AirSea Battle vs. Offshore Control: Which has a better Theory of Victory?
There is an ongoing debate about the role of the AirSea Battle (ASB) concept in a military strategy; that is, should ASB be a central component of U.S. military strategy? On one side are those in favor of this proposition (who I will call the AirSea Battlers) and on the other are those who are not; some have even advocated a different position that called Offshore Balance or Offshore Control (so I will call them the Offshore Controllers). Here are my thoughts on this debate.
Both AirSea Battlers and Offshore Controllers admit that ASB is not a strategy but rather a concept, which is the stated position of both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. However, some AirSea Battlers advocate that ASB should be a central component in any war against likely future adversaries – and some will go as far as saying that ASB is the only operational concept to have a quick and affordable war ending on our terms. Furthermore, they say, ASB is the continuation of the historical power projection that has served us so well both during and after the Cold War.
Perhaps, the Offshore Controllers concede, ASB is a useful part of some unannounced strategy. But if it is, then that strategy must have, as many leading theorists believe any strategy should have, a “Theory of Victory.” Professor Eliot Cohen has said “the theory of victory is just a fancy way of saying, why do we think this will work?” or “we will succeed for the following reasons.” He also says it is the hardest part of developing strategy.
So, if ASB is a part of some strategy, then one of the means of that strategy is the use of power projection. Power projection takes two forms: attack from the air (using the ways of manned aircraft or unmanned missiles) and invading with troops (by land from neighboring countries or by amphibious assault from the sea). Since no one in the lively ASB debate has written or said that we need to think about invading any of our perceived adversaries, I think we can assume that the ASB supporters are talking about power projection through air power. From that one can deduce that this unknown strategy that includes the concept of ASB has a theory of victory stipulating that we can blow up enough of the adversary’s stuff though aerial attacks that they will ask for terms.
On the other hand, the Offshore Controllers say that their theory of victory involves attacking the economy and therefore the legitimacy of the perceived adversary’s government, which stems from economic growth and providing economic opportunity to its people. By disrupting their trade in the sea lanes, the growth of their economy slows. Slowing the growth of the economy makes the people question their government and put the government’s monopoly on power at risk. In order to maintain their power, they will talk terms.
So, how does this work? What gives a strategy containing Offshore Control a more realistic theory of victory than a strategy that contains AirSea Battle (other than the fact we have many cases where economic warfare worked and very few where air power worked)? A bit of analysis is in order. While ASB is not aimed at any of America’s perceived adversaries in particular, I will use China as example for my analysis.
First I will start with The Knowns:
1. The Chinese Communist Party wishes to stay in power.
2. The Chinese Communist Party maintains legitimacy through economic growth.
3. The Chinese economy must have a minimum of 6% growth to absorb new entrants into the labor force (some sources give a higher figure).
4. The Chinese economic model is export driven and production for export accounts for a large percentage of their economy.
5. China has about 150 million internal migrant workers that work in provinces different from that of their birth (i.e., they are entitled to work in a different province, but without a job, may not stay); some sources say this number may currently be as high as 200 million and another source says there may be an additional 240 million by 2025.
6. A significant percentage of this 150 million move from factory to factory following seasonal production patterns.
Now, with any strategy, we have some assumptions:
1. Disrupting Chinese sea trade by embargo, quarantine, blockade, attacks on merchant ships, or any other means will quickly slow China’s rate of economic growth; it may even cause the economy to decline.
2. Slowing growth to below 6% will drive unemployment up, and a declining economy will only quicken the pace.
3. Many of those who will lose their jobs will be from those 150 million internal migrants.
When developing a theory of victory, it helps to have a scenario story that describes a possible path to victory. Such a story is not an attempt to predict the future but rather some plausible explanation of what could happen. This allows a strategist to see where the knowns and assumptions fit to into the strategy and to evaluate whether everything makes sense. My scenario story is:
War starts and the United States and its allies begin offshore controlling. Chinese seaborne imports and exports are reduced drastically. Factory production drops and millions of workers are laid off; soon the numbers soar to tens of millions and perhaps a hundred million. Many of these unemployed are mobile and are used to moving from job to job, so they begin to move. When jobs are not found, they start protesting (hungry people are sometimes like that). Now the Chinese Communist Party is faced with tens of millions of unemployed protesters. It will try to blame some enemy that can’t be seen (ASB, on the other hand, will provide a visible enemy that may rally the people to the party). Not believing the party, discontent grows and protests increase. The Chinese Communist Party orders the People’s Liberation Army to break the blockade, but the People’s Liberation Army-Navy replies that China doesn’t have the right type of Navy for that and are unable to comply with the orders. Discontent grows and protests become more worrisome to party leaders. The Chinese Communist Party declares that it has taught the foreign dog a lesson and seeks a conference at Geneva.
