Sometime around midnight on January 25, separatist fighters in the insurgency-riven Pakistani province of Baluchistan attacked a power transmission line.
They probably didn’t anticipate the immense ripple effects this single strike would have across the country.
The assault, which blew up two key towers near a major power station, tripped the national grid. Eighty percent of the country—including most major cities—plunged into darkness. Many in Pakistan described the outage as the worst in the nation’s history. In some cities, hours went by before power was restored.
This wasn’t the first time militants attacked Pakistan’s electricity infrastructure. Baluch separatists targeted more than 100 gas lines over the last four years, including a February 1 assault that reduced gas supplies to Punjab and Khyber-Pakthunkhwa provinces by 25 million cubic feet. In April 2013, the Pakistani Taliban blew up the largest power station in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Half of Peshawar, the provincial capital with a population nearly as large as that of Los Angeles, lost power.
The fact that one isolated attack can inflict such widespread damage underscores the severity of Pakistan’s national energy crisis. Even in an era of cheap oil, Pakistan is experiencing a power shortfall of roughly 5,000 megawatts (in recent years, energy deficits have soared to 8,500 megawatts—more than 40 percent of national demand). In parts of rural Pakistan, residents are lucky to have four hours of electricity a day. The crisis’s economic costs are stark; shortages have cost the country 4 percent of gross domestic product. Some Western companies, citing electricity deficits, are suspending operations in Pakistan. On January 26, the Moody’s ratings group warned that energy shortages will damage Pakistan’s credit worthiness.
More of a Menace Than Militancy
In Pakistan, energy is arguably a bigger public policy challenge than militancy because it directly affects so many more people. Shortages prevent people from cooking, working (hundreds of factory closures—including 500 in the industrial hub of Faisalabad—have left scores unemployed), and receiving proper medical care (in some hospitals, services have been curtailed). Not surprisingly, public opinion polls in Pakistan identify electricity shortages as one of the country’s top problems. Pakistani officials are not exaggerating when they claim that energy woes are a “bigger menace…to our existence” than the war on terror. Pakistan’s energy insecurity is deeply destabilizing—and not just because militants prey on fragile infrastructure. Streets often swell with angry protestors railing against power outages. They have blocked roads, and attacked the homes and offices of members of Pakistan’s major political parties.
No Quick Fixes
The causes of Pakistan’s energy crisis go well beyond supply shortages. They are rooted in chronic, structural problems such as widespread inefficiencies (including transmission and distribution losses approaching 30 percent) and sectoral debt approaching $3 billion. The losses occur for a variety of reasons. These include bad equipment, inadequate maintenance, theft (when people hook or cut electricity wires), and attacks on transmission lines. The debt is a consequence of huge cash flow problems: energy generators, distributors, and transmitters all lack funds. Compounding the problem is that the government charges a pittance for energy and few customers pay their bills. As a result, the sector can literally not afford to provide energy. Another core problem is policy incoherence. In the absence of an overarching energy ministry, multiple government entities jockey for control over policy, resulting in a dysfunctional policymaking process.
Pakistan’s government has long focused on increasing generation capacity and ramping up supply. Given the deep, structural nature of the problem, however, there are no quick fixes. Islamabad’s latest plan is to tap into unexploited coal reserves in the desert region of Thar. This plan does little to address the crisis’s underlying causes, and it ignores the fact that Pakistan lacks both the technical capacity and funds to undertake such large-scale exploitation—not to mention the advanced infrastructure required to transport this coal around the country. Neither do modest cash infusions from external donors address the roots of the energy crisis (last year, Saudi Arabia gifted Islamabad a $1.5 billion loan to fund new energy projects). And nor do much-mocked government conservation measures that ban neon signs and all-night wedding parties. More promising initiatives, such as efforts to bring cheaper renewables into the energy mix on a larger scale, are years from completion.
A Weakened Government
Pakistan’s 2013 elections swept Nawaz Sharif into power in a landslide. Blessed with a huge mandate from the masses, he was (according to his supporters) determined to learn from the past—when spats with Pakistan’s powerful military got him booted from power during two previous terms as prime minister—and to rule responsibly and effectively.
