When it Comes to Weaponry, Lethality Is Not Enough
It’s time for the national security enterprise to take non-lethal weapons seriously. Yes, non-lethal weapons. The Defense Department has been trying to come to terms with the use of non-lethal weapons in military operations for at least three decades. In 1996, Congress directed the secretary of defense to centralize responsibility for non-lethal weapons development due to their potential widespread operational utility. Nearly 30 years later, after multiple policy and legal reviews, verified requirements, technology development, human effects studies, military utility assessments of promising prototypes, urgent operational need requests, and at least a billion dollars appropriated and invested, the Defense Department still hasn’t figured it out.
Why does the world’s most lethal military need non-lethal weapons? Because history has repeatedly shown, as do contemporary military operations, that lethality alone does not necessarily translate to mission success. Humanitarian operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were negatively impacted as troops faced civilians intermingled with hostile elements. In Iraq and Afghanistan, offensive operations were impacted as military forces often limited lethal fires, jeopardizing their own safety as they made split-second decisions on use of lethal force for fear of civilian casualties. Israel’s incursion into Gaza illustrates the non-lethal capability gap as infantry forces aggressively maneuver in a complex urban environment resulting in civilian casualties and worldwide condemnation. China remains unopposed in its routine interference with freedom of navigation operations and encroachment on the economic exclusion zones of U.S. allies and partners. The use of advanced non-lethal weapons are potential game changers for these situations, but only if the military services emphasize their development and fielding.
Non-lethal weapons are a difficult concept to define. The association with law enforcement capabilities such as bean bags and pepper spray may discourage those focused on lethality from reading further. While such capabilities have utility for military law enforcement, decades of research show promising results for adaptation as complementary capabilities to lethality, providing increased options for deterrence, force application, and force protection. Despite the promise, non-lethal weapons are largely nonexistent in U.S. military weapons inventories.
This article provides the historical context, demand signal, operational effects, and challenges associated with integrating non-lethal weapons as a complement to, but not a replacement for, lethality. It is informed by my perspectives after 27 years working nearly all aspects of non-lethal weapons in the Defense Department, from technology development to policy formulation to the complexities of attempting to mainstream these capabilities that in name appear to be the antithesis of the world’s premier lethal fighting force.
Historical Context
In the early 1990s, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney formed a non-lethal strategy group to study the idea that advanced, high-tech non-lethal weapons could provide, according to Nonlethality — A Global Strategy White Paper, by Janet Morris, “effective action in many situations which pose threats to the U.S. national interests … situations in which the U.S. is currently unable to act effectively, or, in some cases, to act at all.” The idea gained enough traction for non-lethal weapons inclusion in the “Future Issues and Opportunities” section of the 1993 National Security Strategy. In 1994, President Bill Clinton informed the Senate that he would direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense to accelerate efforts to field non-lethal alternatives to riot control agents, a necessary assurance in seeking Senate approval for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and alleviating concerns by the military on that convention’s limitations on the use of riot control agents in situations where combatants and noncombatants were intermingled. When then-Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni testified on the promise of non-lethal weapons following their introduction during the 1995 United Nations withdrawal from Somalia, Congress directed establishment of a formal non-lethal weapons program in the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, reinforced by a subsequent directive. In 1999, the North Atlantic Council approved a similar NATO Non-Lethal Weapons Policy. By the year 2000, research was well under way on a wide range of next-generation non-lethal capabilities.
Demand Signal
Gen. Charles Krulak, then commandant of the Marine Corps, actively sought the role of non-lethal weapons program executive agent, a special designation that gave the Marine Corps a leadership role for the coordination and development of non-lethal weapons across the Defense Department. As a small office stood up at Marine Corps Base Quantico in the summer of 1997 to manage the new program, urgent need requests routinely flowed in from operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti as U.S. forces, armed with lethal weapons, sought additional options for dealing with civilian populations. In the post-9/11 world, the demand signal continued. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the lethality of the U.S. military quickly drove Saddam Hussein from power, but lawlessness soon followed. President George W. Bush would later write that U.S. forces were not adequately prepared for the chaos following the fall of Baghdad and that he had questioned why looters were not being stopped from stealing precious artifacts from Iraqi museums. Quite simply, U.S. forces armed with only lethal weapons under strict rules of engagement lacked non-lethal alternatives for controlling the disorder. According to Bush, “The damage done in those early days created problems that would linger for years. The Iraqis were looking for someone to protect them. By failing to secure Baghdad, we missed our first chance to show that we could.” Civilian deaths at checkpoints also became a significant issue and eventually led to the urgent fielding of dazzling lasers as a non-lethal means to warn by temporarily obscuring the vision of approaching individuals whose intent was unclear. These proved more effective than military police use of traditional and limited-range non-lethal weapons. During a 2005 riot at Camp Bucca, attempts to suppress prisoners with pepper spray, stun grenades, and blunt impact rounds fired from 12-gauge shot guns were largely ineffective as prisoners used simple countermeasures such as moving out of the effective range of the non-lethal capabilities or protecting themselves with sleeping bags while throwing large stones and other items at the guards.
