In late March 1982, a naval task force departed the shores of Argentina under the pretense of participating in an exercise with Uruguay. Days later it arrived offshore of the Falkland Islands, an archipelago in the South Atlantic with 1,850 inhabitants fiercely loyal to Britain. Falklanders went to bed the night of April 1 as free people. They awoke the next morning to sounds of gunfire as Argentine marines stormed across beaches, incarcerated the governor and the small Royal Marine garrison, declared a new government, and renamed the islands Malvinas. That afternoon, other Argentines overcame a small British force on South Georgia, 900 miles further east, and laid claim to it as well.
It was anything but a late April Fools’ Day joke. The invasion was the culmination of years of frustration over sovereignty of these islands and a series of bellicose activities in more recent months. The British government, however, did not connect dots leading to the invasion. And even when it became clear that Argentines were en route to invade, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s closest advisors doubted British ability to retake the islands. Some thought it would take five months just to mount a sufficient force. But a lone admiral swayed the Iron Lady to take action, and what followed became a unique chapter in military history. Never had a nation assembled and deployed forces so quickly to fight a war so far away in an area where it had so little wherewithal. Britain was not ready for this war but still won.
Understanding challenges the British faced on the way to victory could not be more relevant today as the U.S. Department of Defense refocuses, as stated in the most recent Defense Strategic Guidance, on “its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged…”
Although the United States has a long history of waging war beyond its shores, it has never deployed quickly and without considerable planning and preparation beforehand. Moreover, it has not launched forces across beaches in combat for more than 60 years.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, NATO militaries were accustomed to participating in exercises to retrieve prepositioned equipment and supplies and move them to assembly areas. Those high states of deployment readiness started to decline by the end of the last century. As force drawdowns took place in Europe, prepositioned equipment moved elsewhere, including to the Middle East. Strategic focus shifted from the ability to deploy quickly to almost exclusive attention on rotating sufficient number of trained units in and out of the Middle East.
The net result is that over the past two decades, Western militaries, that of the United States included, have no longer maintained the same readiness to deploy quickly to enforce political decisions. Units previously accustomed to conducting emergency deployment readiness exercises as a matter of routine concentrated on preparing soldiers for continuing military operations in established theaters from the start of this century until just recently. For logisticians this has meant disembarking planes on secure runways, offloading large container ships at fixed ports with cranes, moving containers down highways, and issuing supplies from well-stocked warehouses. Units have rarely deployed their own equipment; they have used equipment prepositioned in theater and rotated between other units. In most situations, contractors have maintained that equipment both before and after.
What happens when none of this exists, and a military has to travel thousands of miles, take everything with them, attack over a beach against a determined enemy, and then fight across rugged terrain without a single road, perhaps in winter? This is what the British faced in 1982, as well as an eventual 3:1 force disadvantage, and why Thatcher received such pessimistic advice. The head of the Royal Navy expressed confidence that his forces could handle Argentines at sea. Other senior military leaders and the minister of defence himself, however, remained pessimistic about Britain’s ability to wage war over such long distances with the many logistical challenges. All saw the need to achieve air superiority, something that later proved difficult and as a result costly.
To be sure, the British situation was more challenging than most know even today. With no troop ships and little other capability to move supplies and equipment on sea or in the air, Britain acted quickly to take up commercial ships from industry, eventually requisitioning 54 ships and converting them to meet military needs as transports, supply vessels, repair ships, minesweepers, a hospital ship, a water tanker and more. Government and industry collaborated quickly to modify them, completing work on most within four days. Simultaneously, as ships were being identified and moved to ports for modification, supplies poured out of depots as military units prepared and planned, not knowing which ships they would embark. Tonnage filled Britain’s highways because British Rail had no time to reposition cars.
Few knew anything about the Falkland Islands then, let alone what British forces would do upon arriving there. The Ministry of Defence had no contingency plans or even gridded maps of the islands. Just days after the Argentine invasion, though, an amphibious task group carrying 3,000 men with equipment and supplies sailed from England to link up with a newly formed carrier battle group heading south from the Mediterranean. The task force eventually grew to over 8,000 men and 100 ships. It was a remarkable display of national resolve and military-industry cooperation. That focus remained in place long after the war.
