Episode Notes:

On Tuesday, Senior Hamas leader Saleh Arouri was killed by a drone strike in southern Beirut. To tell us more, we’re joined by Hanin Ghaddar, the Friedmann senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

[:35] Killing

[3:21] Why Now?

[4:22] Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas dynamic

[7:44] Hezbollah Response

[11:45] Nasrullah’s Speech

Episode Transcript

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to the Warcast the members-only podcast for what you need to know now. On Tuesday, senior Hamas leader, Saleh Arouri was killed by a drone strike in southern Beirut. To tell us more, we're joined today by Hanin Ghaddar, the Friedmann Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Welcome to the Warcast.

Hanin Ghaddar: Thank you very much for having me, Nick.

Nicholas Danforth: Now you are kind enough to reschedule this this morning so we could talk to you after Hassan Nasrallah spoke. Apparently we jumped the gun. You said he's still speaking, but give us a quick overview. What do we know about the killing? Why did this happen? I think we know the answer to some of these questions, but give us a little background.

Hanin Ghaddar: I think Israel has said before that they are going to kill Hamas leaders. They're going to target Hamas leaders, not only inside Razlah, but anywhere they are, especially in Lebanon. And Hassan Nasrallah has last August, actually even before October 7th, has warned Israel against killing Lebanese, Syrian, Iranian or Palestinian figures inside Lebanon, saying that Hezbollah will respond heavily to that. Things changed since October 7th. He said that before, and Israel yesterday decided that al-Arouri is one of the most important figures in Hamas and they want him dead and they want him gone. So he's in Lebanon, he's been in Lebanon for a very long time, and they have gathered enough intelligence to target him, but they did it in a way that made sure that not a single Hezbollah official or politician or a military commander is present at that meeting.

The only other Lebanese who was present at that meeting is Muhammad Bashasha who is Jemaah Islamiyah, the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon, official who is originally from Saleh, who was a Lebanese and the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon Jemaah Islamiyah has recently been getting closer to Hamas. There's a big division inside, and then this is the guy who actually is the Hamas guy within the Jemaah, so he was the only one there. It's a message to Hezbollah that Israel does not want to target Hezbollah now, it's a message to Hassan Nasrallah and the Iranians that this is against Hamas.

This is not against Lebanon or even Hezbollah. Arouri is very important in the sense that he's not only the military leader of Hamas, he is the main link between Hamas and the IRGC, the Iranian regime. That's why he is very important. That's why he's present in Dahieh. His role as the link between the Iranian regime and Hamas is huge. And the loss I would say that Hamas losing al-Arouri is equivalent to when Hezbollah lost Imad Mughniyah in 2008. He has that kind of importance. He is a military leader and he is the link to Iran. Exactly why Imad Mughniyah constituted at that time.

Nicholas Danforth: And so then, just to make sure I understand, you think the timing of the strike actually had to do with Israel waiting for an opportunity to hit him without killing other Hezbollah figures?

Hanin Ghaddar: I believe him. I believe the time has nothing to do with the annual commemoration of Soleimani. It's just like they got intelligence that there's no Hezbollah official present at that meeting. And if you see the location of the strike, it is very precise in the sense that only that apartment was hit without really harming any of the apartments in the same building. It was a very precise, very targeted attack, it's basically that with the message that this is not against Hezbollah. This is part of Israel's war in Gaza. This is part of Israel's war against Hamas, and this is a Hamas target per se, and that's why a Hezbollah reaction response to this is not going to be meaningful.

Nicholas Danforth: And before we get to more questions about Nasrallah's speech and that reaction, just give us a little more background as well on what Hezbollah's attitude towards Hamas' writ large and also how it's been handling the possibility for escalation, the tensions on its border with Israel during the current conflict.

Hanin Ghaddar: Yes, of course, Hamas since 2013, when there was a rift between Hamas and Iran in general, but also with Hezbollah, when Hamas joined the Syria War in 2014 against Bashar al-Assad with the Muslim brotherhood in Syria who were part of the opposition against Bashar al-Assad. They thought that as a Sunni Muslim brotherhood themselves, they should be on that side of the war. Of course, this failed mainly because Bashar stayed in power and the Iranians and the Russians helped Bashar al-Assad stay in power. Of course, with all the divisions within Hamas at that moment, Hamas decided to go back under the umbrella of Iran and join Hezbollah. Hezbollah welcomed the Hamas back, not because they forgave them, but basically because they realized that they needed them as well. So Hamas has been really active in Lebanon in terms of creating this united front or the joint operation rules, especially in the past two years in order to get all the Iran militias or the Iran supported groups in the region, from Hamas to the Iraqi militias, to the Houthis, Hezbollah and others under one umbrella organization that Hezbollah basically supervises.

And it has always been attended and supervised by the Iranian IRGC people, especially the Mousavi guy who was also killed in Syria two days ago. He was part of this United Front. He had organized it, and Hamas was a big integral part of the united front. And I think this is what pushed them to do October 7th because they understood the united front as whatever happens at the region, the other groups are going to come for help. And whether Hezbollah knew about it or not, Hamas perspective was, if we do this, Hezbollah will definitely join.

