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Rewind and Reconnoiter: The Taliban’s Terrorism Problem

December 12, 2024
Rewind and Reconnoiter: The Taliban’s Terrorism Problem
Rewind and Reconnoiter: The Taliban’s Terrorism Problem

Rewind and Reconnoiter: The Taliban’s Terrorism Problem

Amira Jadoon
December 12, 2024
In 2021, Amira Jadoon wrote “The Taliban Can’t Take on the Islamic State Alone,” where she argued that a resurgent Islamic State in Afghanistan could emerge in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the country and subsequent Taliban takeover. After three years of Taliban governance, we invited Amira back to reflect on her article.Read more below:Image: XinhuaIn your 2021 article, “The Taliban Can’t Take on the Islamic State Alone,” you question whether the Taliban could both govern Afghanistan and carry out effective counter-terrorism measures; after 3 years, what have we learned about how they are managing this balance?Three years post-takeover, the Taliban’s dual challenges of governance and counter-terrorism have validated initial concerns about their institutional capacity. While their operations have achieved tactical successes against the Islamic State in Afghanistan, mostly resulting in reduced attacks during 2023 and 2024, these gains appear temporary rather than strategic [and] are unlikely to be sustained into the future. The Taliban’s focus on power consolidation, internal cohesion, managing international isolation, and a general lack of resources has precluded the development of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.Effective containment of the Islamic State in Afghanistan requires more than targeted leadership hits — it demands systematic dismantling of their increasingly sophisticated propaganda apparatus, recruitment infrastructure, and global networks. The Taliban’s divided attention has enabled the Islamic State in Afghanistan’s strategic adaptation, exemplified by their shift toward high-profile international attacks, increased recruitment of Central Asians, and their deepening integration within the Islamic State’s global structure. Furthermore, the post-Taliban militant landscape has facilitated the Islamic State in Afghanistan’s growth, as former Taliban-aligned fighters seek a new umbrella organization for their jihadist aspirations. This realignment, coupled with al-Qaeda’s diminished influence, has expanded the Islamic State in Afghanistan’s recruitment pool across South and Central Asia.Although the United States has officially pulled out of

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In 2021, Amira Jadoon wrote “The Taliban Can’t Take on the Islamic State Alone,” where she argued that a resurgent Islamic State in Afghanistan could emerge in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the country and subsequent Taliban takeover. After three years of Taliban governance, we invited Amira back to reflect on her article.Read more below:Image: XinhuaIn your 2021 article, “The Taliban Can’t Take on the Islamic State Alone,” you question whether the Taliban could both govern Afghanistan and carry out effective counter-terrorism measures; after 3 years, what have we learned about how they are managing this balance?Three years post-takeover,

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