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Anti-personnel mines are widely reviled, especially in the humanitarian community, but there are certain places in which they could be used to prevent war in the first place. The eastern edge of Europe is one of those places.
On March 18, the defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland recommended the withdrawal of their states from the Ottawa Convention, which bans anti-personnel landmines. It is unclear whether there are plans to immediately begin stockpiling mines or if the statement is intended only to showcase that these states will retain all possible options for deterring and, if necessary, defending against Russian aggression. In any case, Latvia has been the first-mover, with its parliament voting to follow through on the recommendation.
The types of systems the Baltic states and Poland would be likely to acquire and deploy would also align with international humanitarian law and strategically offset manpower deficiencies, ultimately lowering the risk of a regional and general war, as well as the pressures for a larger arms race. To be sure, some will lament that states are pulling back from arms control treaties. Worries surrounding the potential harm to civilians, the degradation of arms treaties globally, or the proliferation of previously limited weapons are all sure to be raised in the coming months. However, pulling back from the Ottawa Convention and opening the possibility for stockpiling (and potentially deploying) anti-personnel mines are actions driven by a legitimate need to provide security and reduce the risk of war.
Plausible Anti-Personnel Mine Systems and Deployments
If we wish to speculate on the types of anti-personnel mines the Baltic states and Poland may acquire, it is worthwhile to state at the outset and clearly that this is speculation. That being said, speculation may be grounded in common sense as well as an understanding of the tactical, operational, and strategic realities for these countries. For the Baltics and Poland, anti-personnel mines would fill a manpower gap in a future war with Russia (especially in the case of the greatly outnumbered Baltic states) and serve as area denial weapons.
The Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish ministers of defense also clearly stated that they “will remain committed to international humanitarian law, including the protections of civilians during an armed conflict,” which provides further information on what sorts of systems might be used and how. In particular, all of these states are signatories to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. These treaties set clear bounds on how wars may be fought and what weapons may be used. Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons deals explicitly with mines and booby traps, clearly stating what precautions must be taken when laying minefields or deploying remotely-delivered mines.
If one pays heed to the defense realities of the Baltic states and Poland and takes the defense ministers’ words seriously, one can deduce that anti-personnel mines would be deployed in two distinct manners and locations. In aiming to maximize security gains while doing all that is possible to protect civilians, these states would opt for a mixture of minefields laid inside their own territories in border areas they cannot as effectively monitor or defend, and retain a stock of rapidly deployable mines for tactical use in the event of a Russian invasion. For the former deployment context, those mines would be laid in clearly marked minefields in areas controlled by these states. It would therefore be these states’ responsibility to maintain and safeguard such minefields. Given that mines laid in open terrain are also apt to degrade and to create grave risks to civilians, then these minefields would not be left for long durations, but rather deployed in response to a perceived imminent threat. This would present the lowest risk of minefields becoming compromised by weather and wear, and minimize potential risks to civilians in the vicinity. Moreover, as such minefields would be laid in their own territory, states utilizing anti-personnel mines for this purpose would be maximally compliant and conscientious in how these weapons are used.
Of greater worry are rapidly deployable mines to be used during potential combat operations which might be employed in enemy territory. However, the systems the Baltic states or Poland are most likely to acquire or develop would be those akin to the American-made Area Denial Artillery Munition. The Area Denial Artillery Munition is a 155mm artillery projectile which can carry 36 mines of type M67 or M72. In keeping with international law, both mine variants are self-destructing, with self-destruction of activated mines occurring 4 or 48 hours after activation. With such short activation windows, these mines would allow the Baltic states or Poland to quickly close gaps in their lines, interdict Russian advances, or otherwise control their border, while also not imposing any long-term or significant added risk to civilians; because said mines would only be fired into or ahead of advancing Russian forces, any civilians present would already be at extremely grave risk due to their proximity to the enemy. It is also worth clearly stating that the laying of mines in clearly marked and maintained minefields and the use of self-destructing/self-deactivating mines in the event of remote deployment are both governed by tenets of international law, laws to which the Baltic states and Poland are signatories. The Amended Protocol II of The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – a treaty governing the potential use of incendiary weapons, mines, and other conventional weapons – sets clear guidelines and restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines, and all states in question have signed and ratified this agreement.
Humanitarian Risks and Effective Deterrence
If the Baltic states and Poland proceed to develop, acquire, and deploy anti-personnel mines under the restrictions of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, it would not present a significant or grave increase in risk to civilians either in these states or in Russia/Belarus. More than this, anti-personnel mines allow these states to bolster their defensive capacity and offset one of their most significant military shortfalls: manpower. By utilizing fixed minefields and rapidly deployable mining systems like the Area Denial Artillery Munition, the Baltic states and Poland would credibly undermine the prospect of a successful Russian incursion which would not be also massively casualty-intensive for Russia. This itself presents a serious humanitarian upside.
A Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland would create immense suffering and present catastrophic risks of escalation. Anything that reduces the likelihood of such an attack thus presents a clear and present benefit, in humanitarian terms. Moreover, if one wishes to take an “all things considered” approach to (dis)armament, the Baltic states and Poland signaling their readiness to develop, acquire, and deploy anti-personnel mines may actually be a good thing.
By making clear to Moscow that further aggression will meet stiff and persistent resistance and making effective resistance a credible scenario, Russian aggression may be deterred (at least partially). Moreover, the more the Baltic states and Poland can offset their defensive efforts to minefields and rapidly deployable mining systems, the less they may need to fall back on military buildup in other areas. This means that mines may actually allow for lowering armament efforts in other areas. To be sure, none of this is guaranteed — but adding another option to the Baltic states’ and Poland’s security efforts lowers the likelihood of war, which is certainly a good thing.
Nathan Wood is currently leading the project “Military Defense Technologies and Ethics,” supported by the German Aerospace Center and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. He is also an external fellow of the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo, and an associate member of the Centre for Environmental and Technology Ethics – Prague. He has published in numerous scientific and popular journals.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of his institutions or funding agencies.
Image: Saeima via Wikimedia Commons