Now, let’s look at the competing strategy’s scenario story to see if it makes sense. The strategy that contains ASB as a means would have a scenario story like this:
War starts, and the U.S. and allies begin AirSea Battling. This includes direct attacks on targets in a continental-sized power. Factory production may or may not drop (it certainly will should we decide to target civilian manned factories); Chinese seaborne imports and exports may or may not be affected. These direct attacks on the homeland change the legitimacy equation of the Chinese Communist Party to that of the defender of the Middle Kingdom against the foreigners, rather than the source of wealth and economic growth. Any war would most likely have negative effects on the economy, but ASB gives the party the excuse to ignore the economy and rally the people to defending their homes. So, what next? Does the U.S. keep escalating the attacks? Do we attack factories? Hydroelectric dams? What if we run out of munitions before we run out of targets?
Here is where the story of a strategy containing ASB breaks down. In this story, the Chinese Communist Party has shifted its source of legitimacy from providing economic growth to protecting the country against an outsider. How do we project enough power onto a continental-sized country to get them to ask for terms? One of my acquaintances aptly summed up the conundrum of the AirSea Battlers: “we have been doing this power projection strategy for over 60 years and now that someone has developed what may be an effective countermeasure, instead of thinking of a new strategy, we have doubled down on projection?”
All in all, this is a very lively debate with both sides very passionate about their views. I started my study of this leaning towards Offshore Control but with an open mind. Due to the lack of a plausible theory of victory with a strategy that contains the concept of AirSea Battle, and many, many questions about how ASB could fit into a strategy, I now am more firmly in the Offshore Control camp.
Captain Mark F. Morris, USN, is a military faculty member in the Department of Security Studies at the National War College. He was previously Chief, US Naval Mission to Colombia. He is a graduate of the National War College and hold an MS in Economics from Texas A&M University.
Photo credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery
Art Corbett 
Jason B. 
Condor 
T. X. Hammes 
Roberts150 
Jordo Thomas 
C-Low 
denk 
El Sid 
Peter Nicas 
I’m amazed that I find myself defending any aspect of ASB, but if the words in the concept itself are to be used as evidence of intent, then ASB is appropriately not constructed to have a ‘defeat mechanism’ or ‘theory of victory’ as it self purports to be a “limited objective concept” for gaining “freedom of action”—a euphemism for sea control. It is appropriate for an operational ‘concept’ to be an idea about some aspect of the larger campaign, and ASB’s stated purpose is to describe how the conditions for gaining freedom of action—to enable subsequent campaign objectives, can be achieved. I agree with the author that Off-shore Control is more akin to a strategy, but that only makes the comparison of ASB as a self-declared ‘limited objective concept’ and Off-shore Control more of an apples and oranges exercise.
Of course, as he notes, the claims of proponents of ASB have digressed so far from the text that finding correlation between what is written and what is claimed requires creativity. The fact that ASB has both an unclassified and a secret version suggests that there might be some deep meaning hidden from mere mortals but know to its acolytes. So, speculation that there must be something in ASB to make this secret concept worthy of its own public affairs office continues.
While the ASB incantation NIAD3 does not qualify for inclusion, there is nothing wrong with a service or joint force having a quiver full of different concepts that can be used to inform plans and operations as appropriate. Comparison can only be made in the light of specific context –and context will change with circumstance.
“Theory of Victory”? Sun-Tzu and old dead Karl just rolled over in their graves.
