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Those expecting a solid rapprochement between India and China may be misreading the situation, as structural frictions between the two countries endure. Among these, the unresolved border dispute remains at the core of their mistrust.

India and China appear to be reviving their dialogue of cooperation against a backdrop of turbulence given by the imposition of U.S. tariffs and broader shifts in the international order. Recent months have seen signs of a softening in Sino-Indian relations, despite contradictory pressures. The latter include China’s support for Pakistan during its latest confrontation with India in May 2025, the initiation of the controversial Yarlung Zangbo dam, and intensified economic coercion through new regulations on critical minerals, agricultural inputs, equipment for the construction of a high-speed rail, and electronics. Paradoxically, these pressures coincided with engagement efforts such as Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s amicable visit for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization foreign ministers meeting, government advisors proposing that Chinese firms would be allowed up to 24 percent stakes in Indian companies without prior approval, resumption of tourism visas and direct flights, and optimistic bilateral statements on managing boundary disputes.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China on Aug. 31 — the first in seven years — to attend the two-day meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was received as a symbolic moment of goodwill. Modi affirmed the two powers should be partners and not rivals, while equally positive statements were made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, noting that it is the “right choice for China and India to be good and neighborly friends.”

For many, the statements and images generated optimism that the two Asian giants might finally move towards a more stable relationship. Yet, such optimism risks overlooking deeper, unresolved tensions. The same Shanghai Cooperation Organization embodies this “frenemy” reality: For Beijing, this platform is a means to showcase regional leadership; while for New Delhi, it might be more of a necessity to maintain a seat at the table.

Hence, beyond gestures, is a friendly partnership between India and China truly possible or realistic? While both countries have strong incentives to cooperate, unresolved disputes and enduring mistrust raise doubts about the durability of any rapprochement. Trump’s strategy has arguably altered the political context. However, Modi’s absence from Beijing’s military parade a few days after the summit suggests limits to the warmth displayed. Ultimately, a normalization of relations may be fragile at best, as structural tensions, most notably their unresolved border dispute, continue to undermine trust, and India faces the risk of being increasingly vulnerable to Chinese regional influence.

Spotlight on the Border Dispute

As two critical nodes in the Asian power structure, India and China have a complex relationship characterized by phases of cooperation and competition. On the surface, several factors push for cooperation. The economic relationship between the two is significant, with China being one of India’s largest trading partners, which has acted as an anchor preventing relations from veering completely into hostility. At the global level, both countries share a preference for a multipolar order, resisting the hegemony of any single power, even if their visions differ in practice. However, beneath these points of convergence lies a more complicated reality.

Against this backdrop, the border issue provides one of the most consistent sources of confrontation, explanatory of a core dynamic in Sino-Indian relations. The strategic dilemma at the Himalayan boundary has deep historical roots. Indeed, since its independence in 1947, India’s northern borders have remained theaters of recurring clashes. Among these, the Sino-Indian War in 1962 marked the deepest rupture, with China’s offensive leaving India militarily defeated and psychologically scarred. This conflict shaped New Delhi’s view of Beijing as a long-term adversary. The following near-war in 1987 underscored the volatility of their relations, though it also paved the way for the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control, which aimed to institutionalize de-escalation mechanisms on the border.

Despite this framework, the strategic challenge remained. By the early 2000s, China embarked on an infrastructure development project in Tibet, the Qinghai-Tibet railway line, which would have significantly enhanced Beijing’s military logistics and troop mobility along the Line of Actual Control. This infrastructure would have allowed China to rapidly deploy its troops to the frontline, effectively altering the strategic balance in the area. In response, amid a growing assertiveness of Beijing in the broader region, India undertook a defense buildup in 2007, in the pursuit of a greater military posture that would be able to credibly deter Chinese temptations to undertake territorial incursions. Interestingly enough, during this period of undergoing military reinforcement on the border, both countries increased their bilateral trade.

By mid-2009, there were public signs of frustration over the unequal benefits from the general policy of engagement. A perception gained ground in New Delhi that China was the only major power seemingly unreconciled to India’s rise. The feeling in India was, and still is, that China is not willing to give due weight to India on global or regional matters. Furthermore, Beijing’s economic engagement through the development of infrastructural projects and its increasing presence in the Indian Ocean heightened these anxieties. As C. Raja Mohan observed, China’s infrastructure buildup in Tibet increased India’s strategic vulnerabilities, while its global initiatives appeared to bypass or undermine India’s interests.

