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The Power of the Story: Vladimir Putin and the Rise of the Russian Federation

November 3, 2014

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime on April 2, 2003, U.S. and French forces filled the capital city to ensure the unrest and looting, which had been widely predicted by strategists, would not spread. Troops from a carefully crafted coalition poured into Iraq to maintain security along the borders and within the cities. Paul Bremer wisely decided to keep the Iraqi Army intact, and immediately began to structure the security forces with extensive Iraqi military integration. As a result, the Iraqi state remained intact, just as Secretary Rumsfeld had intended. Within hours of Saddam’s fall, U.S. special operations units located a vast arsenal of chemical weapons primed for employment. Saddam’s plans were every bit as sinister as U.S. intelligence analysts had postulated. The evidence was irrefutable. The regime had been conspiring with Al Qaeda for massive chemical attacks in several countries, including the United States. George Tenet’s “slam dunk” case against Saddam had truly come to fruition. Fortunately, the U.S. had acted promptly enough to prevent this massive wave of terror.

The horrors of terrorism, so vividly ingrained in the minds of the world after the attacks of September 11th, had almost been unleashed again. The UN came under immediate fire from the international community, as expert commentators painted the dismal picture of what would have happened on U.S. soil, if the invasion of Iraq had been delayed. Hans Blix was vilified as the great enabler of global terror, while President Bush and Vice President Cheney were celebrated as visionary and courageous leaders. The world was a safer place because the hawks took swift, decisive action. The doves who had sought to prolong the debate were only empowering terrorists. Thankfully, America possessed leaders with the foresight and grit to do what was needed.

Of course, the real story played out differently in every way. Eleven years after the invasion, Iraq is riddled with sectarian violence fueled by ancient rifts between the Sunni and Shia, and threatened by the expansion of ISIL. Yet, the leaders who decided to take America to war were clearly confident in the outcome the invasion would produce. They believed the threat was imminent and immediate violent action was the only solution. Unfortunately, there was a dramatic gap between their understanding of the situation and reality. This article does not intend to explain why they got it wrong, but rather, how difficult it is to get it right.

When we only assume the worst of our adversaries, we lay a trap for ourselves. In preparing for the worse case, we dream up thousands of tragic scenarios unlikely to occur. These unchecked dreams (or nightmares) become our reality and form the lens through which we interpret the actions of our opponents. The trap is sprung when our own narratives lock us onto a dangerous course, and we reject other equally plausible narratives that lack the potential to spiral into violent conflicts. We become prisoners of flawed narratives.

Keeping this prelude in mind, this article examines the narratives surrounding Vladimir Putin and the rise of the Russian Federation. These stories will weave in and out of reality, often making it difficult to discern the line between fact and fiction. The events and the characters will be complex, and the facts will be elusive; however, the moral of our stories will be clear: We must continually scrutinize the narratives we accept as truth, and strive to comprehend the narratives our own actions create for our adversaries. Whether true, false, or somewhere in between, these stories matter, because they drive behavior. Let’s begin with the story of Vladimir Putin.

It was a cold, rainy night in October 1952. Maria and Vladimir Putin, Sr. burrowed into a dirty Leningrad hospital with flickering florescent lights and musty air. After several hours of labor, Vladimir Putin, Jr. was born. His birth fell eight years after the German siege that nearly annihilated the city, and killed more than a million people. The siege left Putin’s father disabled and disfigured, and his mother nearly starved to death. The Leningrad of Putin’s childhood was a harsh and impoverished place that bred a generation of hungry and aggressive children. Putin’s parents endured a series of backbreaking jobs, leaving young Vladimir to fend for himself in the communal courtyards outside of their shabby apartment building. Emerging from an environment of fistfights and drunken thugs, Putin gained an explosive temper. He lashed out violently at anyone who dared cross him.

In his teenage years, defying his mother, Putin became a competitive judo martial artist, earning a black belt at the age of eighteen. He was an average student, and his schoolteachers described him as a troublemaker in class who rebelled against authority and threw chalkboard erasers at other children.

In 1970, Putin became a student at Leningrad State University, and later studied at KGB School No. 1 in Moscow. He began his formal KGB career in 1975, and was primarily stationed in East Germany, where he helped the Soviet secret police manage recruits to spy on the West. His Cold War experiences left him deeply suspicious of the West.

