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In their 2023 article, “Russia Won’t Sit Idly by after Finland and Sweden Join NATO,” Nicholas Lokker and Heli Hautala argued that it would be a mistake to assume Russia won’t respond to NATO’s expansion, especially once their preoccupation with the war in Ukraine ceases. Two years later, we asked them to revisit their analysis in light of recent Russian gray zone influence tactics employed in the Baltics.Image: Jesper Sundström, Swedish Armed ForcesIn your 2023 article, “Russia Won’t Sit Idly by after Finland and Sweden Join NATO,” you argued that it would be a mistake to assume that Russia wouldn’t respond to the expansion of NATO, perhaps once its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine ceases. Two years later, what is your renewed assessment of the Russian response to NATO expansion in the Baltic region? Our overall assessment has not changed greatly since we wrote the article. The fundamental contours of the situation remain the same — Russia views the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO negatively, but it must focus its current attention on prosecuting the war against Ukraine, constraining its current options for responding to NATO’s latest enlargement. In particular, much of Russia’s conventional forces are needed for the war, meaning that Moscow cannot currently take actions such as bolstering its force posture in the High North.At the same time, we have seen Russia attempt to exert pressure on Finland and Sweden in other ways over the past two years, including many notable hybrid warfare tactics. Moscow has also continued making threatening rhetorical statements directed at Helsinki and Stockholm since then. We should expect these tactics to remain features of Russia’s foreign policy approach toward NATO, and Finland and Sweden in particular, going forward.As long as the war continues, which seems likely for the foreseeable future, this situation