How the AP Got the Iran Inspections Story Wrong

August 24, 2015

Last week's Associated Press story on nuclear inspections of an Iranian military facility left out key details on how inspections work, creating a misleading picture and introducing new controversy into the already heated debate on the Iran deal.

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A new controversy over a small facility on an Iranian military base at Parchin now threatens to blow up the support President Obama needs to get the Iranian nuclear agreement past Congress. Unfortunately, the controversy is the result of shoddy reporting and a poor understanding of nuclear inspections.

The Parchin site, which is southeast of Tehran, has been the subject of scrutiny for a number of years. Iran may have carried out experiments there that would help it design a nuclear weapon. In connection with the recently negotiated Iran deal — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran have agreed on a plan to investigate allegations of work that might be related to nuclear weapons design (the IAEA term for this is possible military dimensions, or PMD). Parchin is a military site, not a declared nuclear site under regular IAEA surveillance.

The controversy arose from an article by George Jahn of the Associated Press, which revealed information from what he said was a leaked, draft agreement between Iran and the IAEA on sampling at Parchin. The AP subsequently deleted and then restored parts of the first version of the story. The AP has also published what it says is a hand copy of the document the story was based on. Jahn painted a picture of a dubious, secret deal between the IAEA and Tehran that allows only Iran to conduct inspections of Parchin. Deal skeptics are pointing to this episode as evidence that neither the IAEA or Iran can be trusted and that, therefore, a nuclear deal is a bad move.

Questions have been raised, by me on Twitter and by others, whether that document is an accurate representation of the final agreement between the IAEA and Iran. The reason for my skepticism is that the document presented by AP is missing key elements that should appear in agreements of this type.

Having worked on nuclear issues for years, including environmental sampling at Los Alamos National Laboratory and elsewhere, I expect the agreement between the IAEA and Iran to include a plan for sampling at Parchin. I’ll explain what that might look like.  All quotes below from the AP article are from the version online at the time I wrote this article.

The two IAEA–Iran agreements

Jahn links his document to what others have called “secret side deals” between Iran and the IAEA. He ominously proclaims that the document

is labeled “separate arrangement II,” indicating there is another confidential agreement between Iran and the IAEA governing the agency’s probe of the nuclear weapons allegations.

On July 14, the IAEA released a joint statement with Iran that describes the two agreements. One is called the “Roadmap for the Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program.” The other is for sampling the Parchin site. The details of the agreements are confidential, as are all the IAEA’s agreements with member countries.

The sampling crew

The allegation getting most of the attention is that Iranian technicians will do their own sampling at Parchin, and IAEA inspectors will not be allowed on the site. The original article said that IAEA staff might not be allowed on the Parchin site. A later version stated:

The document suggests that instead of carrying out their own probe, IAEA staff will monitor Iranian personnel as they inspect the Parchin nuclear site.

The current version of the AP story, as I write, states:

Iran is to provide agency experts with photos and videos of locations the IAEA says are linked to the alleged weapons work, “taking into account military concerns.”

That wording suggests that — beyond being barred from physically visiting the site — the agency won’t get photo or video information from areas Iran says are off-limits because they have military significance.

While the document says the IAEA “will ensure the technical authenticity” of Iran’s inspection, it does not say how.

The fact that Jahn’s hand-copied IAEA document does not say how is a key indicator that it is unlikely to be a final draft. The middle paragraph represents only Jahn’s or his editors’ tendentious interpretation.

IAEA monitoring of an Iranian sampling crew should not present a problem. If the IAEA devises the sampling plan and is responsible for the chain of custody — and the agency has an extensive record of being able to do this reliably — it doesn’t matter whose hands take the samples. Jahn has surmised too much from a document that says too little.

The sampling plan

What is the purpose of sampling at Parchin?  The IAEA is looking for residues of experiments that are alleged to have been done to develop a design for a nuclear weapon. They were most likely carried out before 2003, when U.S. intelligence estimates find that Iranian nuclear weapons work ended, although the IAEA has expressed concern that experiments may have been carried out after 2003.

As I describe on my blog, Nuclear Diner, sampling plans start at the desk, when you figure out what you’re looking for. The Parchin document should either be a sampling plan or include one as an annex. Iran’s sensitivities about access to the site and the IAEA’s need to get meaningful samples require that the plan be both detailed and acceptable to both parties.

The sampling plan must be written down, along with plans for analysis of the samples, which may be in a separate document. These documents are essential support for the case that the IAEA will present on potential military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.

How would that sampling plan be developed?

It would start from the experiments believed to have been carried out, their location, and what residues might be found.

