to consume the entire US military — nor will they do so.
In the military reorganization of the late 1940’s the Air Force was not assigned the mission of providing CAS for any component of the Navy Department, nor will they ever do so.
As a former Navy Officer, I wish the Army well, but they need to aspire to providing their own CAS, like the Marines, if they want it provided their way.
Hear, hear, and thank you for your well though out comments sir, I for one as an officer would like to see more of this debate going back and forth between the services, and I for one would like to see the “iron bathtub,” alive and well. I know quite a few sm that thank their lives to the A-10, again personally would like to see this platform stick around for many years to come.
1. Please read articles fully before criticizing. Article says “low-end threats should be the Air Force’s SECOND priority,” saying the article suggests organizing based on low end threats is factually incorrect.
2. The benefits you correctly articulate from the U.S.’ overwhelming Joint Combat Power drives Putin to “Gray Zone” operations. How can we afford to operate in the Gray Zone (i.e. low-end) with aircraft as expensive as the B-1, B-2, F-35, and F-22? How can these pilots be prepared for the high end if they spend all their time fighting the low end?
3. There is little if any evidence for that U.S. “technological advance[s] in weapons systems and the accompanying operational methods that have enabled us to keep pace with the technologies and weapons systems our “potential’ opponents.” Potential US adversaries often steal technology from us, so our tech tends to advance their tech. We SHOULD continue R&D and advancing, but your argument fails against history.
4. Your Fog argument contradicts all experience. We should always attempt to reduce the fog of war because the enemy is always trying to increase it. However, there is no evidence to think anyone can eliminate it, which the Hill and O’Malley article says will happen. There is plenty of fog in the ASW and anti-missile worlds. When do you perfectly know where enemy subs or missiles are?
5. Factually, most combat operations (where shots are fired) occur on the low end. A quick look at combat operations over the past 20, 50, or 200 years should confirm this. This will almost certainly continue, especially if the US retains vast overmatch capabilities as we do now.
6. Building a military is about balancing operations, structure, readiness, and modernization. Using expensive to operate aircraft for current low-end operations prevents the military from buying the structure, readiness (to deter or fight in high-end conflict), and modernization necessary to keep the military strong. This applies to ALL services.
-Pure opinion, Putin likely loves our F-35 fiasco because it is eating our defense budget and he has no intention of direct confrontation
– I have yet to see anyone explain why A-10s (or an improved CAS aircraft) cannot fight in a high air threat environment when we expect attack helicopters fight in the same environment.
-The advisability of low-end missions lacks relevance, FACT: we do, have done, and will continue doing them. Each intervention requires a separate argument based on the merits of the specific case.
-You should probably define “attack” better. Do you mean SEAD/DEAD, deep strike? What mission can the F-35 do better than the A-10, F-22, B-1/2, or long range missiles?
-FYI, Air Force WANTS the CAS mission because they get funding for it, lose it and Congress will likely shrink the AF budget. Army cannot afford to take the A-10s without the budget transfer, hence senior leaders do not argue for transfer.
-USMC aircraft must fly off ships, hence no A-10s. BTW, I know at least a couple Marines who prefer A-10s to their jets.
“CAS is a mission, not a plane….”: right you are. The question is: is it a USAF mission today? It is incredulous to consider this mission without the folks who’s lives depend upon it from weighing in. Here’s the rub(s):
-USAF priorities: CAS isn’t even close to the top
-All weather, 24/7 CAS: never going to happen; weather grounds aircraft.
-Immediately available: when troops NEED suport, they need it right now, not in 30 minutes.
-Contested airspace: do you think the USAF will fly CAS aircraft in an extremely hostile air environment?
This mission should be evaluated by the DOD, not the USAF. The USAF’s only answer is a new airplane. Is this DARPA hard enough?
Our concern, as I made clear, is not what our selected third world enemies possess, it is the competing capabilities of the Russians, yhtthe Chinese, the increasing capabilities of the Iranians, etc. Strategically competing with them, and being anle to dominate them takes priority ovrr providong as wished support in strategically low meaning conflicts.
The trade off is capabilities available as needed for the strategic mission first, not fuel used efficiencies.
