The United States, its allies, and its partners face an intertwined series of challenges in the South China Sea. This nested series of issues is most clearly manifest in China’s recent (and continuing) island-creation and expansion in the South China Sea.
China’s island-dredging is itself only a symptom of the real problem: a significant power vacuum in the South China Sea.
The United States has largely reduced its presence in those waters over the past 20 years. While the overall capabilities of the U.S. Navy are increasing with each new ship, the newer, more versatile platforms are more expensive. In DoD terminology, the Navy has prioritized capability over capacity, with the result being the reduction by more than 20 percent in total Navy ships since 1995. Combined with demands on the U.S. Navy to be present in the waters around the Middle East, and the United States is left with fewer “presence days” elsewhere in the world.
In terms of hard power, Southeast Asia’s littoral states’ maritime—navy and coast guard—capabilities are extremely limited. In addition, they are reluctant to take actions that would put them in direct opposition to China. The reluctance may be due, at least in part, to the fact that China is the top trading partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even considering countries’ willingness to pursue their interests according to international law, the Philippines’ much-noted arbitration case (which was initially highly controversial among ASEAN countries) is only to determine what maritime features are contestable in court—not who owns them, but “can they be owned?”
Together, these factors leave a significant power gap in the South China Sea. While Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are all increasing their spending on maritime assets, their efforts will need to be sustained for at least another decade to provide the countries with both the assets and the crews capable of sustaining presence in their claimed waters of the South China Sea. Mira Rapp-Hooper is right to highlight the need to expedite U.S. capacity-building efforts for maritime domain awareness. That said, China’s 35 years of economic growth, and 20 years of 10 percent or more annual growth in military spending allows it to fill the gap. If current trends continue, the future strategic landscape in the South China Sea will be considerably different, and unlike today, it will no longer be open to interpretation.
Recent events certainly suggest that the Chinese are consolidating their claims in a de facto, if not a de jure way. But is it really so bad for the United States if China controls the fisheries and resources of the South China Sea? After all, China asserts it does not seek to impede the free flow of commerce in the South China Sea.
Despite China’s stated commitment to uphold open commerce, it has demonstrated both its capability and willingness to utilize economic tools punitively to further national objectives. For example, China halted exports of rare earth elements, necessary for batteries and other high-end electronics, to Japan during a 2010 dispute over the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain. At the time, China controlled 93 percent of the global supply of rare earths.
China has a legitimate interest in preserving the continued flow of commerce through the South China Sea, with a large share of its imports flowing through those waters. However, Japan and South Korea have the same interest in the free-flow of commerce, and are even more import-dependent for many resources than China. Approximately 50 percent of annual global merchant shipping traverses the South China Sea. Should China have control of the waters of the South China Sea, there is no certainty it would not utilize the same economic strong-arm tactics used against Japan to secure its objectives.
Promoting the rule of law and equal access by all countries to the maritime commons will require a far more comprehensive set of activities from the United States.
The first need, as noted by several contributors at War on the Rocks, is that the United States will need to pursue policies that demonstrate to China that its actions in the South China Sea risk escalation. As long as China sees little risk of escalation in its actions, it will have little reason to refrain from provocation.
Second, my colleague Zack Cooper is right that the United States needs “gray hulls for gray zones.” To be truly effective, the United States (and countries in Southeast Asia) will also need more hulls so that they are present more often for more time. Doing so will require the United States to carefully consider what the rules of engagement are, and the latitude given to ship commanders.
Third the United States must demonstrate progress on the economic front. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) needs to be signed this year. For the United States to be seen as a viable economic partner (and not just a guarantor of security), TPP is the minimal credible step. In addition, the United States should identify targeted ways to promote U.S. investment in the developing economies throughout Southeast and South Asia, and should work with countries in these regions to bolster rule of law and contract enforcement so that businesses have greater clarity about the market environment.
Fourth, the United States should commission legal scholars from across the region and a broader community of interest to develop a proposal for the legal status (elevation, rock, or island) of each feature in the South China Sea. Countries would be free to debate differing viewpoints, but this would be a useful mechanism for countries to reduce tensions without directly confronting one another’s claims.