The nuclear experiments alleged to have been carried out in a containment vessel about 4.5 meters in diameter and 19 meters long at Parchin would have been tests of:

  • Neutron initiators, which start the chain reaction in nuclear weapons, including those containing uranium deuteride;
  • Multipoint detonation systems, which ensure the optimum implosion of nuclear material into a critical mass; and
  • And hydrodynamic properties of materials, which help designers to know how to fit those materials into nuclear weapons.

Over the past decade, Iran has modified the site and the building believed to have held the vessel, including actions that appear to be cleaning out the building. This activity has been observed through satellite photos.

For all three types of experiments, explosives residues may be discovered. A vessel would have been cleaned out between experiments, but swipe samples would show residue. If the experiments were done outdoors, the explosive may have degraded with time and weather.

Tests of multipoint detonation systems are unlikely to leave residues other than explosives. Fiber optics are sometimes used in such experiments, and fragments might remain.

The neutron initiator and hydrodynamic experiments may have scattered uranium. The isotopic composition of uranium used in these experiments probably would have been natural or depleted in U-235.

Other metals besides uranium, like tungsten, may have been used in the hydrodynamic experiments, and they may still be there. The IAEA may know whether the containment vessel still exists. Most likely, it has been cut up for scrap. Swipes from inside the containment vessel would be the most desirable kind of sample. The document published by the AP mentions only “environmental samples,” without specifying whether they are swipes, paint chips, or wall cores.  Chip samples of the paint or core samples of the wall may give more information than swipes.

If you’re interested in how these samples are taken, Tariq Rauf, a former IAEA inspector, recently described the swipe sample process. Soil samples from outside the building may also be taken, according to the document leaked by the AP. I have described how soil samples are taken at Nuclear Diner.

A sampling plan may include how the samples are to be analyzed. International standards for chemical analysis have been worked out and would be specified. The laboratories each side uses may also be specified. As Rauf points out, samples are split between Iran and the IAEA, with some saved for later analysis if there are differences. After the analyses are done, Iran and the IAEA will meet to share results and work out differences, which might require analysis of the reserved samples by an independent laboratory.

Chain of custody and access

A chain of custody, as is used for environmental and other legal sampling, is essential. The IAEA has standard procedures for transferring samples from one person or organization to another. All parties must sign each handoff.

It doesn’t matter whose hands do the sampling. What matters is the verifiability of the sampling, laid out by the sampling and analysis plans as well as the chain of custody.  The IAEA’s practice is to prepare sampling kits containing the necessary equipment, oversee the sampling, and be responsible for the chain of custody.

If the IAEA does not have direct access to the site or buildings, how can it oversee the process?

Verification experts, armed with cameras and ingenuity, have come up with ways to observe from a distance. On the day of the activity, they might start with a shopping trip that includes  IAEA and Iranian personnel. The group goes to a camera store and buys shrink-wrapped memory cards for the still and video cameras. Then they go to, say, a handicrafts store and buy a small and unique object, maybe a toy. The memory cards are inserted into the cameras in the presence of both groups, and the cameras are sealed with a tamper-indicating seal. Every photograph must include the unique toy.

IAEA personnel then go with Iranian personnel to the closest point to the site that Iran allows. IAEA personnel remain there while the Iranians go to the building or soil sampling site. Real-time video may be sent out to the IAEA monitors from the cameras, along with GPS data to make sure samples are being taken in the correct places. Iran completes the activity and hands the samples and cameras to the IAEA, who check the seals. The group may then convene in a meeting room to review the photos or video to make sure they are as expected, with the unique toy ever present.

What would the IAEA learn from Parchin sampling?

If, against expectations, the containment vessel itself could be sampled, swipe samples from inside it would give the most information. Explosives, fiber optics, and uranium in those samples would point to some or all of the suspected experiments.

If the vessel isn’t there, swipe samples would be taken of building walls and soil samples from outside the building.  In this case, finding explosives, fiber optics, or uranium in the samples would not necessarily point to the alleged experiments. After a decade or more at a military test site like Parchin, other activities could have contributed them.

It is difficult to associate explosive residues with particular types of explosives, unless an experiment went badly and pieces of explosive that didn’t explode can be found. The three types of experiments might use different types of explosives, so knowing what kind of explosives were used might give insight into which of the experiments were done. The IAEA will probably analyze for isotopes of uranium. In particular, uranium-235 is used in weapons, and finding it in higher than natural concentrations would indicate weapons-related experiments.

If no explosives, fiber optics fragments, or uranium are found, then there are two possibilities: No such experiments were ever done or Iran successfully cleaned up after experiments. There is no way to distinguish between the two.

Information from sampling will be fitted together with the documentary evidence the IAEA already has in hand, which includes information from their own investigations and material contributed by other countries. The full extent of that evidence is not public. With that evidence, IAEA might be able to draw fuller conclusions than I’ve indicated here.

