China Is Off the Fence in Myanmar
On Nov. 6, the head of Myanmar’s military junta, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, finally traveled to China, meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Kunming as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion leader’s summit. The Xinhua readout prominently featured a photo of Min Aung Hlaing shaking hands with Li, who reportedly expressed support for the junta’s planned 2025 elections. This is a level of legitimacy and de facto recognition thus far denied to the Myanmar military junta, and it represents a fundamental shift in Beijing’s calculus.
China’s dual approach to Myanmar’s ongoing civil war has now veered sharply in the military junta’s favor. Since the summer, top Chinese officials have ramped up visits to Myanmar to bestow more legitimacy on the junta and its planned 2025 “elections,” as well as pressured key ethnic armed groups to cease fighting the military, known as the Tatmadaw. From Beijing’s perspective, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which it has supported closely, is no longer acting in line with Chinese interests, and it sees the National Unity Government and allied pro-democracy People’s Defense Forces as hewing too close to Washington for Chinese comfort with their “Spring Revolution.”
The implications for Myanmar’s civil war are stark. China has gotten off the fence to shore up a faltering junta and marginalize what it sees as a too pro-American National Unity Government. Ironically, U.S. material support remains limited on the ground. Now, China’s support for the junta’s 2025 elections threatens to resurrect the Tatmadaw’s “divide-and-rule” strategy.
The Junta’s Failure to Stem the Bleeding
Since the military coup of February 2021, China has played a delicate game balancing ties between the Tatmadaw’s regime, ethnic armed groups along its border, and pro-democracy forces. Indeed, Myanmar’s fragmentation allows China to exert leverage over the various factions to position itself as the key power broker. This protects its economic and strategic interests, while also projecting an image of “noninterference.” China hopes that no matter who holds power in Naypyidaw, its interests are secure. However, this pragmatic positioning has now evolved into open support for the military junta because, in the end, China does not want a federal democracy: It desires the bare minimum stability to pursue its interests and it feels the junta is the horse to back to achieve this.
Over the past year, Myanmar’s military leaders have become increasingly restricted to the country’s center and urban areas, even if they have had more success fighting the resistance there. The main instruments of its most recent precipitous decline are the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, who have enjoyed close ties to China for years. Beijing has supported them, even going so far as to greenlight 2023’s Operation 1027 phase one to temporarily punish the junta for its support of cyberscams. Since the first phase of Operation 1027, the alliance has taken much of Rakhine and northern Shan States.
The second phase of Operation 1027 began in June 2024, violating a Chinese-brokered ceasefire. In this phase, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army captured Lashio city and the Tatmadaw’s Northeastern Regional Command Headquarters by early August, marking a watershed moment in Myanmar’s civil war. Meanwhile, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and People’s Defense Forces are now encroaching on the city of Mandalay. To the north, the allied Kachin Independence Army has rolled up territory along the Chinese border and taken valuable sources of rare earth minerals and jade. It has also continued supporting other People’s Defense Forces and the National Unity Government in Sagaing. Despite setbacks while attempting to take the larger cities of Myawaddy and Loikaw this year, the resistance coalition and People’s Defense Forces in the Bamar heartland in Sagaing and Magway, as well as key allied ethnic armed groups like the Karen National Union, are gaining ground through continuous guerilla tactics. Despite several counteroffensives and widescale terror bombing, the Tatmadaw has failed to stem its bleeding. For China, the Tatmadaw’s decline now presents an intolerable risk.
China’s Proxies Buck Beijing
Following Operation 1027 phase one in late 2023, Beijing negotiated a ceasefire in northern Shan state in January 2024. One member of the coalition, the Arakan Army, ignored Chinese efforts to cease its campaigning in Rakhine State, but the halt to fighting in Shan state gave the junta a much-needed lifeline by allowing it to focus on other battlefronts.
But, against China’s wishes, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army — perhaps sensing the junta’s weakness, feeling confident in their ability to reinforce their territorial gains, and distrusting China’s intentions — broke the ceasefire in June and July 2024. As the Three Brotherhood Alliance made significant gains against the junta — most notably taking Lashio — their growing autonomy and threat to the Myanmar junta unsettled Beijing’s strategic calculus.
Although Operation 1027 phase one had advanced China’s interests in stopping cyberscams against Chinese nationals, phase two took Lashio and now threatens Myanmar’s second-largest city, Mandalay. Importantly, the Three Brotherhood Alliance was also clearly coordinating with the National Unity Government and commanding People’s Defense Forces units in the field. By the end of August and early September, with fighting ongoing near its border, the Chinese government had become incensed, with the fall of Lashio city in early August being a clear red line for China. Beijing felt its allies had gone much too far in challenging the Tatmadaw.
Clearly unhappy, Beijing shuttered border crossings to areas under Kachin Independence Army and Three Brotherhood Alliance control. Its action restricted access to food, electricity, and supplies vital for continued campaigning and the local economy. The People’s Liberation Army then held live fire drills to signal China’s displeasure and send a warning.
