What is a strategist? We have many definitions for grand or national strategy, but despite having a community in the United States defined as “strategists,” there is little understanding of who our strategists are, and what they do. At the always thoughtful War Council Blog, Army Major Matt Cavanaugh tackled this important question. He recognizes, as did Hew Strachan, that the word “strategy” is so overused that it’s lost all meaning.
Cavanaugh decided to promote a discussion about what strategists actually do by laying out a concise but quite potent Mission Statement:
To skillfully select and balance achievable ends, available means, effective ways, and acceptable risk to exploit some degree of control of the enemy and environment to secure military objectives, desired political outcomes, and strategic narratives consistent with national interests [emphasis mine].
Given criticisms by recent studies at RAND by Linda Robinson about U.S. strategic competence, which are reinforced in books like Lt. Gen. Dan Bolger’s Why We Lost, it appears that part of our problem in applying strategic theory is not just understanding what strategy is; we may not recognize or appreciate what strategists actually do. So I found Cavanaugh’s offering fascinating and commendable.
Let me make three or four general comments on his bold proposal. I have italicized each element of the defined mission statement that is discussed in the foregoing comment. The definition implies that strategists “select” ends and do so “skillfully.” I don’t think “select” is an appropriate verb as it sounds like something drawn from a menu or checklist. Usually policy makers define aims, desired ends or outcomes, not the strategist. Furthermore, there is little “art” in skill, which implies something trainable by anyone rather than acquired by dint of a rigorous education and the experiential practice required to master strategy which has far more art to it. I subscribe to Bernard Brodie’s construct of the art and science of strategy, but emphasize the art. So instead of “select” I would propose “design.”
Second, I think “balance” is also soft. “Balance” is useful but not optimal and doesn’t connote the inherent logic of a strategic option. I prefer “coherently link” to ensure that the ways/means are the proper method relative to a desired outcome. I emphasize the “link” per Colin Gray’s concept of the role of a strategist on the proverbial Strategy Bridge, bridging or linking policy and operations, or the policy community with military planners and operators. Gray has emphasized the heroic difficulty of this bridging or linking function to what a strategist must focus on.
Coherence is an essential element that any definition of strategy should incorporate. Designing a strategy is more about coherence and linking the basic problem to a solution via a logical method/way. The Ends/Ways/Means triptych can be in balance and ultimately irrelevant to the problem at hand. But if they are coherently linked, they are tied to generating a solution to the problem that has been framed.
I totally agree with Cavanaugh that we need to incorporate an aspect that stresses the role of strategy versus a thinking adversary instead of inanimate matter. As War on the Rocks contributor Adam Elkus has recently noted, we tend to overlook adversaries in strategy. This is also central to the notion of competitive strategies in peacetime, as recently promoted by Thomas Mahnken. For that reason, I have included competitive as a fundamental consideration of strategy and the role of the strategist.
Thus, I would excise “some degree of control” as it leaves me quite cold. The noted American strategist Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie’s concept of power control is not without merit, but “exploit some degree of control over the enemy…” is more limited than “to generate and exploit a competitive advantage.” The notion of environment is not irrelevant but it may be redundant, as holding critical infrastructure or some geostrategic position is often the ultimate high ground. However, the environment is inherent to defining the context of a competitive advantage in time, space, or opponent. Thus, I think the ultimate goal for a strategist is to create a competitive advantage over an enemy that efficiently secures desired political conditions (or effects). This advantage also has to be sustained since our adversary has the option to learn and adapt too. As Williamson Murray has urged, strategy is not just a document but “a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.” The job of a strategist does not end with the approval of a single product; it continues. Including the idea of a “sustained” effort seeks to reinforce this task into the strategist’s job description.
Efficiency is also important so I would modify “available resources” to “allocated resources” to inject the notion of constraints. Strategists rarely get all the available or even desired resources they would like to have. The notion of limited means and constraints is a reality faced by experienced planners and strategists.
Finally, a few small “tweaks” are offered. I would leave out strategic narratives from the definition as a means not an end. As Emile Simpson has demonstratively shown, narratives are critical to execution. The narrative should be considered a component or derivative of the strategy. But it is not clear that the strategist must build that narrative. I would like to hear others chime in on this point.