The AP document

The document published by the AP and said to be a hand-written copy of material shown to George Jahn is not a sampling plan and does not refer to a sampling plan of the type I’ve outlined. I would expect the real plan agreed to by the IAEA and Iran either to be a sampling plan or to refer to one as an annex. As I’ve explained, verifiability, which the IAEA knows well, requires a written plan for all activities in detail. Those details must be agreed between the two parties in order to avoid disagreements during the actual sampling. This suggests that the document published by the AP could be a very early draft or extended outline of what the agreement might be.

It’s too bad that Jahn didn’t put the document he copied into the context of standard sampling activities by speaking with nuclear experts on how sampling is done. That might have avoided the erroneous implications that Iran would be doing its own inspections without IAEA oversight.

The larger context

The results from sampling at Parchin are part of the IAEA’s investigation into Iran’s past PMD work. The IAEA has been investigating these issues for several years, and Iran has supplied information, most recently last week. The IAEA will review this information, get back to Iran with questions to be cleared up, and issue a report on its findings by December 15 to the IAEA Board of Governors.

The report will most likely say that Iran has answered the IAEA’s questions from the annex to its November 2011 report on Iran’s program and that the IAEA finds that Iran is not now working on nuclear weapons development. That is not the end of the IAEA’s investigations, however. It will continue to work with Iran to develop a Broader Conclusion, which says that all nuclear materials within Iran are in the scope of peaceful activities. Broader Conclusions take years to develop. The JCPOA specifies that the IAEA’s submission of a report on a Broader Conclusion will take place eight years after the JCPOA comes into effect in October 2015. The Broader Conclusion could be finished sooner than that.

How much do we need to know of the Iranians’ nuclear weapons programs?

Advocates of a full disclosure of all of Iran’s weapons-related activities say that it would help us to know what Iran might do in the future. This is doubtful. It has been 12 years since the weapons program is thought to have ended. Diagnostic equipment, the way Iran runs its programs, and staff have changed. For many reasons, Iran would change the ways it does things if it reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. In this case, the past tells us little about the future. And those advocates might just be looking for another way to condemn Iran.

Other countries have given up nuclear weapons programs without full disclosure, and they have kept to their nonproliferation obligations. South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Sweden, and Switzerland all had nuclear weapons programs at one time and have given them up. Intensive interactions of the P5+1 nations and the IAEA with Iran under the JCPOA will give more insight into Iran’s past. Most importantly, the JCPOA will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons program now and in the next decade or two.

 

Cheryl Rofer worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for 35 years, where she directed programs in environmental remediation and plutonium storage. She has worked with Kazakhstan and Estonia on environmental issues and now blogs at Nuclear Diner.

Photo credit: IAEA Imagebank

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15 thoughts on “How the AP Got the Iran Inspections Story Wrong

  1. Strange how many people are taking the exact opposite view from Rofer – that the AP story was right on: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/24/iran-deal-truthers.html

    Rofer should go back to basics and read report after report from Amano that said the same thing for several years: Iran was no cooperating. (Rofer: “The IAEA has been investigating these issues for several years, and Iran has supplied information, most recently last week.”)
    After years of Iran stonewalling, lying, obfuscating and cheating (not to mention their horrific human rights abuses at home) Iran gave the IAEA some info last week?
    Excuse us if the skeptics prefer to err on the side of caution. Despite her credentials, Rofer seems to be on the Obama bandwagon claiming that a weak agreement with the Iranians is the best we’re gonna get, so nobody should question it.
    Sorry, we don’t buy that argument.

    1. It’s always interesting to see opponents of the Iran deal bringing up Iran’s human rights violations during these discussions, despite the fact they’re a total non-sequitur.

      1) The United States and the EU routinely deals with states with questionable human rights records, and have for decades. We maintain relationships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others despite their abuses. We do so because maintaining a relationship and striking deals with these regimes, despite their human rights abuses, is a net positive for regional security. We did the same with the Soviet Union, which had an equally dismal human rights record. So why is Iran any different in this respect. Are we seriously, with a straight face, making Iran out to be a worse human rights abuser than the Soviet Union or Saudi Arabia?

      2) Even leaving aside my first point, Iran’s human rights issues will continue irrespective of any deal or lack thereof. What would you rather: a human-rights abuser with a nascent weapons-grade fissile material production capability, or one without one?

      Also, this discussion of Parchin is a tempest in a tea cup. The research work that was done there occurred years ago, and the facility has been long since renovated. Do you really expect to find anything there? Catching Iran in nuclear warhead design work will be extraordinarily difficult, unrestrained inspections or no. The main way to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon will be to monitor and restrain its ability to acquire fissile material. Which is exactly what this deal ensures will happen. There will be minor hiccups along the way, and I’m sure there will be some lower-level obfuscation. But the inspections regime ensures that said obfuscation can never rise to the level of being able to enable sneak-out or break-out. And that’s what matters. They can sit inside nondescript offices in Tehran all day long sketching out possible warhead designs, but if they have no fissile material to apply to those designs we’ve accomplished all we need to accomplish.

