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On June 1, Ukraine caught Russia off-guard with a bold series of drone strikes against five air bases inside of Russia. Weeks later, Israel initiated its ongoing air campaign against Iran’s nuclear program with an equally cunning attack on Iranian soil. These dramatic Trojan horse operations, replete with hidden weapons placed deep within their target’s territory, caught the world’s attention. Hopefully, Taipei took notice too. Taiwan must prepare for a range of potential contingencies. From gray zone incursions to naval blockades, and from long range strikes and offshore island grabs to a full-scale invasion: Chinese defense planners have options. Taiwan has to be prepared for all of them. Now, in the wake of two audacious deep strikes by Ukrainian and Israeli forces — Operation Spider’s Web and Operation Rising Lion, respectively — Taiwanese leaders will need to contemplate another potential scenario: a decisive first strike from within. And they must do so with a citizenry that remains ambivalent about the urgency of both the challenge and the need to prepare for war, as well as a patron that is far away, spread thin, and just initiated combat operations halfway around the world.

Breathing New Life into an Old Threat

Surprise attacks from within are nothing new. From the Trojan War to 9/11, adversaries have long sought to win by unexpectedly hitting their target where they least expect it: at home with covertly pre-positioned assets.

And Taiwan has always been vulnerable to insider attacks. Yet up until now, the expectation was that covert Chinese agents operating in Taiwan would serve as part of a larger campaign and not as a knock-out blow in their own right. After all, other recent attempts to overthrow a regime with the first punch, including the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, failed to deliver a quick victory.

That was before Spider’s Web and Rising Lion. These operations suggest that China might have a way to combine old tools — such as spies, fifth columns, and saboteurs — with newer capabilities pre-staged before the fighting starts — like drones and malware — to overwhelm and paralyze the country. Deterrence could falter to the degree Beijing (thinks it) can achieve these goals before Taipei is able to mobilize its defenses or Washington could deploy U.S. forces in decisive numbers.

Will these two operations reshape China’s calculus or its war plans? We have no idea. It is entirely possible that both operations will ultimately prove overhyped rather than a revolutionary inflection point in warfare. At the same time, it is our well-considered view that Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to a preemptive strike from within. Therefore, Taipei and Washington should take the risk seriously.

Thankfully, there are ways to mitigate this challenge. There are commonsense measures, including rigorously testing continuity of government operations, especially in a communications-degraded environment. Other options include steps that Taipei ought to be taking anyway. In particular, accelerating asymmetric defense transformation and creating a territorial defense force will both offer a meaningful hedge against a surprise attack by making it harder for Beijing to rapidly exploit a successful first strike. Finally, Taiwan should invest in “red teaming” to stress test its leadership and defensive plans against a range of plausible surprise attacks from within. The harsh fact is that Taiwan is at far more risk of being caught off guard than either Russia or Iran, not least because there is no question China has already infiltrated Taiwan.

Learning from Audacity

Ukraine’s daring, multi-axis strike showed that drones can serve as a cheap and effective way to conduct highly precise “long range” strikes (by virtue of having been covertly pre-positioned near Russian bases far from the front) with little to no warning. Perhaps the most notable aspect of the operation was the fact that Ukrainian operatives spent months quietly smuggling drone components into Russia. Ukraine ultimately built 117 first-person view drones, which remained concealed inside wooden boxes on civilian trucks. Ukrainian operatives, and in some cases unwitting Russian drivers for hire, parked these ordinary-looking vehicles near their targets. A remote signal caused the containers to spring open and unleash the drones in waves. The operation disabled or destroyed some of Russia’s most valuable strategic aircraft, including Tu‑95 bombers, A‑50 AWACS, and Il‑78 refuelers. Western estimates place the damage at up to $7 billion, including a third of Russia’s cruise missile-capable fleet.

Less than two weeks later, the Israeli military launched its own, still ongoing, attack. The Mossad quietly smuggled micro-drones into Iran months before the first fighter jet took off. They hid these drones in suitcases, trucks, and shipping containers near Iranian missile batteries and radar sites, and activated them just hours before the main Israeli strikes were set to begin. These drones helped compromise Iran’s air defenses, opening the door for over 200 Israeli jets, including waves of F‑35s, to launch precision strikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, air defense missile and radar crews, and of course nuclear facilities in Natanz and Isfahan.

In the wake of both operations, it seems reasonable to think that Beijing will contemplate whether it too can use cheap, mobile, lethal, and potentially autonomous weapons to mount a surprise attack on strategic targets. Operation Rising Lion in particular demonstrates ways China might creatively weave drones, artificial intelligence, and its longstanding covert preparations into a larger surprise campaign. Indeed, any country now pondering a surprise attack or surviving one cannot afford to ignore these cases.

