As I read Ryan Evans’ frustration with the continued Congressional Republican focus on the Benghazi attacks, I appreciated his perspective and found his analysis almost entirely on point. But he misses two points, one by commission, one by omission.
First, the creation of the House’s Select Committee on Benghazi that triggers Evans’ ire was not the product of paranoid conspiracy theorists. Although most social media activity by political action committees (both right and left) is intended to be red meat for hyper-partisans, and the events at the U.S. Annex and the Obama administration’s ineptly disingenuous communications response play exceedingly well to the right’s “lunatic fringe,” the reality is that conservative/Republican anger on this issue is more widespread than Evans appreciates, and not unreasonably so. This visceral reaction stems in part from the role the attacks are perceived to have played in the 2012 campaign when Candy Crowley – the supposedly neutral moderator of the second presidential debate – intervened on President Obama’s behalf on a substantive point, and incorrectly at that. This incident, combined with the perceived lack of media interest in two other scandals, created the appearance of a stonewalling administration abetted by a compliant media. This belief was initially sparked by the “Fast and Furious” gunrunning scandal (in which 21 House Democrats joined the Republicans in holding the Attorney General in contempt of Congress for refusing to turn over documents). Later, traditional media outlets seemed uninterested by government officials pleading the fifth, emails that were not backed up in accordance with federal record keeping laws were conveniently erased, and a slew of hard drives and Blackberries were mysteriously recycled in response to investigations over whether the IRS targeted grassroots conservative groups during the 2012 campaign.
One does not have to accept the veracity of these scandals or the degree of White House culpability in them to recognize why many people believe Benghazi fits into a broader pattern of perceived administration obstruction and media indifference. In fact, fifty-one percent of those surveyed in a June 2014 Washington Post/ABC News poll said they supported a new Congressional investigation into the Benghazi attacks. In other words, the doubts outlined above are not confined to the far right’s fever swamps.
Ironically, just hours after War on the Rocks published this article, news broke that one of the State Department officials reprimanded over Benghazi claimed that aides of then-Secretary of State Hilary Clinton removed documents before they were turned over to the State Department’s own Accountability Review Board. Even if these claims are true, it is unlikely these documents reveal that President Obama issued a stand down order from a posh golf course or that Secretary Clinton sat atop the consulate playing a fiddle throughout the attack. However, it does suggest that it may still be premature to say we know everything about the attacks or that there are no controversies remaining. (It should also be noted that both the left and right are susceptible to bouts of derangement: ten years after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a majority of self-identified Democrats said they believed the Bush administration knew about the impending attacks and yet did nothing).
Second, Evans is absolutely correct that such conspiracy theories distract from important substantive issues. He is also correct in his assertion about the Benghazi attacks’ significance: the immediate furor exposed the cynicism of the administration’s national security communications apparatus, prevented Susan Rice from becoming secretary of state, and drew attention to America’s withering power projection capabilities. But beyond the benefits that Evans identified, there is another strategic implication of the events of 9/11/2012 that needs to be addressed: America’s level of preparation to meet an increasing need to post U.S. civilian personnel in strategically important yet less-than-perfectly secure regions. One of the key lessons from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is how important an understanding of local social structures and economic conditions is to shaping both kinetic and non-kinetic operations. This knowledge was in critically short supply during the early stages of both wars, and any future interventions will likely see earlier and increased demand for civilians with such expertise.
In a post-Iraq/Afghanistan world, however, the American public will likely be less willing to deploy large numbers of U.S. ground troops to counter threats than it was in the immediate aftermath of al-Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. homeland. Whatever its merits or faults, President Obama’s declared strategy for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a reflection of this fact. Yet if non-kinetic levers of power are to be utilized in countries where the United States seeks to mitigate threats before they rise to the level requiring military intervention, this will require an increase in both diplomatic and development (and covert intelligence) personnel to regions plagued by persistent low-level conflict where they will be appealing soft-targets for anti-U.S. actors. Thus, despite the danger of “hearing fatigue,” we need a definitive account of the lessons learned from Benghazi precisely because we are so likely to face a similar situation again in the not-too-distant future, to include determining how we can improve our Quick Reaction Force capabilities and options to protect other at risk embassies/consulates in the region.
Fortunately, according to the Washington Post, this appears to be the direction in which the Select Committee hearings are headed.
Yet to paraphrase Winston Wolf, “Let’s not start congratulating each other just yet.” (It is my understanding that although quoting Pulp Fiction is permitted — even encouraged — at War on the Rocks, we still must maintain a PG-13 rating.) Ryan’s concerns are not unjustified, as one should never underestimate Congress’s ability to revert to lowest common denominator partisanship. But rather than dismissing the hearings as the product of the lunatic fringe, national security experts should stay more focused on the hearings to ensure they remain on the right track given the importance of the issues at stake to the future conduct of American foreign policy.
Dr. Benjamin Runkle is a former Defense Department and National Security Council official and the Director of Programs for JINSA. His views are his alone and do not represent the opinions or positions of JINSA.