Lastly, the United States must present a vision for what a vibrant and open South China Sea could look like. Currently, zero-sum national interests combine with resource and political constraints to impede countries bordering the South China Sea from working together to achieve positive outcomes. The United States must partner with littoral states to build the case that countries in the region have more to gain working together than they have to lose.
If the United States is unwilling to commit to these actions—or a comparably ambitious slate—then we should all begin to adjust to a South China Sea that is controlled according to Chinese, rather than international, law.
John Schaus is a Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS where he focuses on defense and security issues in the Asia-Pacific. From 2011 to 2014 he worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense.
Photo credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery
Her 
JoePilot 
Francis Ross Vale Conol 
Rebel 
Tyrone Bomba 
CliffB 
Francis Ross Vale Conol 
Mark T 
John Fighter 
Dang Kim Lai 
lion 
Well, China claim the south china sea by it true history, but others ASEAN coountries claim by premises, and US support by international law. What do you think who are the true owners of these islands? Which are these witnesses exist first? The history has existed before the premises and international law. Then who are the true owner? The answer is China. If US wants to solve the south china sea for peacefully it is very simply to do. US must get out and not pivot from Asia then no trouble and war over there. Who is the maker trouble? It is US.
If the US is the trouble maker, then how do you explain why Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia are upset with China, and not the US?
JoePilot the China Government does not cooperated. Meaning China want to die.
Ei Her, better stick with the International law which is 200 nautical miles or 230.156 miles or 370.4 kilometers away in every seashore in low tide basis. Greater than those territorial range is automatically what we called International territory where rules and law are strictly prohibited which is no one is owning it and if it is owned by some then it should be approved by all the Government. Failure to follow command will automatically be destroyed.
Part of the duty of the US Navy is to defend the free flow of goods through the hot points in the world, in national interests and the interests of the global community. This includes the South China Sea. The duty to maintain trade through these waters is not as a matter of who owns what, but to make sure resources get where they’re needed. It has always fallen on the worlds super power to do this.
China merely wants to show its capable of guaranteeing trade passage, in addition to its ironically nationalist claims to the entire area. Their goal is to force the US, and everybody else, out. Therefore, sorry “Her,” leaving is not an option.
Concerning your second point above, about how the US and its allies in the Western Pacific “need more hulls” in the water. I wonder if the argument can be made that idea is actually 20th century thinking being applied to a 21st century situation.
That is, given the emerging technologies of swarm-drone aircraft, long-range rail guns, hypersonic planes, etc., that another warship is still the best way to kill a warship?
This approach China is taking toward building aircraft carriers that, in essence, will give them a fleet that mimics the capabilities of the USN of the 1980s, isn’t akin to the Germans straining to build all those (for then) hi-tech battleships and battlecruisers in the 1930s?
All those Kriegsmarine ships LOOKED great, but in the end turned out to not much more than an ultra-expensive PR-type type operation. Had all that steel and money been plowed into submarines, those little “pig boats” could’ve defeated Britain before the US even got into that war.
I’m just asking.
During the 1800’s and into the 1900’s the British maintained a large Navy for rwo purposes. The first was to insure British Naval supremacy in the North Sea and out into the Atlantic Ocean. Eventually, on the other side of that Ocean, the US carried out the same policy vis-a-vis the Caribbean Sea and this country’s Atlantic Coast. The Royal Navy which had previously been the dominating Sea Power in the Caribbean Sea was pragmatically withdrawn by their government from that area to avoid causing a conflict with the US. They realized that it would be impossible for them to prevail in Naval Contest directly off the coast of the United States.
The British, later emulated by the Americans, employed other ships of theRoyal Navy to secure the flow of trade with their colonies or from other areas. The trade of that era, however, provided a positive balance of trade for both Britain and America. It provided Britain with a major source of inflowing cash on which their nation’s economic health depended. Britain’s industrial base had shrunk significantly due to lower prices from imports, and on that economic basis alone they were running a trade deficit. The positive cash flow (into England) from their colonies was what insured Britain had a positive balance of trade. During this time, and up until the 1929 Depression, the US was a “net expoting” country — and thus also had a positive balance of trade.
In the current era, it is America’s trade with Asia which is the primary cause of our nation’s $40+ billion MONTHLY trade deficit, i.e. a trade deficit that results in approximately 1/2 trillion US dollars leaving the country for Asian Banks every year. The question is, how much longer can can that evel of cash continue to flow out of this country without it bcomming bankrupt?