Unfortunately for Sharif, things haven’t worked out as planned. Bruising battles with the military over militancy, India, and the legal fate of former military leader Pervez Musharraf, coupled with anti-government protests last year, have weakened Sharif tremendously. Today’s government is a brittle shell of its former self. The armed forces have effectively taken full control of the foreign affairs and defense portfolios, and instituted new military courts to prosecute terrorists. To be sure, the Pakistani military has always held a veto on issues of foreign affairs and defense, and wielded immense clout over these portfolios. Yet for the first year of his current term, Sharif—as he did during previous terms as premier—sought to exert more civilian control over these areas, and may have enjoyed some limited success. Sharif, however, has now been cut down to size, and the civil-military power balance has reverted to the status quo ante.
Consequently, civilian officials have once again been reduced to parroting the line of the security establishment—and in recent months, they have been doing so incessantly and vociferously. Consider how Islamabad has been calling for international intervention to resolve the Kashmir dispute—Sharif himself made such an appeal in a UN General Assembly address last fall. Or how it has been loudly accusing India of undertaking “subversive” activities in Pakistan. Or how Sartaj Aziz, the prime minister’s chief foreign affairs advisor, recently warned that a U.S.-India civil nuclear deal—which has yet to be implemented—could destabilize South Asia. According to some whisperings in Pakistan, Aziz is the military’s new de facto spokesman).
As with previous prime ministers, Sharif’s policy space is now fully restricted to domestic affairs, including energy policy. Energy was a priority issue during Sharif’s electoral campaign (energy took up more pages than any other issue in his political party’s election manifesto), and he was elected with a large mandate to resolve the crisis. Unfortunately, he has little to show for it. Sharif’s government has said the right things—pledging lower energy subsidies and higher tax revenue in order to bring relief to a debt-ridden energy sector—but little of substance has come from these promises. One bright spot has been renewables; last month, the government announced measures to facilitate the use of solar power on a greater scale. These include the approval of grid-connected solar energy and the elimination of high taxes imposed on imported solar equipment. Still, such efforts, while encouraging, will not resolve the energy crisis.
In effect, Sharif is simply in no position to resolve the energy crisis, absent major policy shifts that he lacks the clout to carry out. Even the most popular and powerful Pakistani civilian leader would struggle to muster the political will needed to implement tough but necessary energy policy correctives—from pricing reforms and crackdowns on theft to sectoral restructuring and expansions of the tax base. The enfeebled Sharif has practically no chance.
Sharif Backed into a Corner
In the coming months, Sharif could find himself being backed into an even smaller corner. As Pakistan’s scorching summer heat arrives and continued outages keep people from cooling down, tempers could flare and touch off intense street protests. Imran Khan, the cricket-star-turned-populist politician with close connections to the security establishment, could exploit such public anger and (perhaps following a nod from the Pakistani deep state) mobilize large-scale protests against energy shortages—while renewing calls for Sharif’s resignation that he was issuing last summer.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani military might sense an opportunity to pounce. It is eager to minimize public unrest amid a stepped-up counterterrorism campaign announced after the Pakistani Taliban’s December assault on an army-run school in Peshawar. In Pakistan, where the military has held power for about half the country’s history, coups are always a possibility. Today, however, an outright putsch is unlikely. The military already wields ample power behind the scenes, and likely doesn’t want to be directly saddled with Pakistan’s overwhelming challenges. Tellingly, last summer, when anti-government demonstrations briefly became violent, and stone-throwing protestors converged on Parliament, the army refused to intervene directly. Some Pakistani commentators believe Pakistan’s new army chief, Raheel Sharif, is simply not interested in a takeover. (This does not rule out the possibility, however, that the military might intervene—even if just briefly—should energy protests turn very violent, expand, and last for a long time.)
A more likely possibility is that the army—concluding that Nawaz Sharif lacks the credibility to manage, much less resolve, one of the country’s most far-reaching and destabilizing challenges—pressures the premier to call early elections (his term ends in 2018). If the prime minister’s body language in recent weeks—which signaled fatigue and discomfort—is any indication, then he might well oblige. However, if his defiant side resurfaces he may reject early elections. This side was on full display during the anti-government campaign last summer, when he repeatedly refused Khan’s demands.
