In the Star Trek movies and books, cadets at Starfleet academy take the Kobayashi Maru test. The test is a simulation where the cadet captains a ship tasked with the rescue of a stranded ship’s crew, the Kobayashi Maru. Before the cadet can carry out the rescue they are beset with several Klingon war birds. No course of action the cadet chooses can save the crew of the stranded ship. Almost inevitably, the simulation ends in the destruction of the cadet’s ship and the death of all aboard as well as the crew of the Kobayashi Maru. The test is designed to see if the cadets can maintain their composure while in command of the doomed rescue mission, intended to teach a cadet how to deal with a no-win scenario.
In recent times, there has been a flurry of articles written on problems with the military in general, and the Army in particular, that seek to explain America’s strategic misfortunes in Iraq and elsewhere. William Lind recently argued that America’s recent defeats are rooted in institutional failure in the American military’s officer personnel system. Others call for disruptive thinkers. Other critics blame failed military doctrine. But the criticism must pass an if-then test; if we would have implemented the suggested solution, then we would have accomplished our political objective. Unfortunately, none of these suggestions could pass this test. Democracy in Iraq is the Kobayashi Maru; a no-win scenario.
It was not possible to create a “free, democratic, and stable Iraq.” This was well-known almost from the onset and certainly not in the timeframe America was willing to spend supporting this venture. The process of democratization has been studied for some time. Some of the requisites for democracy — economic wealth distributed across the society, political participation, urbanization, and literacy — were identified by Seymour Lipset as early as 1959. Since that time, additional factors have been identified and the originals refined. Based on these well-known factors, it was clear in 2004 that Iraq was not prepared for democracy. As one professor put it:
Iraq lacks any of the preconditions academics generally accept as being necessary for democratization to succeed. It has no middle class to speak of independent from the state; oil revenues, the life-line of any Iraqi regime, are notorious for their ability to centralize rather than democratize power; the country has no tradition of limited or responsible government; national identity is weak in the face of rival religious or ethnic loyalties; regional neighbors will do what they can to undermine whatever democratizing movements exist; and the democrats themselves lack a figure such as Nelson Mandela or Kim Dae Jung who could give them leadership.
Iraq was possibly the worst place on the planet to attempt to create a democracy. One researcher, taking into account the conditions in Iraq at the time of the invasion, estimated the odds of success at 1,725 to 1. In addition to these social factors, a significant portion of the population of Iraq embraced a tribal value system that was antithetical to democratic legitimacy. The values necessary to embrace power sharing and individual rights were largely absent. Values can change, but that takes time. Given enough time it might have been possible to help the Iraqis build a democratic Iraq. How much time? Twenty years at a minimum for successful democratic consolidation. With all the issues Iraq had to deal with, the researcher estimated it would take 50 years to create a free, democratic and stable government. Even Larry Diamond, one of the more ardent supporters of the Bush administration’s attempt to democratize Iraq, had come to the conclusion in late 2004 that due to the conditions in Iraq and the lack of resources committed to the occupation democracy in Iraq would be a long term project.
Even worse, what the military was able to accomplish, a partial democracy, is the most volatile and least predictable form of government known. When all the factors that can be associated with political instability are ranked, being a partial democracy is number one. Certainly elections in Iraq were a triumph of democracy, but elections alone don’t create democracy. Iraqis have voted in large numbers in the past and will certainly do so again in the near future, but as Professor Bruce E Moon observes “… history shows that it has never been the unwillingness to vote that prevented democracy, but rather the failure to honor the results of those elections.” This is particularly true when factionalism — a political system dominated by ethnic or parochial groups that regularly compete for influence — is present. Factionalism tends to limit an interest in power-sharing. You might think that factionalism in any system would be divisive, but it is not necessarily destabilizing. As Professor Jack A. Goldstone and his associates noted in their research on political instability “It is only when factionalism is combined with a relatively high level of open competition for office … that extremely high vulnerability to instability results …”
By holding elections and attempting to create a democratic system in an ethnic and religiously factionalized society, we were creating the very instability we were seeking to suppress. But this was inherent in the mission, and since we had no doctrine on creating or consolidating a democracy, we integrated those tasks into our counterinsurgency and stability doctrine almost ensuring a self-defeating situation.
Ultimately, the mission to create democracy in Iraq was not realistically possible in the time frame allotted. Does this mean that western style democracy is not possible in the Arab world? No. It simply means that the type of social and economic changes that would have to take place to allow for the individual values and intra-group trust necessary for power sharing could not be accomplished in the time given. The seeds of that change have certainly been planted, but it may be several decades before they bear real fruit.
