Editor’s Note: This is the second of a two-part series. Read part I of War, Interrupted here.
Orange is the New Black
The life of a jihadist usually means serving extended periods of time in the various prisons of the “apostate” regimes, interspersed with well-meaning releases or paroles. It is a rite of passage for many jihadist leaders. Abu Musab al Zarqawi spent many years in Jordanian prisons, and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the most famous alum of the American detention system, was released in 2004 after a recommendation by a combined board felt he did not pose a threat. Islamic State messaging frequently remembers “brothers” incarcerated by the Iraqi government, and often complains (missing a sense of irony of course) about their mistreatment. They have also proclaimed to both their prisoners and the Iraqi government that their highest priority is to break them out of prison. As part of the Islamic State’s military campaign to return to relevance, introduced in the first part of this series, they constructed a multi-layered plan to free their members in Iraqi prisons.
To accomplish this feat, the Islamic State created a brigade that specialized in targeting the criminal justice system as a whole, with assassination squads responsible for killing judges, prosecutors, investigators, prison staff, and witnesses. Physical infrastructure was also targeted, including crime labs, detention facilities, and courtrooms. Many of these assaults were enabled by insider information about possible targets passed on during normal visitations, exposing the vulnerability of an open legal system in a country at war with itself. The Islamic State exploited this to the utmost, bringing the justice system to a crawl. Attempts by the government to expedite prosecutions (and executions) brought more complaints by both human rights groups and the Islamic State about persecution of Sunni prisoners: an effective propaganda angle that resonated with the Sunni community, and recalls the convergence of human rights groups and jihadists on the issue of Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay.
The Islamic State’s delaying tactics were successful in keeping many of their leaders from execution, a fortuitous break for the group. There were seven full-scale prison assaults between July 2012 and July 2013, and two were successful in achieving large breakouts. The Abu Ghraib operation in July of 2013 was particularly impactful as over 500 senior Islamic State personnel, many slated for death, escaped unharmed. In an organization that only had several thousand members at the time, this had a large impact. Many returned to serve in key positions, including the emir of Anbar province, Abu Wahib, who led the efforts to secure Fallujah for the Islamic State in late 2013.
Advise and Assist
The arrival of veteran jihadist commanders from the prison break coincided with the need for experienced leaders to staff the growing numbers of assault units in Ninewa, North Babil, Diyala, and Anbar. These battle formations had been fine-tuning their combat skills on ubiquitous Iraqi Army and police checkpoints around the country, eventually growing from squad to company level operations. The checkpoint system had been encouraged by the United States during the occupation to prevent IED placement in certain “hotspots.” The system worked because of robust U.S. air support and mobile reaction forces that could reinforce isolated Iraqi units. Once the United States turned over security responsibility to Iraqi units, there was little thought given to what happened after those capabilities were gone.
Checkpoint assaults are regularly featured on Islamic State videos, demonstrating the weakness of the Iraqi government in key areas as well as providing large amounts of captured weapons and material to a growing Islamic State. The Islamic State’s units received excellent training in small unit assault on these targets, which took place for hours without any response from higher headquarters or nearby units. The videos unwittingly point out the misuse of heavy weapons systems, such as the siting of Abrams main battle tanks in poor defensive positions. These indicators of poor training and doctrine, compared to the self-taught excellence in small unit tactics of the Islamic State from 2007-2014, indisputably reflect on our advisory effort in Iraq.
War as the Reestablishment of Order
There are members of the Islamic State that have been fighting in Iraq since 2003. According to their media releases, they are not weary. While the organization has merged with others, and changed names and objectives several times, its core essence and overall goal have remained unchanged. This is important to understand because the surprise at their success – and the rapidity in which it happened in 2014 – might lead some to believe that the group could easily be rolled back, or that this blitzkrieg force has yet to take roots as an occupying army. This perspective overlooks the effectiveness of the Islamic State’s seven-year campaign to dominate what they see as their core areas. Their seizure of broad swaths of territory was not a random or lucky development, but rather a carefully planned and coordinated offensive preceded by years of preparation by unconventional warfare.
