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There are approximately 50,000 veteran Islamic State members and their families currently being held at 27 prisons and detention centers across northeast Syria. They have been a frequent target of prison break attempts over the years, some of which have succeeded in freeing jihadists who have gone on to reinforce the group’s ranks.
The Trump administration has cut $117 million in humanitarian aid to detention camps in northeast Syria. These cuts include funding that had been earmarked for managing essential camp services, including data collection and security database analysis. At the same time, the administration is considering a drawdown of its force posture in northeast Syria from current levels — approximately 2,000 special operations forces — to approximately 700. These cuts in both funding and personnel have the potential to produce destabilizing second- and third-order effects that will reverberate not just in Syria but throughout the region, impacting American allies and interests in the Middle East.
These prisons and detention centers are incubators of extremism and radicalization. They have long been eyed as a prize by the Islamic State, with militants attempting several high-profile prison breaks over the years, some of which have been successful in freeing jailed operatives who then went on to rejoin the ranks of their fellow jihadists. To prevent a foreseeable disaster, the United States, its Western allies, and Middle Eastern partners, including the Gulf States and others focused on stabilizing Syria, should work to improve the conditions in the camps. At the same time, this coalition of actors must utilize political and economic leverage to expedite the repatriation process, encouraging countries to overcome the lack of political will and other obstacles that hinder the return of foreign nationals to their countries of origin. The longer these issues remain unaddressed, the greater the chances for a massive Islamic State prison break that not only rejuvenates the group’s personnel but also serves as a boon to its propaganda and information operations.
Don’t Call It a Comeback
These cuts are happening at the same time that the Islamic State is resurging in Syria. In 2024, the Islamic State tripled the number of attacks it launched against targets in Syria to some 700 compared to the years prior, improving in lethality, sophistication, and execution. In early March, the United States helped support the Syrian Democratic Forces’ capture of Islamic State leader Salah Mohammad Al-Abdullah in Shahil, Syria. Also in late May, U.S. forces assisted with six separate counter-Islamic State operations, including five in Iraq and one in Syria. In total, two Islamic State operatives were killed, two more were detained (including a high-ranking leader), and multiple weapons troves were recovered.
While attacks decreased in the first quarter of 2025 as the Islamic State assessed the new government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, they have spiked since the U.S. drawdown in forces began in April, averaging 14 per month in April and May of this year. In late July, U.S. forces killed senior Islamic State Leader Dhiya’ Zawba Muslih al-Hardani and his two adult sons. In the same month, Syrian Kurdish forces announced the arrest of nine members of the Islamic State and a drug trafficker during separate security operations in Raqqa city and its countryside in northern Syria.
The Islamic State is not going away, but rather, it has entered another rebuilding phase. Washington should keep up the pressure on the Islamic State. Otherwise, it will provide the group with a golden opportunity to recruit new members, devise a workable strategy, and go on the offensive, destabilizing the government in Damascus and potentially tipping Syria back into civil war. A fresh wave of violence, especially sectarian violence, could draw an influx of foreign terrorist fighters from the region and further afield, exacerbating an already tenuous situation and supplying the Islamic State with a replenished crop of recruits.
Jailbreak
The Islamic State has prioritized freeing its operatives held by the Syrian Democratic Forces in prisons. The group has launched iterative attacks on jails, including the al-Sina’a prison break in al-Hasakah in 2022, which held between 3,000 and 5,000 Islamic State militants. It took six days to repel the attack, and U.S. forces supported their Syrian Democratic Forces allies during that effort. A reduced U.S. presence would provide less bandwidth to address some of the most pressing security issues in Syria.
Nowhere is the potential damage caused by the U.S. funding cuts more apparent than in the detention camps. The U.S. Agency for International Development cuts included 15 projects at the al-Hol detention camp and five projects at the Roj detention camp. While the Syrian Democratic Forces detain some 8,500 foreign, Iraqi, and Syrian men and adolescents in 2 dozen prisons, al-Hol and Roj house 36,000 and 2,400 displaced persons, respectively. These occupants, overwhelmingly women and children, include 15,000 Iraqis and 8,000 foreign nationals from 60 countries.
