The United States should begin negotiations with France to purchase the two big deck amphibious ships originally built for sale to Russia, but subsequently retained by France due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. With the French government set to reimburse the Russians for the voided contract, a confluence of strategic, operational, and fiscal dynamics point to a win-win opportunity for the United States. An American purchase of these assets would relieve a key NATO ally of a fiscal burden they incurred by rightly withholding the ships in response to Russia’s rogue behavior in Ukraine. It would send an unmistakable message to Putin that there are consequences associated with his aggressive policies. Such a symbolic move would reassure nervous Central and Eastern European allies by providing a tangible example of NATO solidarity and American commitment to Europe. Diplomatically, this acquisition would complement recent NATO initiatives to increase readiness within the maritime domain and reward France for taking one on the chin for European security. Operationally, these ships would mitigate the mobility deficit for U.S. Marine Corps crisis response forces that are currently land-based due to the U.S. Navy’s shortage of amphibious ships. Given the modest price of the ships when compared to alternatives, buying the two Mistrals provides a potent bang for the buck.
At 21,000 tonnes, Mistral class amphibious assault ships carry 450 marines (double for shorter deployments), rely on a small crew of 150 sailors (the ship is highly automated), and accommodate 35 light or 16 heavy helicopters, approximately 70 light vehicles (or fewer tanks), and a 69-bed hospital. These ships contain a well deck that carries four landing craft, or two LCAC hovercrafts, an essential feature for amphibious operations. Mistrals have exercised with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and succeeded in several high-profile operations such as the 2011 intervention in Libya. As an addition to the U.S. amphibious fleet, these ships would fall into the category of enhanced afloat forward staging bases, functioning much like the new Mobile Landing Platform, but with the very substantial benefit of having a large well deck to accommodate boats and surface connectors.
Strategically, a sale would demonstrate NATO solidarity at a time when the alliance’s credibility is increasingly under question. Instead of adding a potent capability to Russia’s fleet, the United States would buy these ships for the benefit of NATO and permanently forward station them in the Mediterranean.
Lacking an adequate number of amphibious ships, the U.S. Marine Corps has established several Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTF) ashore. Based in Spain, one of these SPMAGTFs remains on high alert, primed to respond to a crisis in Europe or Africa. Unfortunately, this otherwise impressive formation lacks the inherent maneuverability and flexibility offered by an amphibious ship. The SPMAGTF cannot easily reposition its forces in the early stages of a developing crisis given limited shore-basing options and the requirement for flight clearances and secure holding areas. The Mistrals would be an excellent solution to address this gap since the principal means of insertion for these forces is the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. The Mistral’s large flight deck allows aircraft to be positioned forward, reducing response times and increasing a commander’s options should a brewing crisis escalate to the point that Marine forces must be employed.
The combined cost of the two available ships is $1.5 billion, a good deal compared to U.S. designs costing roughly $4 billion apiece. While refitting the ships based on standards suitable for the U.S. Navy may add as much as several hundred million dollars, these costs could be shared by the two governments. Congress does not have to appropriate dollars at the expense of the existing shipbuilding plan; it would merely need to increase funding in the overseas contingency operations account, specifically under the banner of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI).
Of the $985 million enacted for ERI in fiscal year 2015, only $34 million went to maritime capabilities. ERI was proposed by President Obama and authorized by Congress with a very specific goal:
Reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance, provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of our allies and partners in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, and help increase the capability and readiness of U.S allies and partners.
Adding a substantial maritime dimension to ERI would send a powerful message to nervous allies while enhancing responsiveness.
Other commentators, including retired Adm. Jim Stavridis, have suggested that the Europeans (through the EU or NATO) take the lead on purchasing and employing the Mistrals. While this arrangement is desirable, it may not be realistic. Despite a growing threat from Russia, allies capable of operating advanced amphibious platforms (the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Netherlands, and Italy) are shrinking or flat-lining their defense budgets. Increasing NATO’s common funding and relying on multinational rotations — two proposed measures — may be possible over the long run, but years of negotiations and planning would be required. Instead, the United States should lead by example, establish an initial capability around the SPMAGTF, and look to expand the initiative in the coming years alongside like-minded allies. Without this commitment, a plausible alternative is that China buys the ships in order to service its expanding plans for the South China Sea.
Gene Germanovich and Noel Williams are maritime strategy and policy consultants in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are theirs alone.