In a country as volatile as Pakistan, standoffs between civilians and the armed forces are nothing to sneeze at. And judging by Pakistan’s history, they rarely end well for the civilians.
Pakistan’s government, much like its general population, caught in the crosshairs of an energy crisis that Islamabad cannot control, could be in for some dark days.
Michael Kugelman is the senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org and on Twitter @michaelkugelman.
Photo credit: U.S. Embassy Pakistan
Irfan Shah 
Apparently this article has been written on hearsay without trying to explore ground realities, on top of everything its contradictory on some counts. The reasons are, (1) labeling Imran Khan, the most popular politician having close connections to the security establishment is a blatant lie based on the propaganda of sitting government, had there been any such connections, enough opportunities were there for the army in the recent past to topple the govt. So, Imran Khan is solely on public support and most popular leader of Pakistan.(2) As far Gen. Raheel sharif and his activities are concerned, for sure there will be no army intervention despite the fact that this time people of Pakistan wants that army should act and throw out the present govt paving way for fresh elections. Raheel is like a family member to Nawaz Sharif, both belonging to same Kashmiri Clan. Whatever Raheel is doing is indirectly to save corrupt & illegal sitting government, had he not been acting the way he is presenting himself there had been a coup from within an army by this time.
Agreed, apparently it appears that country is facing acute shortage of electricity, but it is a cooked shortage, I attach herewith an article (THIS IS THE ELECTRICITY GAME PLAYED BY OUR PRESENT LEADERS IN PAKISTAN) one can easily understand the existing capacity to produce electricity vis a vis its utilization but still for their corruption purposeses they want to install Coal operated plants worth around 35 Billion Dollars. Entire world knows that Coal operated plants are obsolete and are termed environmental hazard but this government of corrupts is bent upon for such useless projects for their Commissions & Kickbacks bringing the country under the burden of foreign loans. Fuel operated plants are most expansive quoted @ One million US Dollars per MW and Coal operated Plants are the cheapest (Specially Chinese). At international level the Cost of One MW of Coal plant is .75 million US Dollar but our champions of corruption are charging 1.75 Million US dollars per MW, the difference is understandable for their own good. Hence, reasons of so called shortage are quite obvious.
Had there been any popular government in the country, they would have immediately called for mid term election on the face of such hue & cry by the people. Surely in days to come Imran Khan will go to its people against these corrupts once again, last time this government was saved by Army,lets see what happens in the next round, will it be people or Vested interests.
Dear Pakistani’s Read & Think!!!!! (THIS IS THE ELECTRICITY GAME PLAYED BY OUR PRESENT LEADERS IN PAKISTAN)
Dear Pakistanis !
Read, Think & understand the game International Powers are playing with us with the help of ???? Who- Zardari ? IMF ?
Electricity produced in Pakistan is from three main sources.
1). Hydral
2). Thermal (Gas/Steam/Furnace Oil)
3). Nuclear
There are four major power producers in country which include Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC), Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).
Below is the break-up of the installed capacity of each of these power producers (as of June-2008).