Such quick deployment understandably produced a lot of confusion. Ships showed up at ports for modification as unit supplies arrived to be loaded. Given shipping shortages, the British purposely loaded ships as full as possible with little regard for what might be needed first. Unit supplies became commingled and spread between multiple ships in the rush to load and depart quickly. The British knew they would have time to re-stow supplies on ships as the task force moved south. Most believed politicians would find a way to avoid conflict. Commanders started assessing options. Units trained aboard ships and at Ascension Island, a small volcanic outcropping midway between the United Kingdom and Falklands, which fortunately had a good runway. Training included how to disembark commercial vessels into landing craft and methods to stay alive on the battlefield. More supplies started pouring into Wideawake Airfield at Ascension before the first ships had departed British coastlines. Sorting out the congestion and shifting supplies to passing ships and between ships became a nightmare in the ensuing weeks.
The British retook South Georgia the end of April. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation continued for two more weeks. For most, likelihood of war was becoming apparent, especially with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano and then the British destroyer Sheffield the first week of May. On May 12, the task force received orders to repossess the Falklands.
On May 21, the British landed on the opposite side of East Falkland from the capital of Stanley, where Argentines were anticipating a counterattack and had been establishing defenses. Operation Sutton became their first amphibious assault since the 1950s. It became clear soon thereafter that few people, including senior leaders in London, understood the difficulty of such an operation, especially without air superiority, let alone the need to establish supplies ashore before breaking out from a beachhead. A host of command, control, and communication issues followed, reinforcing today why amphibious operations remain perhaps the toughest of military operations, one rightly controlled by navies in collaboration with marines. Argentine leaders failed to capitalize on opportunities as they developed. They kept ground forces concentrated in positions defending Stanley. British air attacks tried their best to keep them there by destroying helicopters that could be used to relocate troops.
Challenges they faced underscore the importance of training for such complex operations, especially when army units join an amphibious task force. Although paratroopers and marine commandos operated side-by-side from beginning to end in this war, the preparation, deployment, and commitment of a separate British army infantry brigade as follow-on force produced less-than-stellar results and contributed to costly losses at Fitzroy, when Argentine pilots bombed ships that were slow to offload. That brigade was rushed together at the last minute in the United Kingdom, augmented largely by theater-level units and given little time to train together; it arrived in the South Atlantic with a thin organization and without a clear mission. Despite exceptional performance by some, that brigade’s story is a somber reminder of what can happen when military units are not organized, trained or ready for expeditionary-type warfare.
It took the land force nearly a week to build up sufficient supplies ashore to break out from the beachhead at San Carlos. Officials in London had become so frustrated that they threatened to fire their only brigadier for “languishing” on beaches. At one point, the overall task force commander, a Royal Navy four-star admiral in a headquarters at Norwood, told the rear admiral commanding the carrier battle group to go ashore and tell the land force commander, a Royal Marine brigadier, to move out of the beachhead. The rear admiral, equally exasperated, refused to do so.
It was frustrating for everyone that Argentine pilots had succeeded in hitting well over a dozen British ships and sinking five by the end of May, including the converted container ship Atlantic Conveyor carrying nine helicopters and thousands of tons of much needed supplies. Only a single heavy-lift helicopter survived to support land operations. Often Argentine bombs would strike ships but not detonate. Numerous times these bombs passed right through British ships without exploding. Had a few more detonated, or had Argentine pilots targeted some different ships, sovereignty over the Falklands might not have been settled so soon. As it was, damage caused by Argentine air attacks demonstrated, not surprisingly, how essential it is to have air superiority when conducting amphibious operations.
Perhaps it will not surprise some people to learn that the vast majority of casualties during the war, nearly 70 percent, occurred not on land but at sea. The Falklands produced the first fighting at sea since the Second World War. It proved costly for both sides.
