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In 2024, James Barnett wrote, “A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink,” where he argued that tensions in countries like Ethiopia and Somalia threaten to escalate into a broader regional conflict if not contained. Two years later, with U.S. attention largely diverted to other areas of concern, we asked James to revisit his arguments.Image: Joseph Rullo via DVIDSIn your January 2024 piece, you warned that a memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland could actually accelerate al-Shabaab’s expansion into the two countries, pointing to its 2022 incursion into Ethiopia and its sleeper cells in cities like Hargeisa and Berbera. Has that threat materialized as you expected, and how has the group’s posture in both places changed since?The threat we described that al-Shabaab poses to Ethiopia and/or Somaliland has thankfully not yet materialized, although this is no guarantee against such an attack in the foreseeable future. Al-Shabaab is quite patient, and we were not wrong to highlight the evidence that it was building up networks in both countries. The best available evidence, plus my own discussions with Somali colleagues and contacts, indicates that al-Shabaab still maintains sophisticated networks across the region. Of course, when discussing covert cells and attack planning like this, we need to account for a good degree of uncertainty, but I don’t think everyone can breathe a sigh of relief just yet. Indeed, one dynamic we did not initially consider in our piece was how al-Shabaab’s growing ties to the Houthis could provide another vector for the group to attack or support an attack against either Ethiopia or Somaliland. This threat looks quite real in late 2026, especially in light of statements by Houthi officials. Washington depends on Mogadishu as a counter-terrorism partner against al-Shabaab, yet President Donald Trump just called Somaliland “a totally different