Afghanistan was no different. Following the destruction of the al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban exodus from power, a counterinsurgency grew. Civilian casualties mounted as did suicide attacks on coalition forces. Perimeter security challenges at forward operating bases yielded urgent requests for non-lethal weapons to deter people from lingering outside perimeters. While many of those loitering were locals collecting or “scrapping” metal or other items to sell on the local market, some would use the practice as a cover to collect intelligence, probe the perimeter, or plant improvised explosive devices near burn pits. The investigation into the 2012 Camp Bastion attack — in which Taliban fighters penetrated and attacked that base for four hours — revealed that external perimeter breaches and probing incursions had occurred in advance of the nighttime assault when insurgents entered undetected. The needless loss of life and the hundreds of millions of dollars in destroyed aircraft, facilities, and equipment were a devastating blow in what was described as the worst day for American airpower since the 1968 Vietnam Tet Offensive. Then there was the 2021 deadly and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, where the absence of non-lethal weapons technology to assist with crowd control and perimeter security illustrated the lack of progress since the U.S.-led withdrawal from Somalia 26 years prior.
New Operational Effects
If there is a future for non-lethal weapons in military operations, it will predominantly be in the form of directed energy, which will allow for target engagement at greater ranges and with more versatility than commonly understood. Directed-energy weapons use electromagnetic waves to deliver an effect against a target. And just like bullets with different calibers will inflict different levels of damage, understanding what happens when a non-lethal directed-energy weapon hits a target will depend on the type of electromagnetic wave, its frequency, the amount of energy in the wave, and the amount of time the wave interacts with the target. For example, a non-lethal directed-energy weapon using an electromagnetic wave that is specifically designed to interfere with electronics can disable the engine of a suspicious vehicle approaching a checkpoint before it gets too close, avoiding the use of lethal fire against a potentially innocent civilian while still maintaining standoff from a potential suicide bomber. Similarly, the target could be a suspicious craft approaching a U.S. vessel nearing a foreign port, shutting down the engine with an electromagnetic wave instead of using lethal fire and causing an international incident. Or the target could be one or more individuals, instigators in a crowd or suspicious pedestrians approaching a perimeter, engaged with an electromagnetic wave specifically designed to provide a brief sensation of a flash of heat to warn, deter, or delay beyond small arms range, giving U.S. forces valuable time and space to make decisions on the use of lethal force.
Decades of research and established processes for non-lethal weapon human effects characterization provide a solid scientific foundation for their employment with minimal risk of significant injury. Yet misperceptions exist. Unlike bullets or bombs, for many people, electromagnetic waves are mysterious. And while the military routinely uses electromagnetic waves in capabilities such as radar and electronic warfare, using them to non-lethally apply force, such as stopping a vehicle, vessel, or person, is new territory. Unfamiliarity with the nature of their effects, misunderstandings, and/or pejorative pop culture references have often led to rejection of their operational use despite technological maturity and urgent user requests. In The End of Killing, Rick Smith describes the psychological challenge associated with novel technologies as fear of the new: “New technology is forced, in other words, to meet a higher standard than the technology of today. What’s new must be ‘perfect,’ not ‘better.’”
RAND researchers write that effective use of non-lethal weapons could require combating disinformation. Citing the Active Denial System, they describe the inaccurate narratives attributed to this capability, including that the Defense Department has developed a “heat ray” meant to microwave people or that it is a potential source of the Havana Syndrome, the latter of which was discounted by the National Academy of Sciences. Combating disinformation or common misperceptions about the human effects of non-lethal weapons, especially directed-energy ones, will require a clear resolve and communications strategy. That strategy should emphasize that a human-effects characterization and legal reviews are required for non-lethal weapons to ensure they are consistent with applicable law, including U.S. treaty obligations, customary international law, and the law of war — including the law of war principle that they not cause unnecessary suffering.