The battles on land resulted in many instances of bravery and leadership. They also revealed challenges of waging war in remote areas thousands of miles away from a homeland. At Goose Green, paratroopers fought on foot over 24 hours in the rain and snow to defeat Argentines dug-in on a narrow isthmus. Weather hampered resupply. Without robust supplies as they started to attack, some found themselves crawling to dead comrades to retrieve ammunition. Marine commandos and other paratroopers marched 50 miles across East Falkland carrying all their gear and then attacked up slopes of rocky mountains to overcome tough Argentine defenses. Logisticians had to figure out how to support these operations without the benefit of any roads and with few helicopters. It became a frustratingly slow process at times, hampered by Argentine pilots attacking the British support area on land. Wounded often lay on the battlefield for 12 hours or more before helicopters could evacuate them.
When smoke settled from Harrier attacks, artillery, and naval gunfire on June 14, just 74 days after the invasion, the British had retaken the islands and captured over 10,000 Argentines in and around Stanley — a town severely damaged, without utilities or running water, and cluttered with debris, equipment, and human excrement. Then the British military transitioned to a phase of war that has plagued many armies over the years: effectively restoring order after victory. They had to do so when still at the end of an 8,000-mile logistical tether. One of their first priorities was disarming then repatriating thousands of Argentine prisoners back home when their military junta still was not acknowledging defeat.
There is indeed much to ponder from the British experience in the 1982 Falklands War, especially now as military services focus more on expeditionary operations. It is no accident that some military schools are adding this war to curricula for further study. For the past couple years, the U.S. Marine Corps has invited the few senior British leaders from this war still living to speak to students. They are smart to do so. Aside from its relevance for future readiness, this war offers accessibility for students and leaders wanting to study a war from beginning to end or just examine certain aspects of war.
The Falklands War reiterates the historical constant that conflicts occur at times and places least expected. The success of British efforts highlights the power of national resolve, something that is often lacking when politicians commit countries to war. Their deployments became rushed and problematic in many ways, but they also revealed masterful synchronization of government agencies in short order. What they achieved remains without parallel in military history. It never will be easy to move large forces quickly or support operations in austere, remote areas. The Falklands War also resurrects lessons from the past, including consequences when commands are not on the same sheet of music and when combat operations outpace logistics.
The British were not ready for the Falklands War in 1982 but they still won despite many surprises. They did so because they were simply better than those they fought. They were better trained and tougher, more resilient physically and more agile mentally. When setbacks occurred, they were able to bounce back. And this was not limited to units on front lines. Quite importantly, those fighting on or around the islands also were backed up by thousands of men and women working behind the scenes many miles away, trying to get them what they needed. That became a very tough combination to beat.
Could the British do it again? Some think not. They do have the benefit today, however, of robust infrastructure, prepositioned supplies, and more forces in the Falklands. Could the United States military do it in the future in a comparable scenario? Perhaps. At least the Department of Defense is starting to refocus on expeditionary warfare, something quite different than its recent experience.
Kenneth L. Privratsky is the author of the recently published book Logistics in the Falklands War. He is a retired U. S. Army Major General with 33 years of service, a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies and a former National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University.
strategicservice 
drew currah 
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UK army opinion 
Tom 
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Rufus 
David Flandry 
Lewis 
Aaron 
Andy D Mc 
Kenneth Grifiths 
John Amble 
Janko Svarc 
Emmett 
Mark T 
John 
The answer to the titular question is no. The US military has been calcified by fighting wars from fixed fortifications for too long. We have grown accustomed to having what we need readily accessible, whether it’s fuel for the vehicles or buffalo wings from the FOB TGI Fridays.
As it was, Britain was only able to retake the Falklands by the sheer magnitude of Argentine incompetence. I doubt we could replicate the feat against a competent military.
The more Argentina’s Malvinas myth is exposed as a fraudulent claim the less likely the situation will occur again. Google: ‘Argentina’s Illegitimate Sovereignty Claims’ to see the Malvinas myth exposed.
The US military record is very poor.
The Russians won the second world war, US could not defeat North Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya while squandering thousands of lives and trillions of dollars.
The US would be better to cut back on its useless military and spend the money on its own huge domestic problems like fragile infrastructure.
While investment in this nation’s infrastructure could provide sorely needed jobs for our construction workers, presuming that effort was properly managed by the government – and I will leave it there. Importance wise to our declining economy, decreased tax revenues, and lowered standard of living, that need and impact pales in importance compared to the damage done to / being done to our nation’s economic condition by the (continued) moving out of our manufacturing to other countries.
