When the world's at stake,
go beyond the headlines.

William D. James, British Grand Strategy in the Age of American Hegemony (Oxford University Press, 2024)

Back in June, academics and naval officers from NATO nations gathered in Germany for the Kiel International Seapower Symposium, which coincides with the end of the annual Baltic Operations exercise (and, more importantly, the maritime festival of Kieler Woche). In previous years, the United States was always at the center of the discussions.

This year was different.

There were far fewer Americans in attendance — partially because some of the U.S. Navy ships that would have stayed after the exercise were off to deal with the Israeli-Iranian war, and in part due to travel restrictions imposed by the U.S. Defense Department. Those Americans who made it were sheepish and apologetic. At my breakfast before the conference with several old American friends, the conversation was by turns full of lament and dark humor about what we faced.

Opening the proceedings was a discussion on what European maritime power might look like in the absence of the United States. The speakers were a Finn, a German, and a Brit (me). I found it rather difficult to cover the British perspective given the centrality of the Anglo-American relationship and the complicated history of the United Kingdom’s dealings with the European Union during and after Brexit. Where should British grand strategy lead in an increasingly unstable international order? Is Britain experiencing the twilight of its trans-Atlantic alignment? And is the grand-strategic center of gravity shifting, perhaps inevitably, towards Europe?

I drew on recent polling published by the Policy Institute at King’s College London, which evocatively illustrates the shift that is taking place. In a nationally representative survey from December 2024, 53 percent of Britons said they would choose Europe over the United States as the United Kingdom’s primary ally, if forced to pick. Just 31 percent favored America. That’s a dramatic reversal of public opinion compared to 1967, when almost the exact opposite was true: 53 percent backed America and only 33 percent favored Europe in a similar scenario. Although the dataset is limited and excludes other low points in Anglo-American relations (such as the Iraq War), the parallels between 1967 and 2024 are striking. In both cases, the main threat to Britain and its neighbors came from Moscow. During the Cold War, Britons trusted the United States more than Europe to shield them from the Soviet Union. Today, they place far less trust in Washington to protect them against Russian aggression.

This mirrors the underlying strategic realities that signal the need for the United Kingdom to forge a path that does not rely on the United States. Luckily for Britain, William D. James shows that the nation has in fact always had far more grand-strategic autonomy from its American ally than one might think. The question is not whether the United Kingdom can do grand strategy, but rather whether it is any good at it.

What Is British Grand Strategy?

The United Kingdom’s approach to grand strategy after the end of World War II is often characterized as being entirely dependent on the United States, wherein American hegemony removed British agency in grand-strategic terms and meant that the concept of a uniquely British grand strategy became obsolete. Since 1945, the United Kingdom has largely stuck to playing the role of bridge-builder between Washington and Brussels, keeping the United States invested in European security while staying at the heart of Western decision-making. As the first secretary-general of NATO, the British general and diplomat Lord Hastings Ismay, famously put it, the goal was “to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The United Kingdom often shaped its grand strategy to align closely with American interests, participating in combined missions from the Middle East to the Balkans. Intelligence collaboration between the two countries under the Five Eyes umbrella is arguably the most extensive in the world. The British nuclear deterrent has as its foundation American missiles. In short, the United Kingdom has for decades built its strategic identity around the United States.

Or has it? James reassesses this view, arguing that the United Kingdom has had a lot more grand-strategic autonomy during the last century than most give it credit for. Even in the context of American global dominance, James argues that British policymakers and officials have consistently engaged in grand-strategic thinking, even if they do not explicitly acknowledge or conceptualize their actions as such. Assertions that the United Kingdom lacks a coherent grand strategy overlook the more pertinent issue: not the absence of strategic thinking, but rather the quality of that thinking. In recent decades, the effectiveness and coherence of British grand strategy have increasingly been called into question, with evidence pointing towards a decline in its overall quality and consistency. The core question around British grand strategy is thus not one of existence, but of effectiveness. Rather than debating whether the United Kingdom does grand strategy, a more meaningful line of inquiry concerns how well it has performed in strategic planning and implementation. The three case studies that James draws upon show that the historical record is mixed, revealing moments of strategic clarity and coherence as well as episodes of misjudgment and mismanagement.

During World War II, British grand strategy demonstrated a high degree of coherence and effectiveness. Key decisions reflected a deliberate and well-considered prioritization of threats, resources, and long-term objectives. In contrast, the decision to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2002–2003 represents a case of flawed grand-strategic thinking. The intervention lacked a sustainable balance between ends and means, and Britain’s involvement was marked by an overestimation of the threat posed by Iraq and an underestimation of the long-term costs and consequences of war. The decision appeared to be driven more by alliance politics and a desire to maintain the Anglo-American “special relationship” than by a careful appraisal of British national interests. The British withdrawal from positions East of Suez during the 1960s presents a more ambiguous case. On one hand, the decision to retrench reflected a recognition of changing global dynamics and economic constraints. The initial conception of the withdrawal was reasonably well calibrated, aiming to manage imperial decline in an orderly and strategic manner. However, in practice, the process degenerated into a hasty and poorly managed disengagement. While the strategic rationale behind the retreat was sound, its implementation suffered from inconsistent planning and execution, suggesting a disconnect between strategic intent and operational capability. Taken together, these cases illustrate the uneven quality of British grand strategy across time. They demonstrate that while Britain has engaged in grand-strategic thinking, its success has depended heavily on the coherence of planning, alignment of means and ends, and the quality of execution.

