When the world's at stake,
go beyond the headlines.

China’s increasingly powerful military has bracketed Taiwan with exercises. Its air and naval forces launch daily incursions, and Beijing has erased the unofficial maritime border between them. Yet, many Americans are baffled by a Taiwanese public that is seemingly oblivious, resigned, or apathetic to these threats.

Taiwan’s former cultural minister lamented the absence of a “will to fight” crucial to the island’s defense. Current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby has criticized Taiwan for “showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses.” Why should the United States defend Taiwan if Taiwan won’t defend itself?

But a closer look shows that the real problem is political polarization, not will to fight.

More Resolve Than You Think

Multiple overlapping indicators demonstrate that a majority — if not a supermajority — of Taiwanese are motivated to defend their country, eager for organization and leadership, and are deeply interested in civil defense training opportunities.

Surveys consistently  find that over two-thirds of Taiwanese are willing to fight and defend their country if China invades. Support for conscription is higher in Taiwan than it is in South Korea, even among conscription-age cohorts.

Beyond polls, civil defense training from groups like Kuma Academy and Forward Alliance are fully booked months in advance. Medical doctors have lined up around the block to participate in classes on trauma medicine and treating gunshot wounds, incidents that are extremely rare in Taiwan, but may be common during a crisis.

This seriousness of purpose is reflected in defense policy as well. Although there is still much work to do, Taiwan has increased its military budget by over 10 percent in the past two years, and 76.8 percent since 2016. Defense spending comprised 15 percent of the central government budget in 2024 and 22 percent in 2025 — both a larger proportion than in the United States. Taiwan is expanding its indigenous defense industry, which produces more anti-ship missiles than the United States annually. The Taiwanese government also announced that defense spending will reach 3.32 percent of GDP in 2026, with three percent acting as a floor going forward.

Moreover, this amount does not include spending on “whole of society resilience” — formally coordinated civilian, military, and government preparation for invasion. What many in the United States see as Taiwanese apathy or resignation is, in fact, a lack of direction, leadership, and organization. But this is a monumental task: The United States has not had a coordinated, nationwide civil defense exercise since the end of the Cold War. Civil defense planning in the United States is fragmented across private, local, state, and federal government actors. Current U.S. efforts do not prepare the American public for protracted war or threats to the homeland. Without knowing about and consistently practicing a coherent response plan to a distant but pressing threat, many people might simply go about their lives.

Whole of society resilience provides that response plan, preparing the Taiwanese to organize and outlast a possible Chinese invasion or blockade. The Lai government has increased the realism and comprehensiveness of the annual Han Kuang exercise. It doubled the exercise’s length, simulated a greater range of urban combat scenarios, ran it unscripted, and involved significantly more reserve forces. It added civil defense and infrastructure protection components, including evacuation drills and transporting troops and equipment through the Taipei subway.

The exercise was widely publicized in the news and on social media, including videos produced by Taiwan’s Military News Agency with English subtitles. This drew significant local and international media attention to the exercise, carrying additional benefits. The more Taiwan demonstrates its defensive capabilities and preparations, the more willing Washington is to support it. The more Taiwanese engage in civil defense preparations, the more social pressure fence sitters face, prompting them to participate as well.

Listen to this episode of The Insider featuring authors Raymond Kuo and Catherine Kish by becoming a War on the Rocks member here.

The Politics of Paralysis

The real obstacle is political polarization. This stems from a weakness in Taiwan’s political institutions, despite their overall strength. Shielded within local strongholds, parties can appeal to narrow constituencies and ignore broader public opinion. From that platform, politicians have fueled skepticism of U.S. support and lobbed accusations of warmongering against civil defense efforts.

Taiwan’s opposition parties have attacked the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s attempts at defense reform. The Kuomintang has accused President Lai Ching-te of provoking war for personal political gain. In 2024, the Ministry of Education issued a controversial “Youth Service Consent Form” that appeared to be mobilizing high school students for civil defense, causing panic among parents. Though the form was discontinued almost immediately, opposition party members denounced Lai and the Democratic Progressive Party for preparing to send children to die on the battlefield.