If rhe Army desires more, let them budget for and organize for their own such capabilities — or give them two thirds of the Marines, who seem to have as their primary mission being part of the Army. And, it is a dangerous to presume your enemies won’t possess mote advanced wrspons — ask the Russian pilots who flew in Afghanistan.
Joint CAS doctrine as published assumes / demands air superiority. The USAF’s justification for the F-35 to provide CAS in a contested environment is contrary to doctrine – in other words, they won’t do CAS until they’ve achieved air superiority. This reality supports the author’s proposed force structure: ~800 F-22 for AS, ~800 A-10 for CAS.
As for conducting CAS in the low intensity conflicts that we seem to not be able to resist, sending in a ~125M jet that costs 3+ times as much to operate as a perfectly suited (and paid for) A-10 makes little fiscal – or tactical – sense. And not even to mention that the F-35 will not have proper weapons to conduct CAS until after 2025 – right about when the A-10s were slated to retire.
The Army needs some form of air support tailored to ground forces needs. It matters not how one structures their supporting argument, that need will never be top priority for the USAF or USN. However, the Army and its supporters should think outside the box, rather than wasting everyone’s time trying to dictate to other branches of the military.
Here’s a solution — budget for and purchase (via cost transfer) your needs for air support by acquiring it on an ad needed basis from the best at that endeavor — the Marine Corps Air Wings. They have three rather robust air eings capable, equipped. and well practiced at supporting their three 20,000+ man divisions.
Covrt the operating costs of one of their Air Wings and thry should be happy to contract their services to the Army. Yhey are excellent at CAS — its how they make their living. Abd since they are the world renowned experts at thst mission, check out the type of aircraft they use to preform that missio — now and in the future. It is not what you think.
For the Army, contract out your air support needs to the best in that game — the Marines. They don’t complain about the other branches of the service, they have a need, they provide for it. Emulate their style.
Dude, you got some bad s**t.
Our field forces have changed dramatically since the last time we procured a dedicated CAS plane, an event over forty years(!) in the past.
The unit size for the 1970s was the division, the next battleground was Europe, and we expected to see a lot of armor. This theory got one field test during Desert Storm and the idea that Soviet era designs & doctrine could match the west was over.
We’ve shifted down in terms of size, the armor heavy division is gone, the Stryker brigade is here. And yet the A-10 continues to be an absolute workhorse for CAS, just like the Douglas Skyraider was in Vietnam.
Squat, ‘ugly’ planes with straight wings, plenty of hardpoints, and massive direct fire support are what every pinned down platoon or outgunned company wants to see above them. The Air Force always resists such planes, their complaints are often based on aesthetics and pilot ego, but once they’re present on the battle field they remain in service for a long, long time.
The F-35 is a disaster for CAS. The $20m cost $18k/hour A-10 can put 1,200 30mm shells on a target in a few minutes. Getting the same amount of ordinance down in the same amount of time would require six $200m F-35s at $60k/hour each. The Warthog is 60x as effective in terms of capital dollars and roughly 20x as effective in terms of operating cost.
We should collectively dub the F-35 the Feeding Trough and make that nickname stick, because it’s got equally ugly flaws for the other roles it’s allegedly going to fill. We’ve built bad fighters before, we should have seen this one coming a long way off.
That being said, if I was king for a day, I’d wave my scepter around and create CASCOM – a dedicated close air support command. Give them the A-10 the Air Force wants to discard, give them the Textron Airland Scorpion configured with the same avionic & a practice gun pod that lets pilots keep all their skills up in a $2k/hour plane. Give them the MQ-9 Reaper and let them hang whatever they feel would be effective on the hardpoints, but change doctrine so that they’re used for armed overwatch. Sloppy, long term drone based assassination campaigns are a policy blunder that we need to end.
We need something smaller than either the Warthog or the Scorpion for quick & dirty close range work. The A-29 Super Tucano is today’s proven turboprop, but I could get behind the procurement of a bunch of Boeing OV-10, so long as they find something to call it other than “Bronco II”.
