Is the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) contained? And would that be good enough? Dr. Christopher Bolan of the U.S. Army War College seems to think so. He argued as much recently here at War on the Rocks. While Bolan’s line of reasoning is appealing to many Americans who are tired of costly foreign entanglements, both parts of his argument fall apart when subjected to scrutiny.
ISIL is not contained. Bolan states that approximately 30,000 ISIL fighters, armed with little more than rifles, face a formidable array of weaponry from the Iraqi military, including main battle tanks, air forces, and artillery, and that they’re surrounded by enemies on all sides (a point also made by WOTR’s Daveed Gartenstein-Ross). While on paper this is persuasive, it’s also useful to remember that just two years ago, with a force of slightly more than 3,000 fighters, ISIL took on the formidable array of weaponry from Syria’s President Assad. The result? ISIL not only survived, but thrived, now controlling terrain the size of the United Kingdom, which spans both Iraq and Syria, and encompasses 60% of Syria’s oil production. Analyzing the amount of equipment and numbers of troops to determine a given military outcome is a great classroom tool, but it has little bearing in the real world. The fact is that ISIL, while acting like a nation-state, isn’t one. It’s an ideology that’s rapidly growing despite what Bolan calls “containment” that’s “good enough.”
At its core, ISIL wants an ever-expanding caliphate. They are not rational state actors who analyze the costs and benefits of continued action according to Western standards. Action itself, in pursuit of this distant objective, is the group’s reason for existence. To assume that ISIL will be satisfied to remain within the bloody borders they’ve already carved is to mistakenly think that Cold War theories of deterrence apply to them. They do not. ISIL will not stop until it is destroyed as a cohesive group or it succeeds. And that success isn’t restricted to Iraq and Syria. When ISIL proclaimed a caliphate, it projected an area that encompasses the entirety of the Middle East, and in some statements, parts of northern Africa. This sounds ludicrous, I know, but just recently, Islamists in Libya swore fealty to ISIL, and members of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria broke away from that core group and pledged allegiance to ISIL. Even Boko Haram, the murdering sect in Nigeria that’s not connected to ISIL has proclaimed a caliphate. The fight against this ideology isn’t restricted to Iraq, as the success of the Islamic State in that land has generated enormous support in areas far removed. The success of ISIL in controlling and governing terrain — a first for any jihadist organization — has given a real sense of legitimacy to the notion that the establishment of a caliphate in the modern world is not nearly as ludicrous as many think, and other extremist groups are now striving to emulate. As long as ISIL remains a viable state-like institution in Iraq, this will continue, until we won’t just be “containing” ISIL in Iraq, but also in Libya, Sudan, Mali, and Algeria. And therein lies the rub. Yes, as a state-like entity, we can “contain” the current Islamic State to the borders it already owns, but we can’t contain the ideology this situation encourages to flourish.
There is a well-worn theory of counterinsurgency called the “oil spot.” Succinctly put, if an element pacifies one hamlet, then another, and another, the pacified areas will expand, connecting like oil spreading on water and defeating the insurgency. ISIL has taken this theory and turned it on its head, using the oil spots not to pacify, but to conquer. Sitting back satisfied that they’re “contained” in Iraq is asking for a much bigger fight in the future, as the “contained” Islamic State will act as command and control — and inspiration — for conquest in far-flung lands, like the burning ash from a forest fire blowing in the wind. And, unlike al Qaeda, ISIL won’t have to do it with its most influential figure hiding in a building in Abbottabad and relying on couriers. Do we wish to attempt “containment” all over the globe, or put out the fire at its base?
Bolan’s analogy comparing ISIL to Mexican drug cartels misrepresents the application of violence, and using one to contrast the other is misleading. He states that the drug cartels have beheaded plenty of people right on our border, and yet it took the beheading of two American journalists in the Middle East to enrage America and drive it to action. But these atrocities are not as comparable as Bolan would like to think. While I discussed this very thing in a blog post two years ago, before the rise of ISIL, there is a distinct difference between these phenomena. The cartels kill to maintain a flow of drugs into the United States. It’s the market economy driven to its most Darwinian extreme. ISIL kills purely because of its ideology. It kills because the person under the blade does not deserve to live, no matter what he has done to oppose the caliphate. His very existence is the opposition. If allowed to freely distribute its product without hindrance, the cartels would not kill. This is the exact opposite of ISIL. If allowed to freely continue, their very purpose would be to kill anyone not converting to their perverted vision of Islam. Ask a Yazidi whether ISIL brutality is comparable to the drug cartels. I don’t think he’d agree.
