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Recent months have brought a startling shift in U.S.-Pakistani relations. On Sept. 25, President Donald Trump hosted Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, at the White House, marking the latest sign of improving relations. The warming up began with Trump inviting Munir to lunch at the White House earlier in June — the first time a U.S. president had hosted a Pakistani military chief unaccompanied by civilian leaders. Munir was back within two months, sitting in the front row at U.S. Central Command’s change of command ceremony in Florida. Concrete policy moves accompanied this burst of protocol. Islamabad secured the lowest tariff rate it enjoys in any major market. The Balochistan Liberation Army was elevated to full Foreign Terrorist Organization status by the U.S. Department of State. A long-dormant joint counter-terrorism dialogue was reconvened in Islamabad. Washington also signaled new cooperation on critical minerals and hydrocarbons. For a relationship long defined by suspicion and drift, these developments suggest a significant recalibration in U.S. South Asia policy.
However, this pivot does not amount to a long-term shift in U.S. strategy. This is tactical statecraft with narrow objectives: to build supply chain resilience for U.S. industry and defense, clawing back some leverage against China, and to remind India that Washington retains options. It is hard-edged and can even be made useful, but it also carries risks.
Washington’s Tactical Math
Beneath the diplomatic fanfare sits a clear transactional logic. A key priority seems to be securing access to critical minerals — from copper and rare earths to materials used in batteries and missiles. China dominates key mineral supply chains. It once restricted rare earth exports, forcing the United States to make significant concessions. Washington seeks diversified access — without relying on Chinese chokepoints. Pakistan sits atop an enormous and largely untapped $6 trillion worth of deposits in Balochistan. Early moves — U.S. commercial delegations, memorandums, and agreements — all signal intent: friendly supply chains on U.S. terms. In this sense, the U.S. outreach aligns with its broader strategy of reconfiguring Indo-Pacific supply networks.
The realignment also involves counter-terrorism cooperation. The August foreign terrorist organization designation of the Balochistan Liberation Army — along with a renewed counter-terrorism dialogue in Islamabad — syncs American legal tools and Pakistani security priorities, after years of friction over Afghanistan. That cooperation offers near-term gains against violent groups that can target both Pakistani authorities and foreign projects, including potential U.S. investments in critical minerals in this region.
Another motivation is nudging an increasingly aloof India back toward a reliable alignment by reminding it that it is not indispensable to U.S. strategy. After years of a New Delhi-centric strategy, the White House is signaling to India that Pakistan can also be leveraged when convenient. The timing is telling. Trump’s aggressive tariff campaign against India in August sharply escalated tensions. India now faces a 50 percent U.S. tariff wall, even as Pakistan faces a comparatively lower 19 percent rate — an asymmetry that upsets India and sweetens the pot for Pakistan. Against this backdrop, showcasing access for Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership at the White House is as much a message to India as it is a bet on Pakistan.
What Pakistan Gains and Risks
From Islamabad’s perspective, the payoffs are immediate. Diplomatically and economically, it has regained relevance — a windfall for a country that has long been frustrated by the U.S. focus on India. Sharif’s Washington visit, after a long hiatus by Pakistan’s civilian leaders, gave Pakistan a seat at the table. Economically, U.S. attention is shifting capital toward mining and hydrocarbons — sectors that Pakistani elites consider the country’s escape route from financial stress. The minerals agreement is an opening bid, adding to momentum around Reko Diq and other big-ticket extractives that multilateral lenders view as strategically significant in the global energy transition.
Yet the path is narrow. Heavy U.S. investment and military engagement will inevitably bolster Pakistan’s security establishment, which already dominates the country’s politics. The new deals are largely being brokered and implemented by entities with military connections. For example, the key mining agreement was signed between the Frontier Works Organization — a military-owned conglomerate run by a general — and a Missouri mining firm. The military will capture the benefits while democratic oversight remains weak. Moreover, development in resource-rich Balochistan may ignite insurgent reprisals. The Balochistan Liberation Army has made clear that it opposes Islamabad-backed extractive projects that do not benefit local Baloch communities. American-backed mines or oilfields in Balochistan could thus become flashpoints for terrorism, undermining both U.S. corporate interests and Pakistani stability.
The India Factor
In New Delhi, Trump’s outreach to Islamabad has been met with alarm and dismay. The Modi administration sees these developments as a double blow. After years of bipartisan U.S.-Indian cooperation, Delhi’s policy elite now questions Washington’s reliability. They have expressed resentment at perceived parity with Pakistan. The trust deficit runs deep as a result. High-tech and defense cooperation — once cornerstones of the relationship — are now viewed with skepticism. For example, India’s flagship 10-year Major Defense Partnership framework remains unsigned and uncertain. U.S.-led initiatives on technology co-development are faltering. Several arms sales in the pipeline have stalled amid the diplomatic chill.
The net effect is that India’s enthusiasm for its partnership with the United States is cooling. Polite reassurances by U.S. officials sound hollow against the backdrop of crushing trade penalties and sharp geopolitical turns. The near-term risk is not a rupture but a slowing of the U.S.-Indian agenda in defense co-production and advanced tech — areas where momentum and bureaucratic staffing matter.
Trump’s Pakistan pivot seems to be calibrated against New Delhi’s strategic hedge with Moscow and Beijing. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, India has become the biggest buyer of Russian crude oil. Washington’s punitive tariffs, which took effect in late August, have not deterred New Delhi, which continues to buy near-peak volumes as an assertion of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. There is also an apparent rapprochement with China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the first time since 2018 to participate in the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin. Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed on a number of key initiatives, including peacefully resolving their border disputes and supporting a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Bank that would lend outside the U.S.-dollar system — steps Modi framed as advancing India’s multipolar vision. However, structural frictions rooted in the unresolved border dispute, China’s coercive economic tools, and its tilt towards Pakistan keep the relationship stuck in a cycle of managed crises rather than reconciliation, leaving room for the U.S. to reverse the bad days in its relations with India.
