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In 2024, Shanshan Mei and Dennis J. Blasko wrote, “Don’t Ever Invade China: Xi Jinping Prioritizes Border, Coastal, and Air Defense,” where they argued that homeland protection has always been and will continue to be the Chinese military’s primary directive. A year later, amidst developments in both China’s military capabilities and geopolitical shifts, we asked them to revisit their article.Image: U.S. Department of Defense via Wikimedia CommonsIn your 2024 article, “Don’t Ever Invade China: Xi Jinping Prioritizes Border, Coastal, and Air Defense,” you argued that homeland border protection has always been the prime directive for China’s armed forces and would continue to be in the near future. A year later, where does this priority rank in their defense strategy? What tangible developments have we seen that reflect this?Even as China’s military expands its global reach and power-projection capabilities, protection of the mainland and China’s near seas remains a core objective for the Chinese armed forces. Indeed, over the past year, homeland defense has evolved into a multi-domain, joint mission requiring coordination across the army, navy, air force, space, and cyber forces.Since our article was published, the 2024 U.S. Department of Defense report on Chinese military power described the Chinese military’s major reforms to strengthen integrated air defense. The Chinese navy has transferred many of its land-based aircraft to the Chinese air force, including about 300 fighter aircraft: all H-6J bombers and JH-7 maritime-strike aircraft. This restructuring aims to improve command and control over China’s national air-defense network and its system of ground-based radar sites. In parallel, the Chinese air force’s H-6K bombers have begun maritime-strike training, signaling closer cooperation between air and naval forces. The Chinese navy retains one land-based fighter brigade on Hainan Island to secure operations in the South China Sea.These adjustments align with China’s May 2025 white paper, National Security