The United States is facing an imperial collapse, just like the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the British Empire before them. We blundered into Afghanistan, adventured in Iraq, and bled out, just as Ossama bin Ladin predicted we would. Our armed forces are depleted and we are going to have to come to a stable configuration at a lower level of capability.
Post collapse Russia still had nuclear submarines, but by 2002 they didn’t make a single patrol, and they’ve suffered the losses that come with a lack of preparedness. Next to submarines, fixed and rotary wing aircraft operated close to the ground by pilots w/o enough hours are the very best way to lose men and machines. We’ll be performing that sad ritual with F-35s unless we come to our senses fairly soon.
@CBCalif: I think the Army would be happy to take the A-10 fleet from the Air Force and own the CAS mission, but there’s this thing called the Key West Agreement as well as Goldwater-Nichols. The Navy gets around that, but it jams the Army. The author is spot on…how many air superiority aircraft do we need? By the way, you’re right about budgeting though. As an Army guy, I know you won’t give me much credit, but you guys in the navy might want to put the “war” back in warship. Seriously, the LCS is $400M+ speed boat that is underarmed and under armored…and will be 1/6 of the entire battle fleet. Distributed Lethality is a good idea (and not a new one), but please build a warship that protect itself and go on the offensive.
When the Marines wanted their Mission established in Congressional stone — they lobbied Congress and achieved their results. The Army can do the same. However, according to a recent discussion on CSpan they are still not interested in the mission??? Why not? it works for the Marines? They don’t depend on Naval Air for their CAS.
And the Marines plan to rely on the F-35 for that mission — many more F-35C’s than the very few F-35B’s they are acquiring.
The first / primary missions of the LCS / DE will be their role in Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW). I am rather familiar with that operating world, so what deficiencies will the LCS / DE have performing their role in that operating environment? How about their Mine Sweeping Module — what problems will they have completing that mission? What provides lethality in the ASW world? What provides protection, so to speak, in that rather critical environment — assuming one wants to keep control of the Sea Lanes? Also, why the “offensive” in the ASW environment — anybody wish to describe how that would work and be practical in ASW, giving the rather limited number of ships and P-3’s or P-8’s.
The Army is not interested because they would have to get the USAF bases, personnel, AND aircraft transferred over, complete with budget to support them taken from the Air Force, and then they would have a redundant pipeline for attack pilots, meaning it would cost the Army more to do it than the Air Force would, without adding any benefits.
However, the Air Force is (and always has been — even the A-10 was only developed in order to kill an Army program, and as soon as the AH-56 program was cancelled, they tried to kill the A-X off and substitute F-16s for ground attack. . . sounds familiar. . . ) adamantly OPPOSED to providing good CAS. Despite the fact that they won Army support to be a separate service based primarily on the promise that CAS would always be a top priority.
Transfer the A-10s to Army Air Calvery.
Option the Airforce pilots with a one grade promotion to make the move to Army.
Marines get some too? Can an A-10 operate off a carrier?
Start design of a drone CAS aircraft. Armor for survivable return to base. Happy to help on that end. Allow front line designator role with handoff of control between trained in situ and trained external staffing.
Protecting people is expensive in the A-10. Reuse the Avenger in a drone. And woo hoo. More rounds viable.
The writer’s argument (in this aspect) fails for two reason. First, as Sun Tzu noted, the most successful of military operations are those which succeed without the need to engage in hostile actions.
If all nations’ leaders follow this wisdom, the world would be a better place.
Here’s what I think is coming in this area, sometime between now and circa 2030.
The USAF ceases to be an independent branch of the armed services. The navy and army each start running their own in-atmosphere airpower needs, with maybe a joint-service command to handle strategic air transport.
The air forces’s present United States Space Command becomes a newly independent service that handles everything from low-Earth orbit on up.
Perhaps the author should not accuse others of making assumptions before making his own assumptions based on zero understanding of aerodynamics and what is actually important in aerial combat (See irrelevant comparison with J-31 prototype). And really people are improving Radar against LO aircraft – you don’t say!! considering the F-117A was IOC in 1983 and the A-12 was flying over Nam in the 60s!
It might be nice to make up whats actually going on above your head – I mean do you have any clue in the slightest the capability of the systems in the F-35 – or is this more assumptions?