Good analysis, but can the U.S. really get the long-term cooperation, even from purported allies, to make offshore control work? Without Russia buying in, we know China won’t have energy cut off, thus it may well prove capable of survival longer than anticipated. Additionally, if the Party is successful at increasing domestic consumption to the partial detriment of an exporting economy, it may also have the flexibility to survive longer.
While ASB seems to have distinct challenges, even as an operational concept to preserve access, there are very sound reasons to be skeptical that offshore control can offer realistic prospect of “victory” within what will be a tolerable political timeframe absent a massive miscalculation by China.
Ultimately, the casus belli seems to be more important for a Sino-American confrontation than anything.
This said, does ASB matter more vis a vis Iran? That seems much more possible as well.
This is a really bad conflation/mis-identification of terms. Either ASB and OSC could be applied to a whole panoply of “theories of victory”, but this whole discussion assumes I have a defined conflict with either objectives for myself AND the enemy… which I don’t!
If you read the founding documents of ASB, ADM Stavridis’ in particular, ASB is just an operational concept. You can use ASB to accomplish an aggressive OSC! In some situations, OSC is a terrible idea in itself because it assumes a peer competitor is going to let you sit passively on their sea lanes and ruin their trade… which you probably couldn’t do without… ASB! Perhaps you’re trying to repel an invasion of Taiwan… but wait, now OSC makes no sense because Taiwan has been invaded and there’s nothing you can do. This is like saying “my theory of victory is convoy operations” or “sea control”… that doesn’t mean anything! I don’t know what I want my enemy to do yet, or what I need done, or anything!
Though, all that being said, I think this seems more a reflection on the bizarre and often knee-jerk or uninformed non-argument going on between two camps as reflected by a guy desperately trying to understand what is going on.
Just to be clear, my last comment was intended to say CAPT Morris is making a valiant attempt to interpret OTHER people saying dumb things, not HIM being dumb.
First, let’s call “offshore control” what it really is: naval blockade. For a naval blockade to be successful, warships will still have to venture within eye sight distance of the shoreline at times to ensure that merchant vessels aren’t “slipping by” by hugging the coastline. Coupled with today’s technologies and instant communications, I don’t exactly see how “offshore control/naval blockading” would be anymore stealthy than say ASB depending on how the ASB concept was used. Even if only “offshore control/naval blockading” was used, it wouldn’t be a stretch of the imagination that the Chinese would show their population video footage of ships being sunk thus it could still be used as a rallying cause, not to mention you’d have to have “buy in” from a large portion of the world. I’m sure there are a few countries out there that would object to a naval blockade of China. Speaking of ASB, my understanding of the concept was that “offshore control/naval blockade” could be a sub-set of the ASB concept. Maybe I am missing something? Either way, the use of either “concept” is sure to cause escalation as I doubt China would sit idly by. Let’s face it, if the day ever comes for these types of concepts to be put into action people better be prepared to go “all in” because something tells me that there’s not going to be any easy fixes once these events start to unfold.
Condor,
OSC does NOT propose a close blockade. As this thread has noted, its a good idea to read the ASB concept so you see what the writers actually say. (And of course, one must ignore the CSBA paper which started the discussion.)
It is also a good idea to read Offshore Control to see what the military strategy suggests. The original paper is available at this link. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=146696
Blockade will be escalatory. But it will do so slowly in comparison to direct strikes on the mainland. When dealing with a thermonuclear armed enemy slowing things down is a good idea.
I am also curious. Do you think the United States will allow continued trade with China in the midst of a war?
T.X.
It’s too bad about having to ignore the CSBA article, that really is the better work.
How long do you think China will take to invade Taiwan, the Spratleys, the Senkakus, etc? under OSC?
How long do you think it will take to set up a distant blockade and have effect?
Might I suggest your read Offshore Control (link provided in my post above.) It addresses your questions about how long it takes to establish a blockade and the defeat mechanism it uses. It specifically states that a key element is defense of the 1st Island Chain. It flips A2/AD to the allied side by defending the island chain — to include the Senkakus, Taiwan and the Spratleys. I am not sure why you think A2/AD works for China but not the US, Japan and Taiwan.
As for ignoring the CSBA article, the Pentagon and ASB office have repeatedly said ASB is NOT about China and is not a strategy. I agree the CSBA paper provides a much clearly concept to analyze that the current ASB office information.