Jim Roberts 
Jorge Barroso 
John Haas 
Jicdoit 
milprof 
NorEastern 
Ryan Evans 
Bryan McGrath 
John jackson 
Ron 
Thank you for pin-pointing the second presidential debate. I’ll never forget hearing Obama say: “The suggestion that anybody in my team–whether the Secretary of State, our U.N. Ambassador–anybody on my team would play politics or mislead when we’ve lost four of our own, governor, is offensive. That’s not what we do. That’s not what I do as president; that’s not what I do as Commander in Chief.”
In fact, that’s precisely what he did.
I agree with Jim Roberts because, as I said before, the people responsible of that catastrophe must be judged and be accountable of the dishonor of taking politics before the public responsibility of caring for our representatives abroad.
Many people know, but won’t mention, the reason that Ambassador Stevens was even in such a dangerous place on September 11, 2012. Why was Stevens in Benghazi far from the nation’s capital Tripoli at a time when the new government was being formed? Stevens was there coordinating CIA arms shipments to Turkey for use against Syria. His last official act was a meeting with the Turkish ambassador.
“…an increasing need to post U.S. civilian personnel in strategically important yet less-than-perfectly secure regions”
Stevens wasn’t posted to Benghazi. He went there on his own, playing CIA as he had done before against Gaddafi. State-CIA — what’s the difference any more.
One has to wonder who the author imagines the WOTR readership to be?
He asserts–against all experience and reason–that Benghazi-truther-ism is, far from being an effluence of the hysterical far-right fever-swamps, actually a perfectly sane response to administration and media malfeasance.
His evidence? A link to that bastion of hysterical far-right fever-swamp-ism, Breitbart.
Lord, have mercy.
Editors, we realize you want to fairly represent a wide spectrum of political positions. And rightly so. But you need to do so without debasing yourselves, or insulting your readers.
Our republic has enough problems at the moment. More irresponsible journalism isn’t what it needs.
I read them both.
Bless your heart.
JohnHaas:
Thank you, agree entirely. The first two-thirds of Runkle’s post doesn’t actually take on Evans’ argument at all. Instead, Runkle simply argues that a partisan witch hunt into Benghazi is justified, whether or not it is relevant to U.S. national security and strategy, because Obama and the liberal media were unfair to Mitt Romney and Runkle is still mad about it.
That’s a perfectly good case to make at RedState or National Review, I suppose, but hardly the sort strategic discourse that WOTR aims for and that readers here appreciate and expect.
The last, shorter point that _this_ hearing will be different and focus on meaningful strategic and operational lessons is valid, if true. We’ll see what actually happens.
I applaud. Take posts like this to Brietbart. I thought WOTR was serious journalism.
And the original piece this author is responding to was serious journalism?
I see him responding to the “Arm-waving…move it along…nothing to see here” piece with 2 points:
1. Hmmm…strange. I wonder what happened?
2. How can we keep the oversight team on the real problem of seeing this prevented in the future.
It’s really quite simple: If there’s really all this sinister, “worse-than-Watergate,” malfeasance, where are the indictments?
It’s not like we’ve lacked for investigations, or determined investigators. Instead, what we get is year after year of innuendo.
Look at what our author here comes up with: “However, it does suggest that it may still be premature to say we know everything about the attacks or that there are no controversies remaining.”
He can’t even say “it is premature”! It “may be” premature. Wow, there’s a claim.
And what might it be “premature” to claim? That we “know everything about the attacks.”
I’m a historian, and I have a news flash for you: We still don’t “know everything” about the Battle of Gettysburg or the Little Big Horn. We still don’t “know everything” about the Tonkin Gulf incident.
And shall I list all the things from the past about which “no controversies remain”?
Here you go:
If some of us sound a bit frustrated, it’s because we didn’t know you could actually make a career out of nothing more than saying “may be premature” and “controversies remain”! We’re envious.
I’ve never worked for an editor who would let a vacuous inanity such as that pass.
They would have sent it back with an angry red comment: “Aren’t you admitting you’ve got nuthin’ with that?”
But, I readily admit, I’m getting old. Back in my day, you actually needed to have something to say.
John Haas: I am the editor in question! And I also wrote the article Benjamin responded to and argued against. Wrap your head around that! At War on the Rocks, we value debate. I apply that ethos across the board, especially when people are willing to disagree with me, the editor-in-chief! I think Benjamin wrote an article that was worth publishing. I think we can disagree with his arguments. And I do. I agree with your own line of critique. But you and I part ways with your unfortunate use of the phrase “vacuous inanity” (You also don’t address some of the other more reasonable points he made, but you weren’t obligated to do so). Politeness and collegiality are very important to us. Please be polite.
