In the whispering campaign that passes for international diplomacy between Iran and its Sunni Arab neighbor states, late 2013 has been a high-volume period. Saudi Arabia’s pique at American-led efforts to negotiate a six-month relaxation in economic sanctions in exchange for Iran’s halt of enrichment activities was palpable. For several years, top Saudi officials have threatened that should Tehran gain nuclear weapons capability, Riyadh would follow. That rejoinder received life anew as Iran negotiated with the P5+1 in Geneva this November. Many question whether Saudi officials and interlocutors were bluffing or were serious; and, if serious would Riyadh have a reliable partner in such an acquisition from Pakistan?
Western nonproliferation pundits have generally dismissed the possibility of such nuclear proliferation collaboration, viewing the risks to Riyadh and Islamabad to be too high and the whispering campaign to be a Saudi effort to put pressure on the United States to be more firm with Iran. Analysts of the Saudi monarchy also have argued that its conservative nature would mitigate against it going to Pakistan for a nuclear weapons “chit.”
But a more careful assessment of trans-regional history and Saudi-Pakistani interrelations over time makes analysts like me – who both have lived in Middle Eastern countries and who analyze Pakistan and Saudi Arabia security matters from a South Asian security perspective – far less certain that the Saudis are bluffing. Saudi Arabia’s unique relationship with Pakistan during the period of Islamabad’s civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons development programs makes this an especially important connection in the event of an ever-widening chain of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia. Although officially denied by Riyadh and Islamabad, many South Asia experts, including Bruce Reidel of the Brookings Institution, believe that a secret and long-standing agreement exists that Pakistan would provide the Kingdom with nuclear technology and weapons should the Saudis feel threatened by a third party nuclear program. Furthermore, Pakistan has a recent history of responding positively to Saudi security requests, most notably in the spring of 2011 Saudi royals feared spill-over of a Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain and requested Islamabad ready an expeditionary military force to deploy upon request. Pakistan did so without hesitation.
Although it is impossible to know precisely how the Kingdom would react should Iran declare itself a nuclear power or arrive at a “breakout point” where Tehran could quickly mate a credible nuclear weapon with a delivery device, it is clear in 2013 that the Saudi leadership mistrusts American leadership— and American promises—more than at any time in the recent history of U.S.-Saudi relations, and perhaps more than any time since President Franklin Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz ibn Saud in 1945. Even a firm American declaration of extended nuclear deterrence in support of Riyadh and its Sunni Arab neighbors seems unlikely provide sufficient comfort to the Saudis. Given its unprecedented current mistrust of the United States in dealings with Iran and its history of close interaction with the Pakistan military and intelligence services, the Kingdom is likely to seek Pakistan’s assistance in some capacity should Iran arrive at a nuclear weapons breakout capability. There are four distinct possibilities.
First, the Saudis might ask Pakistan for a declaration that its nuclear weapons would be available from sites in Pakistan for retaliation in the event of any use of nuclear weapons against the Kingdom by Iran.
A second possibility is for Pakistan to commit some of its nuclear-armed airplanes and pilots into Saudi airfields. Pakistan’s air force often trains and exercises with Saudi pilots.
In a variant of this option, and a third possibility, Pakistan might send nuclear-capable missiles and trained crews to Saudi Arabia. That would take more time and require Saudi spending on launch-capable pads, nuclear storage facilities, and control systems that do not currently exist.
(Each of these three possibilities has the additional advantage of aligning with the interpretation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that enabled American stationing of its nuclear weapons in Europe during the Cold War, that is, as long as nuclear weapons material remained under at least shared Pakistani control in peacetime, the Saudis could effectively join the nuclear club without a technical violation of the NPT.)
Fourth, Pakistan might be asked to commence transfer of the technical know-how and capacity for nuclear weapons into Saudi Arabia in a phased process. If not combined with one of the above conditions, this would take considerable time and be of significant concern to Saudi Arabia’s neighbors including Israel.
Pakistani military and civilian nuclear weapons officials make it clear that they wish to avoid dealing with a Saudi request for nuclear weapons assistance, hoping that extended American nuclear deterrence can fill the need. But should Saudi mistrust of American reliability make this view unrealistic, Pakistan’s historic and ongoing reliance on Riyadh for a wide array of economic and political support makes it likely that Islamabad would respond positively while adhering to four imperatives.
