In Syria, America Should Be Ruthlessly Focused on the Islamic State
Five years ago, we warned that a snap decision to depart Syria — abandoning the U.S. Kurdish-led partner force that has fought the Islamic State in Syria for the last 10 years while thousands of suspected fighters remained in detention — would provide a devastating setback to the fight against the terror group and damage overall American credibility. A few weeks later, amongst a U.S. withdrawal and subsequent Turkish invasion into areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces, led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, we argued the United States would need to maintain the ability to fight remnants of the Islamic State and ensure the fighters in detention would remain there. Washington ceded much of its negotiating power in the country to Moscow and Ankara, only to reverse course a few months later and keep a small allotment of troops in northeast Syria to prevent a power vacuum and a run on Syrian oil and gas infrastructure.
Today, the United States and its Kurdish-led partners face a nearly identical set of challenges, but in a massively changed balance of power in Syria. Last month, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a Syrian opposition group with previous ties to al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State, shocked the world with an offensive alongside the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army that quickly toppled the Assad regime within 10 days. Under President-elect Donald Trump, the United States should remain focused on its primary security objective in Syria: preventing a resurgence of the Islamic State.
Despite political nominees like incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s reassurances that the United States is unlikely to abandon its partners in Syria, Trump himself has been more ambivalent on Syria. He may be convinced that it is possible to secure American interests without troops in Syria, as he seemed to be during his last term as president. As such, his administration will need to engage in intensive diplomatic efforts to lay the groundwork in Syria for a possible American departure while still ensuring the Islamic State is contained and thwarted from international attacks. The Trump administration can do this by ensuring Islamic State fighters remain in detention awaiting repatriation, or by championing a longer-term solution that will require limiting any Turkish or Turkish-backed incursion into the Kurdish-held areas where they are detained. It will also need to focus efforts on facilitating dialogue between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its Syrian affiliate to help ease tensions along the Syrian-Turkish border. It will also be critical for the United States to support its partner force in engaging with the new government of Syria to fold Kurdish-held areas in the northeast back under a united Syrian government.
Preventing a Resurgence
Despite its historical proclivities, the most important thing the incoming administration can do right now is exercise patience by reaffirming the American commitment to the current military mission in Syria. There is no need to expand it. This will be a difficult step but it will have the benefit of keeping pressure on the Islamic State while also allowing the United States to take advantage of opportunities that may emerge with the new Syrian government. The current situation merits strong consideration of this approach.
Recent reporting indicates that the number of attacks conducted by the Islamic State in Syria in 2024 more than tripled compared to 2023. The resurgence of the group in Syria is in part a result of years of efforts to relocate and reestablish itself in the Badiya, a desolate location in central Syria previously under the control of the former Assad regime and well beyond the more effective operating areas and watchful eyes of the American-backed Kurdish force. The current chaos resulting from the overthrow of Bashar al Assad and the expected power struggle between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, other militia groups, external actors, and others mean that, in the short term, a void is likely to emerge — one that the terror group will be keen to fill as quickly as possible. We have already seen indications of how this could affect the situation — with Turkish posturing around Kobane and the diversion of the Syrian Democratic Forces’ attention away from the Islamic State.
It could get worse, with uncertain control over former regime weapon and ammunition stockpiles, approximately 9000 detained Islamic State fighters in Northeast Syria — a virtual “army in detention” that would be a prize for liberation by remnants of the group — as well as about 43,000 displaced family members of the fighters living in makeshift camps. A strengthened Islamic State would significantly accelerate their efforts in Syria — and likely in Iraq, where coalition-backed Iraqi Security Forces are doing an admirable job keeping the lid on the remnants of the group. A Syrian platform for external Islamic State attacks could expand opportunities for operations like we saw in January and March 2024 in Kerman and Moscow.
The importance of the small, sustainable, and affordable U.S. presence (under 2000 troops) in northeastern Syria has never been greater than it is today. It is a force punching far above its weight, representing less than 5 percent of the overall U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and operating at a fraction of the cost and effort it would take to respond to a full-blown Islamic State resurgence. It would also have the benefit of strengthening American leverage over Iran and creating more pressure to change their behavior, as well as improving American standing in the Middle East.
Pragmatic Diplomatic Engagement
While military action is necessary, it is not sufficient. Pragmatic diplomatic, economic, and messaging efforts should accompany military activities with the aim of engaging the emerging Syrian transitional government to obtain agreement for continued American and American-backed operations against the Islamic State in previously regime-held areas of Syria, disposition of detained fighters and family members, and security of sovereign borders. Washington should also strive to strengthen its military partners in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq as they will be critical to the containment of the Islamic State in the region.