As for your repeated characterization of the military as useless, that is rather inaccurate, to say the least.
It was the U.S. Army backed up by the other branches of the military that kept the Soviet Army out of Western Europe.
Regardless of Mac Arthur’s inept leadership when he was allowed to invade North Korea – the U.S. Army under General Ridgeway afterwards saved South Korea from rule by North Korea.
Our nuclear delivery capability has insured that no nation possessing such weapons has dared use them.
The U.S. military prevented Saddam Hussein from taking control of a large percentage of the World’s oil supply – the loss of which would have had a rather negative effect on the economies of the West including the U.S.
Our Special Operations Forces, in conjunction with the CIA, appropriately eliminated Osama Bin Laden.
The U.S. military forced the Soviets to remove their nuclear tipped missiles from Cuba (albeit placed there in response to the U.S. political executive placing Jupiter missiles aimed at Russia in Turkey).
In addition, we can rest assured without the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, the flow of oil out of that area’s ports to the West would have long ago been interrupted by Iran in their struggles with the Sunni States.
The U.S. Army has also (rather successfully) assisted other Nations in successfully combating insurgencies in the lands – including in the Philippines, Greece, El Salvador, Columbia, etc.
As for Vietnam, did Generals Taylor and Westmoreland promote policies and strategies that failed – Yes. But few remember that General’s Ridgeway and Decker when CoS’s of the Army warned both Eisenhower and Kennedy that the U.S. should not war against a trend of Nationalism and that we would lose in Vietnam, as did Admiral Arleigh Burke when CNO. Also in 1964 the CNO and the CoS of the Air Force told Johnson (LBJ) to his face that “his” bombing campaign against the North would fail – given the strategy “he” demanded / ordered be followed. Lt General Krulack, USMC told LBJ to his face in 1968 that his strategy in Vietnam was failing, and in return he was not appointed CMC as most then expected.
When the President or the Secretary of Defense decides contrary to the recommendations or advice of the military, then one does their best to carry out their policies and strategy. Ours is a civilian run government and the Constitution clearly notes the civilian “President” is the Commander in Chief of the Military.
Were the invasions (interventions in) Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in other places costly and carried out without producing any meaningful political results – absolutely, but if one has a problem with those costs / that result, complain to our political leadership. Those imbeciles thought they could force the will of this country on the (resisting) cultures and societies of other land.
The U.S. military is anything but useless. However, employing it in one failed intervention and occupation after another has produced one strategic debacle after another.
And, by the way – the budget funding for those interventions and occupation resulting military activities does not come from the DOD budget, nor should it. Those trillions of wasted dollars come from what is called the OCO – the Oversea Contingency Operations funds — if I correctly recall the name of that budget account. How much better would it have been if those funds were directed to infrastructure jobs – we should know the positive answer to that question?
Thank you for this excellent article. The recent British experience of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has left us with a great deal of soul-searching questions- from political leadership to military leadership- and whilst the ability, skill and professionalism of the individual soldier is not in question there is much embarrassment over our role in Basrah in particular (where I served); did we actually do a good job? It is with great pride that I read your article on a war that does not receive much attention these days but in which we showed ourselves to be a formidable, well organised and credible force- and a worthy ally.
Could the US do it? Yes of course, but it would hurt; right now the British lack an aircraft carrier but when HMS Queen Elizabeth is sailing and flying F35 we will certainly have the capability again, if not the experience. However, it is worth saying that it is unlikely we will fight a competent enemy by conventional means in the foreseeable future. Whilst the Argentines were fairly woeful the risks and political complexities of engaging a competent enemy would be far to great today (consider Ukraine now).
The other comment above about the US military record is utterly ridiculous. I do think that we (the US and UK) need to urgently turn our attention back to expeditionary capability and maritime operations as the whole bizarre experience of fighting from FOBs, complete with Pizza Hut and KFC, are well and truly behind us.
