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Drones turning tanks into bonfires might make great YouTube content, but the real story of armored warfare’s future is going to be much different than you might think.

Some observers and analysts openly question whether the advances in precision-guided munitions, drones, and anti-tank weaponry seen in wars that have dominated professional military analysis over the last five years — Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the war between Israel and Hamas — have made the tank and armored formations into prohibitively expensive, ineffective anachronisms. While they are correct to point out that almost all belligerents in these conflicts have struggled to employ their armor effectively, these critics jump to conclusions which miss the essential function the tank and armor formations can and must perform on the modern battlefield. As leaders of III Armored Corps, we see how the armor force will retain an indispensable role on the battlefield. However, in order to do so it will need to adapt to meet contemporary challenges. Under the framework of the Army’s Transform in Contact initiative, the armored force will need to integrate new technological capabilities, adapt organizational designs, and evolve its training to ensure it continues to fight as a combined arms team.

As the champions for the future armor force, we are seeking to learn the right lessons from these cases of armor employment in recent wars to guide the development of a more lethal and effective fighting force. Furthermore, we will also need to assess the applicability and limits of these lessons when applied against the war the United States does not want but must be ready for: one against China.

Armor’s Indispensable Role

Before diving into contemporary conflicts, it is important to summarize the critical role armor has played, and continues to play, in ground combat. Armored formations — when fighting in concert with infantry artillery, engineers, attack aviation, and protection capabilities — allow the combined arms team to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative on the battlefield. Armored vehicles’ combination of mobility, protection, firepower, and shock effect restores mobility to static battlefields when they join the infantry and engineers to advance on an enemy entrenched in prepared defenses. The record in historic and recent battlefield events is clear on this.

Some may grumble about the vulnerability of armored vehicles to the latest anti-tank weapons, the considerable costs to train and equip armored formations, and their operational limitations. But only armored formations — again, when fighting as a combined arms team — can maneuver with the mass, tempo, reach, and endurance to gain positions of advantage that threaten or destroy that which the enemy values most. In complex terrain that restricts larger-scale maneuver, smaller elements of armor forces fight in close coordination lighter formations to destroy enemy strong points or provide mobile counterattack forces. They are the best formation to take the offensive to and defeat the armored formations that all U.S. peer and near-peer adversaries possess, including China, which maintains the largest tank fleet in the world. And with the U.S. Marine Corps’ decision to divest of its armor formations, the U.S. Army armored force is now the sole provider of armored capability to the joint force. These realities are why it’s critically important to transform the Army’s armored forces so they can remain a dominant force on land in any theater, despite the rapidly evolving reality of warfare.

Challenges Faced by Modern Armored Formations

Not all lessons from these cases are directly translatable to all conflicts or threats, particularly a high-end, large-scale war with China in the Indo-Pacific theater. Each of these cases exist within limited, regional specific contexts where the belligerent parties possess varying levels of technical sophistication and military professionalism. They are all conflicts that predominately occurred in the land domain and do not fully display the complexities of multidomain joint integration required in a maritime theater of war. While these cases may lack the scope, scale, and intensity of a war with China, they do offer some compelling insights into how the U.S. armor force has an obligation to adapt.

Armenian Failure to Adapt in Nagorno-Karabakh

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan illustrated just how ugly a conflict can become for forces that fail to recognize the evolving character of warfare. Azerbaijan’s effective use of drones, including Turkish Bayraktar TB2s and Israeli Harop loitering munitions, highlighted the vulnerabilities of traditional armored formations for the world to see on social media. Armenian tanks and armored vehicles, largely dug into static defensive positions, were systematically targeted and destroyed, often before they could engage in battle. The continuous stream of images of seemingly helpless armored vehicles reinforced the perception that drones and precision-guided munitions have rendered armored units obsolete.

However, a deeper analysis reveals that the Armenian forces failed to recognize and adapt to changes on the modern battlefield. Their armored units operated without adequate concealment, air defense, or electronic warfare capabilities, leaving them entirely exposed to drone strikes. Once their remaining armor was committed against Azerbaijani forces, poor coordination across formations, a lack of infantry support, and outdated tactics further compounded their losses. The Armenian failures in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict highlight the importance of integrating armored units into a broader network of capabilities to make them an effective fighting force.