The incoming Trump administration should be prepared to find creative ways to provide Turkey the assurance it needs to halt clashes and prevent a potential Turkish incursion, which threatens to undo the last 10 years of the fight against the terror group. The Islamic State remains willing and more able than ever to take advantage of the security environment in Syria. If Kurdish forces are pulled away from guarding the prisons and encampments, it is only a matter of time until remnants of the group attempt another prison break, such as the one in Hasakah in 2022.
Despite an American-brokered truce between Kurdish forces and Turkish-backed groups in Syria, the threat of additional clashes or a potential Turkish incursion to take the cities of Manbij and Kobani as well as the surrounding areas, remains. The de facto leader of the Kurdish forces, Gen. Mazloum Abdi, has proposed a series of concessions from the Kurdish group that include a demilitarized zone in Kobani — which the Turks have rejected — and an offer for all non-Syrian Kurdish fighters to depart Syria if a truce can be reached, a concession the Turks have long demanded.
Ankara remains unable to separate the Syrian Kurdish group from its Turkish-based affiliate the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the United States, and of course Turkey. While there is no question that the two groups remain affiliated and share a goal for Kurdish autonomy, the Syrian Kurds have demonstrated repeatedly since 2014, when they became a partner in the fight against the Islamic State alongside the United States and Global Coalition, that they are committed to removing the threat of the terror group, adhering to a “One Syria” policy, and ensuring Kurdish rights are represented in the future of Syria.
The United States should also be at the helm of both promoting and facilitating engagement and dialogue among all parties. A positive sign from Turkey is President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to allow visits to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in a signal that Erdogan may be ready to return to a dialogue with Kurdish groups. Further, Abdi’s visit to northern Iraq to meet with Masrour Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which has good ties with Turkey, is another signal of progress. The Assad regime, as well as Russian and American forces, have previously acted as an acceptable buffer for Turkey, which has viewed an armed Kurdish nationalist presence on the Syrian-Turkish border as a threat. Dual-security arrangements such as those in Manbij with joint American-Turkish patrols and in Qamishli between the former Syrian regime, Russia, and Kurdish forces provide useful historical examples of potential arrangements the United States can pursue alongside regional partners or elements of the new Syrian Ministry of Defense to alleviate Turkish concerns and ensure that the focus in Syria remains on preventing a resurgence of the Islamic State so that the peoples of Syria are free to focus on rebuilding their country.
Finally, the United States should also continue the Biden administration’s work to facilitate a productive dialogue between the Kurdish-led forces in the northeast and the new leader of Syria, Ahmad al Sharaa, and his growing government. Recent American delegations to Damascus have helped secure assurances from Sharaa that the new Syrian government will not allow terrorist organizations like the Islamic State to operate from within its borders, demonstrating Sharaa’s commitment to finding a sustainable solution for the northeast. Syria’s new leader has also offered the Kurds a path for inclusion — provided any elements of the Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Syria depart the country and the armed groups integrate into the new government. The Syrian Kurds have answered Sharaa’s pragmatism with their own, raising the new flag of Syria in areas under their control and facilitating a meeting between Mazloum and Sharaa. Much of this groundwork is being facilitated by the current Biden team, but the incoming administration will need to continue these efforts and make clear to the Kurdish forces that the United States will not be putting any more skin in the game.
Conclusion
While it is unclear what exactly Trump will do when he assumes office next week, he has made clear — both during his previous term and in the lead up to this one — that U.S. involvement in Syria will not continue forever. With the American presence in the northeast on a potential timetable, the outgoing and incoming administrations should focus on what elements can be influenced by American engagement to secure the interests of the United States and set the table for what is likely to be a rapid departure. Preventing a resurgence by the Islamic State remains the top priority, but in order to do so, the United States should pursue policies that ensure continuity of Islamic State detentions. For that to occur, the Kurdish forces in Syria need to be able to remain focused on safeguarding the prisons and displaced persons encampments, and can only do so through American-brokered cessation of hostilities agreements, as well as facilitating engagement of all parties to alleviate Turkish concerns and promote a unified Syria free from terrorist threats.
Gen. (ret.) Joseph Votel served as commander of U.S. Central Command from March 2016 to March 2019. In that role, Votel oversaw military operations across the region, including the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Before Central Command, he was the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Joint Special Operations Command. Votel is a non-resident distinguished senior fellow on national security at the Middle East Institute.
Elizabeth Dent is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where she focuses on U.S. foreign and defense policy toward the Gulf States, Iraq, and Syria. She was previously the director for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and worked in various capacities at the State Department for the U.S. Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State from 2014 to 2019.
Image: Sgt. Matthew Callahan via DVIDS.