TX
Sir,
I have read the paper (excuse the manner of the question, as you do address it in your strategy), only I respectfully disagree with your assumptions. That the majority of large power wars have been long in duration, does not necessarily hold for the conflict scenarios plausible with China. I think most historical examples of large power wars involved significant ground campaigns between contiguous nations, and even considering Britain’s wars they always had a continental ally, accounting for their length. The US-Japan war had many islands to make for a large ground war component. Short of a second Korea, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or outlying islands would likely not involve a long war as only one major power’s ground forces would be engaged in the process of over-running comparatively much smaller territory than most historical large power wars. It would likely be short, unless Taiwan could hold out. For outlying islands the entire war would likely be settled by a single naval engagement or campaign, IMHO, Falklands-style.
Should the war become a long one, I think you are generally right, and the CSBA paper (sorry, had to go there) has a distant blockade as an integral part of ASB, correctly, I believe. I just see a potential for catastrophe if China can quickly pull off an invasion, and that OSC’s refrain from hitting their logistical supply train for a Taiwan invasion at its base greatly facilitates this possibility. Once China actually takes the island, or wins a naval clash around the Senkakus, blockade is impotent and diplomatically unsustainable.
As to us applying A2/AD against China, I agree again in general we should do this, but half-heartedly. Like distant blockade, it’s necessary, I just don’t see it as sufficient. China is a very large country fighting from its front yard for potentially small territorial gains. The odds are well in their favor. Just how strong a rock can we make the Spratleys? Or Taiwan for that matter? Do you propose US forces on the island? Considering the pre-conflict escalation that would entail, I think no one goes that far. A2/AD wouldn’t work defending these locations because the preponderance of forces is just too heavy on China’s side. They will overrun the defenses, unless they can also be hit at their marshaling points.
The only way out I see is dismantling China’s naval infrastructure with aerial, and subsurface attacks tipping the balance. Mess with their logistical chain to slow down the invasion and systematically defeat their Navy in their ports, since they cannot afford to win the war at the cost of their Navy which makes them credible as a regional hegemon after the fact, presumably their initial reason for fighting.
We assume they will hit our bases, why do we grant them the breathing room to not hold any of their assets at risk? (Yes, the risk of escalation is the answer proposed, but again I respectfully disagree.)
BTW it is truly an honor to discuss this with you. Thank you for your reply.
T.X. Hammes,
First, as Roberts150 stated, I would like to thank you for the response and input. Having read the paper you wrote which proposed the idea of “offshore control” I can understand you would have a vested interest in furthering the discussion in regards to “offshore control” that you advocate.
While my responses could easily become a diatribe and lengthy counterpoint, I will try to keep it as short and sweet as possible. In all fairness I think comparing ASB with offshore control becomes slightly and apples to oranges comparison as ASB has been stated not to be a strategy but an operational concept whereas offshore control is a stated strategy.
Getting to the nuts and bolts of it, I still stick with my original points that no matter how you slice it “offshore control” is nothing more than a naval blockade, while obviously the desire is for the blockade to be a “distant blockade” and “slow in nature” as try and “control the tempo” so as not to “rapidly escalate actions between two nuclear armed superpowers”. While I applaud the intent and obvious attempt to put into writing some sort of “strategic guide” for a possible future conflict between China and the US, here is where I have my hesitations.
First, it appears to be an assumption that somehow the US will be able to control the not only the tempo of operations but China’s actions and/or reactions to our maneuvers. I think this is a shaky premise because as you so eloquently quoted past conflicts and how they unfolded, I don’t think that planning for the best while not preparing for the worst is sound. Maybe I misunderstood some of your arguments but to me, the one thing that rings true in all great armed contests of wills, is that things often don’t happen as planned and even large, rational powers may act irrationally or in ways not expected.
The fact is, neither you nor I know all the war-game scenarios being played out in China’s military planning. What if China forgoes attacking Taiwan as most people postulate and instead takes an avenue of direct attacks on some of it’s continental neighbors? Do you think the US would stick to offshore control as you propose it while America’s allies are overrun and subjugated? How about if China decided to execute as above while simultaneously attacking Japan? What if China used a couple of nukes on Japan to immediately subdue her and scare all of it’s continental neighbors into submission? What would the US response be? Or maybe China would directly engage it’s neighbors trying to lure us in and could China possible use tactical nukes to render our carrier battle groups and maybe even nuclear depth charges to clear the “close oceans” of our subs?