Why Taiwan is so Vulnerable

The fact is that Chinese proximity, Taiwanese openness, and the deep cultural, linguistic, and economic ties between the two have always made Taiwan susceptible to an attack from within. Four vulnerabilities are especially noteworthy in the context of a surprise attack from within.

Espionage

Taiwan has a well-documented espionage problem. The number of recent high profile cases is striking. Three of President LaiChing-Te’s military guards were caught selling classified information to China, including sensitive data from Lai’s Wanli security detail. Ho Jen-chieh, an assistant to the current Secretary General of Taiwan’s National Security Council and former Foreign Minister, Joseph Wu, was detained on charges of spying for China. Taiwanese prosecutors indicted Kao An-kuo, a retired Army lieutenant general and the convener of the so-called “Republic of China Taiwan Military government,” along with five others for taking money from the Chinese Communist Party to establish an armed organization in Taiwan, plot operations to overthrow the government, and pledge to act as an inside agent in support of an invasion from the mainland. The list goes on. An active-duty intelligence officer from Taiwan’s ultra-secret signals intelligence Unit — the Communication Development Office — was caught selling high-level classified information to the Chinese military. A retired Taiwanese air force officer who served in the Communication Development Office and the Ministry of National Defense’s J-2 (Intelligence) division, helped develop covert networks inside Taiwan. Chinese agents recruited a retired Military Intelligence Bureau colonel who referred to himself as “Taiwan’s Number 1 Spy.” He went on to turn other retired military officers. Another Taiwanese air force officer stationed at the Songshan Base Command — which services and operates aircraft used by the president and senior military leadership — leaked classified information. And a former bodyguard to Presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui was accused of persuading his nephew, army officer Wang Wen-yen — then serving at the Presidential Security Center — to gather classified details about President Tsai Ing-wen’s secret meetings with visiting U.S. and Japanese lawmakers and officials.

There is no question that China has already penetrated Taiwan’s most sensitive institutions — including the presidential office, the Foreign Ministry, the Legislative Yuan, top secret intelligence units, and, of course, the military. Active duty and retired personnel are a particularly alluring target. In 2024 alone, 15 retired military personnel — accounting for 23 percent of all espionage prosecutions — and 28 active duty personnel — accounting for 43 percent of all espionage prosecutions — were indicted on charges of spying for Beijing.

More frightening is the fact that these cases might just be the tip of the iceberg. The number of prosecuted Chinese espionage cases has doubled over the past two years alone. Former Military Intelligence Bureau Director Liu De-liang estimates that more than 5,000 undercover Chinese agents are currently living in Taiwan. He describes the threat as “beyond imagination.” Particularly worrying is the fact that National Security Bureau Deputy Director Huang Ming-chao believes that this figure includes approximately 1,300 Chinese nationals who have gone missing after illegally entering Taiwan.

Gangs

Beijing is also actively exploiting Taiwan’s criminal gangs. Chinese intelligence operatives have long worked to establish and leverage ties with both national crime networks — including the Bamboo Union, the Heavenly Way Alliance, and the Four Seas Gang — and smaller local groups such as the Niupu Gang in Taipei, the Blood Eagle Gang in Taoyuan, the Sanhuan Gang in Hsinchu, the Taixi Gang in Yunlin, and the Dongmen Gang in Tainan. Chinese intelligence officers have built an extensive, 30,000-word “Map of Taiwan’s Armed Gang Factions.” This report describes gang influence zones and provides Beijing with a comprehensive breakdown of the major gang factions across Taiwan’s cities and counties, including detailed information on their branches and sub-organizations. It includes extensive intelligence on temple networks, firepower, financial flows, political connections, and even assessments such as “high mobility and aggression,” “uncommitted, needs monitoring,” and “politically unstable.” It outlines proposed bribery budgets and assesses vulnerability to infiltration. The report also shows that Chinese authorities are especially interested in religious sites across Taiwan, including major religious centers such as Dajia Jenn Lann Temple, Beigang Chaotian Temple, and Baishatun Gongtian Temple.

Smuggling

Taiwan’s trade-reliant economy opens the door to smuggling. Nearly 40,000 cargo ships visit Taiwanese ports each year. And some of Taiwan’s offshore islands are literally within swimming distance of the Chinese coast. It is not hard to see how Beijing might exploit such vulnerabilities while also using its aforementioned ties to the Taiwan’s criminal underworld and Taiwanese military personnel to sneak and pre-stage drones, explosives, supplies, and operatives into Taiwan.