First, Islamabad will minimize provocation of Beijing. China’s technical know-how underpins
the vast majority of Pakistan’s nuclear power capacity and armaments designs. Despite
autonomous technological capabilities, Pakistan would require Chinese support to transfer nuclear
weapons expertise to Saudi Arabia. This imperative, coupled with China’s reluctance to be seen as a nuclear weapons proliferator, suggests that Pakistan would prefer a short-term transfer option.
Second, Pakistan will attempt to minimize dispersion of, or disruption of, its nuclear deterrent against India – the primary security rationale for its nuclear force. This imperative would encourage Pakistan to help Saudi Arabia only with a minimum transfer of nuclear weapons assets or know-how.
Third, Pakistan will seek to limit provocation of the United States and the wider international community by abetting the permanent transfer of nuclear weapons know-how to a third party country, especially one that is a signatory to the NPT. Pakistan’s political leadership understands the depths to which the A.Q. Khan nuclear weapons assistance program,
which benefited Iran, damaged its relationship with the international community. The military
is less worried about the fallout from the Khan affair but recognizes the damage that a repeat
offense of nuclear know-how transfer could do to it worldwide. This imperative would also encourage Pakistan to respond the Saudis in a manner that promised rhetorical support or limited transfer of assets but not know-how.
Finally, the Pakistani military and civilian establishments will take into account Israel’s reaction to any nuclear weapons collaboration with Saudi Arabia. As Feroz Khan, a retired Pakistani brigadier general who worked on nuclear weapons in Pakistan noted in his 2012 book Eating Grass, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons developments have consistently taken Israel into account, assuring that nuclear-capable missiles lacked the range to strike the Israeli homeland mainly in an effort to deter the kind of strike Israel launched against Osirak, Iraq in 1981. In order to adhere to this constraint, Pakistani officials likely would offer assistance to Saudi Arabia with a loaned deterrent of nuclear armed aircraft. These would be easier for Israel to counter with standard air defense options and would not threaten a new specter of nuclear missiles from Saudi Arabia or an indigenous Saudi program for its own bomb.
Perhaps ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran will produce a firm halt in the elements of its nuclear program that could lead to weaponization. This remains the best outcome for all parties involved, especially those in the Middle East and in South Asia. However, a declared or a declared and tested nuclear Iranian weapons capability almost certainly will inspire Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent, and is likely to involve Pakistan.
If American efforts and promises fail, then Washington must accept that Islamabad will transfer some form of nuclear weapons capability to Saudi Arabia. Washington’s best policy option is be realistic rather than idealistic and maintain sufficient diplomatic and military relevance in Islamabad and Riyadh to limit the impact of this transfer on Israel’s threat calculus. America should prefer that any physical transfer of capability be limited to aircraft delivery systems and be in small numbers. These features would be the least threatening to Israel in both the short and long term, reinforcing a long-standing Pakistani nuclear weapons posture imperative.
Thomas F. Lynch III is a Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia and the Near East at the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. The conclusions and opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government
Image: U.S. Air Force Photo by Lawrence Crespo
M Ali Khan 
Tom Lynch 
Toby 
Robert 
Alex 
No matter how plausible this scenario is, it is pure speculation for a number of obvious reasons.
Pakistan has learned its lessons from AQ Khan episode and has put in place a very robust and secure command and control structure with extensive export controls completely in line with IAEA safeguards in good faith. Pakistan simply cannot and will not sell its sensitive assets to any other country.
Saudi Arabia is an NPT state. It is legally bound to NOT acquire nuclear weapons. It neither has the expertise or infrastructure or even experience in the field of nuclear weapons. All this is pure rhetoric and bluster from the obviously tense Saudi leadership.
Thanks for your comment and your interest in this important topic.
My point in this short piece and in the longer monograph I released last month on the topic is that Pakistan needs to sell nothing to Saudi Arabia to provide Riyadh with an independent deterrent. Riyadh has already paid “up front” for the delivery of extended nuclear deterrence or direct nuclear deterrence from Rawalpindi. Thus, this has nothing to do with weapons control, export controls or the legacy of AQ Khan.