And this is where they realized that after October 7th, that the united front is no longer united, that this is what's made basically as a united front to protect Iran, not to protect the Palestinians. So Hezbollah took advantage of the situation, used Hamas in Lebanon, but at the same time gave Hamas a lot. What Hezbollah gave Hamas is with the Iranians, the logistics, the arms, the training, the experience. They got a lot from them.

And also Hezbollah helped Hamas take over the Palestinian decision inside Lebanon's Palestinian camps, refugee camps, the battle that happened a few months before the October 7th events as a sign of basically getting rid of the Fatah, PLO factions inside the Palestinian camps. And with the help of Hezbollah, Hamas is now taking over the Palestinian decision in Lebanon. This is a huge thing, and that's why Hezbollah feels that they've already done enough.

Nicholas Danforth: And so that brings us to our final question. What does Hezbollah do or do not do now?

Hanin Ghaddar: So I have a much longer answer to that. I can talk for hours about this. I have so much information, but I'm going to try to be as brief as possible. I know we don't have much time, just to say that at the beginning, Hezbollah on October 7th, they of course the decision for war and peace is always in Baghran. Hezbollah, has a leeway or a margin of decision when it comes to internal domestic affairs. But when it comes to a regional decision like this, because this is a war that can become a regional war that could involve the Americans, that could involve the Israelis and the Iranians, it was an Iranian decision.

And the Iranians know that whatever happens in Lebanon against Israel, it is never about the Palestinians. It's always about the Iranian interest. Even since 2006 all the way through the Syria War and their involvement in the region in Yemen, it's always about what Iran needs and Hezbollah is definitely considered today Iran's main, most powerful asset in the region. And this asset, when I talk about Hezbollah as Iran's asset, I'm talking about two main things, not only their expertise, but mainly the [inaudible 00:09:11] forces, the elite forces, which are now mostly at the border between Lebanon and Israel, and also in the Golan Heights facing Israel. And of course the precision guided missiles that Hezbollah have been building for the past few years.

These two assets are really what makes Hezbollah more important. But Iran also knows that Hezbollah cannot really use these assets. They will not sacrifice them for Hamas. They will not sacrifice them to avenge Hamas. They will not sacrifice them for the Palestinian code. They are there to protect Iran's interest. If Iran itself got hit, Hezbollah will use these assets, and today, Iran doesn't feel that that moment has come. So Hezbollah is not allowed to be part of the Gaza War.

So that's why today Hezbollah is being very calculated in their responses, very calculated in their attacks along the border. Any attack that goes beyond a certain point that go a little bit deeper into Israel is always claimed by Hamas in Lebanon or the Jemaah Islamiyah or others. Hezbollah only claims the attacks along the border to tell Israel that we have to do this in order not to lose face completely. But they are calculated, and this is not our war yet, not yet. Iran doesn't feel that it is threatened enough to use Hezbollah yet.

They will when they feel they need to, and these two big assets, they will be used when Iran feels that they are under attack itself. And that basically is very good for Hezbollah at this point, because Hezbollah is not ready for war now. They have tons of challenges, and I can go through a lot of the details here, but just to be brief, that after they lost Imad Mughniyeh, their last victory, not only divine victory, their last claimed victory, real victory, was before Mughniyeh was assassinated.

He was killed in Damascus in 2008. Their last victory was claimed in 2006. Since then, it's been a mess, a mess in Syria, a mess in Lebanon, everywhere. And they have lost really the rhetoric of resistance. People don't buy the resistance rhetoric anymore. And today is a big example why they are worried about this rhetoric. Hassan Nasallah, in his first speech after October 7th, he basically said that we're no longer part of the resistance access by saying this is a Palestinian war and the Palestinians will deal with it. So that basically negates his resistance regard.

Nicholas Danforth: And then very briefly, sorry, since we do have to wrap up here, although this is fascinating. I mean, tell us what he said today.

Hanin Ghaddar: So today is basically what he has been saying so far that I am not ready for war. So far what he's been saying today is commenting on the usual, the achievements of the resistance in general, the achievements of the October 7th attack, the achievements in terms of how Israel has changed. Some of it actually is true Israel's intelligence image has been hit. That's very true. Some of it is just exaggerated, but he's only talking about how Israel will be defeated and how October 7th has been a great achievement and that's it, and it's expected.

At the end of the day, Hezbollah cannot really take this as an opportunity to launch a war in order to avenge a Hamas figure, even if it's in the heart of Dahieh, in the heart of their stronghold, in a meeting that occurred in Lebanon, it's still not enough for them to launch a war. People were expecting him to at least do something last night, to come today to the speech with something to offer, like an escalation at the border, a barrage of missiles, long range missiles, some kind of escalation. But I think he is so afraid of an Israeli attack right now that he didn't even go that far. It is very embarrassing for him. He's in a very tough position and it'll be very difficult to come back from.

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you so much for joining us on the Wast.

Hanin Ghaddar: Thank you.