Nor does Beijing even need to rely on illicit channels to preposition assets. Chinese logistics companies already operate openly in Taiwan. S.F. Express has been active since 2007, and Hong Kong-based Lalamove since 2015. Their trucks are a routine sight across the island, offering Beijing a low profile, ready-made distribution network for moving weaponized drones or related equipment undetected. And as was the case with Ukraine’s audacious attack, these drivers do not even need to be witting or willing participants in the ruse.

China is even smuggling parts into Taiwanese military technology. In January, a whistleblower alleged that two domestically developed drones — the Chien Feng I and Rui Yuan II — contained Chinese made chips and memory cards. A former employee further revealed that despite a 2018 ban on Chinese components, parts for these drones were still being sourced from the “red supply chain” and funneled through Singapore’s ACE6 Technologies. ACE6 lacks manufacturing capacity and is funded by a Hong Kong firm tied to an address in Shenzhen. Moreover, Taiwan’s flagship drone, the Teng Yun, also uses a Chinese-made RS-2W-1015 wireless module. And when then President-elect Lai visited Taiwan’s UAV AI Innovation and R&D Center in Chiayi last year, reporters spotted a drone on display equipped with a motor labeled “Made in China.”

Centralization

 Perhaps Taiwan’s greatest source of vulnerability to a surprise attack from within that tries to decapitate — or at least overwhelm — its leadership is the fact that its military remains far too centralized. As we previously documented in these pages, Taiwan’s military leadership is top-heavy, rigid, sclerotic, and hierarchical. Exercises are scripted. Subordinates worry excessively about making mistakes. Junior leaders are neither empowered nor trained to seize the initiative. All things equal, a military leadership system structured in this way is already more susceptible to decapitation and paralysis than one which is decentralized and empowered from the bottom up. Anyone who has spent much time around Taiwan’s military knows that if China manages to take out a sizeable portion of Taiwan’s command and control system, there is a very real risk that even its senior most operational commanders will either do nothing until directions are forthcoming, or will insist on executing a pre-scripted plan (that China might already have). It does not help that the Ministry of National Defense’s headquarters is a mere few thousand feet off of the flight path for aircraft landing at Taipei’s Songshan airport.

Connecting the Dots

 Each of these vulnerabilities is a problem in its own right. Viewed collectively — especially after recent surprise attacks against Russia and Iran — they suggest that Taiwan and the United States should take the risk of a decisive surprise attack from within much more seriously.

What might such an operation look like?

Imagine a not too distant future in which yet another crisis is brewing in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing once again uses a supposed violation of its “One China Principle” as an excuse to launch a large-scale joint exercise. Because Washington and Taipei have weathered many such storms in recent years, they return to their well-worn playbook. The United States moves a carrier strike group closer to Taiwan. A U.S. Marine littoral regiment conducts last minute rotational training in Northern Luzon meant to deter and, if necessary, enter the fight. Taiwanese coastal defense batteries set up astride the most likely invasion beaches as units conduct “snap” response exercises to demonstrate their readiness. Yet because the People’s Liberation Army does not seem to be staging a landing force or the logistics needed for a massive amphibious invasion, American and Taiwanese military commanders agree that they have what they need to handle any foreseeable contingency.

Unfortunately, the assault forces are already in Taiwan. Beijing spent years buying off Taiwanese gangs, port officials, and key military leaders. It exploits both these meticulously crafted networks as well as “civilian” owned shipping to smuggle weapons, supplies, special operations cells — and yes, drones — into Taiwan via its many ports. Thus, even as Taiwanese air force jets and naval ships patrol around the island looking for a strike from across the strait, the storm breaks inside the country.

Chinese intelligence agents masquerading as police officers and security guards assassinate key Taiwanese leaders. Saboteurs destroy critical infrastructure and highly visible symbols of political power. Taiwanese gangs on the United Front payroll spill into the streets. Cyber operations, enabled by well-positioned spies, bring down the power and communications grid. Some compromised Taiwanese officers opt not to show up for duty. Others disable critical command and control links. Worse yet, Chinese officers hijack compromised communications systems to issue nonsensical orders to Taiwanese units. That is when thousands of drones infiltrated into Taiwan in the preceding months emerge from nondescript containers to destroy air defense radars, damage fighter jets on the runway, and hammer coastal defense missile batteries the moment they emerge from their bunkers.

In a matter of hours, Taiwan’s key political and military leaders are dead, incapacitated, or holed up in safe rooms — cut off from their people and their military. Police and civil defense units struggle to regain control from Taiwanese gangs. Civilians are in the dark, figuratively and literally. Neighbors begin to wonder who they can trust. Reservists remain at home, because the order to mobilize never comes. Many active duty units sit in their barracks awaiting instructions. With Taiwan’s air and coastal defenses effectively neutralized, the door for missile and air strikes is now wide open. U.S. forces look on helplessly as Chinese aircraft, missiles, and drones surge across the Strait. Sweeping aside surviving Taiwanese ships and aircraft, they hunt ground targets with impunity even as the first airborne and air assault troops put boots on the ground. The Taiwanese people are in shock. Long promised that even if a (very unlikely) invasion does happen, it will be defeated on the beaches, they must now come to grips with the reality that thousands of Chinese troops are already massing in and around their major cities.