In 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin resigned and appointed Putin as President, beginning a long and uninterrupted period in power. Intent on reversing the events of 1989, Putin began a campaign to rebuild a strong Stalinist empire under the banner of Russian nationalism. Putin created his own narrative that vilified NATO expansion as an unjust Western strategy of entrapment. The American and European advance—veiled in the name of human rights and democracy—had trampled his nation’s dignity. Leveraging the Russian military and a large stockpile of nuclear weapons, he coerced the former states of the Soviet Union to distance themselves from the West. He punished resistance by strangling the flow of Russia’s cheap energy supplies, and then abruptly transitioned to a policy of annexation.

The first annexation occurred in Crimea, followed one year later by the annexation of eastern Ukraine. Ukraine had sought closer ties with NATO and the EU, inflaming tensions with the region’s ethnic Russians. Agitated by a series of oppressive Ukrainian policies, ethnic Russians catalyzed Russian intervention. Over Western protest, both Crimea and eastern Ukraine voted to join the Russian Federation, paving the way for further Russian expansion. For the first time since 1945, a major power had forcefully challenged a European border.

The EU reacted by imposing limited economic sanctions, but these sanctions were diluted by the reality that much of Europe was dependent upon Russia’s vast and inexpensive energy reserves. Military responses were removed from the table, since Putin hadn’t attacked a member of the NATO alliance. The world hoped that Putin’s conquest would halt in Ukraine, as echoes of President Obama’s September 2014 speech in Estonia filled the airways: “An attack on one is an attack on all. So if, in such a moment, you ever ask again, ‘who will come to help,’ you’ll know the answer—the NATO alliance, including the armed forces of the United States of America.” Despite the strong rhetoric, pacification seemed the preferred response, invoking comparisons of British and French appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the run-up to the Second World War. The World Wars had bred outright pacifism across Western Europe, and Obama’s strong-arm rhetoric gave these states one more opportunity to let the United States handle the dirty work.

The Russian expansion unleashed a wave of Russian nationalism among ethnic Russian enclaves and pro-Russian minorities across Eastern Europe. Unnerved by events in Ukraine, and emboldened by its U.S. and NATO partnerships, the Estonian government implemented a series of blatantly oppressive policies aimed at squelching potential ethnic Russian uprisings. These policies had the opposite effect, and gave rise to an ethnic Russian insurgency that directly threatened the stability of the Estonian government.

Recognizing the scenario as ripe for further Russian military intervention, the United States attempted to deter Putin by imposing harsh sanctions on the entire Russian gas and oil sector. Russia responded with a crippling cyber attack on the Estonian government infrastructure, and massed Russian troops on the Estonian border. The world was transfixed on the crisis in Estonia as undeniable evidence of Moscow’s military involvement surfaced. This was NATO’s defining moment. Ever since Estonia became a NATO alliance member in 2004, skeptics doubted NATO would ever invoke Article 5 in her defense. Was it all a bluff in the name of Russian deterrence? Putin was counting on it—but he was wrong. In response, NATO unleashed a wave of U.S.-led airstrikes on the Russian troops massed on the Estonian border. Like the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, this single violent event cascaded, as the world was compelled to choose sides in the war between the two great nuclear powers. World War III began.

Fortunately, much of the real story has yet to be written, and there is still cause to hope it will end differently. This narrative combined a variety of sources: some left wing, some right wing—sprinkled in with a few facts, a double dose of speculation, and a healthy serving of outright fabrication. Manipulating a narrative is easy, but determining if a story is true is often more difficult. If we take a more critical look at a few chapters of this story, we can better understand why Putin annexed Crimea, and piece together some of the narratives that govern his behavior. To this end, let’s look at the world through the eyes of Vladimir Putin.

It’s clear that Putin wants to create a powerful, secure, and prosperous Russia that isn’t surrounded by Western security alliances. He also maintains responsibility for the plight of ethnic Russians dispersed across Eastern Europe. These interests hardly sound unreasonable. In fact, they sound downright familiar. Would the United States ignore large-scale oppression of its citizens abroad, or welcome anti-U.S. security alliances from Canada or Mexico? Even if we can dismiss these similarities, surely we can’t ignore the fact that Putin violated the border of a sovereign nation (Ukraine) to undermine a government hostile to his cause. Wait, what about U.S. airstrikes in Syria, and our efforts to remove Bashar al-Assad from power? Touché. Putin surely grasps this hypocrisy, and resents condemnations from the West when he takes similar action to secure his interests.

