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Forced Into the Right Decision? A Look at U.S. Land-Based Deterrence Posture

September 9, 2026
Forced Into the Right Decision? A Look at U.S. Land-Based Deterrence Posture
Forced Into the Right Decision? A Look at U.S. Land-Based Deterrence Posture

Forced Into the Right Decision? A Look at U.S. Land-Based Deterrence Posture

Steve Fetter
September 9, 2026
In 2019, Steve Fetter wrote “A Cheaper Nuclear Sponge,” in which he argued that building a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was unnecessary for strengthening U.S. land-based deterrence. After several years of changing defense budgets and strategic priorities, we asked Steve to revisit his arguments.Image: U.S. Air Force (John Ingle)In your 2019 article, you argued that building an entirely new ICBM was unnecessary and that the Pentagon could save tens of billions by extending the life of the Minuteman III instead. Nearly seven years on, how has that argument held up? What has the new ballistic missile program’s trajectory looked like relative to what you expected when you wrote this?The estimated acquisition cost of the new missile, Sentinel, has ballooned from $78 billion in 2020 to $141 billion in 2025. Although a significant portion of the increase is due to the need to refurbish or replace silos and other ground infrastructure, which would have also been needed to extend the lifetime of Minuteman III, there is little doubt that the cost of extending Minuteman would have been much lower than proceeding with Sentinel through the 2030s. The savings would have been particularly important during this period when the Department of Defense’s budget is under stress from other nuclear modernization programs, including the Columbia-class ship, submersible, ballistic, nuclear submarine (SSBN), the B-21 strategic bomber, the long-range standoff weapon, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, and upgrades to nuclear command and control systems.At the time, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad’s primary objective was deterring Russia, and you noted the targeting-inflexibility problem of overflying Russia to reach other adversaries. How does China’s nuclear buildup and the priorities of the second Trump administration reshape that argument? Do these changes bolster the case for ICBMs, or does it leave your conclusion intact?The expansion of

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In 2019, Steve Fetter wrote “A Cheaper Nuclear Sponge,” in which he argued that building a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was unnecessary for strengthening U.S. land-based deterrence. After several years of changing defense budgets and strategic priorities, we asked Steve to revisit his arguments.

Image: U.S. Air Force (John Ingle)

In your 2019 article, you argued that building an entirely new ICBM was unnecessary and that the Pentagon could save tens of billions by extending the life of the Minuteman III instead. Nearly seven years on, how has that argument held up? What has the new ballistic missile program’s…

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