Commentators arguing that the Islamic State will wear out its welcome, or that it has collected too many enemies need to reexamine this conclusion after reviewing the Islamic State’s campaign since 2007. The Islamic State’s list of enemies has not changed a great deal, and remains expansive. With the exception of the Americans who left, and with some variations due to demographics and geography, the Islamic State targeting has been amazingly consistent over a long period of time: They kill Sunni collaborators, Kurds, Shia pilgrims, Yazidi “devil worshippers,” security forces, Shia militias, government workers, contractors, Communists, and the list goes on. The groups the United States have worked with in the past to stand up against the Islamic State have all the while been undercut and intimidated to the point that they cannot function effectively.
An accurate assessment of the strength of the Islamic State, and its deep roots in their core areas, is essential in determining the feasibility of any strategy that seeks to roll back or defeat this enemy. Any strategy that is dependent upon the creation of a “new Awakening” should also look carefully at what key local leaders the United States would partner with in each Sunni community – considering that a healthy number of former allies are dead, in exile, or have “repented” and are currently working with the Islamic State.
Strategists use simplistic narratives to make sense of the larger puzzle and construct intuitive solutions. Fixing sectarianism at the national level and peeling away Sunni tribes on the ground becomes an instant strategy, obvious to all. This article does not argue against that strategy, but urges a closer look at facts on the ground to see if it is feasible. Political solutions cannot occur in a security vacuum. Pushing out the Islamic State with Sunni tribesmen, who are in essence armed civilians, can only be a means to an end. Otto Marenin, a policing scholar, wrote that police are experts at reproducing order, but they cannot create order if it is absent. This societal order might have been present in 2006 – when the Awakening movement wrestled Sunni areas away from an Islamic State weakened by U.S. pressure – but might not exist anymore. Stability is a very bottom-up process that can be independent of larger narratives. But to be successful, its creation will require the same courageous local leaders that were found in the Awakening movement of Iraq, and in Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan.
Contrary to depictions of the Islamic State as nihilistic killers, the leadership has adapted many of the tenets of a learning organization to adapt from their defeat in 2007. Their concept of decentralized micro-warfare has eliminated many of their local challengers in the tribal auxiliaries and local police, and undermined the power of the Iraqi government to protect their Sunni allies. Isolated Iraqi Army units, losing their local eyes and ears, have been ejected from Sunni areas one by one. Most importantly, a determination to protect and free human capital – a resource that takes years to create – has served the Islamic State well. We have missed most of this story, but it is not too late to learn from it.
Our current Defense Strategic Guidance, stating that the United States will not size its forces to fight large-scale stability operations, leads some to the perception that we will not be involved in stability operations in the future. That is a misreading of the document, and an unrealistic projection of the future. The United States understands that it will fight in stability and support operations in the future, with a preference for leveraging the capabilities of countries that share similar interests to ours, to maintain a global order that is conducive to our economic and security interests. To execute this strategy, we will have to learn how to better recruit and assist allies on the ground, train and increase the capabilities of allied armies more effectively, and develop a successful detention policy that keeps bad actors off the battlefield while adhering to our national values. The situation in Iraq allows the United States the opportunity to improve on the above-stated capabilities, much like the Islamic State did after setbacks in 2007. If we are unable to do any of these tasks more effectively than we have in the past ten years, then we need to seriously reconsider our role as the guardian of an unsustainable world order.
Craig Whiteside is an associate professor for the Naval War College, Monterey. The Iraqi Awakening partners of his former unit, 1-501 Parachute Infantry, are gone. He will defend his dissertation, “The Smiling, Scented Men: The Political Worldview of the Islamic State of Iraq, 2003-2013,” at Washington State University in November 2014. You can contact the author at cawhites@nps.edu or on Twitter @CraigAWhiteside
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The author completely ignores that ISIL must now hold territory and govern. Being good assassins has no relation whatsoever with creating a modern state.
