



READER'S GUIDE

FM 100-5

1986 - 1993

COMPARISON



Chapter 1: Challenges for the U.S. Army

'86 Version

- AirLand Battle concept stressed winning at operational and tactical levels.
- Regarded defining strategic goals and victory as beyond the purview of FM 100-5.

'93 Version

- Did not alter basic thrust of AirLand Battle doctrine. ALB concepts modified to capture changes from new NMS, OOTW.
- Expanded to address the strategic, operational, and tactical linkage and horizontally to address military opns in peacetime, conflict and war.
- Army will always fight joint, usually combined.
- Ties the American view of war to Army operations.

Makes the strategic link.

- Airland Battle was expanded to "Army Operations", defined as the "Range of Military Operations", that includes all the possible activities in war and operations other than war (OOTW).
- The '86 version was rooted in the Cold War assumptions of nuclear deterrence, containment, and large linear campaigns. The '93 version recognizes the changed geo-strategic conditions and the fact that conflicts will tend to be regional and multipolar as opposed to bipolar. Given near "perfect", near-real-time intelligence systems, sufficient lethality with precision strike systems, and massing of lethal effects, operations may be nonlinear and therefore not subject to all the tactical constraints of the linear battlefield. Additionally, the '93 version stresses the use of "overwhelming" force as a way of achieving decisive victory with minimum cost to friendly forces.
- The new doctrine also recognizes that the fight is conducted by a regional CINC in a joint and combined or coalition context. The purpose of the Army is to provide trained and ready ground forces for the CINC to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land.
- There are a lot of other activities the Army does and has been doing for the last 200 years by virtue of the way it is manned, trained, and equipped. These fall under the title OOTW. Rather than respond in an *ad hoc* manner as in the past, the Army will develop doctrine and training for these operations, so that it will have trained leaders and soldiers who can respond in a deliberate manner.
- Logistically, commanders now must think about how to maintain and sustain forces as the Army operates simultaneously in several theaters of operation. New methods for doing this are discussed in Chapter 12, Logistics.