Bolan contradicts himself by first stating that ISIL is contained because of the military might and “natural enemies” arrayed against it, then stating that further operations against ISIL are ridiculous because we have no trustworthy partners in the region to help us. Notwithstanding the fact that ISIL is currently “contained” because of American airpower, he can’t have it both ways. Either ISIL is doomed to destruction because of all of the enemies surrounding it, or it’s ridiculous to attempt to destroy it because of the duplicitous, prevaricating allies we have available to us.
There are distinct consequences of accepting Bolan’s argument at face value and simply calling the current end state “good enough.” I mentioned one repercussion above — the consequences of the perception of ISIL’s success among other jihadist groups — but there are others. First, Bolan makes the mistake of assuming that ISIL’s capabilities will remain static even if their borders do. ISIL’s continued existence, whether contained to its present locations or not, is a siren call for foreign jihadists. ISIL has seen the greatest influx of foreign fighters in modern times – many of them westerners – and this is a direct result of their claim to a caliphate. A direct result of would-be jihadists seeing nothing but success. Allow ISIL to remain – to be “contained” – and the number will only grow. It’s impossible to predict how many of the fighters would have become radicalized regardless, but logical to assume, given past history, that it wouldn’t be near as many as ISIL has recruited through social media and other outlets. And make no mistake, once they’ve entered ISIL’s embrace, very few will turn back.
Second, ISIL has slaughtered innocents on a mass scale, and intends to continue doing so. Just because they aren’t doing it in America does not absolve the United States of global leadership, and that leadership extends beyond whether a cheap supply of oil is threatened. The moral implications alone merit the group’s eradication.
Third, ISIL has invaded and destroyed the boundaries of two different nation states, claiming such borders are illegitimate. By containing them in place, we’re basically saying, “that’s okay.” One of the tenets of the ISIL fight is that Iraq remains a sovereign state, including Kurdistan. Whether one agrees with this position or not, it’s the administration’s stance. If we were to follow Bolan’s advice, what’s to keep Kurdistan from leaving outright? How can we ask them to remain a part of Iraq when we’re allowing another group – that seized Iraqi terrain by force – to keep what they have? There is an example of a more appropriate response to such a violation of international norms in the past, and Bolan even mentions it. In 1991, Saddam Hussein claimed that the country of Kuwait was illegitimate and actually a historical rump of Iraq. He invaded. And we reacted with Desert Storm. How is this situation with ISIL different? Bolan claims that we are emotionally over-reacting, but I believe it’s the opposite. The very debate about whether to destroy ISIL is clouded by our long incursion into Iraq beginning in 2003. Imagine an alternate reality, where Saddam Hussein fell due to the Arab Spring — without any American involvement. Then, ISIL appears just as it has. Would we even be having this debate? No. Without the anxiety of “another Middle East war,” we would clearly see the danger and remove it. Which brings up a final point.
Bolan claims ISIL poses no “imminent” threat to the homeland, and has no capability to conduct a large-scale attack, but this is precisely because they are focusing all of their energy on surviving a battlefield fight. Sitting back and “containing” them allows space and time for the development of such a capability, and make no mistake, that is exactly what they want. Like al Qaeda before them, they’ve stated repeatedly that the United States is a target. From declaring that they’re coming to the White House, to the first American suicide bomber in Syria predicting our demise, ISIL has made no secret of its plans. And the planning is sinister indeed. Recently, an ISIL laptop was captured in Syria. In it were thousands of documents related to chemical munitions and the weaponization of biological agents. The sawhorse argument is that it’s too hard to do such a thing, and ISIL doesn’t have the technological capacity. This might be true today, but in August of 2001, I would have said it would be impossible to destroy the World Trade Center using nothing but box cutters. All warfare requires two things: the will to use force, and the capability to leverage that will. ISIL has the will in spades. Why would we wait until they have the capability?