For the U.S. Army, the lesson of the Nagorno-Karabakh War is that ignoring the changing character of war will lead to defeat. Even middle-weight powers like Azerbaijan are leveraging new technologies in a reconnaissance strike complex to disintegrate air defenses and attrit maneuver forces to the point of combat ineffectiveness. China, a clear leader in developing these technologies, possesses significantly more advanced systems in far greater quantities and will leverage these capabilities to even more destructive effect.

This is a problem the Army cannot wish away if it hopes to preserve combat power and operational effectiveness in the future. It is essential that the armor force develop an appropriately layered counter-drone network to and tactics to deny or defeat air threats at echelon. In addition to enhancing protection, the armor force should integrate advanced reconnaissance assets and electronic warfare systems to increase its ability to sense and strike adversaries at greater depth.

Russian and Ukrainian High-Cost Failures to Achieve Combined Arms

While much of the analysis about fighting in Ukraine has recently centered on static battles of attrition and the ever-accelerating proliferation of unmanned systems, the conflict provides many lessons about the challenges of employing armored formations against a modern industrialized military in large-scale combat. During the initial phases of the invasion, Russian forces, despite massing thousands of armored vehicles along several axes of advance, failed to achieve success because they proved incapable of coordinating or sustaining ground combat operations. While Ukrainian drones and western anti-armor weapons were deadly against armored vehicles, much of the Russian failure can be attributed to shortfalls in force design, large-scale combat training, and discipline. The battalion tactical groups, Russia’s basic organic fighting unit, were optimized for independent small-scale battles with short lines of supply running from proxy-controlled areas. This design left Russian forces woefully ill-structured for sustained offensives deep into Ukraine in 2022. Furthermore, the Russians training exercises in the run up to the invasion centered around active defense scenarios within Russia territory which did not prepare them to fight at scale with the whole of their army. Once in action, poorly trained and ineptly led units failed to effectively perform essential functions such as reconnaissance, cross-unit coordination, and logistics operations critical to maintaining combat power over time. As a result of these challenges, the Russians were unable to use their armored forces to exploit their invasion’s initial shock and culminated rapidly, allowing Ukrainian forces to regroup and defeat their disorganized mechanized formations in detail.

Much as Russian armored formations initially stumbled in the face of small teams of Ukrainian light infantry armed with anti-tank weapons, so too did Ukrainian forces struggle to employ their armor to achieve operational objectives in the face of complex entrenched defenses during their counteroffensive in 2023. Russian forces, leveraging layered anti-tank defenses, electronic warfare, and a lethal tactical reconnaissance strike complex, inflicted significant losses on Ukrainian armored columns when they attempted to breach the Surovikin line. Ukrainian forces, unfortunately, were inadequately equipped, trained, and supported for the fight which they ultimately encountered. As a result, they were unable to effectively employ combined arms principles while attempting to deliberately penetrate the Russian defenses. Their armored units operated without adequate infantry support, air defense, or air cover, making them vulnerable to repeated attacks from anti-tank guided missiles, attack helicopters, and drones. Moreover, Russian electronic warfare hampered effective communication and situational awareness making coordination between the breaching armor units and supporting artillery and engineer units ineffective. The Ukrainian armored thrust’s tempo subsequently broke down under the enemy disruption, allowing the Russians to reallocate their forces and further attrit Ukrainian combat power until it became clear that they could not achieve their objectives at an acceptable cost. The failure of the counter-offensive highlighted that armored units cannot rely on massing the combat capabilities of their platforms alone to achieve breakthroughs and should continue to adapt to ensure they leverage all arms, including joint enablers, to achieve suppression and create freedom to maneuver.

While the armored forces of both nations have struggled to conduct effective combined arms operations, neither army is rejecting the utility of armored formations in the conflict. On the contrary, both belligerents continue to go to great lengths to bring their armor into the fight, albeit at a smaller scale based on attrition and training shortfalls. Ukrainian armored units’ combination of mobility, protection, and firepower was a critical element in the success of both their counteroffensive in Kharkiv and the initial phases of the Kursk incursion last year. For the armored force, the Russian-Ukrainian war underscores the importance of modernizing doctrine, equipment, and training to adapt to a rapidly evolving battlefield. The U.S. Army should reevaluate armored unit’s organizational design to ensure they are integrated with the advanced reconnaissance, command and control, electronic warfare, and air defense systems that will enable them to maintain their ability to fight, survive, and win in modern combat, particularly against a high-end peer competitor like China. Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from each side’s struggles is that combined arms operations are inherently difficult to perform in war. As a prerequisite, units should develop experienced leaders at each echelon and disciplined soldiers with rigorous training. Absent this professional skill set, all the newest technology cannot and will not generate success. The U.S. Army does this at its combat training centers at a scale, intensity, and frequency that is unmatched in the world. However, even here there is an imperative for the Army to ensure that its combat training centers are continuously replicating the evolving character of war and pushing leaders to become masters of combined arms.