From Putin’s perspective, NATO expansion was a broken promise, a violation of a post-Cold War covenant between Russia and the West. President George H.W. Bush understood that Russia must not be treated like Germany at Versailles. He believed in the possibility of a “Europe whole and free.” In his vision, Central and Eastern Europe were off the geopolitical chessboard, and Russia’s door to engagement with the outside world was wide open. The United States would create a balance of power and sphere of influence across Europe. Russia would have room to stretch its wings and regain its strength peacefully, without Western interference. In the late 1990s, the Bush vision was forgotten and old Western approaches to Europe re-emerged. NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe crystallized the narrative in Putin’s mind that the West was reinvigorating its policy of containment. If this narrative doesn’t match our actual intent, how do rewrite the story for Putin?

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was injurious to the psyche of a proud people. To Russians, that wound was inflicted by the United States. These wounds may never fully heal, but until they do, any U.S.-led actions will be inflammatory. The United States shouldn’t abandon its European allies, but it should lead from behind. Perhaps it’s time for the West to stop slinging Article 5 rhetoric, and let Europeans handle this European problem. Rather than creating hostile policies aimed at changing Russia’s behavior, the United States should focus on modifying the rest of Europe’s behavior. The oppression of any people, including ethnic Russians, is a human rights violation that NATO should firmly condemn.

Russian expansion is a natural counterpunch to Western policies, as Putin seeks to ensure Russia’s regional dominance. As long as the West keeps punching, Putin, the hotheaded and thin-skinned judo martial artist, will punch back. President Bush’s vision for Europe is still achievable, but it will only take hold if Russia is accepted as a colleague (or comrade), not reviled as a threat.

Our worst nightmares about Putin might come true, but considerable evidence suggests there are peaceful alternatives on the horizon. We must recognize that our actions and the narratives we construct play a direct role in either creating that nightmare or plotting a peaceful alternate course.

We must also never forget the consequences of failure. The leaders who sent America to war in Iraq believed swift military action was imperative. They weren’t bad men, but they made a bad decision because they firmly believed in a story that simply wasn’t correct. Their failures are vivid reminders of the power of the stories that surround us. To get the stories right, we must proceed cautiously. We must read and write each chapter thoughtfully. For Vladimir Putin and the rise of the Russian Federation, the narratives we create will make all the difference.

 

Lt. Col. Derek O’Malley is an officer in the United States Air Force. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

 

Photo credit: www.kremlin.ru

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16 thoughts on “The Power of the Story: Vladimir Putin and the Rise of the Russian Federation”

  1. Sir,

    I must wholeheartedly reject the ideas and interpretations amassed in this article.

    First of all, I would invite the author to find factual evidence as to the “plight of ethnic Russians”, in particular regarding Ukraine and the Baltic states. I would venture to say that a state requiring citizens to speak its language does not amount to repression, unless, the rest of the planet is also complicit.

    Second, to compare the fall of the Soviet Union to the Versailles treaty is unfair and factually erroneous, as Russia was not stripped of territory through on the whim of the victors, but rather through the people excercising their right to self-determination, dismantled from within, if you will.

    Third, and stemming from the second point, it was not through the actions of the West, but rather through those nations formerly (through little wish of their own) part of the USSR made a conscious and deliberate decision to join the EU and NATO – neither of which was particularly forthcoming. To treat these regions as gains of the West and not actors in their own right is to comply with the Russian narrative of Russia as destined to reign over smaller demi-nations, incapable of sentient thought.

    The point being – it is Russian imperialism, side-effects of which traditionally include assimilation, russification and deportation, that is to blame for its neighbours joining Western political structures, not Western expansionism. The trauma to the psyche of the “proud Russian people” is due to a terminal messianic syndrome which entails dominion over other sovereign nations. To acommodate it at the expense of these nations is perverse. And it is Russian imperialism that drives the narrative of oppressed Russians in their near abroad.

    You might want to look at the largest Russian-speaking country with a free press for more information. It’s called Ukraine.