At the end of his piece, Bolan repurposes a question from Gen. Petraeus: “Can anyone tell us how this ends?” I cannot predict the various twists and turns if we continue our efforts to eradicate the scourge known as ISIL, but I can damn sure tell you how it will end if we declare the current state “good enough.” And it isn’t with ISIL focusing on free healthcare in its nascent caliphate.
Brad Taylor is a 21-year veteran of US Army Infantry and Special Forces, and has served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He retired in 2010 as a Lieutenant Colonel. He holds a masters of science in defense analysis with a concentration in irregular warfare from The Naval Postgraduate School, and is the author of six New York Times bestsellers. He can be found at bradtaylorbooks.com.
Alan Wolfe 
Maphisto86 
Brad Taylor 
USNA Grad 
Jacob 
Dave P 
Guest 
longwalkdownlyndale 
Peter_E 
Christopher Bolan 
Clif Bradley 
Andrew P 
Written by someone who evidently has not absorbed any of the lessons learned over the past decade of fighting in Iraq. Taylor’s prediction of a growing caliphate in the Middle East qualifies him to be a Fox News analyst but not a serious military analyst. His suggestion that ISIS is getting into the chem-bio terrorism business and therefore is a substantive threat to the U.S. Homeland is unfounded and without merit. Containing ISIS and letting Iraq determine its destiny – and Syria determining its own – is the only sane and affordable path for US security interests.
I hate the thought of another drawn out military adventure like in Iraq in 2003. Sadly though this time the terrorist threat is very real. Whether the “Islamic State” has the capability to build/and or acquire let alone use nuclear, biological or chemical weapons is irrelevant. Both the leadership and rank and file of this quasi-state are determined to build an international jihadist movement and create a caliphate that will swallow up the traditional Muslim world and beyond. Based on what has happened over the last two to three years I don’t think I am spouting hyperbole.
Alan Wolfe, thank you for the robust analysis – and especially for not simply devolving to ad hominem attacks. The discussion about ISIL spreading into the Maghreb didn’t come from Fox News. It came from Arabic reporters in the region (if you care to click the links), but your point is duly noted: clearly, your qualifications as a serious military analyst dwarf mine. One comment in your excellent rebuttal did cause me to scratch my head. As reported by Foreign Policy magazine (not “suggested” by me), a laptop of a foreign ISIL recruit – who was trained as an engineer – contained thousands of documents on utilizing CBRN as a weapon (I’m assuming, given your healthy credentials as a military analyst, that you understand the acronym CBRN). My question to you: in your mind, what level of evidence of ISIL’s nefarious intentions is required before you no longer consider it “unfounded” and “without merit”? Do you honestly believe that the laptop was owned by the single crazy guy in ISIL? I’m as weary of war as the next guy – certainly more weary than you, I promise – but, unfortunately, the world exists as it is. Not as I fervently wish it to be.
Although somewhat eloquent in his writing, as a retired military officer, have you forgotten what we used to continually criticize State Department officials and Academics? What is your proposed solution? Criticizing current strategy and tactics can be done by any Poli-Sci grad student…but we rely on military and diplomatic minds to offer viable solutions. So if containment is not the answer, how do you propose we eradicate ISIL?
You miss my criticism. I’m not criticizing the administration or the state department for their current strategy – as their plans do not include “containment”. I’m criticizing Dr. Bolan for suggesting that we’ve already succeeded as far as we can because of our limited engagement, and that anything further is folly. Yes, the problem set is large, and not easily resolved, but it’s not so hard that we should just throw up our hands. For the most part, I agree with what the administration is doing – with some select reservations. I’m not sure where you’re coming from. I do have strong views of what such a strategy should entail, but a reply to a comment wouldn’t do it justice. That’s a whole other blog.
Bolan is at least right on one thing. ISIL (or ISIS or whatever) was an opportunist that took advantage of Sunni Iraqis’ disenfranchisement by the Shi’ite-led government. That means that any long term strategy for driving out ISIS depends on a reconciliation deal being crafted by the Iraqi government, and that will only happen if we hold their feet to the fire. Military strikes against ISIS can keep a lid on them for the time being, but it’s not something that we can keep up forever…which is exactly what we’ll be doing if we allow the Iraqi government to twiddle its thumbs and dither on reaching a political solution.