In this context, efforts to manage the border continued, including the establishment of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination in 2012, but it did little to shift the perception that China sought to constrain India’s strategic space. In 2013, the Depsang standoff marked a revival of tensions. When the Bharatiya Janata Party won an absolute majority in 2014 and Narendra Modi became prime minister, he initially expressed willingness to engage constructively with Beijing, especially through deepening economic ties. However, Modi also invoked rhetoric about China’s “expansionist mindset” during his election campaign. In his efforts, India’s prime minister balanced the pursuit of trade and investment with an assertive response to Chinese actions. During Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to India, Modi directly raised concerns over Chinese incursions at Chumar, signaling willingness to confront Beijing more robustly. The instability over the border and of broader conflicting views thus set the stage for the crises that followed, from Doklam in 2017 to Ladakh in 2020.

Cycles of Escalation and De-Escalation

The Doklam standoff of 2017 is a rampant example of the recurring cycle of escalation and de-escalation between New Delhi and Beijing. The Doklam plateau is a disputed patch of land between Bhutan, China, and India. In mid-June 2017, Chinese military road crews began to extend a road in this area, reaching closer to India’s Siliguri Corridor, also called the “Chicken’s Neck,” a narrow, strategic passage connecting India’s northeast to the rest of the country. This action was a relatively cheap and clear way for Beijing to advance its claims in the dispute, while also establishing infrastructure for further intelligence gathering on Indian military troops.

However, India quickly deployed its troops into the disputed territory, under the 2007 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, impeding the roadwork. Both sides engaged in risky confrontation, testing each other’s resolve, before ultimately retreating through diplomatic channels. The statements issued by Beijing echoed historical confrontations such as the 1962 war, and both sides relied on heavy and tense tones. The standoff, while bearing no actual disclosed combat, was one of the most serious engagements between India and China in almost 55 years, igniting fears of another military clash between the two countries. Furthermore, it signaled an even more dangerous trend: the normalization of high-risk confrontation. Indeed, if military posturing increased and diplomatic retaliation relied on tense tones, in parallel, the economic ties between India and China were growing.

Only after over two months of standoff, through the established working mechanisms, both sides agreed to withdraw troops to their original positions. The disengagement in Doklam enabled Modi to travel to Xiamen in China for the BRICS summit in September 2017. The wave of de-escalation was further welcomed with multiple signs of improvements, such as the informal summit between Modi and Xi in Wuhan and the parallel foreign ministers meeting at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In their first bilateral meeting the following year, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit at Bishkek in June 2019, Modi told Xi that there had been “a new momentum and stability’” in Sino-Indian relations as a result of an improvement in the strategic communication between the two sides, and this would make them “more sensitive towards each other’s concerns and interests.”

The wave of de-escalation proved to be fragile. The abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution in August 2019, which made Ladakh a separate union territory to be administered directly from New Delhi, created a new bone of contention between India and China. In an effort to support Pakistan to internationalize the Kashmir issue at the United Nations, China criticized India’s actions as directly affecting its interests. As its attempt failed, China began enhancing its military deployments along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh, particularly near Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, and Pangong Lake in April 2020. As a response, India countered Chinese positioning in May 2020, which led to a series of standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in different areas along the Line of Actual Control. Whilst both governments attempted to downplay tensions, the stand-off escalated into a violent confrontation in Galwan Valley in mid-June 2020.

The clashes of 2020 marked an even sharper turning point: Unlike Doklam, the Galwan Valley confrontation resulted in fatalities on both sides, the first ones in decades. In Ladakh, China’s surprise move to militarily occupy key positions at multiple points forced India to mobilize quickly. Yet, India’s response was stronger than in the earlier 2017 episode. Despite the diplomatic effort, China continued strengthening positions at Pangong Tso, Depsang, and Hot Springs with new bunkers, roads, and fortifications. India responded by mirroring China’s troop presence. Ultimately, the Indian Army launched Operation Snow Leopard at the end of August 2020, w aiming to take control of the strategic heights in the Pangong Lake area and other friction points. This military operation arguably brought the two sides to the edge of conflict in the most acute way. Meanwhile, as the diplomatic stalemate persisted, military reinforcement was coupled with economic countermeasures, such as further restrictions on Chinese investments and apps. These actions, while primarily protectionist against economic vulnerability, might have also aimed at demonstrating resilience as, while Beijing may have enjoyed an initial advantage in the confrontation, India signaled its determination not to be caught off guard again.

An attempt to intensify efforts to disengage and de-escalate occurred when Modi and Xi met briefly on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in 2023. Yet, it proved to be unsuccessful. Only in the summer of 2024 did momentum pick up, and in September 2024, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar said that about 75 percent of the “disengagement” problems at India’s border with China had been resolved.

Even so, the resolution was partial at best. Beijing continues to expand strategic infrastructure and enhance military deployments, including the Hotan-Shigatse railway line paralleling friction zones in eastern Ladakh, with plans to extend toward Yadong near Doklam Valley. Since June 2025, discussions between India and China on clarifying and demarcating the long-disputed boundary have become more ambitious, signaling potential progress, though substantive change remains limited. The management of confrontations on the border has thus remained a “management” as such, rather than achieving a long-lasting restoration of trust.

