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A decade into the effort to concretely integrate information warfare into its operations, the Marine Corps appears to be in the thick of another intellectual firefight. Consternation abounds regarding the value of the Marine units organized to employ information related capabilities. Moreover, some observers claim there is a deeper debate about the value of information operations as a central aspect of maneuver warfare.

Such arguments are common in the Marine Corps, especially in the face of change. The professional journal of the Marine Corps was replete with arguments about the service’s identity as early as the journal’s establishment in 1916. The maneuver warfare movement led to fierce debate across the service, culminating in doctrine that defines the Marine Corps to this day. Arguments clamored for a new mission and identity for the service in the waning days of the Global War on Terror. The adoption of Force Design 2030 led to a renaissance in Marine Corps thinking, writing, and speaking on its future, matched by stalwart and stubborn opposition from its fiercest critics. Critical dialogue on every front of the Marine Corps’ future continues, with a special emphasis on the roles and authorities of the Marine littoral regiment and the stand-in force.

As such, another hearty argument about warfighting should be seen as a sign of healthy discourse within the service. However, such discussions should be framed correctly and soundly if they are to serve the good of the Marine Corps and the nation.

While perhaps no marine is neutral regarding the impact of information advantage on warfighting, there are significant disagreements about the means of gaining that information advantage via a unit of action designed to do so within the Fleet Marine Force. I am neutral on that latter point and previously served as an operational planner at a Marine expeditionary force headquarters when debate swirled about the utility and mission of the information group. While not advocating for the group’s maturation or termination, instead I propose how commanders should think about and approach the debate in order to generate sound conclusions and meaningful ways forward.

What follows is not an argument for or against the specific unit of action built to integrate information operations. Rather, it is a discussion about the argument itself. It is intended to provide an aim point to ensure future discourse on this important subject is as valuable as possible.

What the Debate Is and Isn’t

I cannot find evidence of an argument within the Marine Corps against the importance of information operations to maneuver warfare. As a warfighting philosophy, maneuver warfare is characterized by many traits that are achieved by information operations, from decentralized command and control to cognitive defeat mechanisms. The professional journals most closely tied to the Marine Corps and the sea services, the Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings, regularly publish articles authored by marines about information’s many uses and advantages. If anything, there is violent agreement about information’s value as a warfighting function, and commanders and staffs everywhere want more of it, not less.

Inasmuch as a debate exists on the topic of information operations, it is largely centered around a single, formation under which the preponderance of the Marine Corps’ information capabilities are found: the Marine expeditionary force information group (henceforth referred to simply as the “information group” or “group”). There is one such group found within each of the three Marine expeditionary forces, so each three star corps-level Marine commanding general employs one information group commanded by a colonel. Within each group are several subordinate commands, each aligned to information-related capabilities: a communications battalion, support battalion, radio (i.e., signals intelligence) battalion, air naval gunfire liaison company, and an intelligence battalion.

These formations have undergone significant experimentation since their initial activation a decade ago. As with any new enterprise, much was learned along the way, and there is still much to learn. Marines, characteristically as aggressive with organizational adaptation as they are in combat, have not been shy about sharing their assessments of the experiment.

One camp concludes that the experiment is a failure, arguing that the information group does not deliver information warfare effects at the operational level of war as intended. The staff work they perform is unnecessarily duplicative of work conducted at higher echelons. As a result, this camp argues that the information groups should be shuttered.

The other camp argues that information groups contribute to an aggregate deterrence effect by employing their many information related capabilities, and that the friction prohibiting the full potential of information warfare at this echelon resides within fat and unwieldy staff structures outside of the information group. It concludes that the information group’s efforts are value added and that the service should continue optimizing it.

Operational planning teams across each Marine expeditionary force continue to analyze the mission of their information groups, attempting to perfect the mission, organization, and concepts of employment. But with the debate at an apparent impasse, it is unclear if that progress is moving the needle forward or backward.

At the core of the debate are two simple questions: Are these units worth the resources placed against them, and how do you test for that?

What Will and Won’t Test the Information Group

As these units continue to evolve and the debate regarding their efficacy continues, commanders and staff officers should focus the debate on criteria which will prove the unit’s value — or disprove it. To truly be good stewards of their nation’s interests and the marines under their charge, Marine leaders should be agnostic toward the outcome, so long as the outcome is valid.

Approaches to Abandon

First, given how much attention has been given to unsound approaches, it’s worth highlighting what arguments to avoid. Practitioners need not appeal to the value of information as a warfighting function or as an enabler of operational art. As discussed above, there is no debate on that subject in the Marine Corps. You will find few fiercer advocates for deception, surprise, decentralized command and control, and shattering an enemy’s mental and moral cohesion than the maneuverists that are marines. Emphasizing this as a core of the debate incorrectly bins opponents of the information group as opponents of information’s value.

Moreover, pointing to the corpus of books and doctrinal publications about information is not useful. Identifying the plethora of military literature asserting the value of information operations does just that — asserts the value of information — and no more. But the existence of doctrine neither proves the value of its claims, nor does it prove the value of a particular unit.