Having spent a great deal of time training with the U.S. Marines, I’m confident that they would be able to execute an Operation Corporate-like mission in relatively short order insofar as the Navy/Marine Corps team were allowed to take the lead in planning and orchestrating the operation. I am less confident with the capacity of the Army and Air Force to serve in a subordinate role. (I’m reminded of the Army’s propensity for claiming Operation Overlord as superior to the Marines’ amphibious campaign in the Pacific.) The current national obsession with the strategically anemic marriage of RMA-enabled precision air strikes and SOF direct actions suggests that such a recipe would be applied to a Falklands-esque scenario, despite the fact that an appraisal of Operation Corporate suggests that such campaigns are won when the joint force supports a commitment of purpose-trained, task-organized, amphibious-specialized boots-on-the-ground to take and occupy territory. As such, I have no doubt that American forces could accomplish such a mission; however, I worry that doing so would require methods that have fallen out of fashion.
The Argentine army was also comprised of very young draftees with very little training. They were victims of the junta who started the war to mask growing problems with their leadership and economic problems at home. Also, what % of the casualties were from the Belgrano? To this day Argentines believe it was sunk “illegally” as it was supposedly turning away from the battle. I don’t follow their logic since they started the war and the Belgrano certainly would have re-engaged later.
The Belgrano was sailing, probably inadvertently, into shallow waters that would have made following it exceptionally difficult, after having received orders to sail north and engage (the fact that the Argentine naval communication systems were nowhere near as secure as they thought was closely held – it was released a couple of years ago under the 30-year rule).
The thought at the time that the two escorting destroyers that Conqueror hadn’t even fired a speculative pot-shot at (despite it being an ideal opportunity to get rid of a couple of the universally disliked and unreliable Tigerfish homing torpedoes, don’t forget that Belgrano was sunk by unguided torpedoes) but they steamed away having not seen the explosions, Belgrano’s distress flares or their lamp signals.
The total loss of life aboard ARA General Belgrano was 323, 321 members of the crew and two civilians who were on board, just under half (49.8%) of the total Argentine fatalities.
National will was needed to win the Falklands War, as well as a professional military. Once the Iron Lady was convinced by the head of the navy, the war was almost won. Lack of national will has been the major factor in losing most wars. World War II could not have been won with a cynical press, academia, and cultural elite as we have today. Normandy would have been called a risky escalation, Churchill would have been a jingoistic wordsmith ignorant of the true odds, and so on.
The British (and American) political and public will is just not there to fight wars anymore, as winning wars means killing enemies and having to accept both military and civilan casualties.
Iraq and Afghanistan have had exceptionally low casualties for Western forces, <700 British soldiers in total have died in Iraq/Afghanistan The US lost 3,481 men in Iraq (KIA) from 2003-2010, and 1,832 men (also KIA) in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. These casualties are constantly fawned over by Western media and the wars are lionzed as bloodbaths.
Compare that to the forgotten Korean War, classed as a "UN police action" at the time and only lasted from 1950-1953 yet had full scale conventional fighting between UN and N. Korean/Chinese troops, the US lost a staggering 33,000 men, that's in direct action, potentially 40,000 if you include the 7,000 who are still MIA to this day.
Normandy was a bloodbath. As was Iwo Jima, the Somme, Verdun, Stalingrad, Berlin, Pusan Perimeter, Chosin Reservoir, etc..
6 month patrols in Helmand province are a holiday in comparison.
Although somewhat off the posed question, which we will address, presuming it was this country faced with a Falklands 1982 crisis – at that time, it would have been a matter almost one hundred present handles by the U.S. Navy and the Marines. It would have been over in short order as at that time the Navy have substantially more ships than today’s fleet. Preceded by multiple Nuclear Attack Subs (transiting there at high speed) that would have cleared the area of any Argentinian Ships, two or three Attack Carrier Battle Groups with their normal eight accompanying Destroyers each would have departed Norfolk for the area, followed by two or three Amphibious groups with their Marines, accompanied by more Cruisers and Destroyers. At the same time U.S. Navy Auxiliary Ships, then almost always at Sea in large numbers, such as AOE’s, AFR’s would have followed behind the Task forces – possibly accompanied by Destroyers and VBP coverage if there was some concern about Argentinian Subs.
While I can’t recall what SOSUS coverage we had in the area (having then been a Navy Officer), we would have used long range VP P-3’s to begin searching for those subs. Between the Subs and the Air Wings from one or two CVA’s we would have taken out the Argentinian Air Bases and their aircraft and sunk their Navy’s Ships in short order – in the mainland bases.