Next, I was concerned with the positioning of “military objectives” in front of political outcomes, which may imply that strategy only deals with military objectives and means. Is the military instrument the only tool that has objectives? Cavanaugh clearly was oriented on explicating on his role as a military strategist. My proposed changes would offset the perception that this is a military officer’s definition of what strategy is and what strategists do, or the notion that only military strategists are truly strategic.
Thus, my counter-proposal:
To artfully design and coherently link achievable ends, allocated means, effective ways, with acceptable risks to generate, exploit and sustain a competitive advantage against an enemy to secure desired political effects and outcomes.
So with a tip of the cap to Cavanaugh for his initiative. I offer mine above to continue the conversation in our pages. The inclusion of art, coherence, limited means, and competitive advantage are worth considering. They represent the critical elements of strategy and the ultimate test of what a good strategist has to create and sustain.
F. G. Hoffman is a Contributing Editor at War on the Rocks and a member of the Board of Advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He current works at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, and is completing a PhD in War Studies at King’s College, London. This comment does not reflect the views or position of the Department of Defense.
Photo credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery
Hank Foresman 
Tom 
Tyrone Bomba 
George Andrews 
Rick Bennett 
Tom Timmerman 
Mark Seip 
John Oakley 
James B. 
Frank Hoffman 
Elton Parker 
I have no problem with the revised definition; though while we normally think of Strategy in us vs an enemy–as if war is the only answer; we really need to think in terms of us vs an adversary and that war is merely one of many set of political outcomes.
Strategy properly executed should not lead to war; unless of course that is what you want in the first place–then it is not strategy.
I would quibble a bit with the initial wording, partly because “artfully” – while understood upon explanation – implies something a bit more hippy-dippy than I suspect the author is advocating for. I also prefer the art/science balance proposed by Brodie, particularly in his essay “Strategy as a Science”.
I’ll also caveat that it’s alternately amusing and unsettling to see LTG Bolger’s name mentioned so repeatedly in recent discussions of strategy. I’ve not read his book, but I’ve heard him interviewed, read reviews of his book, and done some research into his background. I’m of the mind that LTG Bolger’s views are symptomatic of an officer corps that has spent at least two decades learning what used to be known as “campaigning”, but with a giant “Strategy!” label slapped onto it. That, I believe, is one of the root causes of strategic confusion in the upper echelons of American leadership.
You don’t think there’s a possibility you’re slicing the baloney a little thin here, do you?
The Strategist as an integral part of Strategy Verification and Validation (V&V):
Given the proceeding counter-proposal by Mr. Frank Hoffman and response by Mr. Hank Foresman, here’s the synthesis used as my point of departure:
To artfully design and coherently link achievable ends, allocated means, effective ways, with acceptable risks to generate, exploit, and sustain a competitive advantage against an adversary in order to secure desired political effects and outcomes.
Furthermore to the above synthesis, I would like to expand it by adding verification and validation (V&V) sub-parts (a & b below):
(a) To validate that the political effects and outcomes achieved are as desired. The Strategist provides objective evidence on whether or not the political effects and outcomes achieved are as desired. Validation is a key risk-reduction activity during strategy implementation – integration and especially (top-down) synchronization.
(b) To verify the coherent linkage between achievable ends, allocated means, effective ways, and acceptable risks towards generating, exploiting, and sustaining competitive advantage against an adversary. The Strategist provides objective evidence on whether or not there is a coherent linkage between achievable ends, allocated means, effective ways, and acceptable risks towards generating, exploiting, and sustaining competitive advantage against an adversary. Verification is a key risk-reduction activity during strategy implementation – synchronization and especially (bottom-up) integration.
Both the definition and its revision leave me cold because it has the strategist acting as a route planner making no judgment about the advisability of reaching the intended destination. First and foremost, a strategist must be able to describe why a particular outcome is on the route to a better future for his nation and have some general idea of what onward routing would look like.
“You should avoid needless and entangling engagements. You may boast about them, you may brag about them, you may say you are procuring consideration of the country. You may say that an Englishman may now hold up his head among the nations. But what does all this come to, gentlemen? It comes to this, that you are increasing your engagements without increasing your strength; and if you increase your engagements without increasing strength, you diminish strength, you abolish strength; you really reduce the empire and do not increase it. You render it less capable of performing its duties; you render it an inheritance less precious to hand on to future generations.”