Additionally, analysts should avoid pointing to the existence of information capabilities and their employment as validating. Just because the information group fields forces with information capabilities does not prove the value proposition of the headquarters sitting atop them. Even if the information forces are organized together as a task unit before ”chopping” them to the using unit, if the using unit simply piecemeals them out for conventional use, then no points are won. This merely highlights the information group as a force provider.

For example, marines that are chopped to the Marine expeditionary unit are employed under the tactical control of the staff section to which their capabilities fall. Communications marines sent here from the information group’s communications battalion are placed under the tactical control of the Marine expeditionary unit’s S-6, or communications, section. The same holds true with every other information related capability similarly chopped to a using unit.

Why the force provider argument is so obtuse is that this approach is little different from the predecessor to the information group, the Marine expeditionary force headquarters group. Then as now, information capabilities existed administratively under the headquarters group, but were chopped to their using units, transferring command relationships appropriately. Focusing on the employment of information forces themselves merely gives more credence to the idea that the information group is the headquarters group of old, albeit with better branding.

Finally, highlighting particular programs of record employed by the information group, such as the Maven Smart System, is an unproductive line of reasoning. Not only is this an errant pursuit of the technological “silver bullet” fallacy, but these same capabilities exist across the joint force and are now standard fare across the Marine Corps. This fails to demonstrate any distinct value of the information group, and the rationale runs counter to maneuver warfare as a warfighting philosophy.

Approaches to Explore

Instead of the above lines of argument, those intent on exploring or optimizing the value of the information group should focus on approaches that demonstrate whether or not it is greater than the sum of its parts. This is a tried-and-true test of any intermediate headquarters, in particular at the regimental and group level. Typically, such headquarters have additional enablers and staff sections that can coordinate, synchronize, and prioritize the combat power or capability resident within its subordinate units.

The information groups have such an organization that does this not just for itself, but for the Marine expeditionary force writ large: the information coordination center. This center plans, coordinates, integrates, and employs information activities on behalf of the Marine expeditionary force commander, facilitating friendly maneuver and denying enemy freedom of action in the information environment. Of note, this center is comprised of personnel from the information group’s headquarters, its subordinate battalions, and is organized and employed by the information group’s commander. This is a unique contribution that did not exist under the former construct of the Marine expeditionary force headquarters group, and is a distinct contribution of the information group.

What should be determined, though, is whether or not the information coordination center is a more effective means of organizing information activities than other staff sections that currently exist within the Marine expeditionary force headquarters. As an example, the G-2 fusion cell collates data to provide a more comprehensive picture of the battlespace. Are there elements of this function that are now duplicated at the information coordination center? Whether or not they are unnecessarily redundant, which element performs this function in a way that better supports the commander? And finally, is the effect generated by the information coordination center worth the additional personnel and resources that are sourced from the information group’s subordinate battalions, when compared to the opportunity cost of allowing these same personnel to otherwise provide general support to the rest of the Marine expeditionary force?

Another important avenue of exploration pertains to authorities and their execution. A common critique of the information groups is that while they have personnel who are trained and equipped to execute various information activities, the information group lacks the authorities to employ them. Many such authorities initially reside at the combatant commander level and might be delegated to a joint task force commander. This creates the risk that while the Marine Corps is expending significant resources to train marines in information warfare, their skills are of limited use because the Marines reside at a colonel level headquarters instead of at a four star combatant command.

This is an important consideration, but that line of reasoning doesn’t give full credit to the utility of having such skillsets at lower echelons. While residing within the information group, these information Marines serve at the behest of the Marine expeditionary force, or three star corps level commander. These Marines are subsequently the subject matter experts who are uniquely trained in requesting the given information effects that might otherwise be retained by the combatant commander, but which will be employed on behalf of a subordinate formation. Such relationships exist across echelons throughout the joint force.

What should be demonstrated, then, is that having these information enablers at this echelon, under the information group construct, is the optimal way to employ these Marines, achieve the effects they provide, and is done in a way justifying their placement at the information group compared to placement at other echelons or organized under different constructs.

Thinking First, Adapting Fast

Reasonable leaders will disagree on the application of scarce resources. The debate surrounding the information group is no different. At its heart, this argument is not about the information group, but about how to best achieve information advantage with the forces the Marine Corps can afford to train and equip.

Because ten years ago the Marine Corps elected to stand up the information group, this has served as the locus of the debate, which is about means and ways, rather than about ends.

It is unclear if the information group is the optimal way to achieve information advantage. It is certainly a way, but whether it is the most effective way while also being feasible, suitable, and acceptable to the service is unclear.

To help settle this issue, leaders charged with iterating on the information group’s design should avoid entrenchment around the value of information itself, avoid emphasizing the provision of information forces, and not hold up individual programs of record. None of these elements prove the case under discussion.

Instead the debate ought to focus on whether the information group is worth the value invested into it, if it is greater than the sum of its parts, and whether it is a more useful means of synchronizing information than the legacy method that redundantly occurs at higher echelons. Exploring the debate focused on these areas will yield the data Marine leaders need to make better decisions on the future of the information group.

Brian Kerg is a Marine Corps operational planner, strategic planner, and a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is currently the commanding officer, Marine Wing Communications Squadron-38.

The views in this article are those of the author and not those of Marine Corps, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Gunnery Sgt. Daniel Wetzel via DVIDS