The U.S. Marines are organized, equipped, and trained for Falkland landing type of operations. Besides the one or two Task Forces that would have been formed on the East Coast by the 2nd Marine Division and its Air Wing, they probably would have temporarily redirected the one then at Sea in the Mediterranean Sea to the Falklands, landed on the Islands and secured them.
No doubt the Argentinian Air Force Pilots were courageous, but the distances to target they had to fly restricted their maneuvering and loitering time over the target area and their attack formation tactics were flawed. If I recall from the reports their planes came in one at a time allowing the British gun crews on their ships to concentrate their fire on one plane at a time. If the Argentinians had taken the time to properly train their forces, planned out that effort, and practiced they would have realized their logistical and other problems in advance and planned for them. They didn’t need and couldn’t support that (comparatively) large ground force they put ashore and tried to maintain in the Falklands. Most of them and the civilian population should have been promptly removed to the mainland. The Argentinians then should have rushed Engineers to the Islands, built protected air bases, and moved their A-4’s to that Island – having invested more in their Air Force than they had previously chosen to so do. Their attacks should have concentrated on the British suips carrying troops and supplies and their single Aircraft Carrier. They should have invested more in Subs and placed them in a (quiet) screen out from the Falklands awaiting the British response. And. Regardless of the risk they should have had multiple AEW aircraft searching air and sea for the British – 24 hours a day. They should also have place mines in the waters off the Falklands.
Would the U.S. be able to react to a similar situation somewhere in the World today, although unsure of where that would occur, given the ever shrinking size of the U.S. Navy – the answer is probably “No.”
Have we ever rapidly concentrated our military forces of the needed type and number in response to a crisis in past years / decades — “Yes.” Few reading this blog were around at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and don’t realize how quickly a rather large Naval Task Force effect surrounded Cuba and was in place off Guantanamo Bay, how quickly thousands of Marines landed at Gitmo and were defensive positions and offshore, how quickly U.S. Army Divisions left Texas by troop trains headed for the Navy Base (Port) at Mayport, Florida, how quickly Navy Destroyers and P-2’s had the Atlantic Ocean area covered and the Russian Ships and Subs located, etc. All that occurred in days – not weeks or months. But, as those of us in that Navy recall, we had over 900 ships in the Fleet – in 1962. Other rapid responses have occurred over time, such as U.S. Army ground forces rapidly arriving in Saudi Arabia in 1990, all three services rapidly directing units, squadrons, and ships into South Korea or the Sea of Japan immediately upon the North Koreans taking the USS Pueblo, etc.
Force size brings with it a quality of its own, Today’s miniscule sized U.S. military would be hard pressed to respond to the crises of past era’s, and our political leadership certainly is not of that mind set. Even more important, as implied above, this country is an economic shell of what it once was. Our manufacturing has been relocated to foreign lands depriving us of the tax revenues needed to sustain the Nation’s needs. We (also) no longer have the in-house capability to equip and sustain a large military. Add to that, by allowing our industrial capability to depart from this country the standard of living of our population is declining and our country’s cash is departing this land at the rate of $500 Billion dollars a year in the form of our trade deficit, but fear not – you can buy cheaply made items at Wal Mart, that will far apart in short order so you can buy more and line their pockets with profit and provide manufacturing jobs for those in other lands.
The directly above is a rather serious problem that will impact the fate of this nation – in a rather negative manner, and one that is of importance to the U.S. Military, which has been rather slow at recognizing that fact. The Royal Navy’s Admirals realized Britain, and therefore the RN, was facing the same type of problem with their declining tax revenues and industrial skills around 1900, as Britain saw its Manufacturing and Ship Building Industries being out sourced to other countries with lower costs We see what happened to England – it is shell of its great self, economically and militarily. One could read “Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution” by Nicholas Lambert, if one is interested in that story, and see our America’s future.
And if the Brits had kept a single real aircraft carrier (Ark Royal, for example) with Phantoms, this probably wouldn’t have happened, and if it did, Argentine naval and air power would have been destroyed nearly immediately upon the arrival of the carrier battle group.
Harriers made do, barely. Phantoms would have dominated Skyhawks.