Completely agree. My rebuttal isn’t based on who’s to blame. It’s solely focused on the fact that they’re a threat, pure and simple, and containment is a chimera that will do nothing but engender future problems. And future bodies. That’s exactly what airstrikes are doing – keeping a lid on the situation, which is what Bolan argues is good enough. I’m saying they need to be eradicated. The true solution, which does – as you say – go through the Iraqi government, is engaging the Sunni tribes, a trust that was destroyed by Maliki and our ill-advised head-long rush to leave the country. It’s not going to be easy, but it’s not impossible. The entire point of my blog is that IT’S WORTH IT. In the long run, leaving ISIL to their devices will ensure a return visit, just as leaving Afghanistan after the Soviets fled did.
“And make no mistake, once they’ve entered ISIL’s embrace, very few will turn back”
I think this statement is entirely wrong. There are numerous groups operating in Syria and elsewhere that share the same ideology and goal of a Caliphate (Al-Qaeda et al).
Its the methods that these groups utilize to achieve the goal that differ.
Given that these groups have shifting alliances and contact, its entirely possible that should ISIS begin to be defeated, fighters will join other groups that remain more viable.
Quite simply put, you’re not going to destroy the idea’s and all the terrorist groups, but by using air-strikes you can degrade ISIS capability significantly.
Also, why can’t air-strikes be used long term? I would have thought this was the perfect setting for a drone war.
You missed my point here. I meant once a person is radicalized, be it for ISIL or anyone else, there is no turning back. ISIL is acting as a giant recruiting machine, and yes, I agree, once someone goes that route, it’s too late. He’ll still fight even if we get rid of ISIL, but this isn’t a static thing. Every day ISIL exists, it recruits more members. Yes, other groups are recruiting as well, but on a much smaller scale. Most discussion I see on this issue assumes that there is a finite number of fighters, and that they’re going to fight regardless. This is incorrect. Having read a host of analysis on the radicalization process, i’ve seen that it’s not finite by any stretch, and that a man has free will. He could choose to be a candle-stick maker, or take up arms. There is always something that entices him to choose the latter, and in today’s world – especially for western recruits – ISIL is a big part of that calculus. It’s exactly why England just arrested a bunch of imams for recruiting for ISIL. Getting rid of ISIL won’t stop the process, but it will certainly slow it down. It’s the difference between a shaving nick and a cut femoral artery. That’s all I was saying.
I think Lt. Col. Taylor should go visit a few sociology/humanities university departments around the nation. He’s going to find self-declared communists. I guess for him the Cold War is still raging hard. Everything he said above applies to communism today. You CANNOT eradicate ideas. One can only contain their political manifestations. Perhaps nothing but a failed example of political Islam (something along the lines of the USSR trial – something ISIL is unlikely to be able to replicate due to its fanaticism) would weaken the movement to the point of near-extinction. Aside from that, one is committing themselves to an eternal fight that strengthens rather than weakens one’s foes.
Lt. Col. Taylor understands this when he writes:
“I cannot predict the various twists and turns if we continue our efforts to eradicate the scourge known as ISIL, but I can damn sure tell you how it will end if we declare the current state “good enough.””
He’s basically saying, “we don’t like ISIL, so let’s keep fighting them. Who cares about well-defined goals and their costs.”
Such a mentality is precisely the one that ISIL espouses. You two can have your cosmic battle. The rest of us will apply rational cost/benefit analysis. The current Obama strategy seems to be the product of such rational analysis.
Ultimately it is for the ME to decide its own fate. The West has been imposing its will on the region since before WWI. That’s going to come to an end one way or another.
In some ways I think Boland and Taylor are talking past each other here. As I read Boland he’s basically saying “ISIL is evil, but containment is the best strategy now as destroying it with an invasion would be a disease worse than the cure.” While Taylor doesn’t really address where he stands on strategy and costs.
As I see it getting rid of ISIL is dependent on meeting a number of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions first (creating a broad-based power sharing government in Iraq, cutting off private funding coming in from the Gult etc.) It clear that these conditions haven’t been met and unclear if they ever will be. So until they are Boland’s containment idea seems like the least worst option, it’s possible that some sort of “roll back” (or whatever) could be possible in the future, but we clearly aren’t there yet.
