Episode Notes:

On Thursday, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said of Israel and Saudi Arabia “Many of the elements of a pathway to normalization are now on the table” but added “We don’t have a framework, we don’t have the terms ready to be signed.”

Here to discuss the state of U.S.-Saudi-Israeli diplomacy we’re joined by Khaled Elgindy. Khaled is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and director of their Program on Palestine and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs.

[:50] Elements of normalization

[3:21] U.S. Role

[4:46] Domestic politics

[8:16] Israeli angle

[9:58] What's next

Episode Transcript

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth, and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to the Warcast, the members-only podcast for what you need to know now. On Thursday, National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, said of Israel and Saudi Arabia, "Many of the elements of a pathway to normalization are now on the table," but added, "we don't have a framework, we don't have the terms ready to be signed." So here to discuss the state of US-Saudi-Israeli diplomacy, we're joined by Khaled Elgindy. Khaled is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and director of their program on Palestine and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs. Welcome back to the Warcast.

Khaled Elgindy: Thanks for having me back.

Nicholas Danforth: Now, give us an overview of the elements that are part of this normalization process.

Khaled Elgindy: There are a lot of moving parts on a trilateral, maybe multilateral basis, but particularly on the two bilateral tracks, the US-Saudi and US-Israeli, where the Palestinian issue is floating somewhere in between there. It is not the number one issue on any of those agendas, but it is likely an issue. So on the US-Saudi track, the Saudis have made some fairly bold demands, they want a security agreement with United States that is roughly the equivalent of that of a NATO ally, that would most likely be in the form of a treaty and all that that would entail politically here on the US side of the equation. They're also looking for, obviously beefing up of the strategic partnership with the United States. They're also looking for a civilian nuclear program, for the US to sign on and maybe even partner with the Saudis on a civilian nuclear program.

Something obviously part of the broader strategic vision for Saudi Arabia to move out of the world of hydrocarbons that it has been in for almost the last 100 years. So, those are the two main things. On the Israeli track, obviously, Israelis have concerns about any Arab country and anything involving arms and security and strategic relationships. And so, those concerns will be on the table as well as Israeli demands for moving ahead. Those, I think certainly not going to include the Palestinian issue, I think their primary objective there will be to minimize that issue as Netanyahu has recently said, basically a box ticking exercise. As long as there's something there, as long as the word Palestinian appears, then that might be enough. But it's really primarily the focus is on the US-Saudi track.

Nicholas Danforth: So then, tell us where in the current state of diplomacy is Washington and trying to triangulate between these bilateral issues?

Khaled Elgindy: Washington is clearly very enthusiastic that this administration is enthusiastic about the prospect for a Saudi-Israel grand bargain of some sort. And in the not so distant past, I think in Biden's... We heard the statement from Jake Sullivan, but also more recently, Biden has said in his recent interview with Fareed Zakaria that we're not quite there. The pieces are not in place. And they are pretty big pieces. I think Jake Sullivan's statement is consistent with that, but more forward leaning. I think they're trying to build momentum toward achieving something, but playing a relatively long game. I think they understand it's not going to happen this calendar year, I think their hope is that in the next 12 months, particularly before the November elections in 2024, they would like to have something in place. At least the framework of some sort, the broad outlines of what a Saudi-Israel arrangement might look like.

Nicholas Danforth: So now you mentioned the asks on both the Israeli and Saudi side, but tell us a little bit more about what the specific obstacles are as the administration tries to create this framework.

Khaled Elgindy: Well, I think there are a lot of obstacles, and one reason why I'm not sure I'm convinced that the pieces are all there, or that they will be there, at least not during Biden's first term, as I see it, the obstacles are big. The Saudis, although an absolute monarchy, they still have to think about public opinion, they have to think about-

Nicholas Danforth: Yeah, tell us more about that.