I know maybe this sounds preposterous, but what if? Maybe China would bank on our lacking resolve to engage with nukes because we know it would be suicide. Or maybe they would play by the rules and try to find other ways to check our forces.
What about allies? Would Russia and Iran and many other countries, maybe even some within Asia, take China’s side should major events start unfolding? I would postulate that many who live in that region are starting to face the reality the China may be the new kid on the block in the relative future and US power and influence may be waning, not to mention some might start to question our resolve to come to their aid in the event major conflict starts unfolding in that part of the world.
Now, getting to my last point, you asked if I thought if the US would continue to trade with China in the event of conflict. Of course I don’t think we would, in fact maybe it would actually force the US to start being more productive in the industry sector. With that being said, many around the work may put pressure on us, not China, to end hostilities because in effect we could be the ones who are “rocking the boat”. Also, strangling China economically might give China all the propaganda it needs to mobilize it’s vast population in armed conflict against us. Keep in mind as I made mention earlier, even a “distant blockade” may not have the desired effect considering the ability for just about anyone with a cell phone to upload images and footage to the internet.
On the issue of economics, this article and debate got me to start writing my own thoughts on what some of the economic considerations might be when going to “war” with China. Maybe I will submit it here and see if it gets published! Once again, thanks for the reply and I do respect what you have argued, just not sure I agree with everything you have put forth.
Agreeing with Matthew Hipple mostly, and not the original author.
China has historically in the modern era engaged in short wars to “teach a lesson” to someone it perceives as going against their will too much. The likely starting points of a conflict would be Daiyou/Senkakus or Spratleys or Scarborough Shoal at the low end to a Taiwan invasion at the high end. In any point on this spectrum the CCP would try to win as quickly as possible. We’ll take Taiwan as the most stressing scenario.
OSC is a disaster for this scenario. If we abjure from direct attacks against cross Taiwan airfields and attacks on the PLAN shore based infrastructure, the logistical chain to complete the invasion in short order exists, likely weeks. Meanwhile what are the many examples of economic warfare working that the author alludes to? Economic blockade takes months to bite, if not longer. Most warring nations have endured blockade for years, i.e. Germany during WWI. Do we really expect the people that have survived the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution to roll over after a short period of distant blockade? Seriously??? When China has successfully taken Taiwan in weeks, do we continue to rally the domestic and international support to maintain a years long blockade to take effect, or does the rest of the world say, screw it, it’s over, we’re going back to trading with China? To ask the question is to answer it. OSC’s theory of victory is a joke, to put it mildly.
ASB at least offers a chance for a denial of the invasion style campaign. Hell no we wouldn’t start bombing factories and hydroelectric damns. The most effective air campaigns are the ones directed at enemy fielded forces or at their bases. With ASB we can start hitting airfields, naval bases, shipyards (all right on or near the coast, not requiring deep penetration) and start dismantling the infrastructure of the Chinese Navy and disrupt their ability to maintain air superiority over Taiwan and logistically support their invasion. This turns the fight for Taiwan into a possible stalemate. If China continues the invasion in spite of this resistance it becomes a race, can they pull it off before their shipyards and whole Navy, which they need to be in place AFTER the invasion is complete, are dismantled by ASB style strikes?
You made a great point in regards to naval blockades, that the duration it takes for one to be successful can be measured in years, not weeks or months. The there’s the fact that a large and aspiring power such as China isn’t going to sit idly by while being blockaded. China has been investing heavily into weapon systems that are designed to specifically deny the US its ability to project naval power into the South China Sea among other places. Any type of situation that arises where conflict starts to unfold in this part of the world is probably going to quickly escalate beyond the limits of a naval blockade (or offshore control as it’s now being called).
