In 2025, Nurlan Aliyev wrote, “The Mayhem of Russia’s “Research” Fleet,” where he argued that NATO must act decisively to safeguard critical undersea infrastructure from Russian sabotage attempts. A year later, we asked him to revisit his arguments. Image: Andrey Luzik via Wikimedia CommonsIn your 2025 article, you argued that NATO needed to act decisively to safeguard critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic, Barents, and Arctic regions from Russian sabotage. Since then, where has NATO strengthened its deterrence and defense in this area, and where do gaps still remain? Since 2025, NATO and E.U. members have strengthened coordination to protect critical undersea infrastructure through closer planning, joint measures, and initiatives such as NATO’s Baltic Sentry and the U.K.–Norway Lunna House Agreement. However, the geography of the Baltic, Barents, and Arctic regions, together with Russia’s enduring presence, makes it impossible to eliminate the threat entirely. Continued improvements in surveillance, coordination, and rapid-response capabilities therefore remain essential. The Baltic Sea NATO allies and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding to protect critical undersea infrastructure. In May 2025, the European Union introduced measures to strengthen its resilience, complementing NATO’s efforts and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s work. In June, Poland and Sweden launched the Baltic Sea Pact to deepen bilateral security and defense cooperation. These initiatives are only the beginning, and I expect cooperation among European NATO members to deepen as Russia continues its asymmetric activities in the Baltic, Barents, and Arctic regions. At the same time, continued U.S. involvement in NATO’s activities, particularly in the Arctic, remains strategically important. NATO should place greater emphasis on Russia’s undersea capabilities, as its research vessels serve as platforms for deploying and supporting robotic systems. Despite financial and technological constraints, Russia continues to develop these capabilities, drawing on lessons from the war in Ukraine, which makes effective deterrence
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In 2025, Nurlan Aliyev wrote, “The Mayhem of Russia’s “Research” Fleet,” where he argued that NATO must act decisively to safeguard critical undersea infrastructure from Russian sabotage attempts. A year later, we asked him to revisit his arguments. Image: Andrey Luzik via Wikimedia CommonsIn your 2025 article, you argued that NATO needed to act decisively to safeguard critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic, Barents, and Arctic regions from Russian sabotage. Since then, where has NATO strengthened its deterrence and defense in this area, and where do gaps still remain? Since 2025, NATO and E.U. members have strengthened coordination to protect critical undersea infrastructure through