Democracy in Iraq was the American military’s no-win scenario. Therefore, no claims that had we done this or changed that would realistically have altered the result. When looked at from that perspective, how did the American military score on its Kobayashi Maru test? Overall, the military scored pretty well. It never quit. It continued the mission until the political leadership relieved them of that mission. It maintained its dignity and its honor, never turning away from the fight and never blaming those that gave it the impossible mission for its inability to accomplish it. We also learned, or relearned, many lessons. Once the nature of the mission changed from regime change to supporting the nascent Iraqi government, in conjunction with the Department of State, we created Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams took the lead on coordinating the training and resources necessary to help build a new Iraqi state. But there was never going to be enough time to see the mission through till the end.
Are there things we can learn from this experience? Yes. Since the military is going to be used to accomplish political objectives by other means, then we should probably learn a little more about the nature of politics, particularly in the less stable portions of the globe. Efforts to learn to understand the human domain are a good start. Perhaps security should be our first objective, and only once that is achieved, promote democracy. We are also rewriting our doctrine giving greater consideration to the existing socio-cultural conditions on the ground. Does this absolve the American military of criticism? No. There is much to learn from Iraq and there is always room for improvement. The officer education and promotion system is probably behind the times and I have already mentioned needed changes in our doctrine. But for criticism to be valid, it needs to relate to the failure it is trying to rectify. In this case, neither a better officer corps nor a better understanding of counterinsurgency principles would likely have changed the outcome as long as success was defined as a stable, democratic Iraq. For all intents and purposes, democracy in Iraq is the Kobayashi Maru.
Lieutenant Colonel Stan Wiechnik enlisted in the Army in 1982 and received his commission in 1993. A veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq, he is a graduate of Command and General Staff College, Indiana University, and Vermont Law School. Currently, he serves in the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve at Fort Belvoir, VA. The views expressed are his own.
Austin Fall 
Mark 
Claude Schmid 
Stan Wiechnik 
YoYoTheAssyrian 
Liked the article, it is nice that the time was taken to add to the too few articles on a foundational aspect of war that is too oft not given enough consideration before hostilities begin; is our desired outcome possible, as recently experienced in Iraq, Afghanistan and even in Vietnam.
As much as the Star Trek reference is appreciated, the reference to the US’s ill-fated invasions are not quite the same though it would be much more forgiving if a no-win situation had really been the case. The US probably could have “won” in all its recent conflicts, at issue is not the capability but the desire to do so, or having 50 starships, well within proton torpedo range, watching the Kobayashi Maru unfold but doing nothing. Since at least Korea, it seems the way the US has been fighting is like putting lipstick on war; trying to make it pretty or at least presentable. History has shown what has been required to win and we are likely to continue creating our own no win situations if the US is not willing to apply the force and forces needed to succeed.
Rather than add the task of achieving “political objectives by other means” to the already long list of skills required by the officer corps would it not be more intelligent – in the light of near universal failure of national building efforts – to just accept it is not a military task?
Excellent article, LTC Wiechnik. Insightful & colorful analogy. I’m not aware of any democracy that has been “created.” It is a myth that they can be. Governments, like societies, are always evolving from something previous. Hence, as you mention, key attributes foundational to democratic possibilities are essential. Of course many supporters of the Bush Administration argue that intervention in Iraq was justified for other, more crucial, reasons. Likewise, they argue that achieving a stable democracy in Iraq was never a widely held expectation. What are your thoughts on that?
Thank you. The original justification for military action in Iraq was not democratization although I am sure there were those in the administration who saw an opportunity to spread democracy. The reasoning being based in the idea of the Democratic Peace – that democracies do not go to war with each other. I do believe that there was more than a small amount of hubris left over from the fall of the Soviet Union and the belief that capitalist democracy was “the end of history”. It does not appear that anyone in the administration seriously engaged people who studied democratization until after the invasion and it became apparent that democracy was not going to spring up spontaneously. I have to give Larry Diamond credit for at least attempting to work with the administration. I am certain that other academics were content to stand back and watch the venture fail from the safety of their university offices.
That said, I cannot agree with your assertion that a stable democracy cannot be “created.” I would cite post WWII Japan. It was perhaps the perfect storm of democratic opportunity. Reading Barrington Moore Jr’s “The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy” you will see that Japan was socially well on its way towards democracy before the Americans dropped anchor in 1853. They had previous constitutional government experience in the Meiji era. It had a homogonous, mostly literate population with a diverse, largely industrialized economy. On top of those positive social and economic conditions, the occupation force that arrived in 1945 was granted legitimacy by the sitting Emperor. Within days the Americans handed the new Japanese government a democratic constitution they had little input in. In essence, we “created” that democracy … and it flourished.