The Red Cross has described conditions at al-Hol as “existential.” A 2023 United Nations report notes open sewers, inadequate housing, limited access to basic necessities, routine violence, and sexual assault. 60 percent of detainees at al-Hol and 63 percent of detainees at Roj are children. Islamic State cells are active throughout al-Hol, but especially in the Annex, home to the non-Iraqi foreign contingent of detainees.
To guard against recruitment by the Islamic State, the Syrian Democratic Forces began removing sons from their mothers upon reaching adolescence, sending them to prisons where they are held incommunicado. Arbitrary family separation is causing epidemics of severe anxiety among both the mothers and the sons, while doing little to lessen Islamic State sympathies in the Annex. The cuts exacerbated an already untenable situation, leaving space for the Islamic State to fill the vacuum.
What to Do Next
The threat posed by the Islamic State and its repeated attempts at prison breaks, as well as the conditions that contribute to further radicalization, highlight the need for investment and implementation of plans for repatriation. Thirty-six countries have repatriated at least some of their nationals, while 21 have yet to initiate the process.
The standout country has been Iraq, which, as of last week, had repatriated 25,000 nationals — some 80 percent of the total Iraqi population within Al Hol and Roj. In a statement on X, US Central Command has lauded Iraqi efforts stating they demonstrate Iraq’s commitment to “the sustained defeat of ISIS.” The Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism has also praised Kosovo, Kazakhstan, North Macedonia, Albania, Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, and Barbados for their progress in repatriating their nationals. The United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Malaysia, and Russia are also making strides.
After a 5-year pause and with repeated delays, Indonesia has still not begun to repatriate its more than 400 nationals in al-Hol and Roj. Indonesia’s Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, civil society organizations, and local governments stand ready to receive returnees; they have been waiting for approvals from higher-level government officials. The United Kingdom has been notably reluctant to repatriate its nationals and has stripped some of them of citizenship. While citizenship stripping may sound like a viable option, it could result in negative consequences for national security, rendering one’s nationals trapped in al-Hol stateless, with no options other than joining the Islamic State.
The United States remains committed to supporting nations seeking to repatriate their citizens. International organizations are also playing key roles, recognizing that stripping citizenship will not defuse the threat posed by the Islamic State in the camps. Myriad international organizations are supporting national-level efforts at repatriation. The International Committee for the Red Cross is working with countries to identify their nationals at al-Hol and Roj camps. The Global Community Engagement and Resiliency Fund is focused on supporting returnee programs in more than a half-dozen countries, including a program that prepares women and children to return to their home countries through the provision of education and counseling. The U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime are engaged in policy advocacy to strengthen government commitments to addressing the needs of women and children returning from Syria. These agencies are working on the ground in tangible ways, with the U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund advising on guidelines for child rehabilitation and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime providing training to local psychologists and social workers.
These efforts must continue. With every passing year, the youth in al-Hol and Roj grow older; adolescent boys spend more time in prisons, away from their mothers and sisters; trauma builds exponentially; health and educational deficits compound; and the burden of repatriation becomes heavier. Meanwhile, the Islamic State continues to recruit in al-Hol, Roj, and in the prisons where young men are housed. Repatriation will likely prove a complex and expensive task. However, if the right investments are made and states and international organizations support these efforts, women and children can successfully reintegrate, al-Hol and Roj can close, and the Islamic State will be deprived of a ready pool of recruits.
Julie Chernov Hwang, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Goucher College, a senior research fellow at the Soufan Center, and a Harry Frank Guggenheim distinguished scholar.
Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D., is the director of research at the Soufan Group and a senior research fellow at the Soufan Center.
Image: Voice of America via Wikimedia Commons