To Tom: Overlord WAS superior to any amphibious operation in the Pacific or anywhere else. The marines could not have done it simply for lack of size, although they certainly could have provided some very good troops.
It’s an apples and oranges comparison, sir. First and foremost, the Navy/Marine Corps team fought the island hopping campaign almost entirely on their own, without significant assistance from the allies. By contrast, Overlord involved landings by forces from three nations, supported by what would now be referred to as a joint task force – the takeaway being that the U.S. Army didn’t execute Overlord alone. Also, the scale of Overlord may have been greater, but the complexity was comparable to the actions at Saipan, Tarawa, Guadalcanal, and elsewhere. The Marines had more practice and a proven track record, and had they not been otherwise occupied on the other side of the planet, they would have been poised to have done a better job of establishing the Normandy beachhead than the Army. I’m reminded of a friend who used to brag up the fact that the 4th Infantry Division caught Saddam Hussein, ignoring completely that it would have been a different division had Hussein been hiding in a different AO.
Well, anyone would naturally expect that the US Marines have more expertise in amphibious assaults than the US Army – it is their raison d’etre after all.
The USMC developed the amphibious warfare doctrine used throughout WW2 in all theaters built on the lessons of the failed Allied Gallipoli campaign in WW1.
Still, a little known fact is that the US Army did most of the land fighting in the Asia-Pacific Theater – the side of WW2 that many Americans believe to this day was strictly a USMC war due, I think, in part to the fame of Iwo Jima.
However, the Army fought in New Guinea, the Philippines, Burma etc where they took on the bulk of the Imperial Japanese Army forces.
E.g. In New Guinea, the US Army killed/captured/displaced 250,000+ Jap troops.
The US Army also did most of the fighting in the decisive Battle of Okinawa; there were four Army Infantry divisions (7th, 27th, 77th, 96th) and two Marine divisions (1st and 6th).
The Pacific island hopping campaign by the Marines was largely a bloody sideshow, many of the islands captured had questionable strategic or tactical value to the US/Allies considering the huge cost in blood that was shed to capture them – Peleiu and Tarawa especially, but don’t forget US Army troops were present in some of these too.
As you have got your little known facts wrong and whilst I appreciate you may not like the actual facts but I feel that historical accuracy demands the truth. The actual facts are that :-
a) The Pacific Island Hopping Campaign was a was a side show within the bounds of WW2.
b) The numerically largest single army in the world in 1944 was the British controlled 14 th Army (Known as the forgotten army)with over 1,000, 000 combatants.
c) According to Japanese official history the largest military defeat in all Japanese history (Not just WW2) was when the 14th army evicted a Japanese controlled army of well over 400,000 combatants and inflicting 150,000 fatal casualties from India and Burma
Having served for over 14 years in the Royal Navy (RN) from 1999 to 2012 all my sea survival, damage and fire training were put into place by the RN after the Falklands war. Lessons were learned and new methods and new training were adopted. As were the training environment of the Thursday Wars off the Southern UK coast.
It’s tragic the navy learnt and instilled new training methods from sailors, marines and soldiers from loosing their lifes during the sea aspect of the Falklands war.
However the training and methods learnt is second to none in the Military Naval World.
Having slept and visited a variety of old and newer US warships I think the US Navy would be able to hold their own. Though tough lessons can only be learnt from experience or perhaps looking into the RN training that evolved from the Falklands sea war.
Some interesting comments here. I just want to boast that I took the photograph that is depicted in this article.
HMS Bristol storing at Ascension Island. Taken on the flight deck of HMS Cardiff 18 May 1982.
Ken Griffiths.
HMS Cardiff – Radar Operator.
1982.
Thanks for the comment, Ken. And thanks for releasing the photo into the public domain!
Without subtracting from the well deserved praise due to the British fighting element that took part in the Falklands war, it must also be noted that the Argentine fighting element they faced once contact with them in the Falkland Islands was made, consisted mainly of army recruits, as the better trained forces that had participated in the initial taking of the islands had been shipped to the Argentine mainland just days after the invasion. However, there were no recruits flying the Argentine planes that took part in the conflict. Their efforts were hampered by their faulty ordnance.
Sequestration was supposedly going to force lean services to be more nimble and cooperative.