China, largely under the auspices of its special envoy Deng Xijun, also began a renewed effort to pressure the border ethnic armed groups to cease their offensives. After the battle of Lashio, Deng met with and, according to a source close to the resistance, threatened the United Wa State Army to cut its support for the Three Brotherhood Alliance, including the flow of arms. China also stated that it does not recognize Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army control of Lashio and warned of supposed U.S. influence along the border. Intriguingly, we know of details from this meeting because the minutes were leaked, likely by the Wa, which indicates a level of dissatisfaction with China’s pressure.
Deng’s pressure clearly influenced the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, who are highly dependent upon the Chinese economy and weapons from the Wa. In response to China’s pressure, they issued a Chinese-language statement in September that denounced cooperation with the National Unity Government and announced a policy banning its officials from meeting with international actors — meaning Americans. They have also halted their offensives and entered a defensive pattern to consolidate their newly taken territory.
China’s backdoor pressure proved much less effective with the Kachin and Ta’ang, who are less dependent upon China than the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. In August, China issued an ominous, threatening letter via a local security committee to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. China’s Foreign Ministry coyly refused to confirm or deny the threat, thus seemingly confirming it. Clearly incensed, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army has continued advancing and coordinated closely with People’s Defense Forces in Mandalay. The Kachin, meanwhile, have met with the Chinese government but have stubbornly kept taking territory along the border and publicly reaffirmed their commitment to ending military rule.
In sum, China’s influence is perhaps less than it hoped. That the United Wa State Army leaked their meeting minutes is a signal of their own displeasure and reminder that they are far from Chinese “yes men.” The Kachin and Ta’ang, as well as the Arakan Army in Rakhine, continue to resist China’s pressure.
Only the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army gave in publicly, but not enough to escape China’s wrath. Recent reports indicate that Beijing has allegedly detained the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance’s commander, Peng Daxun, in China after inviting him for talks in October, likely to coerce the group into withdrawing from Lashio completely. If true, this is a substantial escalation in Beijing’s pressure campaign, and it signals China is rapidly running out of patience. Whether the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army will cease behind-the-scenes cooperation with the National Unity Government and People’s Defense Forces, or give up hard-won Lashio, remains to be seen. The group violated earlier Chinese ceasefire negotiations to seize Lashio in the first place and must be well aware that the military will not allow them to keep their other conquests indefinitely.
China’s Longer Leash for the Junta
China has not only punished and pressured its aligned ethnic armed groups but also ramped up its direct engagement and support of the Myanmar military regime. After the fall of Lashio, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to Naypyidaw on Aug. 14 to meet face-to-face with Min Aung Hlaing. In this meeting, he emphasized that Myanmar must advance the “new Five-Point Road Map within the constitutional framework to realize political reconciliation and resume the process of democratic transition at an early date.” Although ostensibly a pro-democracy statement, in reality “constitutional framework” refers to the 2008 constitution that the military claimed to uphold with their February 2021 coup d’etat and that the pro-democracy resistance openly rejects. China’s promised support for the junta’s census and planned 2025 elections under this framework were later reaffirmed during Min Aung Hlaing’s November visit to Kunming. China is now a primary driver behind the Tatmadaw’s planned elections for 2025.
China’s support for the Tatmadaw now extends further than it did before. Although there are limits — China reportedly fired warning shots in October at a military bomber straying too close to the border — Beijing has acquiesced to the military’s escalated bombing of Lashio, occupied by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Indeed, despite the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s denunciation of ties to the National Unity Government and other resistance actors, Chinese pressure continues, as do the junta’s bombings, meaning that China wants them to abandon Lashio and enter peace negotiations with the junta. In a sign of their tacit approval of the junta’s strategic bombing campaign, China has delivered additional warplanes and considered supplying military drones. It has also reportedly proposed establishing a security company to enhance security for Chinese assets and Belt and Road projects in Myanmar. Most significantly of all, Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to China in November amounts to de facto recognition, something that the Chinese government had deferred thus far.
China’s Cold War Obsession and Turn to the Junta
Viewed together, China’s pressure on its wayward proxies and expanded help for the junta should be understood to mark a fundamental shift away from its “double game” toward a more assertive pro-junta stance. From a 50,000-foot view, Beijing greenlit Operation 1027 in 2023 to punish the junta (which soon moved its cyber scam operations away from China) before realizing that the Three Brotherhood Alliance was more autonomous than it had previously understood. Concerned with U.S. influence and spiraling instability in Myanmar, Beijing aims to rectify its error and ensure the junta comes out on top through elections under the 2008 constitution, which will undoubtedly prove unfree and unfair and result in a military-dominated “civilian” government.
The key evidence for this shift in Beijing’s thinking is that resistance success has not translated into a pragmatic China publicly or privately expanding its outreach to the National Unity Government and the loose coalition of pro-federal democracy forces. Instead, it has apparently kept them at arm’s length and only grown closer to the Tatmadaw, while pushing its aligned armed groups to cease fighting alongside the rest of the resistance.