Challenges
The 2011 Budget Control Act (sequestration) and the Asia-Pacific Rebalance Strategy, which began the military’s shift from preparing for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to planning for war with near-peer or future peer competitors, led to a rapid decline in service interest in pursuing non-lethal weapons. The 2018 National Defense Strategy, with a clearly stated focus on a more lethal force where “every decision we make must focus on lethality and affordability,” further diminished interest. Non-lethal capabilities previously fielded for urgent requests were not included in service sustainment budgets or maintained in weapons inventories. Promising developmental systems failed to transition to service programs of record.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy continued the lethality focus while also acknowledging coercive and malign activities in the gray zone by competitors such as the People’s Republic of China. How the military’s lethal capabilities will support “active campaign[ing] across the spectrum of conflict in order to sow doubt that competitors can achieve their objectives or conduct unattributed coercive actions” is not addressed. Meanwhile, China routinely employs gray zone tactics to assert control over disputed waters. Those tactics include the use of proxies and maritime militia to harass, block, and shoulder U.S., allied, and partner vessels and use of non-lethal weapons such as dazzling lasers and water cannons controlled by AI. Without a robust non-lethal weapons capability to either proactively deter or reactively respond to China’s gray zone tactics, the United States is left with the binary choice of using lethal fire or doing nothing at all. Either choice is to China’s advantage.
As the U.S. government implores Israel to reduce civilian casualties in Gaza, it is a fair question to ask how well prepared the United States is to conduct operations and mitigate civilian harm in an urban environment. In 2022, the secretary of defense announced an effort to improve civilian harm mitigation and response that would “incorporate lessons learned into the planning and execution of future combat operations.” The Non-Lethal Weapons Program was established to develop capabilities that are explicitly designed to minimize fatalities and permanent injury to personnel. Despite applicability to civilian harm mitigation, the president’s budget submission to Congress for non-lethal weapons routinely rounds to near zero percent of the annual Defense Department budget request. As the Army stands up a new Civilian Protection Center of Excellence, there are parallels with the non-lethal weapons program management construct established by the Marine Corps decades ago. Each effort is the result of congressional direction, with a small staff and responsibility to coordinate across the Defense Department and other government agencies with a goal of reducing civilian harm. However, success will ultimately be determined by the actions of the military services and the decisions they make under their Title 10 authority to train and equip. With guidance to the services to be “more lethal,” it is hard to conceive how civilian harm mitigation will be addressed in practical terms. As the current Army chief of staff has said, “if doesn’t make you more lethal, ditch it.”
A Complement to, Not a Replacement For, Lethality
As described in Joint Force Quarterly, perhaps the biggest obstacle to the integration of non-lethal weapons is the military’s doctrine and training as a fighting force whose mission is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. To move beyond that will require a “shift in mindset to convince the Nation’s warriors that employing tools that allow for mission accomplishment without loss of life or highly destructive lethal fires where possible will not weaken the force.”
Gen. Zinni opined that non-lethal weapons “make the United States more formidable, not less so. With nonlethal weapons, we can address more situations effectively and have a better chance of controlling the escalation of violence in the complex environments we are most likely to encounter. Our actions thus will be more consistent with the basic humanitarian values embraced by our nation and expected by our citizens. This is crucial in maintaining the popular and political support needed to ensure success in the field.”
Without visionary leadership and enduring guidance to mainstream non-lethal weapons, they will remain a military sideshow. As one Council on Foreign Relations task force member wrote,
The fielding of a robust NLW [non-lethal weapons] capability requires that Congress (members and staff) and the administration (both the White House and the Defense Department) determine that NLW play an essential role in American defense policy. Only decisive political direction will enable NLW to compete with the plethora of mission-critical program priorities.
The 2024 elections provide an opportunity for that direction. The next president should clearly state in the National Security Strategy that the U.S. military, while still the most lethal in the world, will also use non-lethal means to support the full spectrum of U.S. national security objectives. The next National Defense Strategy should elaborate on the role of non-lethal weapons in U.S. defense policy with subsequent defense planning guidance providing direction on the fielding of specific non-lethal weapons to support, at a minimum, countering adversary gray zone aggression, mitigating civilian harm during armed conflict, conducting post-conflict stability operations, and increasing force protection. The new Congress should review the 1996 legislation that initiated the Defense Department Non-Lethal Weapons Program and make adjustments in the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act to strengthen the legislation and role of non-lethal weapons in U.S. defense policy.
As “more lethal” has become the Defense Department’s mantra, Zachary Tyson Brown noted the dangers of “a military culture myopically focused on increasing lethality could prevent it from seeing vulnerabilities or opportunities that lie beyond its immediate field of view.” The Defense Department is sitting on one of those opportunities — a nearly 30-year investment in advanced non-lethal weapons that can provide new options for dealing with complex operational situations across the spectrum of conflict. It’s time to take non-lethal weapons seriously and seize that opportunity.
Susan LeVine is the former principal deputy director for joint integration and outreach at the Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office (previously the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate). Prior to her retirement in December 2023, she also chaired NATO’s Non-Lethal Weapons Capability Group.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense of the linked websites, or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Defense Department does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.
Image: Cpl. Nayelly Nieves-Nieves