Man alive, I guess I’m not nearly as clear a writer as I thought. Yes, if you read the blog, I completely understand that military power will never defeat an ideology. That’s pretty much stated up front in my thesis. The root causes of Islamic fanaticism run much deeper than a 5.56 round can eradicate. BUT allowing ISIL to remain as it is in an effort at containment only encourages the ideology to flourish. Put succinctly, if Jim Jones had been stopped from spreading his philosophy, hundreds of people wouldn’t have committed suicide. Eradicating ISIL as a state-like entity now running amok in Iraq and Syria won’t stop the ideology, but it is a step towards slowing it down. Trust me, I understand that the solution to Islamic fanaticism doesn’t come from the barrel of a gun, having lived within it for close to a decade. But I also understand that sometimes using that barrel is in our national interests. Just as it was in the Cold War. As for “well defined goals”, I think I’m pretty clear: ISIL no longer holds terrain in Iraq or Syria, and no longer functions as a quasi-state. Pure and simple.
Thank you Sir, for your clarifying comment.
You write clearly, and I hope that I have understood you (which I’m fairly sure I do).
To quote your comment, “Put succinctly, if Jim Jones had been stopped from spreading his philosophy, hundreds of people wouldn’t have committed suicide.”
Here I’m going to slightly disagree. Sure, Jim Jones’ followers wouldn’t have killed themselves due to Jim Jones, but that doesn’t mean another “Jim Jones” wouldn’t have filled his place and let the suicide ensue.
What I’m trying to say is that ISIL could be pounded to non-existence, but so long as the ideology remains alive, a new “ISIL” will replace it. And then what? To use the Israelis term, do you suggest we keep “mowing the lawn” indefinitely? What about Al-Shabab? They are also holding territory, and mowing the lawn seems to be the region’s strategy. But the lawn keeps growing, despite all the proxies and drones we’re using.
I don’t think you and Boland disagree. Boland is arguing that as a specific political entity, as a state if you will, ISIL is contained. Despite you arguing against him, what I really think you’re arguing is that the ideology isn’t contained.
Your best defense IMHO is the reverse Oil Spot strategy you discussed. Let’s suppose that all these oil spots sprout everywhere in the ME and pledge allegiance to the “caliph” of ISIL (a huge assumption). Certainly your argument would have been correct that ISIL was not contained.
But what I’m saying is that it is irrelevant if the oil spots are for ISIL. What’s more important is that there are oil spots for violent Islamists. Who cares if it’s ISIL or some neo-ISIL that eventually wins out. I doubt that many of the fanatics pledge allegiance to ISIL because they are convinced that al-Baghdadi is a good leader who is most well suited to lead the caliphate. Rather, more likely is that these followers pledge allegiance to the ideology, and Baghdadi is it’s symbol. If Baghdadi or ISIL is gone, then they will find a new Baghdadi and new ISIL to pledge allegiance to. Then we’re back to square one.
Boland was arguing that Baghdadi is contained, and I believe he’s right. I think you’re failing to recognize that the Baghdadi you are going after is not a person or political structure at all, but an ideology. I say this despite you writing, “I completely understand that military power will never defeat an ideology.”
And your goal that “ISIL no longer holds terrain in Iraq or Syria, and no longer functions as a quasi-state. Pure and simple.” Is neither pure nor simple since while you can perhaps accomplish that for ISIL, what I really think you would like is that nothing worse will replace it. But then you must fight the ideology itself rather than particular political manifestations of it (which may be contained).
You write, “Eradicating ISIL as a state-like entity now running amok in Iraq and Syria won’t stop the ideology, but it is a step towards slowing it down.” If the last ten years has taught us anything it’s that it won’t slow down fast enough, and that it will accelerate quickly so long as the broader circumstances of the ME persist.