In light of the above, several factors nurture this cycle. First, the Himalayas are not a settled frontier but a historically “contested geography,” producing constant frictions. Each new road, bridge, or troop deployment shifts the tactical balance, making confrontation nearly automatic. Second, each time the two powers engage at the border, they manage to de-escalate, making these standoffs become normal tools of statecraft. In this dynamic, asymmetry matters: China, the stronger power, sees little incentive to concede, while India cannot accept perpetual disadvantage. Third, nationalism is a political resource on both sides. Chinese leaders invoke territorial integrity to project strength. Indian leaders highlight toughness against China, partly to avoid looking weak and partly because any change in the Indian territory requires parliamentary approval. This allows border incidents to be politicized, narrowing room for compromise. Fourth, standoffs serve as cost-effective signals: China reminds India of its vulnerability, while India demonstrates resilience. Each confrontation thus also becomes about credibility and deterrence. Finally, existing mechanisms manage rather than resolve disputes. The main issue, however, is that most of these mechanisms are activated only once the crisis has begun. They are crisis control valves, not conflict prevention tools, and hence every flare-up is “contained” but never fundamentally solved. Furthermore, as the border dispute has deeper historical legacies and political stakes, the two sides might even avoid using them at the right time to maintain domestic credibility or wait until the one side has demonstrated enough restraint.

Strategic Implications: India’s Dilemma and Imperatives

The persistence of crisis management at the border without resolution underscores a structural nature of the Sino-Indian rivalry. What appears as normalization is often a fragile truce, which is again easily jeopardized by localized confrontations. Meanwhile, China’s multifaceted influence, through military pressure, economic leverage, diplomatic isolation, and technological dominance, places India on the defensive.

The stakes extend beyond bilateral engagements at the border. The same economic ties, rather than stabilizing the relationship, have become a source of friction. India faces a massive trade deficit with China, while disputes over market access and resource competition persist. Beijing’s recent use of economic tools, from export controls on rare earth minerals, which are critical for India’s technology sector, to restrictions on fertilizers and machinery, has reinforced India’s vulnerabilities. Rather than offering reassurances of a more balanced future, China’s approach has underlined India’s acute dependencies, deepening mistrust. While India and China cooperate publicly, they remain economically interdependent and strategic rivals, highlighting the fragility of the “win-win” narrative that often frames the relationship.

On the broader level, there is little alignment as well. China’s long-time partnership with Pakistan is seen as an affront, including the Belt and Road Initiative’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as well as broader efforts to project its influence into other countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives. In turn, India seeks to convince other countries in the region to halt or reduce Beijing’s strategic footprint in their territories. Additionally, New Delhi has sought to build its own relationships with China’s neighbors. For instance, India cooperated with Vietnam in its exploration for minerals in the South China Sea and took steps toward selling BrahMos missiles to the Philippines. The Trump factor further complicates India’s strategic calculus with China, and despite U.S. tariffs, the reality is that New Delhi may not afford to move away from Washington either.

India and China thus remain locked in a “frenemy” dynamic, compelled to cooperate yet bound to confront, with the border dispute at the heart of these tensions. Economic interdependence coexists with a strategic rivalry in which border disputes perpetuate cycles of escalation. India’s real dilemma, then, is not whether it can “manage” China but whether it can escape becoming a permanent crisis manager, locked into reacting to Beijing’s moves rather than shaping the strategic environment itself.

Economic interdependence has proven illusory, serving as a lever of coercion rather than stability, while U.S. support cannot substitute for India’s own structural transformation. New Delhi should therefore develop an economic resilience that reduces its dependence from Chinese trade and technology, while strengthening its alliances with other influential countries to gain leverage. Simultaneously, India should upgrade its border infrastructure, enhance surveillance and reform its crisis management mechanisms to anticipate rather than simply containing standoffs, while pursuing diplomacy selectively.

The future trajectory at the border remains uncertain, and several developments could exacerbate tensions. The acceleration of Chinese infrastructure along the disputed sectors, increased troop deployments, and domestic nationalism further limit room for compromise. Conversely, progress could be possible should the two countries institutionalize military-to-military communications, clarify and codify rules of engagement beyond the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, and establish a long-term framework that reduces strategic risk. Until then, gestures of rapprochement, such as the recent ones displayed at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, will remain symbolic, and India risks drifting into a future where its China policy is defined not by strategy but by survival.

Chiara Boldrini is a final-year Ph.D. candidate at the University of Bologna. Previously, she has been a Fulbright Visiting Researcher at Boston College and Visiting Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research in New Delhi.

Image: Indian Prime Minister’s Office via Wikimedia Commons