China and Saudi Arabia have underwritten Pakistan’s development of nuclear power and acquisition of nuclear weapons. While the Chinese have provided the bulk of the technology and nuclear power generation know-how, Saudi Arabia has financed much of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Saudi money also cushioned Pakistan against the impact of western sanctions after Islamabad conducted its first nuclear test in 1998. Although officially denied in Riyadh and Islamabad, many experts believe that a secret and long-standing agreement exists that Pakistan would provide the Kingdom with nuclear
technology and weapons should the Saudis feel threatened by a third party nuclear program.
Observers of this relationship believe that the agreement was most recently re-signed in October
2003 when then–Crown Prince Abdullah made a state visit to Islamabad. Former President Asif Ali Zardari reportedly verbally reaffirmed the Pakistani promise on his state visits to the Kingdom since 2008. Mid-2012 press reports suggest that Pakistani Prime Minister Raja Ashraf took the occasion of a summer visit to Saudi Arabia to meet with King
Abdullah in Jeddah to validate the long-standing deal and confirm the details of preliminary
coordination such as training Saudi special forces in Pakistan for the rigors of safeguarding
nuclear weapons. Current Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif owes his very life to Saudi Arabia for they provided him with safe haven during his decade-long exile from Pakistan.
As I observed in the piece, there are at least two ways that Saudi Arabia could acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan that do not violate NPT. First Pakistan to commit some of its nuclear armed airplanes and pilots into Saudi airfields. Pakistan’s air force often trains and exercises with Saudi pilots, and there are many commonalities in command and control approaches. Pakistan might also send nuclear-capable missiles and trained crews to Saudi Arabia. That would take more time and
require Saudi spending on launch-capable pads, nuclear storage facilities, and control systems
that do not currently exist in the Kingdom. Tese options align directly with the interpretation of the NPT that enabled American stationing of its nuclear weapons in Europe during the Cold War, namely that if nuclear weapons material remained under at least shared Pakistani control in peacetime, the Saudis would effectively join the nuclear club without technical violation of the NPT.
These details are important for a holistic understanding of the dynamics between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
Best,
Tom Lynch
In theory, the Saudis could pursue a nuclear option with the Pakistan, but in the current strategic environment, it is hard to imagine this as a realistic scenario. Islambad and Riyadh have never had close military relations, largely because Washington has provided the Saudis with advanced military equipment, as well as security assurances against international threats, that Pakistan cannot provide.
Toby.
Thanks for your comment and your interest in this important security matter.
I write to contest one significant claim you make in your response.
It is factually incorrect to suggest that the Saudis and Pakistanis do not have a close military relationship. In fact, they do.
Saudi Arabia has a long and intertwined military history with Pakistan. These dimensions date back decades. Pakistani pilots and ground
troops have assisted with defense of the Kingdom in separate actions during the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s. Pakistan contributed air forces, ground forces and anti-aircraft units to defense of the Kingdom during the Gulf War of 1990-91. Their respective air forces exercise with each other regularly and share many command and control procedures. Most recently – and as noted in this War on the Rocks piece – Pakistan positively responded to standing up an emergency reaction force in the Spring of 2011 to answer a Saudi request for such a force in case of internal Shi’a unrest during the Bahrain protests in the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.
Chief among these military-strategic interactions between the Kingdom and Pakistan has been their relationship in the course of Pakistan’s development of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.
China and Saudi Arabia have underwritten Pakistan’s development of nuclear power
and acquisition of nuclear weapons. While the Chinese have provided the bulk of the technology
and nuclear power generation know-how, Saudi Arabia has financed much of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program. Saudi money also cushioned Pakistan against the impact of western sanctions
after Islamabad conducted its first nuclear test in 1998.
Although officially denied in Riyadh and Islamabad, many experts believe that a secret
and long-standing agreement exists that Pakistan would provide the Kingdom with nuclear
technology and weapons should the Saudis feel threatened by a third party nuclear program.
Observers of this relationship believe that the agreement was most recently re-signed in October
2003 when then–Crown Prince Abdullah made a state visit to Islamabad. Former Pakistani
President Asif Ali Zardari reportedly verbally reaffirmed the Pakistani promise on his many
state visits to the Kingdom from 2008-12. Mid-2012 press reports suggest that then-Pakistani Prime
Minister Raja Ashraf took the occasion of a summer visit to Saudi Arabia to meet with King
Abdullah in Jeddah to validate the long-standing deal and confirm the details of preliminary
coordination such as training Saudi special forces in Pakistan for the rigors of safeguarding
nuclear weapons. Finally, current Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif owes his very life to the Saudis for providing him political exile during the decade after his abrupt dismissal from power in 1999 by a military coup.