    2. “Sorry, we don’t buy that argument.”

      Who’s “we?” You and an imaginary army?

      If you are going to attack the article, you might at least make some substantive criticism. Your post is nothing but a lot of “many people don’t agree,” and mere unsupported restatements of unsupported charges against Iran.

      US Iran policy, under malign influences, has been an unmitigated disaster–sending a natural ally into the arms of Russia and/or China. Amazing, given that there isn’t any convincing evidence that there even IS or ever has been any Iranian nuclear weapons program.

      Also interesting that the precedent of Iran’s refusal, under Khomeini’s fatwa, to respond in kind to the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran in the Iraq-Iran War (with our tacit approval) has been almost entirely absent from the debate.

      Glad to see our self-destructive policy on the cusp of being gutted and rebuilt.

  2. Economic relief is what they desire most urgently. Nothing more from the Great Satan is required. The IAEA has never impeded their advancement towards the bomb in the last two decades. The numerous scandals are well documented. Clearly Mr Cohen was referring to the long history of this cat and mouse behavior while his mention; in parentheses, to human rights were simply an anecdote for how this religious hierarchy operates with impunity; not the main focus of his concerns. This theocracy has isolated itself, both in the Arab community and the world; much to the detriment of its people. This country can and must do better.

  3. To Brian Cohen. I have yet to read that the release of this document by a person unknown created a serious violation of the NPT agreement between the IAEA and Iran. The inevitable conclusion is that the IAEA cannot be trusted.

    1. Yes, well everyone knows that the Associated Press is the house organ of the neocon wing of the Republican Party.

      If you have some evidence, show it. If not, you’re just littering.

      1. Here’s the same “journalist” three years ago doing the same thing. Isn’t that a coincidence?

        In 2012, Jahn wrote a piece for AP making claims about and Iran nuclear weapon based on another document provided to him by–again–anonymous sources.

        One Farsi-speaking physicist who examined it said:

        “The graph is not only weirdly crude, but also undated, unsourced, and unexplained. The Persian text at the bottom, as translated by AP, mentions nothing about nuclear weapons or an atomic payload for a bomb. It just reads, “Changes in output and in energy released as a function of time through power pulse.” To call this graph “dubious” would be generous; to tout it as “proof” of anything is simply embarrassing. It literally means nothing, except perhaps that math exists. The graph shows nothing more than a probability density function, that is, an abstract visual aid depicting the theoretical behavior of a random variable to take on any given value.

        Beyond that, theoretical physics professor Dr. M. Hossein Partovi, who teaches courses in thermodynamics and quantum mechanics at Sacramento State, noting that the graph is plotted in microseconds, explains that “the graph depicted in the report is a nonspecific power/energy plot that is primarily evidence of the incompetence of those who forged it: a quick look at the energy graph shows that the total energy is more than four orders of magnitude (forty thousand times) smaller than the total integrated power that it must equal!”

        http://mondoweiss.net/2012/11/the-aps-george-jahn-serves-up-israeli-propangada-on-iran-yet-again#sthash.6mcya1tL.dpuf

        Jahn and AP are shills plain and simple. And another question: Why is no one else in the media looking a the pattern of Jahn’s and AP’s history of using fake documents to try and shift public opinion on the Iran nuclear issue?

  4. Yes the IAEA can draft the plan, but the author seems to ignore the possibility that Iranian inspectors could willingly violate the plan. For example, they could deny the vessel is there, thus saying no swabbing is possible – when the vessel might be there. Or they could take soil samples from specific locations in the facility that the Iranian government has brought in, rather than allowing neutral inspectors to sample as they see fit. In short, there are many ways to violate the written plan that cameras will not detect. Cheryl well knows this, but is writing an article designed to buttress support for the agreement. I wonder if she believes that those who count the votes don’t matter, as long as there is a written plan for fair voting?

  5. Then why the secrecy? What is the point of a secret side agreement on an inspection protocol if not to shield it from public examination? And why would any of the parties involved wish to avoid public examination of the agreement?

  6. I would take exception to the idea that it does not matter “whose hand takes the sample.” It most certainly does. It is very easy to cherry pick a site to get samples that are not representative. Dig a little deeper, dig not so deeply, only take sand, not clay, only take clay not sand, don’t include vegetation in the sample or do include it. Sample technique is extremely important, not just a sample “plan.” A valid sample requires a conscientious sample collector who will try to take a representative sample. I will not credit the Iranians with conscientiously trying to take the correct samples. Samples not taken by an independent and objective sampler should not be considered valid, regardless of what the folks in the air-conditioned offices say.