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Let’s see if we are actually smart enough to take this opportunity.
First, the French must obtain a Russia’s permission to sell and compensate all Russian expenses.
Pity they weren’t used in Libya or Iraq
I think the proposal only continues the pattern of our allies expecting the US to do the hard work, spend our billions while they cut defense spending and capability. Canada is one option to pick up one ship for their Amphibious Assault Ship Project. These ships while available at a good price are not a good long term idea for the US. WE should buy more LHA-6 class small carriers.
Wishfull thinking you have. I think that you don`t realize that the stern of both Mistral class ship were actually built in St-Petersberg, Russia. I don`t think that Russia will ever consider selling them to a third party what is rightefully her`s, no matter the penality France will ever agree to pay. Beside this is not to a third country to decide in which country the ship should go, but solely to the text of the initial contract between France and Russia. Up to now, only France has fail to fullfill it part of the contract.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRk3CuAq_W0
If we do (I don’t think its likely but hey, stranger things have happened) we should name them the USS Lafayette and USS Rochambeau.
The Last Thing we need to do is waste scarce Defense budget on two platforms completely unique from the rest of the fleet. How would you support these two ships? Sure there are bound to be some common items, but they were intended for use by the RUSSIAN NAVY – how many items would you expect to be found in the current supply system? You’re advocating this as a political move that completely disregards the military and how it is operated and sustained. There is only one unmistakable message here – do your homework before you publish such rubbish.
It kind of depends on the work required to bring it into the fold with combat systems / comms integration and HM&E systems. Those may sound trivial, but we operate several big deck amphibs, and it is cost effective in the long run because training for many hundreds of sailors the logistics train for maintenance and spares can be standardized. From a life cycle sustainment point of view, if these ships are different enough to require their own schoolhouses, separate PMS boards, and spare parts catalogues, they may cost too much on the back end to be worth the effort.
AN INTERESTING IDEA. ALL POSITIVES AND NO NEGATIVES.
I HAVE COMPLETE FAITH THAT ALL OF THE GREAT MINDS WITHIN OUR MILITARY, THE CONGRESS, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO WHAT’S BEST FOR WHATEVER LOBBY IS INSTRUCTING (PAYING) THEM TO DO.
GOD BLESS AMERICA!
there would be a significant cost (400 million USD upwards per carrier) to stripping out the russian customisations and systems, and putting some shiny US hardware in place.
So, to quote, despite a growing threat from Russia our “threatened” allies are shrinking or flat lining their military budgets.
Shouldn’t that tell one something — just maybe they don’t view Russia’s struggles in its sphere of influence as a grave (or any) threat to their existence.
Second, amphibious operations are an event out of the past. At most we may need to put ashore a couple of companies to rescue civilians from a local disturbance. The U.S. Navy cannot afford to live in the past. One USS Constitution is enough for memory’s sake.
The Navy needs its budget for truly potential threats, thus must invest in ASW warfare technology, invest in continued improvements to its Aegis system, invest in Laser weapons and in increasing the range of ship carried missiles, invest in fighter / attack Drones, etc.
An A2AD defensive capability would wreck havoc on and destroy an Amphibious Force.
Since the law holds that the sole mission of the Marines is amphibious warfare, why do we keep funding / maintaining such a large second army? Hold the Marines propaganda to a professional minimum, please.
Not all hostile nations have neighbors who hate them enough to provide a staging area for the US Army, and the heavy tanks are coming by ship anyway, so fighting a land war always requires securing a port by charm or force.
A2/AD threats exist for all methods of invasion unless the enemy is stupid, and relying on that is a lousy strategy.
You are correct on many areas the Navy needs to improve; frankly the Navy needs to accept some cuts in the Aegis CRUDES fleet in order to beef up every other capability.
I don’t think buying a couple of “special children” for the amphibious fleet is wise, but Canada, Japan, or Korea might have use for them at a good price. That being said, war at sea is a means to influence events on land, and not having the amphibious capability to do so makes most of the fleet useless.
The U.S. has only engaged in one successful land conflict over the past 50 years and that was the First Gulf War. The Saudi’s provided the staging area, and that was in the pre-A2AD era.
As we are again going to find out in Iraq, interfering in / intervening in the internal ground (civil) wars of other nations and peoples is a sure strategic loss for this country — after we spend millions / billions. We need to stay out of the land warfare business.