Blunting the Risk

Again, no one knows if Beijing is actually thinking along these lines. At the very least it appears that Chinese planners are paying close attention to the war in Ukraine and are aware of the costs and risks associated with a prolonged conflict. In any case, hope is not a course of action, especially because Taiwan is unusually susceptible to a surprise first strike from within. At the very least, the risk of such a scenario is not zero.

Thankfully, there are ways to reduce the risk, many of which involve doing things that Taipei ought to be doing anyway.

First, the Lai administration ought to get serious about planning for continuity of government operations. Insofar as we are aware, although Taiwan has a list of successors, there are no protocols in place to determine who is in charge if multiple leaders are incapacitated or otherwise unable to communicate; or how such determinations will be made if governmental command and control infrastructure is seriously damaged. Lai and his national security staff should develop, rigorously test, and religiously rehearse scenarios in which different — and multiple — key civilian and military leaders are neutralized.

Second, Taiwan should accelerate asymmetric defense transformation. If Operations Spider’s Web and Rising Lion do nothing else, they demonstrate the risks associated with over-investing in $2 billion submarines, F-16V aircraft, and M1AT main battle tanks. Small numbers of expensive weapons make for especially alluring targets. In contrast, a military force equipped, postured, and trained to wage a flexible defense in depth across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan itself is the best (and most affordable) insurance policy against a preemptive attack, even from within. It bears repeating that making such a transition requires Taiwan to do more than just buy the “right” weapons. The Ministry of National Defense also needs to articulate a coherent doctrine, publish operational concepts, and begin reforming its rigid culture to make asymmetry a viable and credible reality. Time is running out to take these steps. Not because war is inevitable, but because change — especially culture change — tends to unfold slowly. Nor would it hurt to thin the ranks of the military’s 300-plus-strong general and flag officer corps, if only because it reduces the number of key leaders Beijing might attempt to turn.

Third, Taiwan needs to establish a territorial defense force comprised of volunteers trained and equipped to wage an insurgency. The Lai administration’s existing efforts to enhance resilience and civil defense are admirable, but they are not enough. General Secretary Xi Jinping will not be deterred from launching a devastating insider attack because the Taiwanese people have stockpiled supplies (which most have yet to do) or know how to perform first aid. The best way to convince him not to try is to ensure that his attempt to cut the head off the snake will not eliminate the need for a costly, prolonged, and uncertain occupation.

Finally, Taiwan should stress test its vulnerabilities to a multi-dimensional surprise attack, not least because Taiwan is arguably far more at risk of being caught off guard and overwhelmed than either Russia or Iran. A common mistake in defense planning is preparing for a generic threat rather than anticipating how the enemy sees the situation, and the way it is most likely to solve the operational challenges it believes that it faces. One of us, a cybersecurity professional, has witnessed this mindset play out repeatedly in Taiwan’s digital domain — where organizations rely on broad, checklist-style defenses instead of analyzing adversary behavior and crafting tailored countermeasures. The best way to address this shortfall is to engage independent red teams empowered to creatively explore and uncover vulnerabilities that internal personnel may overlook. These red teams can also help identify and reality check potential counter-deception and counterintelligence operations designed to identify and expose inside threats.

To be sure, the dust has yet to settle on either Spider’s Web or Rising Lion. Defense planners in Washington and Taipei should therefore guard against over-learning from events that are still playing out. It is nevertheless imperative that the United States and Taiwan start to think seriously about the latter’s unique vulnerability to a surprise “shock and awe” insider attack. China is undoubtedly studying the recent strikes in Russia and Iran — not just the drone tactics, but the intelligence groundwork, clandestine logistics, and operational secrecy that made them possible. It also knows it has many of the necessary pieces already in place to launch similar attacks against Taiwan. While Taiwan is only just now starting to get serious about exploring asymmetric warfare to counter China’s conventional military advantage, the unfortunate reality is that it must now also prepare for a Chinese asymmetric campaign against it.

Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he also directs the Taiwan Security Monitor. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.

Yuster Yu is the senior executive advisor of Octon International and a senior advisor of the iScann Group. A retired Taiwanese naval officer, he served on Taiwan’s National Security Council and as a naval attaché to the United States. He is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, the U.S. Pacific Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer Course, and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Image: 臺灣港務股份有限公司高雄港務分公司 via Wikimedia Commons