This is a great discussion. I am a former ASB-er and I agree that the direct comparison between OSC and ASB is not relevant. From my perspective, the central idea of Air-Sea Battle — NIAD3 (Networked, Integrated forces, capable of “Attack in depth” in order to disrupt adversary C4ISR; Destroy adversary capabilities (meant to take away US/coalition freedom of action), and Defeat employed weapons by an adversary) are essential capabilities needed to enable operational plans that could make a strategy such as OSC achievable…if the “whole-of-government” decision was made to go in that direction.
Let’s take the recent example of Beijing’s unilateral Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) declaration and our response. Beijing, arguably, has demonstrated an intent to close off the part of the ‘global commons’ (areas of sea, land, space that are not owned by any one nation but are important to the free flow of trade and information). So, I applaud the decision to send B-52s to demonstrate that the US has the will and capability to not let China get away with it. What if the PRC established a credible IADS that could target US aircraft (regardless if it was Navy, AF, USMC, and even Army)? Would our response be different or would we have any response at all? This is where ASB comes into play. ASB advocates for capabilities (regardless of domain or Service) that will provide options for US leadership. The ASB concept advocates for “cross-domain operations” using advantages in one domain to create opportunities in another domain. For example, if there was a credible HHQ-9 threat in the area, how would the B-52s get through? It would require capabilities across all domains…perhaps using cyber effects to create the freedom of action we need to (in this case) demonstrate our resolve.
To those who say we are already capable of doing this, I would agree that this is something we are capable within our own Services (e.g., AF cyber units do practice with AF squadrons at Red Flag), but we are not there yet between the Services. This is where ASB concept is pushing how we org, train, and equip our forces to meet CCDR needs.
For old guys, like me and Art Corbett, this sounds a lot like “going back to the future”…like 1999. However, 75% of the men and women in the AF joined after 9/11…so, this concept (USAF and Navy/USMC) working together is new to them. Our ability to do so, is also critical to our future strength of our military.
I have two last points:
1) ASB is more than just air & sea control…it also includes space, cyber, and land.
2) The term “attack in-depth” is often misinterpreted as pre-emptive “mainland strikes.” That is not the intent. What the concept means by attack in-depth is the ability generate effects across the adversaries F2T2EA “Kill Chain” in order to Disrupt adversary C4ISR; Destroy (hard or soft, reversible or non-reversible) adversary capabilities; and Defeat enemy employed weapons.
Here’s a link to the unclassified ASB Concept document. It is informative…
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf
C’mon, Jordo. You don’t actually expect people to READ that, do you? More fun to opine without it!
I’m going to read it ONLY to show you are wrong.
Bryan – I have come to embrace the point/counter-point discussion on ASB from all sides. It forces us all to think through our our pro & con positions and rethink (or even just recognize) some of our biases.
“(other than the fact we have many cases where economic warfare worked”
Really please do tell?
Economic blockade has had minimum effect in most if not all conflict. Iraq, Syria, Germany WW1, Iran, North Korea, Britain WW2. Dictators don’t care about their people, it is easy to blame outside enemies for their suffering, and finally rebels are easily crushed when a nation is at war with a outside force (note name change from rebels to collaborators).
-What level of blockade?
-Are we going to sink stop everything?
-What about 3rd party nations? What about neutrals (think US WW1 Lusitania)?
-China is a major part of allot of nations economy including ours, will this blockade that by definition will take time not bite both ways? The US will accept that but will the rest of the world?
-What if China adapts goes ole silk road? Trains and trucks can handle the volume and distance seaborne trade is just cheaper.
-What about border nations being conduits (Pakistan, Burma, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia)?
-What if China expands is missile bombardment to our allies population centers? Do we now have to go ASB but with a force shaped on the hope of not having to penetrate or contest the denial (bloody)?
-If we allow the denial because we cannot counter the source on Chinese soil what if they invade, take, expand to our allies territories? What if they move their denial forces to say the string of pearls to protect their sea lanes to the ME (Burma, Pakistan etc..)? Do we now go ASB into these areas just not the Chicom homeland? If so will we not still need all those fancy expensive tools blockade claims to save US from needing?
-What if they take the DF21 warhead and put it on a intercontinental missile and harass say our soft points (refineries, canal lock reservoir, power plants)? How do we respond without the tools?