Moreover the author assumes USA strategy is to “degrade and destroy” ISIL, as has been officially stated by the Obama administration. Perhaps he may be forgiven for believing sound bites of the government rather than looking at what’s actually happening on the ground, but he’s a professor.
The relative magnitude and frequency of the Kobani strikes vs Iraqi strikes speaks volumes. The U.S. will preserve the balance of power viz a viz the various sectarian and ethnic groups.
As far as ISIL, it’s clear that the US is leaving them to be a Sunni problem. The U.S. doesn’t care if they occupy the desert and turn the place into a dungeon – that’s a problem for the Sunnis to resolve. No need to waste missiles; let the Sunnis rot under their rule until they collectively rise up against them. Then maybe the U.S. will help. Until then, ISIL can have their desert “state” of no strategic value and contend with bitter population they must expend considerable resources in order to subdue.
That’s the USA strategy. I thought it was obvious, but apparently many people focus on words rather than look at what’s right in front of them. Perhaps the Machiavellian character of our government’s policies are too much for them to swallow, so they continue regurgitating propaganda that’s meant for people who can barely spot Iraq on the map. Somehow the intellectuals believe and continue to propagate the “party line”. They ought to know better, and I suspect they do.
That’s what Realism is all about.
Leaving aside “Who let the Gog Magog Out?”, concern remains how to Obliterate them? Inaction would result into a disaster. As it would have grave ramifications; Motivating factors for others, A ‘Casus Belli’to venture out further and worst of all, a nurturing place for their kind from where they can operate further. World cant let them loose. That be the case, its matter of time that no Ocean would present any obstacle. A Monster gone renegade poses threat to all (All in fact Means, All. Their success will generate domino effect all over the world) Following ‘Machiavillian Realism’its a cause enough to initiate convergence of ‘Interests’. Should not be perceived as US gains / losses / War. EU, China, Russia & OIC are all the stake holders, since they all have those elements in the society which, if prompted, can follow the lead. The philosophy or Concept of IS is highly contagious and extremely egregious. With nothing to do with Islam, Its all about influence and influentials. Very few of them and that too at the lowest possible level, are convinced as if they are fighting for Religion, rest all know whats this all about, Power and Interest. Possibly everyone would have its own ax to grind in this war, in pursuance of their interests, But they tend to forget that power negotiates with None. And soon after they all will be ‘None’.
You write, “…concern remains how to Obliterate them?”
I would say they’re their own worst enemies. They’ll obliterate themselves. In fact, ISIL might even obliterate all Islamist movements, including the moderates. The Tunisians recently voted out the Islamists. ISIL isn’t creating a wave of revolutions, as Iran’s might have (but didn’t), instead it is creating resentment against anything Islamist.
You write, “…a nurturing place for their kind from where they can operate further.”
There’s another way to look at this: its creating a place to gather all the radical Wahhabis, so that they can all live in their dungeon, contained, and no longer a threat to the homelands they once lived in. You are afraid this will allow them to “operate further”. What do you mean? Do you mean that they can then strap themselves with bombs and blow up Shia, creating even more resentment? Or go out to the frontlines with inferior weapons and get massacred? Or become part of the “Islamic police” making the subject population hate them even more?
” its matter of time that no Ocean would present any obstacle.”
Really? You’re concerned about them leaving their desert dungeon and crossing oceans? They can’t even recruit the subject population, how will they cross oceans? They kill 700 of the Al-Shitat tribe, and now a similar number of the Albu Nimr. They aren’t going to have the manpower to do anything. The type of people they are recruiting aren’t forward looking intellectuals. Instead they are ignorant and radicalized, YOUNG, fools. They’re their own worst enemies. Where will they get the recruits that understand technology when they have forbidden philosophy and science in any meaningful way? Are they going to have universities that challenge Oxford and Harvard?
You write, “..Their success will generate domino effect all over the world)”
Really? All nations in the world are trying to emulate the “ISIL model”? That’s news to me. The OPPOSITE is happening.