Israeli Combined Arms Columns in Gaza

Although there is limited utility to the effort to prepare for future large-scale combat, the recent conflict between Israel and Hamas offers valuable insights into the continued relevance of armored formations in urban and hybrid warfare. Learning from their own recent history in Lebanon in 2006, the Israel Defense Forces demonstrated the efficacy of integrating armor with infantry, artillery, engineers, and air support in a complex and dynamic environment. While Hamas could not be characterized as a peer competitor with the Israeli military, it persistently employed asymmetric tactics, including extensive use of tunnels, improvised explosive devices, and rocket barrages to attempt to counter Israeli advantages in conventional ground and air power. In response to these challenges, the Israeli military successfully leveraged armored combined arms columns to penetrate Hamas defenses, protect infantry forces as they cleared urban terrain, and provide responsive mobile firepower to overcome strong points. The Israeli military’s advanced defensive systems, such as the Trophy active protection system on the Merkava tank, proved vital countermeasures by neutralizing anti-tank guided missiles and keeping tanks in the fight during sustained offensive operations. Israel’s experience demonstrates that armored forces remain an indispensable asset across the range of military operations when employed with modern technology and adaptive tactics. Although the threat faced by Israeli armored units was different in scale and technological sophistication than those seen in Ukraine and Armenia, several lessons for the U.S. Army remain worthy to heed. Investing in active protection systems, enhancing urban warfare training, and ensuring seamless coordination between armor, infantry, and air assets will be vital to maintaining the effectiveness of armored formations going forward. Other lessons coming out of the conflict, such as the suitability of certain tactics or the value of specific capabilities, do not translate directly to inform the future needs for the U.S. armor force.

What to Learn, Especially for the Indo-Pacific

Since their inception in 1916, armored platforms have continuously adapted to an ever-evolving battlefield, even through the moments when critics declared the tank and armored formations obsolete. Three saliant points emerge from examining these recent cases of recent armored warfare. First, U.S. Army armored forces should integrate new capabilities, specifically counter-drone, electronic warfare, and command-and-control systems, or risk being rendered combat ineffective in future combat operations. Second, they need to reevaluate current organizational designs to ensure they remain fit for purpose — namely combining mobility, protection, firepower, and shock effect to destroy the enemy in sustained, close combat. And third, to be prepared to execute combined arms operations, it’s imperative that armored forces conduct large scale training to stress all warfighting functions against a technologically advanced opposing force in an environment that replicates the demands of modern combat.

The large-scale combat training imperative should be expanded to integrate into a joint force construct as the armor brigade cannot be brought to bear on land in the Pacific region without the integration of joint logistics, intelligence, fires, maneuver, and command and control in all domains. While exercises such as Talisman Sabre 23 and Pacific Fortitude 24 served as initial learning opportunities to better understand armored formation deployment and integration into the theater, continued trials and exercises will be needed. Furthermore, recognizing the geographic realities of the region, armor forces should be trained, organized, and equipped at echelon to enable seamless integration into lighter or joint ground maneuver units which would likely proceed them into the area of operations.

China’s military represents a vastly more technologically advanced adversary than the forces previously discussed, and one that is specifically designed to compete with the U.S. military for dominance in all domains. Considering this, the technical capability gaps above remain a relevant concern that must be addressed in an iterative and aggressive manner. There will be no silver bullet solutions that will allow the armored force to suddenly nullify Chinese advantages in low-cost, AI-enabled drones or blind their integrated reconnaissance-strike complex. The solution will lie in a lead bullet approach — continuously iterating with numerous technologies to construct resilient capabilities in areas such as counter-drone, command and control, and reconnaissance strike that evolve over time to enable the armored force to achieve its core mission of combining mobility, protection, firepower, and shock effect to seize the initiative and destroy enemies in close combat.