We’re saying the same thing. Where we differ is that you assume that there is a finite number of radical jihadists in the world, and there’s nothing we can do about that. Whether it’s ISIL or some other organization, they exist, and will join it. As you state with my Jim Jones analogy, if it wasn’t him, it would have been someone else. In your mind, those people were doomed to die. I disagree. It IS an ideology, but one that is reliant on recruiting, and ISIL is a giant recruiting machine. People have free will and aren’t pre-ordained to become radical. Getting rid of ISIL as a “political manifestation” will help slow down the radicalization process. Allowing it to remain acts as an accelerant. You seem to feel that a jihadist is born as such, and is just waiting to spring forth. I feel the opposite: a jihadist is recruited, and once that tipping point is reached, there is little chance he will turn back. Yes, I understand it may come from poverty, a despotic government, etc, but in the case of Western recruits and foreign fighters, it is the siren call itself, and ISIL is providing this. Saying there is no use fighting the ideology because it exists belies other such fights that have succeeded. In the 1990s, Sendero Luminoso – a marxist ideology in Peru – was on the verge of literally toppling the government, with thousands of members. Today, due to a host of Peruvian efforts, they are a back-channel group living in the jungle. I understand the ideology exists, and that military force is but one lever – and is not, nor should be, the most prominent one – but disagree that a campaign against it is doomed to failure. We do agree that the ultimate solution lies in the broader circumstances of the ME. This blog wasn’t intending to address that.
Fair enough.
Dragging this conversation out will inevitably lead us to what should be done (we could use your example of Peru, but there are many others like the FARC, etc., we could build a template out of and see if the conditions are the same, as well as analyze the likelihood of success – a topic for a different day). Certainly I agree with you that insurgencies can be degraded. Where we may disagree is on the seriousness and imminence of the potential threats such insurgencies may pose – factors that influence our definition of “containment”. This is especially true of an unpopular insurgency such as ISIL that got its butt kicked really bad by Sunni tribesman when they had enough of them. I doubt we will ever see hundreds of thousands flocking to pledge allegiance to ISIL, and even if they did, I doubt ISIL will have the capacity to absorb and utilize them.
But, as a final point, just to put things in perspective, I would recommend for anyone alarmed by ISIL to place a list and compare the ideologies, manpower, military might, ability to influence and recruit, wealth, history, technology, geography, industry, popularity, support for terrorism/proxies, ultimate goals, etc. of both ISIL and Iran. Take a look at the hard numbers and strategic assets of both polities, and arrive at your own conclusion about the proper relative weight of concern we should place on each polity.
“If we were to follow Bolan’s advice, what’s to keep Kurdistan from leaving outright? How can we ask them to remain a part of Iraq when we’re allowing another group – that seized Iraqi terrain by force – to keep what they have?” And, so they should. The US spends a lot of time, money, and rhetoric defending the Jewish state of Israel as the Jew’s homeland. The Kurds have sn equally legitimate (perhaps even more legitimate) claim to their autonomous homeland. If anyone deserves our support it’s the Kurds.
“In 1991, Saddam Hussein claimed that the country of Kuwait was illegitimate and actually a historical rump of Iraq. He invaded. And we reacted with Desert Storm.” Check the history. Saddam was correct on this one. He was undoubtedly a tyrant, but even a tyrant can have right on their side occasionally. And he did, in that case. It was just a bit too inconvenient for the US’s “allies” (who, incidentally, are taking a bit of a back seat now, and might in fact be funding – or have funded – the same IS that we now want them to stand-up against)
I’m glad that at the end of your piece you agree with my basic initial assessment that “ISIL poses no ‘imminent’ threat to the homeland, and has no capability to conduct a large-scale attack.” This confirms my basic contention that there is much threat inflation both from senior public officials and from the media attempting to justify yet another US military adventure into a region that we don’t understand nearly well enough. The ISIL threat is a distant and remote one that warrants USG attention, but doesn’t justify more panic-inspired actions substituting for strategic thought.
The global threat from ISIL you do mention exists only in the distorted dreams of these terrorists themselves who in your words desire “an ever-expanding caliphate”. However, you offer no plausible scenario beyond your own hellish nightmares for how ISIL would achieve this fantastical goal. US strategy must be a rational process that considers both the intent and capabilities of potential enemies. ISIL simply has no capability to achieve anything remotely of that significance (see my first point above).