The primary mission of the Navy is first: to insure that the sea lanes stay open — at least the sea lanes on which commercial traffic flows to the U.S.; certainly not all the sea lanes, and the ships making that effort need to be able to defend against incoming missiles, planes, and against sub attack. We do not have adequate surface ships and systems today to support that effort, thus we (having been a Navy Officer) need more surface ships with the noted capabilities and additional VP squadrons.
The next most important mission of the Navy is to have the anti-missile capabilities on our ships such that they can be positioned / stationed (on a rotating basis) off the necessary nations to intercept missiles should that need ever occur.
Influencing events on land is a secondary mission of the U.S. Navy, not its primary mission. And, in this day and age it is one that should rarely occur — as the strategic benefits from those interferences rarely, if ever, work out well. Libya is a great example of such a failure.
The days of large scale ground invasions and occupations are over. They are simply improbable, to say the least, against other nuclear powers absolutely impossible, and unnecessary because there is no geographical place in the world where we have a strategic national interest worth a war and an opposing party capable of warranting such a response. Also, again, A2AD capabilities have rendered access by sea into many areas to risky to contemplate. Ignoring capabilities of ones potential enemy is a prescription for disaster. It would be like the horse cavalry of WWI riding against machine guns.As the song goes, one must know when to quit – when to fold.
They would also be unnecessary. If the Nation wishes to exercise Sea Power ashore, that is why we have aircraft, cruise missiles, and the like. We need to stay out of the invasion and occupation business — lest we repeat our failures in Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon 1982, Iraq, and soon to be recognized in Afghanistan.
It is time for a new strategic approach to managing difficulties abroad — and amphibious invasion will play no role in that effort — absent short term rescue missions in turmoil ridden and backward areas. An Amphibious force capable of supporting perhaps two afloat Marine Battalions is more than sufficient for that rather secondary role.
So long as the Navy doesn’t waste their budget on unnecessary amphibious capabilities that is not a problem, but it would be nice to have the budget funds wasted Marine Divisions allocated for surface ships and VP Squadrons.
For l50 years the sole major use / mission of the Marines has been to provide two of their divisions to the Army during times of ground conflict. Perhaps, it is time to give that force level to the Army where it belongs.
P.S.
Lt. Col. Lloyd Freeman USMC, once wrote a paper entitled, If America’s amphibious force doesn’t adapt, it’ll be dead in the water, arguing for different reasons that the Amphibious forces of old are obsolete and calling for a revised Marines Corps with effectively a new mission. Those ensconced in the status quo were rather upset with him. It does make for interesting reading.
A better idea; buy them for Canada who needs them more than the USA.
They are designed for cold weather operations, so Canada is the ideal choice.
The one thing missing from this article is whether the US Navy and Marine Corps actually need new amphibious warfare platforms at this juncture. It’s one thing to say the Mistrals are great and France deserves some financial help in offsetting the sale cancellation. It’s another to say the US should pony up billions — outright billions — at a time when it’s looking at big defense cutbacks for a capability it doesn’t really need.
A better, although more complicated, solution would be to broker the sale of the Mistrals to a third party that actually does need them, perhaps by providing credits. That way the US eventually gets its money back, France gets paid, and an ally that needs the capability gets it.
And they are cheaper than anything that the US can build, probably even after the re-furb.
This subject has been analyzed to death. What I haven’t seen yet is an analysis on whether Russia has the technical know-how to produce this type of ship itself f the deal doesn’t go through. How hard can it be for a nation that has some of the most sophisticated submarines, fighters, and spacecraft. It seems that the incentive on Russia’s part is a cost and time-to-delivery issue. Or am I wrong?
So. This was always a plan for the US to steal Russian technology and know how.
By by to ship building in future France. Who will ever trust you in future if you sell the Russian technology to the US.
Americans seem to live in a different world to Europeans yet somehow claim to speak for “the west” to include Italy, Spain, France etc.
We don’t hate Russians or Putin. Putin in fact is admired by many Europeans, certainly by the tsunami of new parties dubbed “extreme right” or “extreme left” but also by many in the declining conservative and socialist parties. One thing is for sure. Parties which are seen to be kowtowing to Brussels or to Fleet Street will be removed from power.
We are also very aware that the world is moving to Eurasia. We want to form part too of that new world.