How do the Marines specialise in CAS without the A-10 – how!?
Seriously based on whats written above I fail to see Why your loose assumptions of the future are any more valid than theirs.
Maybe it’s time for the Army to take control of the Air Force again? The Navy and Marine Corps have their own Air Force; maybe an independent Air Force was a mistake?
Having served as a line officer in USAF AND in USN, I can tell you that the AF abandoned the “Army Support” missions – close air support and tactical airlift-a long time ago-paying them lip service, but worshipping the concept of “strategic bombardment” and expensive platforms such as the F-111 that initially weren’t that good at anything (it did get better.) The Army and even Marines LOVE the A-10-and are always glad to see it. Joshua Jordan has a very good point- USN and USMC have their own “air forces”. I think an independent USAF is somewhat redundant at this point. An independent Space Command is more supportable.
Heck, leave the USAF Space Command, Global Strike Command (basically, the old SAC for those of you out of the loop), AMC, and the US portion of NORAD. Missiles, bombers, transports, tankers, and pure interceptors.
Those are the only things the Air Force wants to do anyway (and the transport job only reluctantly).
Everything that would normally be TAC missions and platforms (circa early 1970s organization), turn back over to Army Aviation: bases, funding, personnel, and all.
Have to figure out the transition period back to warrants; maybe bring commissioned ex-USAF pilots *not* in an actual leadership role over as the equivalent of Navy LDOs. Tell them, “If all you want to do is fly, you’ll be an LDO or a warrant — commissioned line officers have to put up with the “jointness” and “career broadening” BS, but can accede to command. (The Air Force has long had a HUGE problem of good pilots who just joined to fly cool planes getting out at Captain (promotable) or Major because they don’t want to leave the cockpit to go command a supply unit for “jointness”; a lot of those guys end up joining the Guard and flying for an airline during the week.)
I would like to highlight a few issues that I see in this idea.
The first few concern the idea to replace the F-35 with expanded F-22 and A-10 fleets. This decision would leave substantial capability gaps, because of the loss to the CVWs and LPHs of about 20% of their air wing (F/A-18C/D can’t be replaced with A-10), and also because not every ground attack mission is CAS.
The F-35 brings a SEAD and strike capability to the table that no other platform can, combining 2000lb bombs with large numbers (so sorties aren’t prized, as they are with the B-2) with stealth. This enables them to be effective against IADS and C&C systems while those systems are still operational, a role that F-22 couldn’t fill alone. The A-10 is far less survivable than the F-35 or F-22 against any SAM system, combining slow speed with inferior kinematics and no stealth, making the A-10 totally ineffective against an advanced near peer opponent like Russia or China.
Secondly, the sources cited for the reduced costs of operation of a split A-10/F-22 fleet don’t really make a lot of sense. What it seems like is that they derive from CPFH numbers, which include a lot of various factors up to and including ongoing upgrade costs, then multiplied it by some arbitrary number of flight hours demanded from the fleet. This causes some costs to be overcounted (R&D, for instance), and undercounted (maintenance). CPFH numbers don’t scale very well.
Thirdly, it doesn’t explain particularly well what exactly about the A-10 in particular is so unique that it couldn’t be filled by a combination of platforms. Already, CAS missions are mostly fulfilled by F-16s, F/A-18s, and B-1s, and even then the majority of the missions flown by the A-10 result in the use of PGMs, not the GAU-8 (or else why would the A-10s carry sniper pods all the time)? The F-35 can fill the role of the F-16s and F/A-18s flying CAS, and fill it better with pilots who are dedicated to the CAS mission (especially after ADVENT), while a platform like the A-29 or the T-9 can provide gun or rocket support. What’s more, at long range the fast air gains a massive loiter advantage, as the A-10 will burn most of its fuel on the way to the OA, unlike the faster fighters (which arrive more quickly to provide support, too).