From the outside, I see they are all getting less training time, less field time, less flight time. I have not seen more cooperation.
From a Vietnam era of almost 900 ships we have a Navy trying to maintain 250.
There is no training ground like combat, but enlistments are short. What I see is the institutions being cut and the troops stretched thin.
I suggested previously perhaps Sprint or Petco could be persuaded to purchase the next carrier in exchange for naming rights, but I do not know who will man them.
Will China pull a Falkland after their Ponzi-scheme-biggest-bubble-in-history-economy has it’s final Minsky moment meltdown after bursting? Distracting their proletarian masses of sheeple with an vague offshore threat. It not for nothing that Patriotism has been called the last refuge of a scoundrel; whether those scoundrels have been part of an Argentinean military junta in 1982 or members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in 2015.
Britain won, quite frankly, because they sent the best of the infantry, the Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines, to decimate the Argentine army, despite (or in spite) of the fact they were mostly ill trained unwilling teenage conscripts who were being lead by incompetent and corrupt NCOs and officers. The British public had the political will to fight and win in that war and accept the casualties that came with it.
In only 2 months, there were around 1,000 British casualties, with 255 Brit servicemen dead.
British society and both the professional capabilities and culture in the military has drastically changed since then.
The Brits were humilated and ran out of Basra, and the Afghans in Helmand had no confidence in the British to protect them, as the Brits routinely had to retreat back to FOB if they came into contact with the Taliban. Sad, but true. They’ve approached Iraq and Afghanistan like as if it’s another Northern Ireland situation.
Like the US to an extent, they’ve become incredibly risk averse, constantly fawning over the casualties, wanting to avoid civilian casualties, obsessing over restrictive ROEs etc. They’ve not actually fought ‘wars’ at all, but glorified police actions – in war you do actually want to destroy your enemy.
Yet after 6 years in Iraq and 14 years in Afghanistan they only lost 179 and 453 soldiers respectively.
If Western forces cannot or will not, for whatever reason, handle third world untrained Islamic guerillas/insurgents with no artillery/air/whatever capabilities who fight with literally whatever they can get their hands on, then God help them if they ever have to fight in a conventional war against a competent foe.
“British society and both the professional capabilities and culture in the military has drastically changed since then.”
I have to agree. Two completely different militaries.
It’s scary how it can decline like that in 25 years. Political correctness/cuts/guilt and all that have contributed – but also egotism. When the SAS stormed the Iranian embassy it changed the way the military saw themselves. Their heads got big. VERY big. The Falklands was only two years after this so a lot of the standards (evidently) were still intact. But it was all downhill after that with the SAS becoming a brand, it got ridiculous in the end and no surprises, the standards in battle have dropped like a stone.
I think the UK military got freakishly lucky in Sierra Leone, that would have been well into the decline phase yet they looked as good as ever. I’m thinking it was a fluke that papered over the cracks.
I’m not certain this is a good comparison. The British force involved in the Falklands lacked AWACS, Aegis-style radars and missiles, and could only maintain air parity with its Harrier jump-jets. Its aircraft carriers had about 1/5th the fighter compliment of an American carrier. Finally, the British had to travel by foot for the most part, having lost their entire fleet of Chinooks (which was just a handful) when one of the container ships was sunk. Finally, the British had very few long-range aircraft capable of strike missions.
Thank you sir for the (very) respectful commentary. Kudos.
Could Britain take this on with the same results today you asked? As you suggested, some think not and I’m afraid (talking as a Brit) I’m one of them. The standards/ethos of the UK military seems to have collapsed in on itself during the last decade. They’re totally unrecognizable compared to the early 80’s and before.
The US Marines, Navy SEAL’s and all the rest could do it, they’re clearly in better shape unfortunately than the badly faded Brits and I do think they’ve significantly improved under the leadership of Petraeus and McChrystal, they’ve come a long way since Vietnam. I suspect however that they’d need a few more troops and bits of hardware (which they’ll always have anyway) than the circa-early 80’s UK military, who really were something. Not sure, maybe not.
I always thought the USMC were basic grunts who got by on numbers and tech while the SEAL’s were a mediocre, hit and miss spec ops unit, but both have certainly improved, so maybe they can.
Thanks again for the commentary Kenneth.