You are copy-pasting the worries of the Capitalist world viz a viz the Communism… There’s one enormous problem with that: ISIL’s ideology and state doesn’t even remotely compare to the lure of Communism and the USSR. I won’t even compare the two for you, you should be able to do it yourself. A model that pulled Russia out of the third world to the second in a generation with rapid industrialization; a model that lured many intellectuals, even in Western countries; a model that was able to govern large swathes of people, should not be compared to Wahhabism. Communism was infinitely more appealing than Wahhabism. There’s no comparison.
Despite that, the West contained and ended Communism. Why should anyone worry about Wahhabis who aren’t even able to govern any Shia-dominated city? They are stuck in the desert, and will die there.
You write, “The philosophy or Concept of IS is highly contagious and extremely egregious.”
Perhaps you are confusing pan-Islamism with ISIL. Islamists are very diverse, and some are highly influential with the potential to grow. If anything, ISIL’s Wahhabism will put an end to all pan-Islamists by creating a failed model. Erdogan’s AKP and Iran’s revolution are far more influential to the Islamic populations. ISIL’s Wahhabism doesn’t even remotely come close. Saudi Arabia, which is Wahhabi like ISIL, has 6% atheists. That’s no coincidence. Why do you think Saudi Arabia consciously supports Wahhabis meanwhile fighting the Muslim Brotherhood? They know that Wahhabism has no future. They know Wahhabism alienates indigenous populations.
You might ask, “Well then why do Saudis have a Wahhabist ideology?” Saudi Arabia’s ruling party exists not because of its bogus ideology, but because of the enormous petro-dollars. They adopted Wahhabism for historical reasons: they needed an ideology to justify their rebellion against the Ottomans and against the local tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. They wanted to have a distinct state and a motivating force, and Wahhabism provided that in 18th century. It is now the 21st century.
You write, “Very few of them and that too at the lowest possible level, are convinced as if they are fighting for Religion, rest all know whats this all about, Power and Interest.”
Well, those seeking the “power and interests” have chosen an ideology that will doom them. They should have tried Socialism or Libertarianism or Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamism. Wahhabism is a dead end.
You write, ” Possibly everyone would have its own ax to grind in this war, in pursuance of their interests, But they tend to forget that power negotiates with None. And soon after they all will be ‘None’.”
Sure, the power is contained in Capitalist-democratic countries, and indeed, they control the world, literally.
Well, my analysis is a dispassionate realist view, actually not taking into account Wahabism or any other ethnic inclination a pure focus on the threat and not going into who promoted it and why, remeber “A monster gone renegade”. In the world pronounced by interconnectivity and Globalization its seldom possible to Contain an “Idea” spatial bounds / boundaries do not matter much more. In my reckoning, their use of softer prong (Via Internet) i.e FB and Youtube and what not, some welfare measures with pics uploaded is an attempt to use and extend themselves in the Cyber Space and assert themselves World Wide. It points out that they are not at all averse to use of technology. Furthermore, while fighting such people u ought to destroy their sanctuaries and support means (Refer to Hu Chi Minh Trail and so on…). Why and How they would persist (Talibans persist in Afghanistan even after decades) is another debate, beyond the scope of this discourse. Pan-Islamism, remains another subject which can not be compared with this phenomena, i agree.
Why people would join them? yes, people afflicted with hunger, deprivation, discrimination, suppression and so on…… are highly vulnerable and potential candidates to seek solace in such activities. Since, they get it all….Power and Money..which guarantees everything else; What you can not get Snatch it….so they get addicted to power and do not reconcile. A man with nothing, repulsed in the community, an unknown invalid, all of a sudden becomes powerful…. Who hates Power. Power asserts and exhibits itself at all level from house to town to country and so on……Children fear the person in house who has Power :) so its not the matter of Capitalist and Communist World.
I would like to attend to the subject devoid of any ethnicity because ISIL is now beyond this all.