Acting Without America

At Kiel, I spoke about how the United States under Trump’s second term has been turning inward, pulling back from multilateralism and redefining America’s global role in starkly transactional terms. The administration’s dismissive rhetoric, including a vice-presidential reference to Britain as just a “random country” and repeated threats to undermine NATO, has raised serious doubts about the future of American commitments to European security. Article 5 of the NATO treaty, the collective defense clause, is emblematic of this shift. Trump has openly questioned whether the United States should even honor it. This clause has only been invoked once, after the 9/11 attacks — that America was the beneficiary of this invocation makes Trump’s stance particularly jarring. His grand-strategic vision is not rooted in shared values or collective security. Rather, it is pragmatic, deal-based, and driven by domestic political considerations. NATO, in this worldview, is not a stabilizing force but rather a financial burden. Talk of unity and deterrence is replaced by that of withdrawal and division. This marks the sharpest departure from post-World War II consensus in living memory. Although Trump cannot constitutionally run for a third term in office in 2028, the Republican presidential nominee is likely to be of the same mold given the ways in which Trump has reshaped the ideological foundations of his party, so this is a question that will be likely to persist beyond the tenure of this administration. Even were a Democrat to win the White House, the reputational damage and wider consequences of four years of an American pivot away from Europe will not be remediated overnight.

So, what does this mean for the United Kingdom? Prime Minister Keir Starmer has so far tried to avoid making a binary choice. He has stressed the importance of both trans-Atlantic ties and deeper engagement with Europe, neither looking to unpick the ties that bind London and Washington nor to focus solely on Britain’s continental allies. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 echoes this too. But the idea that the United Kingdom can have both equally is starting to look like wishful thinking. The pressure to choose is becoming structural rather than hypothetical. In assessing this choice, characterizing the United Kingdom as merely a subordinate or satellite of the United States is not only inaccurate but also politically problematic, as it risks absolving British policymakers of responsibility for strategic judgments. In reality, the alignment of British and American grand-strategic interests has reflected not subservience but shared objectives — but do those shared objectives still exist?

This is a moment for serious grand-strategic thinking. The United Kingdom has remained committed to the U.S.-led international order since 1945 largely because it served British national interests. However, when divergences have arisen, Britain has demonstrated its capacity to pursue independent courses of action. Should the United Kingdom continue aligning with an increasingly erratic, mercurial, and unpredictable United States? Or should it double down on building stronger links with a Europe that, while not without its flaws, is developing a more coherent defense identity? Hoping that the United States will return to its old ways after Trump is not a strategy. Grand strategy requires action, not nostalgia. And right now, the most viable path for the United Kingdom lies in Europe, particularly in taking an active role in shaping European defense cooperation, rather than standing by passively.

This turning point is both a risk and an opening. Without American leadership, power vacuums will emerge that adversaries like Russia and China will be more than willing to fill. However, Europe, for the first time in decades, has a chance to step up and define its own strategic path — one less dependent on Washington — and Britain can help to lead that effort. The United Kingdom still boasts high-end military capabilities, global diplomatic reach, and a world-class intelligence network. It also brings to the table a legacy of international engagement and, crucially, a sense of renewed purpose.

Despite Trump’s exhortations for Europe to do more to bolster its own defenses, skeptics will argue that a British shift too far toward Europe might alienate the United States and harm the so-called “special relationship.” But that relationship, as it stands today, is more emotional than strategic. It’s a product of history, not a roadmap for the future that is in British interests. And as the polling shows, the British public already senses this. They understand that their nation’s interests are increasingly aligned with Europe, not just geographically but in terms of values and shared threats.

Ultimately, this is about agency. Britain ought to take ownership of its grand-strategic future. That means recognizing when alliances evolve and having the courage to adapt. The United States will and should remain a close partner, but it can no longer serve as the sole anchor of British strategy. Europe, for all its imperfections, presents a chance not just for cooperation but also for leadership. As I argued in Kiel, I believe that Britain has the means to be a driving force in shaping that future, and James’ book shows that the country has a substantial foundation of grand-strategic autonomy to build upon. The real question is whether the United Kingdom has the will.

Emma Salisbury, Ph.D., is a non-resident senior fellow in the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an associate fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.

Image: Number 10 via Wikimedia Commons