Fundamentally, Beijing views the pro-democracy National Unity Government and its allies as too close to the United States for its comfort, despite China’s formerly close relations with the ousted Aung San Suu Kyi government. This belief started slowly in 2023 after the National Unity Government opened an office in Washington and the United States passed the BURMA Act. There is a “cold war-ization” dynamic in China’s thinking that has only deepened since then. Beijing’s paranoia is no doubt spurred by public U.S. government engagements, including those that occurred just after Wang was in Myanmar, expressing concerns about U.S. involvement.
The National Unity Government has worked to mollify China’s concerns, even issuing a January 2024 statement expressing its support for the One China policy. But despite this Beijing continues to publicly ignore the National Unity Government. Naturally, China’s support for the junta has generated real dissatisfaction among the resistance, especially behind closed doors. Recently, the National Unity Government promised not to recognize any debts to China incurred by the junta and expressed public frustration at China’s continued stonewalling. After Min Aung Hlaing’s November visit to China, the National Unity Government expressed its opposition to Chinese pressure and the 2025 elections: “The revolution must bring about a new system that leaves no room for the Myanmar military in the country’s politics, and that guarantees federalism for ethnic people. Just applying pressure won’t work and it won’t be good for China.”
Despite Beijing’s dislike, distrust, and desire to get rid of Min Aung Hlaing, China increasingly feels that only the Tatmadaw as an institution can hold the country together. China appears to buy into the narrative that Myanmar will Balkanize absent the Tatmadaw’s control over the state, a belief that the regime is careful to inculcate. Moreover, Beijing appears to (incorrectly) believe that elections in 2025 will somehow give this institution an out.
China’s backing for the elections is important, as it represents largely uncritical endorsement of the junta’s preferred offramp from its current battlefield and political dilemma. For decades, the Tatmadaw’s countrywide strategy has been “divide and rule,” aiming to buy off or coerce the various ethnic armed groups and isolate them from support. This approach has largely failed in the current iteration of Myanmar’s civil war, but the junta has repeatedly promised to hold elections under the 2008 constitution, which is heavily favorable to the military’s interests. In the past several months, the Tatmadaw has begun undertaking a census and asked the resistance fighters to join it in the elections (which they quickly rejected). Some resistance actors have also informed the author that Beijing ceased talking to them after Operation 1027 phase one, but quietly resumed outreach in recent months to pressure them to participate in the upcoming elections. Beijing seems to think that elections in 2025 are the only way to stabilize Myanmar, and it appears to reject any changes to the system as demanded by the resistance coalition.
China’s Weight Behind the Junta Demands a Counterweight
Fundamentally, what this all means is that China has picked a side in Myanmar’s civil war. At a time when the resistance coalition has grown from strength to strength on the battlefield, including taking control of areas surrounding Chinese investments, one would expect Beijing to become more open to the National Unity Government and the rest of the resistance. But, guided by a paranoid fear of U.S. influence and support (which is ironically quite minimal), the Chinese government saw the junta’s weakness and moved quickly to punish its allied armed groups for their success, shore up the Tatmadaw’s failing rule, and push all sides to enter peace talks and hold elections.
Beijing’s faith in elections is either a bet that it and the Tatmadaw can split members of the resistance coalition with carrots and sticks or a last-ditch effort to provide the military with a fig leaf of international legitimacy that will justify its further support, including in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In either case, 2025 elections conducted under the Tatmadaw’s purview will only result in continued military dominance or further fighting and instability. In any case, the resistance has little willingness to enter negotiations at this juncture. Despite China’s pressure, only the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army has ceased offensive operations within the Three Brotherhood Alliance, and the wider resistance continues to reject the Tatmadaw’s proposed elections.
Going forward, China’s interventions are unlikely to do much besides undermine its own interests in Myanmar. Indeed, on Oct. 19, a small explosive device detonated outside the Chinese consulate in Mandalay, sparking China’s condemnation. Although it is unclear who is responsible, the bombing underlines the depth of anti-China sentiment now roiling within Myanmar as Beijing expands its open support for the hated Tatmadaw. Moreover, its reported house arrest of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s commander during negotiations in China is likely to only further weaken China’s leverage over its aligned border ethnic armed groups, who must now choose to listen to Beijing and cease fighting or soldier on against the Tatmadaw and risk Chinese retaliation.
For both the pro-democracy resistance and its most significant international supporter, the United States, it is far from time to enter negotiations with the Tatmadaw or give in to Beijing’s paranoia. Momentum is on the resistance’s side, and the coalition needs more time and support to develop a post-war political framework. For policymakers in Washington, it is increasingly clear that China is locked into a “cold war mindset” and little can reassure Beijing of U.S. intentions. Although Washington should not abandon cooperation with China where possible or provocatively cross any Chinese or regional countries’ red lines regarding lethal support, it should feel confident that an inclusive, federal democracy in Myanmar is in America’s strategic interests regardless of Beijing’s opposition to it. As such, the incoming Trump administration should provide expanded U.S. funding and non-lethal support in line with the BURMA Act for the resistance to offset the weight of Beijing’s pressure, assist in resolving Myanmar’s growing humanitarian crisis, and help buy them the time needed to achieve their Spring Revolution.
Lucas Myers is the senior associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program.
The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center.
Image: Maung Sun via Wikimedia Commons