    1. You may not agree with Col O’Malley’s policy recommendations as you stated in your third and fourth points. That’s fine—opposing points of view on this topic are rampant. However, why are you debating the narrative that he created, when he clearly stated that the narrative “combined a variety of sources: some left wing, some right wing, sprinkled in with a few facts, a double dose of speculation, and a healthy serving of outright fabrication.”? You’re actually proving his main point quite nicely. Narratives are easy to manipulate, and it’s difficult to discern truth. Would you have preferred for him to make up a different story?

    2. Balt,

      The core problem you have is that self-determination can cut both ways. There is no doubt in my mind the vast majority of Crimea residents wished to rejoin the Russian Federation — you can find articles about ‘separatist’ politicians dating back to 1991 or 1994 — and after Kosovo, the West lost its moral authority on the issue of absolute and holy territorial integrity of European states.

      NATO had no problem facilitating a war that led to the dismemberment of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in no small part because a newly reunified and historically powerful state called Germany wished to back its old allies the Croats against its old enemies the Serbs. I don’t deny a majority of Kosovo residents wished to be free from Serbia considering the atrocities the Serbs committed — even if these were vastly exaggerated and in some cases found to have been faked by the ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’. I also don’t deny there may have been some fraud in the Crimea referendum and it was done in a rush with plenty of ‘Polite Men in Green’ aka Russian paratroopers nearby. NATO troops were still occupying what had until Kosovo declared independence been UN recognized as an integral part of Serbia when the Kosovars voted. But at the end of the day, it was not Russia that destroyed the Constitutional order of Ukraine initially but those who hijacked a peaceful, anti-oligarch series of protests and turned them into a Russophobic, NATO/EU geopolitical project using extreme violence against riot policemen and threats to Party of Regions and Communist parliamentarians in order for them to vote ‘the right way’ on Yanukovich’s impeachment. The constitutional court of Ukraine was tossed aside and several of its members were forcibly removed under threat of bodily harm. The Maidan itself used tactics that, were they copied by the Occupy movement in say Manhattan, would result in the Occupiers dying in a hail of police gunfire and the Molotov cocktail assembly lines including those run by females being shut down with extreme predjudice and overwhelming force. There is also no doubt in my mind if Yanukovich had resorted to the tactics of the Poroshenko government citing the same reason “to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine” by shelling Lvov, Ternipol, or Ivano-Frankisk and subjecting them to lengthy sieges, the Polish fighters rushing to those cities would not be called ‘invaders’ but ‘freedom fighters’ and Yanukovich would be viewed as one of the worst war criminals in the world. We are of course, speaking of a hypothetical scenario — because whereas soldiers from Galicia have no problem indiscriminately shelling ethnically Russian cities, the opposite would not be true. Yanukovich may have toyed with the idea of deploying the army against the Maidan or against the Right Sector element of it but it’s clear even Berkut riot policemen from Donetsk and Lugansk probably would’ve refused orders that involved civilian deaths even on a fraction of the scale the Ukrainian Army has inflicted on the Donbas.

      Let’s not forget, Milosevic, Gaddafi, and Assad all have claimed, like President Poroshenko of Ukraine, that they were defending their nations territorial integrity from ‘foreign backed terrorists’ as well. BTW the Polish newspaper Nie that reported that Right Sector militants were trained in urban combat, including sniper rifle techniques that may have been handy for the Heavenly Hundred false flag operation, has been shut down.

      As for the Baltic states, I understand your suffering under the Soviets and narratives. I just wish this would not lead to rationalizations and excuses for the UPA/OUN campaign of mass murder against Poles for which Stalin cannot be blamed. The Baltic states need to remember that their Jewish populations, like those of Western Ukraine, where wiped out over 90% with the enthusiastic collaboration and assistance to the Nazi Germans of many locals.

  3. Col. O’Malley’s speculations and his admonition to “lead from behind” defy rational application. The basic tenet of leadership (that he should have learned) is “Follow me!” exemplified by all leaders past. There is no more effective social method for balance of power than T. Roosevelt’s solution: “Speak softly, and carry a big stick … .” Mr. Putin’s moves seem to be following that advice, as did his predecessors. The real problem with Russian saber rattlings is the U.S.’ degrading it’s war posture. Pacifism has never resulted in a better life for its advocates.