Given the above economic scenatios, why do some believe tnis country should invest even more US dollars to insure that the shipping which carries the foreign made imports that are bankrupting us should be protected by the US Navy. And, while we are wandering down memory lane, recall that 20 years ago most of the products that we now import from China and other Asian Nations (or their predecessors) were made in this country.
Perhaps the US needs to allow the Chinese have the South China Sea — on an uncontested basis, and if it bothers the other nations in that area or the Koreans or Japanese — it’s their conflict. If they so choose, we should elect to let them fight it out at their expense.
The US has lost enough money already in that part of the world. Of course we can always sell weapons to any nation wishing to buy them, and maybe recoup some of our “nation’s” economic loss resulting from so called American Corporation’s doing business in that part of the world.
I presume (perhaps incorrectly) from their use of the term “Gray Hulls” that the author of this article has read the Three Warfares Study prepared for the DOD Office of Net Assessment on this subject. The Chinese srategy is going to bring them success in that area of the World / Sea.
The South China Sea is their Carribean, and the U.S. would do well to recognize that fact.
Also, as a Navy Officer (Surface Warfare as they say today), I spent many months on surface ships in the South China Sea. The US would be acting strategically foolish were it (very unlikely) to engage the Chinese in combat in that rather confined area — especially given the number of air bases, etc the Chinese have on their Mainland and on Hainan Island.
While personally I believe it is the smarter strategic move to recognize And respect the fact that other nations as powerful as China have a Sphere of Influence, the simple fact of geography and the size of their nation and its military ensure that China will dominate the South China Sea — should this country be foolsh enough to contest that domination.
March 17, 2015
08:44AM
General Santos City
Philippines
We need the following.
(1.) At least 10 million men and women at the age about 18 years and above in defending this disputed islands in the South East Asia.
(2.) At least 1 million units of anti-air in defending this disputed islands.
(3.) At least 1 million units of naval cannon in defending this disputed islands.
(4.) At least 10 million units of flak cannon in defending this disputed islands.
(5) At least a thousand units of any type of naval ships in patrolling this disputed islands.
(6) At least a thousand units of any type of radar in defending this disputed islands.
(7) Unlimited armaments.
(8) Unlimited supplies.
Other than those is for further discussion.
-Francis Conol
And just how is TPP helpful for the 300 million average working American? From what’s been reported it sounds about as beneficial for the average working joe as jacking off with a cheese grater.
China is the biggest Ponzi scheme in history. Each and every rate increase at the FED from June on wards will lessen the time until implosion; lessen the time until Beijing has it’s Minsky Moment. With it’s economy on the rocks they will likely lash out externally in a bid to divert their population’s attention just as the Argentinian junta did in 1982. (as Pres. Johnson said about Nixon: “Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.” When you can’t go any lower just wrap the flag around yourself and invoke visions of grandeur and heroes from the past.)
Now the really interesting variables will be things like how many of it’s own citizens is the CCP willing to kill in order to retain it’s grasp on power?
I agree with Mark T’s conclusion in the post above. That is, the current regime in China is certainly the stereotypic giant-with-feet-of-clay.
Despite all of the CCP government’s current and particular problems, you also want to keep in mind more generally that, over their roughly 5,000-year history, times of national DISunity have been approximately as common for the Chinese as have times of national unity. Their country suffers from both east/west and north/south social, economic and political fissuring.
So, taking that into account for US strategic planning purposes, I don’t think we’re in a situation in which we have to reconcile ourselves to some new Chinese imperium sustaining itself on the world stage now and forever.
Besides TPP to get southeast asian countries into the common trade with US, military presence on the south china sea by Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia navy is a must. The ocean can’t be left open that China would work its way to control. The US can donate or selling their war ships that are pretty much outdated to the US standards to these countries with reasonable cost. That is the best way to fast track naval defense of these nations. why getting those ships to scrap yard? It’s never too late. Vietnam is willing to fight China and why not pouring support to it?
U.S. must has a concrete step to prevent China making South Chiana sea as a precedent, then in future Beijing claims China sovereign upon America land beause the rsil ways of U.S. were built by Chinese labor
boycott china made products………