But situations like that are rare, and each situation needs to be considered individually.
Thanks for your reply to my question. Again, you make many solid points and I generally agree with them all. Reference “creating” a democracy, I suspect our differences are mainly semantics. Clearly, Japan rapidly became a democracy following WWII. However, as your reply readily acknowledges, Japan had several starts in that direction previously, and hence, I would argue, the political soil there showed reasonably promising fertility. Yet, even if we accept the “creating” argument for Japan, other than Japan there are few, if any, historical examples suggesting reasons for optimism. The plain and simple truth is that democracies take time to grow. The political evolution of each — ours definitely included — is unique to its own historical journey. Of course I do not mean to say that we never should try to install a democracy; it is an important consideration in some interventions. A cold assessment of America’s national interest has to be the number one priority. Every other argument is, at best, 2nd tier. Nevertheless, in my view, considering this in relation to Iraq, perhaps the right question about the Bush Administration is a version of the famous Watergate question: “what did he know, and when did he know it?” Clearly Saddam was a menace. The unanswerable question is how dangerous of a menace might he have become.
History suggests that small wars can’t be expected to deliver big results. Many Americans tend the think of war in WWII perspectives. That’s unrealistic. The main lesson of conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, like most small wars, is that the best possible victory is usually just moving the ball in the right direction. That’s why the Long War was such a fitting name.
And I hope to continue to read your writings. I enjoyed what you wrote to YoYoTheAssyrian too. You have great insight and write with precision.
Just wanted to start out my critique by saying that I liked your argument, and that I always thought the military was being handed a shit sandwich by its civilian superiors in the Iraq war.
That said, I do think that you absolve the military too much. The initial failure of the Iraq Invasion and the absolute chaos that ensued when the insurgency blossomed showed a fundamental lack of institutional memory that is prevalent in the military. I once heard a noted military academic, who served in Vietnam during the Easter offensive, say that the military was a fundamentally “a-historical.” You say you that the military “created” provincial reconstruction teams, let’s be honest here, you were remaking a wheel that had been created in Vietnam and then erased from the institutional memory after that conflict was brought to a close.
Now my tone is mightily unfair, Hey military, why didn’t you learn from an incredibly traumatic experience that was a generation and a half ago? Furthermore this experience was succeeded by at least 28 years of a doctrine that can be surmised as, “no more Vietnams.” (from the same academic)
But it speaks again to your initial metaphor. In Starfleet, officers are trained to deal with no-win scenarios. Where was the military’s response to being asked to deal with a counter-insurgency with inadequate resources and time? As far as I can tell we got a double-down on blitzkrieg tactics with a 21st century spin, which did not work.
Again, I feel I’m being overly harsh, but the question remains. You rightly blame the civilian leadership for leading its soldiers into a cul-de-sac. But you were in the cul-de-sac, you will probably end up in that same cul-de-sac in a generation or so. (unfortunately) How will you or others adapt and prepare for the next kobayashi maru?
I don’t believe you are being overly harsh. The American military made a number of mistakes and we need to own up to them. Mr. Lind’s article is not wrong in identifying that the Officer Corps has some serious issues. But it is the connection between those problems and the idea that they would have had an impact on the outcome of Iraq that I have an issue with … for precisely the “a-historical” reasoning you cite. Let me explain.
If we start to believe that changing doctrine or the military personnel system would have changed the outcome in Iraq, then we forget the lesson that we should have learned; that we need to consider whether the political objective (Ends) is achievable given the time and resources (Means) that the government is willing to commit combined with the methods (Ways) we plan to use to achieve the objective before we enter into a fight. If we start to believe that the Ends were achievable had we had only changed our Ways, then we are rewriting history and opening the door to making the same mistake again.
The trick is not to do better in the next no-win situation – it is to identify a no-win situation and not get into it. That may not always be possible as the military does not (and should not) independently decide when and where to fight. The military needs to understand the limits of what can be done with force of arms. While coercion through force, threat of force, or even bribery is a powerful motivator that can suppress human nature, it cannot change it. My fear is that in the military’s attempt to find a solution to the problems of Iraq we will forget the human component and concentrate only on the military itself, our doctrine, education, and personnel system. We may actually start to believe the people who tell us that if we had done this or that, we could have won a no-win scenario.