  4. One fully endorses views of Col Derek, who seems to be trying to show the mirror but fog is still covering the surface for few. Economic strength sustains the military might. The subdued reaction of EU / NATO is self-explanatory in this regard. Why should US lead from front if the pack is comprising of reluctant partners with different economic and military agendas. The rhetoric are not being supported by economic actions or military commitments.
    As regards treatment of Russian minority is concerned, there are few countries (new members of NATO) who are yet to grant citizenship to Russian minorities. The reason claimed – “these minority people are required to clear few mandatory tests”. The country they were born in has become alien to them; is this the form democracy EU / NATO is propagating?
    On the issue of Volunteering to join EU / NATO, there is no credible evidence for either way as no wants to talk about coercive economic incentives.
    Finally, US must be looked up for conflict resolution and NOT a party to conflict. “Leading from the front” is an ideological comment and meant for scenarios with well framed problem and not for all the problems in the world; had it been so, the Cold War could not have been sustained for even one year.

    1. Sir,

      If I may interject, regarding the status of Soviet-born inhabitants of some former Soviet republics, taking Latvia as an example, if you will.

      It is not “the Russian minority” that remains in a limbo short of citizenship, despite what some sources may claim. Citizenship in the Republic of Latvia was restored to those that held its citizenship in June 17, 1940, when the independent and internationally recognized state was coerced, occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union. Citizenship was restored regardless of nationality – descendants of the local Russian community of 1940 gained citizenship instantly, as did Belarusians, Ukrainian, Poles and others.

      As it is a widely recognized fact that the Republic of Latvia, along with the other Baltic states, was occupied and annexed illegally, their current independence is a restoration of the independence declared in 1918 – and as such these states cannot be held responsible for citizens of the Soviet Union that were, without the consent of this sovereign republic, relocated there.

      If one wishes to draw historical analogies, no quarter, and certainly no citizenship was granted to citizens the Third Reich relocated to its conquests to the East. If anything, the approach of the Baltic states has been courteous and civilized.

      Sincerely,

      A Balt

  5. A perceptive piece with advice that American Presidents and NATO should have taken, and a course they should have followed.

    When the U.S. and NATO elected to move into the Russian Sphere of Influence, they made a rather poor choice. It matters not that some of the Nations bordering current Russia, or which were within the Soviet sphere, neither the U.S., the EU, nor NATO should have established other than normal hands off relationships with them. At some future time, Russia is / was bound to regain its position of strength — and then what, are we going to enter into a conflict thousands of miles from our shores in-support of countries or peoples which provide precisely zero benefit to this nation?

    Comparing Russia to Nazi German, directly or indirectly, is simply off-base and it has become tiresome reading the claims or hints (again indirectly or directly) that this era is a repeat of the 1930’s. It simply is not.

    If this country desires to have peaceful relations with countries such as China and Russia, it needs to respect the fact that the age of Euro-American Imperialism is over, we need to grasp the meaning of “Spheres of Influence”, and we need to put aside that false belief that this country is an all powerful world power. One would think we would have learned from our defeats and / or strategic failures such as those early in the Korean War at the hands of the Chinese, in Vietnam, in Iraq, and soon to be publicly verified in Afghanistan, and previously in both in Lebanon in 1982 and later in Somalia.

    Again, a well thought out piece with some wise advice for this country’s political leaders.

    Former USN Line Officer

    2. Nonsense. Russia has always been an expansionist power, grasping to control any state that lies on her periphery. There are several reasons for this, the primary being geographic, as Russia does not have natural borders and has been subject to invasion over the course of her history. However, if we are to accept the concept that smaller states and less populous peoples are to actually engage in self determination, than Russia must be kept in check constantly. Russia will continuously attempt to take control of any state nearby, whether through physical control (e.g. the Crimea in the current situation, South Ossetia a few years ago, Afghanistan in the 1980’s, etc.) or through undermining a neighbor’s government (e.g. Ukraine’s puppet government until the most recent upheaval). If we (NATO) do nothing to stop this, then we consign those peoples to life under what has historically been the most authoritarian and backwards state in human history.