1. WAPDA
a. WAPDA Hy dal
Terbela 3478 MW
Mangla 1000 MW
Ghazi-Brotha 1450 MW
Warsak &nb sp; 243 MW
Chashma 184 MW
Dargai 20 MW
Rasul 22 MW
Shadi-Waal 18 MW
NandiPur 14 MW
Kurram Garhi 4 MW
Renala 1 MW
;Chitral 1 MW
Jagran (AK) 30 MW
Total Hydal ==> 6461 MW
b. WAPDA Thermal
Gas Turbine Power Station, Shadra 59 MW
Steam Power Station, Faisalabad 132 MW
Gas Turbine Power Station, Faisalabad 244 MW
Gas Power Station, Multan 195 MW
Thermal Power Station, Muzaffargarh 1350 MW
Thermal Power Station, Guddu 1655 MW
Gas Turbine Power Station, Kotri 174 MW
Thermal Power Station, Jamshoro 850 MW
Thermal Power Station, Larkana 150 MW
Thermal Power Station, Quetta 35 MW
Gas Turbine Power Station, Panjgur & nbsp; 39 MW
Thermal Power Station, Pasni 17 MW
Total Thermal ==> 4811 MW
WAPDA’s Total Hydal + Thermal capacity is ==> 11272 MW.&nb sp;
2. Karachi Electric Supply Company
Thermal Power Station, Korengi 316 MW
Gas Turbine Power Station, Korengi 80 MW
Gas Turbine Power Station, SITE 100 MW
Thermal Power Station, Bin Qasim 1260 MW
Total (KESC) ==> 1756 MW
3. Independent Power Producers (IPPs)
Hub Power Project 1292 MW
AES Lalpir Ltd, Mahmood Kot MuzaffarGarh 362 MW
AES Pak Gen, Mahmood Kot MuzaffarGarh 365 MW
Altern Energy Ltd, Attock 29 MW
Fauji KabirWala Power Company, Khanewal 157 MW
Gul Ahmad Energy Ltd, Korengi 136 MW
Habibullah Coastal Power Ltd 140 MW
Japan Power Generation, Lahore 120 MW
Koh-e-Noor Energy Ltd, Lahore &n bsp; 131 MW
Liberty Power Limited, Ghotki 232 MW
Rousch Power, Khaniwal 412 MW
Saba Power Company, Sheikhpura 114 MW
Southern Electric Power Company Ltd, Raiwind 135 MW
Tapal Energy Limited, Karachi &n bsp; 126 MW
Uch Power Ltd, Dera Murad Jamali, Nasirabad 586 MW
Attock Gen Ltd, Morgah Rawalpindi 165 MW
Atlas Power, Sheikhpura 225 MW
Engro Energy Ltd, Karachi —– MW & nbsp;
Kot Addu Power Company Limited (Privitized) 1638 MW
Total (IPPs) ===> 6365 MW
4. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
KANUPP 137 MW
CHASNUPP-1 325 MW
Total (Nuclear) ===> 462 MW
Hydal Electricity generated by WAPDA varies between two extremities i.e. between minimum of 2414 MW and maximum of 6761 MW depending upon the river flow through the whole year.
Total Power Generation Capacity of Pakistan (including all sources) is 19855 MW and the electricity demand (as of today 20-04-2010) is 14500 MW and PEPCO is merely generating 10000 MW.
So it is obvious that these 15-20 hrs power shutdowns in most parts of the country are not because of the lack of generation capacity but only because of IMF / World Bank policies imposed on our nation by the Government. The Power Generation companies are not buying Furnace Oil from PSO by saying they don’t have money to do that but we are all paying for Electricity that is generated from Furnace Oil. This is the reason that top refineries like PRL are operating at 40% capacities. IMF / World bank has imposed to reduce budget deficit by importing less crude oil. But due to this fact all our industries are under severe crisis. None of our political party who are in Assembly is ready to speak on it because every one is blessed by US / IMF / World Ban k.
Dear Pakistani’s,
This is a time to show your social activism your power and strength. It is your silence which is deafening and your couldn’t care less attitude which makes the people in power more powerful evasive and secure in their Air conditioned offices.
WE WANT ELECTRICITY IN PAKISTAN.
Electricity now is @11 Rs. per unit, and it will increase after every two months as directed by (American) IMF policies.
Also CHINA offers to Pakistan Electricity for justRs.200 Monthly Bill and Unlimited Usage of Electricity but our government is not taking the offer seriously. This is because there will be neither kick backs nor any commissions to be pocketed by the strong mafia of politicians and bureaucrats.
These people are there because of your votes. Let them serve you rather than rule you……
NOW THIS IS OUR TIME TO SHOW THE GOVERNMENT YOUR STRENGTH.
PLEASE SPREAD THIS MESSAGE AS MUCH AS YOU CAN, BECAUSE OF THIS MESSAGE MANY PEOPLE WOULD COME TO KNOW ABOUT THE TRUTH