For each of these reasons, one must be clear to understand that the reciprocal and very close relationships between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia makes it unwise to dismiss the potential for their collaboration in establishment of a nuclear deterrent for the Kingdom against Iran.
Best,
Tom Lynch
Kate Amlin, a nuclear analyst at the U.S.-based Monterey Institute of International Studies, who believes that Saudi leaders would not want to incur the political and economic backlash resulting from pursuit of a nuclear arsenal, at a time when they are trying to integrate further into the international economy.
Robert.
Thanks for your comment on this article.
I find Ms. Amlin’s analysis to fit directly into the category of “western nonproliferation pundits” I mentioned at the beginning of this War on the Rocks Commentary, specifically:
“Western nonproliferation pundits have generally dismissed the possibility of such nuclear proliferation collaboration, viewing the risks to Riyadh and Islamabad to be too high and the whispering campaign to be a Saudi effort to put pressure on the United States to be more firm with Iran.”
I last saw Ms. Amlin write on this topic back in mid-2008, half a decade ago, and on a website – the Nuclear Threat Initiative [NTI] – that has an unabashed rooting interest in dampening the prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation. I have since seen her piece cited a couple of times including in The National Interest.com in mid-November 2013 by Zachary Keck of the Diplomat Magazine, but didn’t see it updated to contemporary realities in South Asia, the Middle East or the status of US-Saudi relations.
Thus, while I don’t know where Ms. Amlin is on this matter in light of current realities, I feel comfortable in challenging most of the assumptions that underpinned her writing in 2008 – many of which were debatable then and most of which are irrelevant today.
A sober analysis of the multifaceted interactions between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan can give no one comfort that a deal between the two would not come to pass should Iran progress to a nuclear weapons capability.
Best,
Tom Lynch
Dear Tom,
Great to see a classmate out here keeping everyone straight.
In past op-eds and columns I have written on similar topics. You are absolutely correct on the point that so much of the non-proliferation literature such as Ms. Amlin’s is woefully out of date. In fact, in much the same way as Digital Age technology is obsolete the moment it hits the shelf, so many of these studies fall victim to the very fluid (read: chaotic) environment they purport to analyze.
The other thing important thing to note which is implied throughout your tight reasoning, but merits a louder nod is basic cultural awareness. You may recall that I grew up in the Eastern Med and spent much time in the Middle East and Asia Minor, not just for my obligatory Army sandbox tenure, but as a young adult in the streets, with both language and cultural proficiencies.
I am preparing a reply to Dr. Anna Simons on her latest piece which addresses this point, but will summarize here for you by simply stating that if you understand the Arab, Mede and other regional mindsets, then it is easy to see why your assertions makes sense, even independent of hard data.
The position you argue against is, simply put, naive when one takes into account the psychological and cultural sensibilities of these factions in question, particularly when it comes to the exercise of power and politics. So many well-meaning and highly educated Westerners miss the point completely while applying norms and logic to these peoples’ sense of governance.
I could fill a book with this. We have a lot of very smart people on our side, unfortunately, who view these situations through the wrong prism of context.
I hope you are well and we get a chance to chat more out here, now that I’ve found this nugget, WOTR.
Very Respectfully,
Telly (A-3)
Hi Telly!
Terrific to hear from you and to have a bit of your thoughtful, first-hand expertise from time in the regions in question.
Like you, I have found that book learning and interactions with South Asians and Middle Easterners in western lands or in extra-regional contexts although important is far from sufficient for contextual perspective and real understanding. My time living in Qatar and Saudi Arabia coupled with extended and extensive work-related time in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India has been invaluable in more fully understanding what the “mean” not just what they “say.”
I too look forward to more interactions on these and other security topics here at WOTR.
All the best,
Tom Lynch (E-1)
Is it possible that Saudis have thier “nuclear contacts” with Pakistan in order to force Iran to violate its obligations on its nuclear program