Washington’s “Pakistan option” can be real leverage with India only if it is bounded and paired with affirmative inducements for New Delhi. Otherwise, it appears to be a blunt instrument that yields some gains in Islamabad while pushing India toward hedging — harder bargains on defense-industrial deals, increased diversification in tech ecosystems, and a tighter grip on strategic autonomy with Russia. If the aim is to build a broader anti-China coalition in the Indo-Pacific, eroding trust with its largest pillar is expensive.
Ego, the Afghan Frontier, and the Gulf Triangle
Beyond critical mineral access and India-centric objectives, America’s tilt toward Pakistan can be explained by diplomatic maneuvering by practical needs. Trump tends to respond to overt personal validation, and Pakistan’s leaders have taken advantage of that. Senior Pakistani leaders publicly lauded Trump’s “peacemaker” role and even floated a Nobel Peace Prize nomination — praise that tracked with Islamabad’s broader courtship, from minerals to market access. By contrast, New Delhi has made it clear that it will not play along. Modi and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar have repeatedly denied that Washington mediated the May ceasefire with Pakistan, issuing formal statements at the United Nations and on the floor of the Indian Parliament. Those rebuffs help explain why flattery from Islamabad lands while Indian counterparts fall behind.
The United States still needs Pakistan for broader counter-terrorism support to watch jihadist groups in Afghanistan and along its frontier. Pakistan has also been facing rising threats from Afghanistan-linked groups. This is the practical backdrop for the formal U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism Dialogue, which reconvened in Islamabad in August to tighten watchlists, financial tracking, and casework far beyond Balochistan. The United States also has a straightforward interest in keeping a modest U.S. foothold in Pakistan’s defense market. Limited support for existing U.S. gear, such as F-16s, keeps American firms involved, preserves leverage with Islamabad, and can be framed at home as “supporting U.S. jobs” without altering the military balance in South Asia.
Then there is the Gulf triangle. Pakistan’s army has unusually deep ties with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar — built over decades of training, advisory billets, and periodic troop rotations. In mid-September 2025, Riyadh and Islamabad signed a mutual defense pact that formalizes their relationship. For Washington, maintaining a steadier line to Islamabad may make three conversations more streamlined: deterring Iran and managing risks from Yemen with Gulf partners, coordinating through oil market shocks, and securing airspace for any future over-the-horizon counter-terrorism missions.
The Path Forward
The United States needs to pair the stick with a serious carrot for India. If tariffs are leverage, trade them for tangible Indian concessions in areas Washington actually cares about. In parallel, accelerate the 10-year defense framework and revive staffing and budgets so ongoing programs don’t wither while negotiators bargain. Offer some deliverables that matter in India: approvals on sensitive tech transfers, timelines for co-production milestones, and a visible queue of joint tests and exercises that make the defense-industrial roadmap look real, not rhetorical.
Washington should limit and condition its engagement with Pakistan’s security establishment. The minerals bet is worth trying — but only with enforceable standards and civilian visibility. Counter-terrorism cooperation should stay mission-bound. Target groups that attack civilians and critical infrastructure, share intelligence for interdictions, and build forensic capacity — but resist the slide into open-ended security assistance that blurs the line between domestic repression and counter-terrorism. On governance, the United States should condition security sector assistance on measurable transparency, including third-party audits for military-run enterprises engaged in U.S.-linked projects.
Broaden — don’t just balance — South Asia. Don’t let an Indian-Pakistani framework eclipse the rest of the region. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal serve as the connective tissue for supply chains, maritime awareness, and resilience in response to China’s economic pressure. Offer them more tangible benefits, including concessional finance for digital and critical infrastructure, maritime domain awareness packages that integrate with U.S. and Quad data pipelines, as well as debt management and infrastructure governance advice that protects them against predatory concessions. A denser web of middle-power partnerships gives Washington options when New Delhi hesitates and adds weight when Islamabad wobbles.
Keep the crisis ladder short. The U.S.-Pakistani military channel is useful for de-escalation — but pair it with predictable public lines during Indian-Pakistani flare-ups. Condemn terror attacks unambiguously, defend both countries’ right to self-defense within international law, and reinforce red lines against nuclear escalation. That stance denies spoilers the perception of U.S. ambivalence while preserving the private space to lean on both sides.
Trump’s courtship of Pakistan is a tactical play that can result in broader ripple effects. On the upside, it opens a mineral corridor for U.S. and allied supply chains, revives a counter-terrorism channel that still serves mutual interests, and reminds India that Washington has options. On the downside, it risks deepening Pakistan’s military-dominated political economy, igniting new conflicts in Balochistan if benefit-sharing fails, and squandering hard-won trust in New Delhi at a time when the United States needs a robust defense tech partnership to compete with China. The move can still yield a positive outcome — for Washington and regional stability — if the administration treats Pakistan as a limited partner and continues to keep options open for Delhi to get back on track. Otherwise, today’s tactical romance may become tomorrow’s strategic hangover.
Muhib Rahman, Ph.D., is a Perry World House postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. A former research fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (under the Bangladeshi Ministry of Foreign Affairs), his research focuses on interstate conflict, border security, defense cooperation, and civil-military relations, with a particular emphasis on South Asia and U.S. policy toward the region.
Image: Midjourney