      1. the problem for you and what will be NATO and the EU’s problem, the Mighty Q, is the ‘you can check out anytime you like — but you can’t never leave’ nature of the economically stagnant, demographically declining EU(SSR). At some point, most likely in Catalunia, but perhaps not too far in the future in Greece, it is pro-US and pro-EU governments that are going to be faced with the specter of an Orange Revolution, but with elements that just happen to have had contacts with Russian NGOs and with an element that was missing from before — Greek or Catalunian economists calling for new trade agreements with Russia and China if not temporary yuanization until the reborn lira, peseta, or drachmae stabilize.

        What will all the NATO and EU ‘stand for freedom’ hoorah patriots do then, when the roles are reversed and Moscow and Beijing start dealing the Colored Revolution cards? After all you told us every movement that just happened to hurt Russia’s geopolitical interests in Eurasia was purely spontaneous. Will you hold back and let the ‘people power’ run its course, or will you send in the tanks (more likely drones) into Athens or Barcelona? I think we already know the answer to that question.

  6. West have been writing obituaries for Russia in general, and Putin in particular, for ages. West has never deciphered, and will never crack its code. Putin is a modern day tzar/Stalin – you name it. And the names don’t matter. What’s the myopic Western pundits don’t get is that there are more fundamental reasons for Russia’s perseverance than quarterly reports.

    Those reasons are laid down here:

    http://wp.me/pnMvn-nd

    http://wp.me/pnMvn-qd

  7. The question I would ask of the hard-core Realists is, do you have any idea how much harder life will be if we squeeze Russia until those brilliant inventors and designers but incompetent industrialists are driven entirely into the arms of the Chinese?

    What if the next Ufimtsev (stealth theory) is able to have his ideas quickly translated into reality by a Chinese design bureau?

    The brilliance demonstrated in this comment thread reminds me of all the brilliant talk that took us to Iraq.

    1. I don’t know why my comment isn’t posting, here it is again:

      A realist would take a look at a map and notice that a billion odd, resource hungry Chinese need extra lebensraum. Siberia is fairly uninhabited by a declining Russian population, huh? Not to mention the Japanese…

      China and Russia never really got along, even during their Communist stints. China made a deal with the Americans first, and the rest is history.

      I suspect the whole NATO expansion is to convince Russia it can’t fight on two fronts. It’ll have to strike a deal with someone, and it’s clear from history which culture it understands and works with best (not to mention its former satellites, now NATO members).

      Unlike the Greater Western world (which encompasses the Greater Middle East), the Eastern nations bide their time well, and try their best to remain silent and “neutral”.

  8. The authors of these War on the Rocks pieces are all imagining scenarios where the Russians play to US strengths, not theirs. In reality, the Russians are not going to attack NATO where it has the most loyal support, much less mess with trying to occupy territory where most or even large swathes of the population are hostile. The Russians haven’t even rolled officially into Donetsk and Lugansk, though we all know they are there unofficially — just as there are Polish and Lithiuanian private military contractors if not regular infantry and pilots who have been fighting for Ukraine in this NATO-Russia proxy war.

    No, because War on the Rocks is primarily focused on war and not on psychological operations or long term propaganda with the aims of undermining the raison de e’tre of the West itself — that we stand for freedom as opposed to our adversaries — it cannot see the obvious. The Russians are going to undermine NATO through its soft economic underbelly, by ideologically and morally undermining the European Union whose entire southern tier from Portugal to Bulgaria is impoverished, racked by record youth unemployment and primed for a social explosion. Old fears of Russian expansionism will keep Poles and Balts firmly in the NATO camp. But what about Hungarians, Czechs or Germans for whom memories of Cold War repressions with tanks are fading? What about the Greeks and Bulgarians who have religious and cultural affinities with Russia? Do War on the Rocks contributors think those can be glossed over or safely ignored in the event we see Moscow start copying US ‘Colored Revolution’ tactics from Lisbon to Barcelona to Athens to Sofia? What if the Russian-backed Maidanists don’t, unlike their Kiev counterparts, immediately resort to violence? What if instead their actions resemble the 2004 Orange Revolution?

    It seems the entire neocon and Atlanticist apparat is hyperparanoid about European and euroskeptic politicians like Orban turning the tables on them, calling the EU the prison house of the nations and NATO as its hired muscle. And perhaps they should be!