Ryan sent me an earlier version of this piece for my reaction, and I don’t think he’ll mind if I repeat here a portion of the marginalia I provided:
“What you see is a communications failure, I see as a straightforward attempt to manipulate information in order to attain POLITICAL and ELECTORAL objectives. This was TWO MONTHS before a Presidential election—the same length of time before a mid-term election that the offending Tweet you point to. While I find myself generally accepting of much of what you say about the actual FACTS of the matter and the significant loss of opportunity the Republican Party is suffering by not concentrating on the foreign policy aspects of the question, I find myself concluding that you are insufficiently moved by the degree of targeted propaganda designed to inoculate the President from political injury as the election closed in. You may be a better judge of these things than I, but your detachment from the issue leaves you unable to understand the tremendous emotion (yes, Republicans have emotions) that this issue raises in the Right. You can rail all you like about the waste of money and time or whatever it is you want to rail about, but the President and his people DIRECTLY and KNOWINGLY LIED to the American public, repeatedly, at an important time in our political process. Where you see incompetence, I see malice and manipulation.”
Let’s leave aside the fact that about 4% of the US electorate considered foreign affairs “very important” in the 2012 race; that only some fraction of that could be expected to actually allow the event to affect their vote; and that only some fraction of that number would have changed from Obama to Romney; and that, therefore, this was hardly anything the White House needed to be worried about. The election was already won back in March.
Let’s leave aside, also, that, if you’re a panicking administration intent on lying your way out of a presidency-destroying crisis, you don’t send your UN ambassador–who is hardly a house-hold name or a trusted figure among the hoi polloi–out to save your career.
Let’s, rather, zero in on this telling statement: “Where you see incompetence, I see malice and manipulation.”
Of course you do.
Richard Hofstadter nailed this mentality back in 1964: To the paranoid, “The enemy is clearly delineated: he is a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman—sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving.”
http://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics/?single=1
Ten congressional investigations into Benghazi. Count them. Ten. Christ. Four deaths. Only four. In what was most likely a far to forward CIA operation. The completely falsified reasons to invade Iraq over nonexistent WMDs cost four American every day for eight years. And fifty Iraqi deaths each and every day on average. Go ahead, keep beating a dead dog, while the mass murderer is still on the loose. 180,000 people lost their lives in that CF fiasco which we call the invasion of Iraq.
Your comment is absolute balderdash. I spent over 3 years in Saudi Arabia and attended the weekly intel briefs from the DIA and CIA detailing Sadaam’s chemical weapons program. And the weekly gas mask drills were conducted for some other reason than just to torture the troops (try functioning while wearing a full rubber hood and gas mask when its 125 outside). The president? Clinton. CIA director? Clinton’s man Tenet. SECDEF? Clinton’s man Cohen. Even as truth-challenged as Clinton was/is, he admits he and his administration believed Iraq still had chemical weapons and the will to use them, as they had done just few years before.
Everyone: Let’s try to keep it civil
Noreaster
There were actually WMDs found in Iraq 1) my battalion captured an Al Samoud missile with a liquid warhead on it during the march up in 03. It was later tested as “Bug Spray.” 2) In about every ASP captured by US forces during the march up there were 55 gallon drums of what would similar test as “bug spray” The Germans original develop the nerve agents Tabun and Sarin when they were researching bug spray. The Iraqis made their own never agents to what would be generously be called less than pure or full strength concentration. The Iraqis than stored their munitions in conditions no ASP in the western world would ever store ammo in, to include open air storage that allowed the agents to be exposed to 100 plus degree temps for years. High temperature is something anyone who knows about chemical munitions would know severely degrade nerve agents to the point that it would be no more than bug spray by the end of it. 3) there were numerous IEDs used from 04-2010 that contained various chemicals to include Sarin, Soman and Mustard that were looted from Iraqi ASPs 4) there actually was a declassified document put out around 06 that listed the various WMDs found.
No-WMDs and Bush lied are perfect cases of if you tell a lie long enough, the less than informed will believe it.
Ryan, I was referring to this pivotal sentence as a “vacuous inanity”:
“However, it does suggest that it may still be premature to say we know everything about the attacks or that there are no controversies remaining.”
I question the unfortunateness of the term. When one says a survey of the facts “suggests” that it “may be premature” to say what no one with any wisdom would ever say about anything, then one has evacuated one’s claim of any significance or substance. And that’s not a wise thing, I would maintain; it is the opposite of wisdom, ie, among other things, foolishness, senselessness, and etc., which are among the meanings of “inane.”
Again, I’m old school. “Vacuous inanity” is among the gentler assessments my own writing received back in the day.
In our own, self-esteem obsessed, everyone’s above average, age, a term such as that may sound overly-blunt or harsh, but it’s not ad hominem. It merely points out the flimsiness of the argument being made.
Back in the day, calling people out on bad arguments was the name of the game. Personal attacks were off limits.
I would argue we, as a culture, have made a mistake in pulling our punches on these matters. The Internet is a perfect storm of two lamentable trends: The proliferation of the most rancid, vituperative ad hominem rants in un-moderated comments; and the toleration for flabby argumentation because “it’s just a blog, we’re not doing long-form journalism.”