Second, you have a narrow view of how a containment strategy might work and has indeed worked in the past. Containment is a strategy that successfully led to the dissolution of the Soviet empire – both an ideological foe and global nuclear and conventional military power. Why would containment not work against the much lesser threat posed by ISIL? Moreover, containment is not a static strategy. The US actively supported anti-communist efforts and resisted Soviet encroachments at several points during the Cold War. A strategy of containment against ISIL could work in much the same fashion: chocking off financing; militarily supporting local efforts to resist further ISIL expansion; and countering the ideological poison espoused by ISIL and other violent Islamist groups.
Fourth, if you have an alternative to containment, articulate that strategy clearly. In doing so ensure you are willing to devote sufficient resources to that effort and answer the questions I pose in my original posting for those like you who believe that the destruction of ISIL is a feasible strategic goal that can be accomplished at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure. And please go beyond answering my questions with rhetorical questions of your own. That’s a proven debate technique, but it doesn’t yield a more informed or thoughtful strategy.
First, I’d appreciate it if you’d keep the debate civil. There’s no reason for the snarky tone and insinuations. I realize that I don’t have a PhD and have never advised presidential administrations, but I can assure you I have experiences that more than measure up for this discussion.
Second, I’m honestly confused by your assertions. I believe you’re conflating ISIL’s state-like entity versus its ideological underpinnings. In some of your response it appears you’re talking about the quasi-state currently in place, in others you refer to a global phenomenon. Which is precisely my point. By “containing” the current territorial gains of ISIL, you actively work against containing the greater Jihadist phenomena. You hand them a propaganda coup that allows the ideology to flourish. To be clear, for the rest of this discussion, I’m referring to the ISIL state-like entity.
Third, I disagree with your model of using the Soviet Union as a good example as to what can be done. As I said above, ISIL does not work under the same Cold War parameters of deterrence, and doesn’t make cost/benefit decisions as a rational actor would. Its entire conviction is absolute. I remember a conversation before going into Afghanistan in 2001, right after the towers fell. As we were planning, an Operator stood up and said, “We have to understand what we’re fighting. These men left everything they knew, family, friends, and home, then trained for years, knowing at the end they were going to kill themselves. How many of you in this room have the same commitment?” Honestly, I’m weary of all the Cold War strategic analogies. They don’t fit.
Fourth, I do agree that ISIL may not an imminent threat now, but that is only a function of time. A function of your word “imminent”. If contained in its present borders, it WILL be a threat, and it WILL have the capability for a large-scale attack. That is not hyperbole or a theory. Because the threat only exists in the “distorted dreams” of the terrorists today in no way indicates it we can dismiss it with a wave of our Cold War hand. It boggles my mind, given the history we have experienced, that someone could actively argue differently. AQ stated over and over again that they were coming, and we sat back and waited, “containing” them to the caves of Tora Bora. Talk about not learning the lessons of the past. Of course, “threat” in and of itself is a subjective thing. Yes, it won’t rise to the level of a thermonuclear war between the Soviets and us, so if that’s your yardstick, I guess we’ll simply agree to disagree. If you don’t see the destruction of the World Trade Centers rising to the level of a “threat”, then there’s no point in further debate.
Fifth, I didn’t realize I needed to present a strategy, mainly because I happen to think – with some specific reservations – that the administration’s strategy is the correct one. You assume that I’m frothing at the mouth for a full-scale invasion with US troops, but that’s not the case. All I was proving is that stopping short with “containment” is a bad idea. You berate me for not “articulating that strategy clearly”, yet, beyond using the word “containment”, you’ve articulated nothing, spending all of your time discussing why it’s a good idea but none on how it would be accomplished. If using the word “containment” encompasses a strategy, then my using “destroy” does the same.
Realizing I don’t know what I don’t know, having not been inside Iraq since 2007, I will offer a few strategic nuggets:
a). Treat the issue of ISIL in two separate sovereign countries as distinct elements. Yes, ISIL cannot be defeated (in the definition of a state-like entity, not an ideology) without dealing with Syria, but it doesn’t mean we need to solve both problems at once. Deal with Iraq first.
b) Lock down the border for military applications. Prevent ISIL freedom of movement across it. I realize we can’t completely close it down, but we can prevent convoys of vehicles coming in from Syria, and convoys of oil headed out of Iraq. Ones and twos sneaking across are fine, but deny Syria as a safe haven for operational forces. This can be done with persistent ISR and airpower.