Khaled Elgindy: Yeah, obviously Saudi public opinion, but also more broadly, Saudi Arabia views itself as a leader, if not the leader in the Arab world, and has a certain responsibility on that. The Saudis, after all, are the authors of the Arab Peace Initiative, that conditions any normalization with Israel on the achievement of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and so on and so forth. Obviously, that goal was undercut by the Abraham Accords with the UAE, Bahrain and later Morocco. So the Saudis are not the UAE. The asks are greater, the responsibility is greater, and so any kind of attendant Palestinian component would have to be commensurate with what the Saudis view as their gravitas in the Arab world, but also the broader Muslim world. They see themselves as, again, in Muslim majority countries, as the leader. The King's titles include that he is the custodian of the two holy places in Mecca and Medina.

And so, Jerusalem being the third-holiest place in Islam, is an issue that will figure, I think, very prominently for the Saudis, they can't be seen as compromising or obviously giving away Jerusalem. So there would need to be some tangible, concrete provisions for the future and fate of Jerusalem. So that is a serious obstacle. I don't think the Saudis are in a hurry, I think they are happy to begin the talks to see what they can get now, they might even view a future Republican administration as something more favorable. Maybe they might get more favorable terms, but I think that you can make an argument for the reverse as well.

One more thing in terms of the obstacles, which is not insignificant, there are US political obstacles. If what is on the table is something like a NATO type security guarantees for the Saudis, that would most likely be in the form of a treaty, which would need, not a majority of the Senate, but two thirds. So, trying to imagine 67 senators signing on, I think is a very difficult, just given the political polarization in our own system, it's hard to imagine that broad of a consensus.

Nicholas Danforth: Well, and finally then, we've touched on domestic politics in Saudi Arabia, in the United States, Israel is also having its own domestic politics right now, how do those factor in?

Khaled Elgindy: In late 2020, the Abraham Accords was definitely a feather in Netanyahu's cap, and a major achievement, obviously. Saudi Arabia would be the big prize as far as Israel's normalization and integration in the region. I think a Saudi-Israel deal would be probably the most significant development on the Arab Israeli front since the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. So it's much bigger than the Bahrainis or the Emiratis, and so this is a top priority for him. I think it's a strategic priority for him, especially given his domestic troubles. I think he's trying to project that only he can bring that kind of integration and normalization for Israel. That's a major talking point, I think, for wide-reaching desire, I think across the Israeli political spectrum, left, right and center, and it's a way maybe to try and offset and distract from the ongoing protests and the political opposition to his entire coalition and its program of overhauling the judiciary and what many people see as undemocratic and illiberal moves.

Nicholas Danforth: So final question then, I may have said that before. Where is this all likely to go in the near future? What do we see next?

Khaled Elgindy: Yeah, as I said, I don't think that a Saudi-Israel deal is in the [inaudible 00:10:10]. I think there are too many large moving parts, and would take a lot of ironing out. The president would have to have his ducks in a row on the Senate side of the equation. There's going to be a lot of resistance from Democrats, given Saudi Arabia's human rights record and role in the war in Yemen. And also, for at least a good number of Democrats, they're going to be concerned about the Palestinian issue, that this is not taking a two state solution off the table permanently, or sidelining the Palestinian issue. So there's going to be a lot of pieces to put this together, I don't see this happening before the end of Biden's first term, I just don't think that, like I said, I don't think the pieces are there.

I think we're on probably an irreversible long-term path towards some Saudi-Israel normalization deal, but I think just given the actors, you have the most extreme government in Israel's history, where, never mind Jerusalem, Jerusalem is clearly off the table as far as they're concerned. But the whole notion of a Palestinian national identity is off the table for large elements of this government. I can't imagine this Israeli government agreeing to anything that is meaningful on the Palestinians. Whether it's day-to-day life issues, like checkpoints and work permits and some economic incentives, much less at the political level, of bold statement on Jerusalem or on Palestinian statehood and self-determination. Those are not on the table, so I think because of all of those reasons, I don't see this happening anytime soon, but the conversation is clearly going to continue for the foreseeable future.

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you once again for joining us in the Warcast.

Khaled Elgindy: Thanks for having me.