Opposition legislators criticized this year’s Han Kuang exercise — which featured a significant civil defense component — as the government attempting to manufacture public fear of impending national destruction. They also proposed amendments to the Civil Defense Act and National Mobilization Act in 2024. These would have prevented civilians from supporting defensive military operations.

A recent RAND report found that political polarization within Taiwan weakens the effectiveness of whole-of-society mobilization. Without cross-party support for civil defense, mobilization planning, resilience-related efforts, and public engagement programs faces significant headwinds. Because opposition parties hold a majority of county and city leadership positions, local-level engagement on whole of society resilience has been fitful. Some politicians have accused a civil defense group of profiting off of cross-Strait tensions and promised investigations.

America Can Help

America’s role is not limited to supplying arms. Washington also has unique leverage to strengthen Taiwan’s civil defense, where even modest U.S. statements, cooperative efforts, and policy shifts can yield outsized effects.

Most importantly, the U.S. government can publicly laud societal resilience efforts. This will cut through Taiwanese polarization, providing political encouragement for cities and counties to join the central government’s preparations. This is a rare instance where public diplomacy on its own can decisively clear partisan obstacles to serious defense efforts.

The Trump administration’s stance towards Taiwan hasn’t been made clear yet. The White House imposed 20 percent tariffs on Taiwanese exports, putting them at a five percentage-point disadvantage to their Japanese and South Korean competitors. Over the summer, the Trump administration also instructed the Lai government to cancel planned stopovers in New York City and Dallas as it sought to keep trade talks and a possible fall summit with Beijing on track.

Civil defense ultimately benefits U.S. interests. The more cohesive and organized Taiwan’s society is, the more effectively it can move and resupply forces at beachheads — bleeding or even defeating invading Chinese military units. The more it stockpiles food, water, and energy, the longer its population can survive a blockade. The longer Taiwan holds out, the more decision-making space that opens for Washington, Tokyo, and others to respond.

In an ideal world, Taiwan would face a trade-off between the marginal benefits of increased societal resilience versus further weapons acquisition. But Taiwan is still awaiting the delivery of the $21.54 billion backlog of U.S.-built weapons that it paid for, but that U.S. defense manufacturers are struggling to produce. Even if that equipment appeared in armories tomorrow, developing and training effective concepts of operations can take months.

Civil defense enhancements can more immediately contribute to Taiwan’s overarching security, with less strain on U.S. production capacity or budgets. U.S. federal and state agencies could share lessons learned in protecting critical infrastructure, maintaining government functions during disasters, and establishing secure communications. During an invasion, destruction of communication networks would cut off civil defense actors from the central government. U.S. military, political, and business leaders could provide training in crisis decision-making to lower-echelon Taiwanese governmental, civil society, and military leaders.

Washington could also facilitate Taiwanese engagement with other countries, who are themselves innovating on civil defense. Finland’s National Defense Training Association, for example, standardizes instruction across civil defense organizations, tracks training by individual, and conducts readiness assessments. The association also serves as the liaison between member groups and the national government. Similarly, Estonia’s Cyber Defence League could serve as a model for cybersecurity cooperation between the government, nonprofits, and private enterprises. Singapore’s Volunteer Corps opens civil defense opportunities to women, as well as structuring medical and cybersecurity training that go beyond the standard conscription.

Although it has a long way to go, Taiwan is making enormous strides in preparing its government, society, and military to face China’s multidimensional challenges. Washington has a critical opportunity to cut through polarization and bolster defense efforts beyond the military to the whole of Taiwanese society.

Raymond Kuo is director of RAND’s Taiwan Policy Initiative and a senior political scientist at RAND.

Catherine Kish is a research assistant at RAND.

Image: Taiwan Presidential Office via Flickr