-What if our allies don’t wish to hold fast under the Chinese assault while we sit back in the safe zones waiting for the embargo to hit? Would you?
Bottom line is if we build our force around ASB with the ability to penetrate the Chinese denial zone IF WE SO PLEASE we control the escalation. ASB can be used defensively holding the line while blockading, or offensive cutting the Chinese ability to project power from their shore. Blockade can only blockade, and if China escalates what is our option without the tools?
Why should we limit our options we should expand our options. Deterrence is the communist gov knowing we can first stop, then defeat any Chinese military attempt to expand. Then at our discretion either target military only all the way up to shutting down the power across China. You want to see the communist fear revolution target the Chicom power generation and electrical grids in the industrial cities.
Blockade is not bad and I would suggest it as step one, but we must have ASB so IF NEEDED we have a step 2, 3, 4, before we have to go MAD.
C-Low…I especially your statement…
“Bottom line is if we build our force around ASB with the ability to penetrate the Chinese denial zone IF WE SO PLEASE we control the escalation. ASB can be used defensively holding the line while blockading, or offensive cutting the Chinese ability to project power from their shore. Blockade can only blockade, and if China escalates what is our option without the tools?”
I offer a minor refinement…”Organizing, training, and equipping our forces based on the principles of ASB” will enable CCDRs to develop options to execute concurrent and follow-on operations. Having these options allows US to make the political decision to escalate (or deescalate) as appropriate.
Yes, we have a winner!
Pretty much agree with everything but targeting the power grid. The Chinese will weather that too. They’re tough, and like has been attributed to Machiavelli, if you want to unify a people attack them directly, paraphrasing. OK, so hitting shipyards isn’t exactly an anodine act, but if we struck shipyards, major ports, naval bases and near shore airfields the vast majority of Chinese will at most hear a distant explosion.
China already HAS a competent IADS, which is what’s scary. Even with stealth and ASB I think the best we can do is hit military targets on the coast, and I’d put some special strikes -if need be by escalation- on the space launch facilities.
Does it worry anyone that the OSC theory of victory is so close to the airpower theory one – bugger up industry and the mob will rise? (Brett Holman at airminded.org would say that in fact the thinking behind airpower theory originates in the idea that naval blockade would beat industrial nations.)
meanwhile, china isnt even entitled to its own adiz, hehehe
The point is that the ADIZ is not over China’s territory….
hmm
*civilian factories*, *dams*
an open discussion of war crimes !
how interesting !
Captain Morris has written an excellent debate starter. China, the multitude of synergistic strategies and tactics involved…..economic coupling etc. is of course worth spending DOD/think tank time to consider…..but even strategies are of a multitude.
Iran, that’s another question. The Israel’s are not going to sit idle given the current diplomacy from our Commander-In-Chief.
Now, one has to consider one squadron of F-22 Raptor coverage while USN air assets knock down radar and anti air missile missile sites while the Israelis do their thing to the underground nuclear facilities……this is actually coming up fast in my opinion.
Not sure about some of your “knowns”. In particular, number 3. Fixating on any particular growth figure is meaningless in the context of Chinese statistics. But according to official statistics, employment grew by 2.84m in 2012 and GDP by 7.7%; yet in a speech on 4 November Li Keqiang said GDP growth of 7.2% should produce 10m new jobs, and Morgan Stanley have come up with numbers around 12m. Do Li and MS not understand the relationship between employment and economic growth – or are the statistics nonsense?
You also have to consider demographics – even by official statistics the working population started to decline in 2012, and other sources believe it peaked in 2010. Total population is forecast to peak in 2018-20.
So on both grounds, assumption 3 looks weak. And right now the Chinese economy looks to be constraining itself without external assistance, it looks like it’s finally reached the point of diminishing returns where new capital can’t be employed particularly efficiently.
As others have said, ASB vs OC is an apples to oranges comparison as in Morris’ own words ASB is not a strategy. If you’re having to guess what the theory of victory is of an “unknown strategy that includes the concept of ASB” – then it sounds like you’re just setting up a strawman to knock down. ASB can equally be part of an OC strategy.
However you do it, perhaps the most important element of a strategy to counter China is to look after the back door – and that means getting a lot friendlier with Russia and the ‘stans than previously.