Where Do We Go From Here?

For U.S. Army armored formations to maintain their capacity to provide the unmatched mobility, protection, and firepower which make them indispensable in large-scale ground combat, the Army should invest in armored transformation. In the near term, Transformation in Contact will afford the armored community the opportunity to test new organizational designs, technology, and tactics which build on the lessons identified in recent wars. This includes integrating a variety of drone, layered counter-drone, electronic warfare, and command-and-control capabilities tailored to support mounted maneuver. Once integrated, units will test how these technologies can be employed to shorten kill chains, suppress the enemy, enhance situational awareness, mask targetable signatures, and preserve combat power so it is available at critical points in battle. Commanders at each echelon will be required to experiment with novel tactics and inform doctrinal adaptations that will determine how armor forces achieve combined arms and destroy modern adversaries.

Furthermore, Transformation in Contact will enable the armored force to accelerate upgrades to existing combat platforms, such as AI-assisted targeting, active protection systems, and improved fuel efficiency. This iterative process will result in a refined armored brigade organizational design and equipping framework that will ensure that the U.S. Army armor force adapts to meet the demands of the evolving character of war. While the U.S. Army’s current armored combat platforms remain among the most lethal and survivable in the world, the future operating environment demands improvements which the current Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle cannot meet in their current form.

Under the broader framework of Army Transformation Initiative, the U.S. Army should continue to accelerate its development of the next generation of ground combat vehicles that can be manned, optionally manned, or autonomous, decrease sustainment requirements with greater fuel efficiency, and increase mobility through decreased overall weight. Perhaps most importantly, the armored force should foster the culture of innovation and adaptation that has been a defining feature throughout its history. The character of conflict now demands that leaders drive rapid and continuous transformation in contact. The armored force should exploit this opportunity at every level, continuously testing new doctrines, organizations and technologies.

To uphold the U.S. Army’s combined arms edge, the armored force should also enhance training in light of observations gleaned from recent conflicts and understanding of the threat posed by peer adversaries like China. This includes an emphasis on counter-drone tactics, urban warfare, and sustaining large-scale combined arms operations to prepare armored units for future conflicts. Units should also develop proficiency in operating dispersed across wide areas and rapidly consolidating at the right time and place on the battlefield to capitalize on opportunities and generate the mass to overwhelm enemy forces. The U.S. Army rightly places a premium on rigorous training and professional development, ensuring that its armored crews and leaders are among the best in the world. Regular exercises, such as the National Training Center rotations, prepare soldiers for complex, high-intensity combat scenarios, fostering adaptability and resilience. These exercises should replicate, to the maximum extent possible, the contemporary challenges that are shaping the battlefield. Further, the armored force should continue to prioritize rigorous multi-echelon home station training in fire and maneuver and build leaders who are adaptive, creative, and critical thinkers.

Conclusion

While recent conflicts in Ukraine, Israel, and Nagorno-Karabakh highlight the susceptibilities of poorly employed or outdated armored forces, they also provide valuable lessons for future warfare. The U.S. Army, with its superior training, combined arms principles, and capacity for rapid transformation is uniquely positioned to adapt to these challenges and maintain the combat effectiveness of its armored formations. It will require professional commitment and intellectual collaboration from the soldiers and leaders of the Army’s armor force to get right. Those who would minimize the future role of armored formations because of instances of ineffective employment or vulnerability are taking away the wrong lesson from these wars and would leave the Army unprepared. Rather than signaling the end of armored warfare, the lessons from contemporary conflicts are the call to action to adapt now to meet these new realities. By embodying the principles of adaptability, innovation, and resilience, the U.S. Army can ensure that armored formations not only survive but retain their place as a cornerstone of modern military power and a decisive force in future conflicts.

Lt. Gen. Kevin D. Admiral is the commanding general of III Armored Corps. He has 31 years of experience leading armor, infantry, and cavalry formations including previous assignments as commanding general of 1st Cavalry Division, chief of armor, and 76th colonel of the 3d Cavalry Regiment.

Nicholas Drake is a U.S. Army officer and the armor brigade transformation lead for III Armored Corps. He has 18 years of experience leading armor and cavalry formations in armored, Stryker, and infantry brigade combat teams.

The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: Midjourney