c) Continue the train and equip path, but emplace US personnel inside the fighting formations. This is against the administration’s plan, but I believe it’s critical, both as a leavening force to prevent Iraqi/Kurdish army/Peshmerga blunders amongst the population as well as tightening up the OODA loop for command and control of offensive combat assets. Upwards of 300 Iraqi soldiers were just executed in a base that ISIL overran (guess they don’t understand “containment”). This wouldn’t have occurred if a single American soldier had been on that base.
d) Work with the Gulf states to co-opt the Sunni tribes under ISIL control. At the same time, work to marginalize the Shia militias who are currently the flag-bearers for the Iraqi army. Using Shia militias under the sway of the Persian state of Iran only exacerbates the situation. ISIL would like nothing more than to paint the struggle with a sectarian brush, and using Iranian proxies feeds right into this strategy.
e) Obviously, continue to hold the new Iraqi government’s feet to the fire about inclusion, demanding a less strident sectarian tone.
I can’t get any more specific, because I’m not on the ground, and having once been there and hearing talking heads in the states, I realize that any more granularity is nothing more than an academic exercise. Don’t bother replying by demanding I provide who, exactly, would do the fighting. I can’t answer from my armchair who it should be, but neither can you argue who it won’t be. Neither of us is bestowed with omniscient abilities simply because of our military past. I, for one, understand this, but also understand that out of all of the players in the region, there is an ability to do what I say. I’ll let the men on the ground determine who it will be – Iraqi Army, Peshmerga, Sunni tribes, former Ba’athists, or a combination of all.
In the end, where we differ is the threat and the impact of leaving the status quo. You see no threat, and could care less about ISIL’s rampage. You state, “How do advocates of yet another war in the Middle East spearheaded by the United States avoid further damage to the perceived legitimacy of U.S. military actions both here and abroad?” as if we picked this fight, and that’s the only risk. We did not. ISIL, acting as a state-like entity, invaded a country, seized terrain, and then set about beheading everyone. Out of all our half-brained interventions around the world, from Lebanon to Iraq in 2003, this is one time we can stand clearly in the right. If this action isn’t legitimate, then that bar is too high to reach.
Beyond anything else I’ve said about threats and ideology, at a bare minimum, containing ISIL only emboldens others. You state I’m living in my own “hellish nightmare”, but clearly you haven’t looked at the world stage lately. Libya is well on its way to being another jihadi paradise, with Benghazi already a self-proclaimed “emirate” under Ansar al Sharia, northern Nigeria is for all intents and purposes a Boko Haram state, and a splinter of AQIM, now calling itself the “soldiers of the caliphate”, is eyeing swaths of terrain in Algeria and Mali, and just beheaded a Frenchman in exactly the same manner as has happened in Syria with ISIL. If you don’t think ISIL’s success has emboldened any of this, then we’ll just have to part ways. Containment is sending one signal: “If we take it, they’ll let us stay.”
PS – this is my last post. I’ve enjoyed the discussion, but I really have to get some work done.
Containment doesn’t work on ideologues. You can’t contain an idea that spreads through propaganda and is based on heresay. ISIL can ‘control the message’ because they are there on the ground. Just like any Hollywood director or news producer can create a spin on the facts, ISIL can do the same. Eliminating their top people blunts their ability to create mass havoc and murder. You can’t exactly be eradicating a village if your too busy being on the run and being hunted by armies. Plural. Denying their fighters a safe haven to re-arm and regroup will fragment the group into smaller more manageable pockets that are easier to kill.
Make no mistake, the genie is out of the bottle and we are going to have to deal with them either here or there. But they must be killed. They don’t adopt the liberalism theory of live and let live. The belief that if we ignore them or try to contain them is myopic.
Containment may not be a good option, but it is the best one we have – other than doing nothing at all. Destroying the IS would require a massive invasion of US troops and the killing of every last Sunni in the areas controlled by the IS. The US doesn’t have the will to do this. No friendly country in the region will do it either. The Turks support ISIS. The Israelis won’t act until they are directly threatened by ISIS entering Jordan. And the USA wants to overthrow Assad so Qatar can build a gas pipeline thru Syria to Europe, breaking the Russian gas monopoly – so we can’t ally with Assad. There are no realistic options here besides imperfect containment.