– William Ewart Gladstone
Rick: I’m sympathetic to the philosophy behind your argument, but I think that the function you are discussing is one that belongs to the political leadership. Now, one might reasonably argue that they should have some strategic sense, as well and I’d agree.
Thus, I think what Frank Hoffman is describing is the lower of two levels of strategy, perhaps “strategy” itself, while you describe “grand strategy.”
As always, context matters. The question of what strategists do depends, somewhat, on what strategists we’re talking about and the level of decisions they’re wrestling with. I take some exception to Frank’s “against an enemy” language, really a quibble.
If you are describing military strategists, addressing use of military instruments of power, then Frank’s counterproposal can stand without caveat, dealing with enemies and potential enemies. The trouble is that we aren’t seeing many situations where even component HQ staffs are dealing with problems amenable to only military ways and means.
If you describe strategists operating at the grand strategy level, with all instruments of power at play, then you also need to consider where they are at on the spectrum of conflict. The extent that interests are shared or are in conflict determines the degree of opposition, between ally, partner, “frenemy”, adversary, and no-kidding enemy (all terms arguably needing additional precision).
I agree with the importance of struggling for advantage against a thinking opponent. But I’d hesitate to encourage the perception that strategists only deal with wartime. How about, instead of “against an enemy”, “against opposition”?
I offer one that may be too simplistic:
Strategy is the plan we make
To get us where we want to go
As modified by what we learn along the way.
(DKBrown37 2013)
I do think that this is too simplistic. As the author notes, “the word ‘strategy’ is so overused that it’s lost all meaning.” A big part of the problem the international community is encountering is that “strategy”, which has had a very specific connotation linking political objectives and national power, has been diluted to the point that people – including policy-makers, whose understanding of strategy is critical – believe that “strategy” is just any large scale plan. Coherent political goals are critical to sound strategy, so removing that element from the definition confuses the issue rather than clarifying it.
As you asked for feedback: “As Emile Simpson has demonstratively shown, narratives are critical to execution. The narrative should be considered a component or derivative of the strategy. But it is not clear that the strategist must build that narrative.”
I agree with Simpson – you can have the best strategy but without the ability to communicate it or pieces of it externally or even internally you risk the buy-in that execution of that strategy requires. The narrative should be a component, not just a derivative, if it’s to be effective. Too often the US in particular has treated the use of information (public diplomacy, strategic comms, call it what you will) as an afterthought rather than as an integral part of the strategic development process. If the strategist isn’t going to build that narrative himself, then he should at least embed those that have those skills within his process.
I believe Mr. Timmerman is on the right track regarding the enemy. My first thought was adversary but if we’re talking grand strategy then it must deal with all relationships and not just opponents. To that end, not qualifying the specific relationship seems to provide the generic answer. Therefore – “sustain a competitive advantage — to secure political….”
Clausewitz (in his best known quote) wrote that all military ends are ultimately political. Strategists need to connect the desired political end-state to available means, though the achievement of identifiable objectives.
Many previous American “strategies” have been:
Step 1: Bomb them
Step 2: ???
Step 3: Victory
We need to improve our competence at Step 2, because American forces have been really good at Step 1 for decades, but have often had trouble at reaching Step 3.
Thanks for the feedback Mark. I will endeavor to reincorporate it.
See my last Orbis essay on Grand Strategy where I listed Communication as a consideration in making and executing strategy.
The question is Who develops the narrative? If it only the strategist, then we must incorporate it into the job description. If its the commander…..?
Very respectfully, Frank
Thought-provoking and furthering the strategic conversation, Frank–exactly what WOTR is known for and in which they are setting the standard. You know where I fall on the power and placement of the narrative–it is even contained within these pages/pixels (It’s All About the Narrative). In general, and closely aligned with your Cs piece, the placement is ubiquitous and omnipresent. Thoughts come first, then get transcribed into words (and images), and then must match deeds to the letter (pun intended). Thus, the narrative is merely the way the strategy is repeatedly communicated up, out, and down, and the way to start and maintain the two-way conversation with stakeholders, partners, and competitors.
To answer your final question, it is the organization that develops the strategy (which includes the narrative)–who the face is vs who the pen is vs who stands behind the podium fielding questions, they are all elements of the same organization and thus (ideally) speaking with one voice and from the same sheet of music.
V/r,
Elton