Furthermore, the gun isn’t unique in terms of accuracy. if you compare the GAU-8 to other weapons like DAGR or APKWS, the GAU-8’s CEP is larger and so is the lethal radius. A laser guided lightweight missile can provide superior close support while keeping the launching platform farther away. Combined with dedicated flight crews (the solution to the problems of erroneous requests and ground maneuvers), small guided missiles provide more ammunition (compare an A-10’s ~12 bursts to a 4×20 APKWS loadout) and equal CAS performance, without requiring a special purpose large expensive platform.
Then, consider the proliferation of SAMs. Fighter support, especially support provided by the AARGMless F-22, can’t suppress the MRSAMs effectively, and it’s classically hopeless to try to defeat MANPADS with only fast air cover. If anything, these weapons make your vignette even more hostile to the A-10, since the faster speed and better kinematics of the F-35 and other fast air let it evade missiles more effectively (and the F-35 is slated to get a DIRCM system, the last hope of IRCM against IIR missiles).
The A-10’s problem isn’t that it’s a bad platform, it’s that it’s a platform that doesn’t provide any unique capabilities at very high cost. High performance trainers like the A-29 can handle the low and slow missions in uncontested airspace effectively, while fast air like the F-35 can perform strike and PGM CAS more effectively than the A-10 can.
As a former desk jockey (engineer) in the Air Force, not a pilot, not even rated.
The question I ask is do we need a CAS aircraft like the A-10 to fly 100 miles 3 or 4 times an hour to take out 3 or 4 insurgents each time? Cost ineffective and a tremendous waste of resources if answer is yes.
The F-35 will not be used for the CAS mission. Without the A-10, the Air Force will be effectively out of the CAS business.
Attack helicopters are not the answer either, as Maj. Fernandes alluded to.
Maybe suicide drones could be used for this mission, or drones big and accurate enough to fire an automatic rifle .
The Army needs to develop drones that do more than reconnaissance. Drones that have the ability to attack and are man portable.
You are looking at it from a paper perspective. One, two or 4 enemies. As long as they are key enemy players, such as those holed up on a ridge with superior position to our forces, worth every penny of flying CAS aircraft. Not to mention the psychological effects of such a plane loitering around above contested space both for the enemy and our allies more than pays for itself in terms of battle effectiveness. Enemies are going to be less likely to show themselves with an a-10 who can spot them and setup field of safe movement in the battle space essentially playing a strategic game of war from the air space which gives greater area of movement to allies and contested space can quickly come back under controlled space. As for drones, the only way a drone could ever prove out useful is if it’s got a self contained mission. IE once it leaves base it will not stop until mission is complete or it’s dead. Even then, you will lose most if not part of the psychological effects that the a-10 provides loitering around. It’s a matter of understanding the multiple points of view.
Now, if we could equip drones with low cost high detail sensors to provide high detail accuracy of the battlefield we could achieve at least in part some of the benefits of CAS platforms. However, this would more likely serve more to compliment multiple battle platforms into the contested space than replace them.
The effectiveness of a platform largely depends on the weapons it fires, rather than how fast it goes. The A-10 can carry pretty much every weapon you can care to mention, it can do it cheaply, and it can take intermittent ground fire. It can loiter for far longer than any fighter, and land on austere airstrips.
No, this isn’t really that relevant for a peer state conflict with lots of aerial threats.. But we haven’t had one of those for the past 30 years, and the A-10s are already paid for. The airframe can take a lot more flying, and a basic re-winging and maybe a re-engining would keep them relevant for the next few decades.
These sort of airframes should be a priority for every service with a fixed wing attack. The A-6 was a good example; paid for, could carry a lot of bombs, and didn’t need tanker gas. Something like the Textron Scorpion is a another good example, albeit new, and could double as a trainer (how is THAT for multirole!)
We have flown the wings off of expensive fighter jets, most of which needed to hit the tanker every 45 MINUTES to complete a mission. All to do a task that any aircraft with a targeting pod and pylons could accomplish.
Like it or not, if we are going to stay in the middle east indefinitely (unfortunately, more like it) than we cannot use the same tactics we used in Iraq. They will bankrupt us, or taxpayer will revolt and punish the military, like they did in Vietnam. The point of an insurgency is to bleed dry the blood and the treasure of the occupier until the lose the will to fight, and we have played right into their hands.